There's been some discussion, both here and on various other blogs (though this particular post was inspired by this post by Matt Yglesias) about the recent killing of Abu Azzam al-Iraqi, with a lot of the more cynical discussion as far as whether or not he's simply the dead or captured Zarqawi lieutenant of the week and even more skepticism on how much effect it will have on the insurgency. Leaving aside for a moment the fact that I disagree with most of Matt's narrative because ignores or demeans the excellent research and analysis that people like Gunaratna (who, as I'll note yet again, was the first person to note Zarqawi as a major threat in May 2002), Kohlmann, Cordesman, Brisard, etc. have actually done on both Zarqawi and the Iraqi insurgency, I think it touches on the far more important problem, namely that the administration has been scandalously lax in informing the American public about the nature of the al-Qaeda.
To use a comparison I've made before, most people know the names of the top Nazis and what their basic function was in the Third Reich. You mention Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, Eichmann, Hess, Rommel, Skorzeny, and so on everyday conversation and most people usually have a pretty good idea of just who it is that you're talking about. Not so in the case of al-Qaeda and the problem has gotten so bad that there was considerable debate when Abu Faraj al-Libi was captured as to whether or not he was third-in-command as some were alleging (he wasn't), the head of al-Qaeda in Pakistan (he was), or simply a case of mistaken identity with Anas al-Libi, another senior al-Qaeda leader (he wasn't, and even if he were it'd be irrelevant since Anas al-Libi isn't the third-in-command either). As a result, thus far the only al-Qaeda figures whose names can hope to be readily recognized and understood in everyday discussion are bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Zarqawi.
In addition to the Yglesias post, a lot of this was prompted by an e-mail I received from a friend who sent me a link to this post that chronicles all of the Zarqawi lieutenants that have been captured or killed over the last 2 years. While it's certainly incomplete (no mention of many of the Ansar al-Islam leaders captured from 2003- early 2004), once you get past all the snark it makes the point that there's been a lot of these guys captured without (at least to the satisfaction of the critics, some of whom I think it's fair to say are going to be unsatisfied regardless of the answer on this one) an appreciable impact on the insurgency.
In my reply to my friend, I noted the fact that the Pentagon appears to be using terms like "Zarqawi lieutenant" or "Zarqawi aide" to describe everything from individual brigade (kateebat) commanders (a position, for lack of a better term, roughly equivalent to our idea of a colonel), bombmakers, propagandists, and money men in addition to the really big fish like Abu Talha or Abu Azzam, who are roughly analogous to generals in the al-Qaeda in Iraq hierarchy. Now all of these Pentagon designations are technically true, but absent any kind of a meaningful organizational diagram it becomes very difficult for general public, let alone the snarkier critics, to fully appreciate the reality of the situation. Then there is the issue that al-Qaeda in Iraq, like its parent network, is a decentralized organization rather than a conventional guerrilla army. One of the major ideas that al-Zawahiri and the Egyptian Islamists incorporated into al-Qaeda very early on (though I believe the genesis of this idea is actually Marxist in origin) was that cells should be like grapes, where you can pull a lot of them apart without harming the broader cluster.
Walid Phares notes some other issues in his fisking of the much-citing Newsweek article:
1) No one in al Qaida Iraq has issued an official statement yet, declaring the Bayi’a, a necessary Jihadi formality to render one particular commander as the deputy, or Nai’b. So, even as many web sites and other sources “talk” about this or other mujahid as the “man who comes after Zarqawi,” it is only talk. We don’t have a name yet: it’s that simple
2) However, intelligence services both US or Iraqis can obviously determine if one of these “emirs” is acting as the second most influential man after Zarqawi. But that is only assessment. Therefore, if a man with that profile is eliminated, it is normal to state that upon intelligence assessment, such a person has the profile of the second most powerful man. And to rebut this executive assessment –not impossible- one would have to present stronger evidence. Not a game of words about what the President said or unofficial releases by Jihadi online: we need hard evidence.
3) But beyond this Byzantine debate, let’s consider few al Qaida complicated mechanisms:
a. The organization’s pyramid has more than one deputy and more than one second in command. Strange but efficient.
b. The second most powerful man in the organization is not necessarily the second in command or the number two.
c. The next to take over is often “hidden” and not always chosen from the immediate entourage.
d. The head of the military committee or tanzeem is not always the head of the organization nationwide. Hence the military chief of staff is not necessarily the deputy chief on the political level, but could be as well.
e. The real hierarchy is imariya, meaning based on “emirship.” So far, there is not enough information about the “emirship” not only in Iraq but throughout al Qaida worldwide.
f. Last but not least, if and when Zarqawi “goes” there would be a “legal” process to name the heir. It involves clerics, commanders, and other procedures and details.
My only disagreement with Phares here is that the fact that a bayat has not been made public by Zarqawi's immediate deputy (reckoned by Kohlmann as Abdul Rahman al-Iraqi, who is then followed by Abu Usaid al-Iraqi) does not preclude the idea that its already exists and is simply being kept in-house or otherwise clandestine in keeping with the al-Qaeda doctrine that you don't go public with the full details of your organization for reasons of operational security, which is why the groups that publicly signed bin Laden's 1998 declaration of war were but a small portion of his actual terrorist coalition. Phares's Point F may strike also strike many readers as somewhat bizarre, but following the particulars of Islamic law is extremely important to al-Qaeda, which is one of the reasons why Scheuer started ringing the alarm bells when bin Laden successfully secured a fatwa from a prominent Saudi cleric authorizing him to use WMDs against Western targets back in 2003.
Phares also makes another important observation:
So was the man killed by the Coalition “the” man? He certainly is one who deserves commenting and a story. But instead of thorough investigation of the “emir” place and value in the real world of Jihadism, the “story” was diverted towards the politics of the War on Terror not the actual war. Regardless of good analysis of who is really abu Azzam, how does al Qaida functions and will this episode weaken or not the organization, the investigative effort targeted the misreading of the President. In fact the article didn’t provide with neither a better reading nor another reading of the equation. For both the Administration and the “secret sources” of Newsweek agreed that the man was high up. No one was able to determine his file number within the organization.
Another interesting argument made by the article was the criticism of US authorities for announcing several times since the war in Iraq began that key al Qaida commanders were terminated, although leaders are still in place. I don’t understand the logic of the argument: For it is evident that al Qaida replaces its vanishing emirs and commanders as the conflict is evolving. I thought this was standard procedure. Unless some experts believe that al Qaida has only ten cadres, and by their vanishing the war would be over…
It would be naïve to think that if a number two is eliminated, his post will remain empty (?). Hence it is obvious that the possibility of announcing the departure of several number 2s over the span of a conflict is very high.
While I think he's certainly right to criticize Newsweek on this one, I also think that this goes back to the far broader problem that most of the American people, let alone most journalists, simply do not understand the nature of the enemy, which is why they either want to treat it like it's a paramilitary organization with a strict regimented hierarchy, something that even the most vehement advocates of the point of view of al-Qaeda as a centralized organization will make perfectly clear is simply not the case.
Furthermore, and this goes back to my main point, the administration really needs to set to work educating the American public about what the threat is if they expect people to both understand and celebrate whenever we do manage to take down some very dangerous operatives. So far (and I expect the White House penchant for secrecy is heavily to blame here), they simply aren't doing that and while people relying on open source analysis like myself and others can fill in the gaps as best we can, we have neither the bullhorn nor the information that the people in government do so we are to a certain extent at their mercy. Moreover, since most of the information coming out of the American academic community with respect to terrorism is more or less garbage (with some notable exceptions, among them Dr. Phares), we are also competing with a lot of parallel narratives that are only serving to further confuse the general public on these issues.
One of the major obligations that I think both political parties have is to educate the American public as best they can about the threat we're now facing. Double that given the new and dangerous nature of the enemy. Now as I recall in my history, when communism reemerged after a major threat after World War there were all manner of speeches and the like made to educate the American public as far as the threat of communism is concerned. There was also some rather unfortunate nastiness that went along with that in certain circles, but provided its done properly and in a planned rather than ad-hoc manner I'm confident that such an effort can succeed. Given that there are only two major views as far as al-Qaeda is concerned, it might even be simple enough to explain in public schools.
Thoughts, anyone?
The problem, of course, is that it is virtually impossible to say anything about the war on al Qaeda without appearing to be partisan and being attacked for same, especially if Iraq is involved. For example, any discussion of the order of battle of al Qaeda in Iraq has huge implications for the politics around the war. If al Qaeda is an important factor in Iraq, then it makes no sense to withdraw even if our retreat would (as the left avers) suck the oxygen out of the nationalist insurgency. That is why the anti-war left mocks claims that there are more than a couple of hundred foreign fighters in Iraq -- they assume that higher estimates are nothing but a sham justification for continuing "Bush's war."
Without in any way defending the communication strategy of the Bush administration -- which has just been terrible even when it has not been infused with political considerations -- how would it conduct the education campaign that you propose without it creating yet more fodder for the left and its supporters in the MSM to object? The media would be very skeptical, and the left would be derisive. If the administration tried to use the schools to make its case the anti-Bush left, which is clearly on the ascendency, would go completely and utterly batsh!t.
As for civil discussion among citizens (which might be the primary means of education beyond the newshounds who pay attention to presidential speeches), the war is off-limits. Within our social circle (northeastern professionals and academics), one must simply sit there and listen to contempt for the war and those conducting it. I usually just keep my mouth shut and take it (knowing that I will blog my response later), but if I simply say "I supported the invasion of Iraq" with neither rancor nor defensiveness, people either stop speaking entirely or completely lose it and wonder whether I'm insane. More to the point, they assume that because I take a certain position on the war I must be a devoted follower of George Bush in all his positions (which is truly bizarre, since his position on many issues is incoherent). Rancor among friends troubles my wife, so now I must promise not to talk about the war no matter how severely I may be baited.
Point is, the current political atmosphere simply does not permit the kind of education that you think we need (no matter how correct you are in your view that we need it).
I wrote that last comment without having read your penultimate post, which to some degree touches on the point I made in the comment, to wit:
The issue of just how great a threat Zarqawi is in Iraq has become a political issue with some rather amusing twists on both sides of the aisle depending on the current topic of debate. Whenever Bush wants to argue that Iraq is a major front in the war on terrorism, Zarqawi is Exhibit A. Whenever the Democrats want to argue that the war in Iraq has only increased the threat of terrorism, he's also front and center.
The argument over Zarqawi's significance is but one example, though, of the fight between those who want to argue that the occupation is now the root cause of the insurgency, and those who claim that -- regardless -- al Qaeda is now in Iraq and we have to stay and fight whether it was a smart idea to invade in the first place or not. Almost every other argument over al Qaeda is also reduced to partisan rancor. If you think, for example, that Osama bin Laden is of declining strategic significance, be prepared to be called an apologist for the Bush administration's "incompetence at Tora Bora" if you give voice to that idea. Do you think al Qaeda and its affiliates are growing in size, or shrinking? Well, if you suggest that perhaps al Qaeda is smaller today than when it was pumping soldiers through the bases in Afghanistan, you must be pimping for Bush. Or perhaps you wonder whether al Qaeda has lost irreplaceable people, even if its ranks have swelled with losers who cannot function in Western society (and who are therefore not likely to be effective in pulling off a mass casualty attack in the U.S.). Since that implies some success for the "over there" strategy of the Bush administration, you must be a fool for wondering it.
It is extremely frustrating.
Dan,
I was writting the responding post to elaborate on the structure of Zarqawi's organization but it was getting too long for the comment section. So I wrote a rather long post here:
http://state-of-flux.blogspot.com/2005/09/responding-to-dan-darling-on-zarqawi.html
My main thesis is the organizational structure of Al-Qaeda or any Islamist Group is not Marxist in origin but tribal in origin (particularly of nomadic tribe). It is therefore natural for them to evolve into their current structure.
So much of the key information is subjective, or secret, or both. Insight can come from reading very widely and skeptically, and from slowly widening out a "circle of trust" regarding sources and interpretations. This leads different people of good faith to quite different pictures of the nature of the threat.
On top of this, much of the reporting in the newspaper is confused, misdirected, or plain wrong. Reporters and editors haven't read and understood Guratna, or Burke, or Scheuer; it's all at the level of car-bombs and Vietnam redux.
This is one of the factors that leads to the social situation that Tigerhawk describes so well. People make assumptions based on quite understandable misconceptions, and it becomes very difficult to have a productive and civil discussion on the subject.
Let me posit some thoughts on this subject:
1) I believe that the comparison to the Nazi party might not be a good example. First, many of the people that you mention were only known to the American people well after the war. They might have been familiar with Himmler or Goering, but people like Albert Spear (sp?) or Mengele or any number of SS senior officers were well off the radar until the Nuremberg trials. Himmler, Hess and Goering got attention because the Nazis were not adverse to making their own propaganda and appearing in it. Still, we are only familiar with some of these worse sorts because the post war days allowed for a free flow of information.
2) However, your point about "educating the people" as we did about the Nazis was well taken, but, I believe there is more at issue here than "secrecy" of the administration. You do make a point about it, but I think it was rather a slight dismissal of the concern. That being that past "education" attempts do have social side effects that we have been taught to abhor, mainly things like the internment of Japanese and the "Red" hunts that inspired quite a bit of paranoia, discrimination and even violence. I believe that the administration is more than "secretive", but caught between a rock and a hard place, trying to make their point but not wanting to cause wide spread panic and reactionary attacks against part of our citizenry.
3) Whatever is said will be viewed as propaganda, true or otherwise. People have also learned a hard lesson about propaganda, not just from the US, but the type of propaganda used by the Nazis, soviets and other regimes. Thus, the type of "education" we saw during these time periods would be much harder and less well received. For education on the subject to be succesful, I believe that it would have to come from a well funded non-government agency that was able to produce educated speakers and programs, buy time freely on cable and network TV, do regular interviews, press releases, etc. It maybe that the appropriate organizations exist but have not been either funded appropriately or have not "marketed" themselves.
4) Lastly, in order for true education of the people to occur, there would have to be an acknowledgement of what the strategic goals and what American "security" really means which means that somethings would end up giving additional credence to some anti-war slogans and also be tacit acknowledgement of it's longterm global policies. What I mean by this is that, yes, there is a security issue regarding oil in the middle east since energy is an important aspect of America's ability to function and project military power. it also means that, yes, along with keeping money, weapons and territory out of AQs hands, we have to keep the oil out of their hands because they could damage our energy security and we have to protect friendly countries from over throw since new governments may find it more convenient to have closer relationship with China or even Russia. The cold war might be "officially" over, but it isn't really. Tacit or direct acknowledgement of this issue would not only effect the home front but may also change our foreign relations totally.
That is a fact even if the main issue is denying territory and support to terrorists, these are real secondary effects.
So, how are we prepared to acknowledge it, address it and keep it from exploding all over us?
"Binm Laden always said the jihad was like a bunch of grapes. when you pull a cell apart, you never know what yer gonna get..."
Other memorable quotes:
Zarqawi: "By the Prohpet's Beard, have you found Allah yet, Gump?"
Gump: "I didn't know I was supposed to be looking for him, sir."
Gump: "Blessed Abu Hamza al-Misri, what are you doing here?"
Abu Hamza al-Misri: "I'm here to try out my hand at jihad against the infidel!"
Gump: "But you ain't got no hand, Abu Hamza."
Abu Hamza: [mildly irritated, but understanding] "Yes... yes, I know that. You wrote me a letter, you idiot!"
Gump, on a fellow jihadi: "He was from a long great tradition of Muslims. Somebody from his family had fought and died in every single jihad. I guess you could say he had a lot to live up to."
"Sometimes, I guess there's just not enough enough 767s."
And that's all I have to say about that.
call me crazy, but didn't phares critique an article based almost entirely on analysis by his own site-mate, Evan Kohlman? Granted, Isikoff seems to have imparted his own meaning onto some of Kohlman's words--intimating that the Pentagon is "lying" rather than that this is a nuanced thing and the intelligence is murky--but still.
I don't think that he was so much critiquing the view as arguing against the way that Newsweek was running with it. Kohlmann made some substantive objections to the reason that Abu Azzam al-Iraqi wasn't the #2, which Newsweek then heavily intimated meant that the Pentagon and the administration were lying. Phares criticized the narrative that Newsweek then took the story, noting "their fast conclusion missed crucial nuances, crashing analytically" and then noted that it ain't quite that simple and then addressed the broader issue that Kohlmann mentioned in the passing but which had become an issue of contention as soon as the Newsweek story hit the web, namely the fact that a lot of these high-tier guys have been criticized without what they regard as an appreciable effect on the insurgency.
Then there is also the issue of how the Newsweek article was going to be received from a popular level and I think it's entirely fair to say that a lot of people who read it would have just as soon concluded that the Pentagon and the administration were lying on that one. Phares didn't accept that narrative, so it more than makes sense that he criticized it.
TigerHawk has the key to the Bush information strategy:
how would it [Bush admin] conduct the education campaign that you propose without it creating yet more fodder for the left and its supporters in the MSM to object? The media would be very skeptical, and the left would be derisive. If the administration tried to use the schools to make its case the anti-Bush left, which is clearly on the ascendency, would go completely and utterly batsh!t.
I think the Bush strategy of leaving it up to the bloggers is excellent. The Bush folks have mentioned bloggers and like them! So it is not an unconcious strategy. It is by intention.
Dan,
I think it is wishful thinking to think that one can properly educate the public about Al-Qaeda. If the public have problem comprehend our own political system and chain of command, chance is they will find the organization structure of Al-Qaeda too complicate and complex to comprehend. This is why counterterrorism is always a subject of highly specialized individuals, as it should be.
This past summer I posted multiple times that the President needed to not simply make the case for the Iraqi campaign but to explain. He gave a hooribly weak speech this summer and all anyone had to say is it was OK. Nothing about that speech was stirring to the people not onboard. Dan your criticism is the greatest and I wish you luck but I fear you are doomed to failure because the overwhelming response is that the MSM will not cover the President or use the opportunity to attack him.
This premise is wrong because the President can call for Prime Time Speech and lay it out. He never does. That is why your criticism is so valid.
I think we need to accept that this administration does not want to (a) alarm people (except with color charts) or (b) project uncertainty. A corollary rule is that projecting uncertainty alarms people.
A few specific observations:
The problem is the public mindset. The Media elite seems to have convinced most people that:
A. Al Qaeda is no longer a threat.
B. Al Qaeda only exists in response to the Iraq War and can be mollified by well, running away.
C. We should "negotiate" with Al Qaeda ala the North Vietnamese since they'll win anyway.
LAT ran an article suggesting that the US negotiate with bin Laden and basically hand over the ME to him. The response to the article was uniformly positive.
Sadly, the quotes by FBI and CIA officials at the end of the 9/11 Documentary by the National Geographic Channel was probably sadly accurate: that 9/11 did not kill enough people to awaken the American people to the danger.
I don't think given the willful denial of reality by the Media (and let's be fair the Democratic Party) that ANY statement of the risk Al Qaeda faces for the US public would be allowed to pass without screaming. Al Qaeda is treated like the NVA, a righteous third world liberation movement acting against "the imperialistic aggressive US War Machine" which is the attitude of most Media and Dems. Sadly.
A Nonpartisan Issue to Unite the World in the GWOT
OK folks, I'm somewhat of an optomist. I say we as individuals/bloggers can win the GWOT.
Our government can't or won't characterize the enemy for what it is. Nor will it speak in terms of this war being clash of civilizations and ideologies.
It's time we call a, "shovel a shovel."
The ideology of Islamofascisim is doomed to failure. The question is how long and at what cost.
We must think outside the box to defend this Country if our government is too politicized to be effective.
See this comment and post at Roger L. Simon's re the Achilles heel of the enemy that will destroy it and it's ideology:
Titan's of the Blogos,
See this comment I just posted in a thread at Roger L. Simon's in line with what the Gay Patriot is saying as well. LGF just had a similar thread yst.
This is the Achilles hill of the enemy in the GWOT.
The Blogos needs to drive this message home. The Blogos now has the power to carry this message. The MSM and the MRL (Roger's term for modern radical left) can't ignore this or justify this behavior.
These dirty little practices of the Islamofascist world are abhorrent and unconscionable to the majority of Western people no matter what their political leanings may be. This is pure Evil incarnate that has no place in the 21st Century.
This is no religion of peace as we know it if those who do these practices find justification for these acts in this religion.
This can be the unifying issue that causes the modern world to close ranks and to defeat the enemy in the GWOT and wipe this pathological ideology of hate and evil from the face of this earth.
[...]
RLS Link
A few others lightly pointed on this, but I want to emphasize this point a bit more. I'm not sure if the goverment exact knows the exact governmental structure of al-queda. Even if names and a heirarchy are produced, it seems as though al-queda is in a constantly shifting state. This makes accurate reconnaisance very difficult to pinpoint.
One of the things I always remembered reading about the Afghanistan/soviet insurgency (and now in Iraq), is that most leadership is in a constant state of shift bewteen cells and between groups. This way there is a constant sharing of goals, techniques and strategies. It also makes it very difficult (for outsiders) to figure out who is responsible for what, and when.
Over the last two years, we have killed several #2's, but the insurgency has not seemed to flinch. Wether or not this is 'the guy' I think al-queda is long accostomed to losing it's top men, and replacing them promptly and effeciently.
#15 Alchemist
You're spot on! That's the exactly the point I was trying to convey at #14. Victor Davis Hanson and others say to win a war you must know your enemy and the ideology that drives it. We can continue to attrit the enemy but this will not win this war. As you suggest AQ will continue to move replacements up from the ranks. This is a war of ideas, culture, religion, and ideology. This war will of information. Islamofascism is doomed to failure it's just we need to show the world why.
Until we have a, "Come to Jesus Meeting" with the Sauds who are funding the radical religious madrassas worldwide there will be a ready source o of "programed cultists" ready to die for Islamofascism. Especially when young boys are indoctrinated before the age of eight. They become "hardwired" and difficult to "deprogram."
This is not unlike other cults we are familiar with e.g., Jim Jones and the Davidian Branch (Disavowed sect of the Seventh Day Adventists) and David Koresh and the Kool-Aid Bunch. They recruit in the same manner that other supremists groups do. They seek out disaffected youths in Muslim enclaves that have not assimulated into the host country e.g. as witessned by the second generation bombers in London.
The only difference is the radical Islamofascist mosques and madrassas are funded with Saudi petrol dollars. The House of Saud is split. One side in a deal with the fundamentalist Wahhabis is funding this ideology of hate and evil worldwide. The other side is a little more circumspect. Both run the danger of being seen as hypocrites in the Religion of Islam from their exploits in the haunts of Europe.
The key is the free flow of alternative sources of information to out the "Big Lies" of the purveyors of this hate and evil. The "Big Satan" and the "Little Satan" are not the root cause of the failure of Islamic societies to grow in the modern world. In short they must look inward and reform their pathological behaviors that bind them to the age of the 6th to the 12th Centuries.
As Dr. Phil says, "Now how's that working out for you?"
I would buy tickets for the "come to Jesus" meeting with the Saudis!
No, on second thought... I would SELL tickets to that meeting. Sorry, not yet thinking like an American quite... visa application still held up in INS.
If, on the face of it, 9/11 did not provide a sufficient lesson, what sort of lesson do we therefore need?
And might we consider ourselves fortunate that AQ and its affiliates and sympathizers are eager and willing (and even, at times, able) to teach us that lesson?...
....Given our short attention span, lack of concentration, and other sundry learning deficits....
You mentioned several top Nazis...and those really were the TOP Nazis, akin to Osama, Zarkawi, and the Egyptian doctor guy. I think most Americans would have passing knowledge of these people.
However, I don't think we would know about, say Rommel's second in command, or which General was in charge of Stalingrad, which is analagous to Abu Azzam al-Iraqi.
There is also the language issue - Americans are naturally going to be able to remember "Goebells" much better then Al-Iraqi...no wait, which Al-Iraqi? Abu Azzam? But he also is known as...you get the idea.
The media has resorted to laundry list stories of dead and the occasional color commentary by embeds. I can't blame them since there are no set piece battles like Kasserine pass or D-Day, and counter-insurgency by its nature doesn't want to advertise their plans. Without a clear story, the public has very little change to understand what's going on, and I don't think Bush or anyone else could do it. No, Rumsfeld could if he did it 24/7 and was allowed 3 hours per night on prime time.
An overarching theme for 50% of the public is that we have lost the war, and thus any information you give them must agree with that meme or it will be discounted. Go to www.fark.com and read any comments section on a war related story. The amount of idiocy coming from computer literate people is amazing.