Winds of Change.NET: Liberty. Discovery. Humanity. Victory.

Formal Affiliations
  • Anti-Idiotarian Manifesto
  • Euston Democratic Progressive Manifesto
  • Real Democracy for Iran!
  • Support Denamrk
  • Million Voices for Darfur
  • milblogs
Syndication
 Subscribe in a reader

Inside Baseball and Basra: CTA Panel

| 103 Comments

Excellent discussion of recent events in Basra at CTA by Bill Roggio (recently returned from Iraq), Omar Fadhil (Iraq the Model blog), Lt. Col. Ralph Peters (ret.) and Michael Ledeen. Some good insider perspective from Omar re: Shia community politics, interesting notes from Bill whose front-line research remains excellent, and some perspectives re: Iran from Ledeen and Peters that are likely to surprise people.

My personal take: Basra was a partial success at best. The Brits' "pull-back, hunker down, and leave a security vacuum" approach failed in Basra twice, in sharp contrast to the Petraeus strategy elsewhere in the country. Confronted with this shambles, Iraq's government was left holding the bag, and the coalition of parties in Iraq backing the effort to clean Basra up is promising in and of itself because of the way it crossed ethnic lines. Still, when you say you're going to take Basra, take Basra.

Having said that, Roggio's cite of T.E. Lawrence is dead-on, and I learned a few things I didn't know from "CTA Symposium: Iraq v. Mahdi Army" that make me a better informed observer.

As for Lawrence, the exact quote is from his 27 articles of advice, published in The Arab Bulletin on August 20, 1917:

"15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is."

103 Comments

It's noteworthy that everyone in this panel and all commenters here agree that the stated rationale for the offensive put forward by both Maliki and Bush (fighting criminal elements associated with various militias) was a fiction sufficiently transparent to be disregarded. Moreover most commenters agree, to a greater or lesser extent, with the Sadrist assessment that the aim was to weaken Sadr in the leadup to the provincial elections.

Five years and a bit after Powell's WMD speech, you might have expected a little more reflection on whether there is any problem with going to war under false pretences.

As regards the contrast between UK and US strategy, a couple of observations.

(1) The difference didn't seem to be such a big deal to many when both seemed to be working to some extent

(2) Triumphalist claims that the US strategy has done a better job of containing JAM and other militias than the UK alternative seem a bit premature in the light of the last few days of fighting in Baghdad.

"and some perspectives re: Iran from Ledeen and Peters that are likely to surprise people."

Hmmm... That we should sell arms to Iran through Israel?

Oops, sorry, that was my time machine firing up again. I know, I know, you shouldn't use one quasi-legal arms sale to a US enemy to judge a person.

I did wander over to Ledeen's blog:
I think General Petraeus is trying to force the Bush Administration to recognize these hard facts and act accordingly. He is saying that we cannot accomplish our objectives in Iraq without challenging the regime in Tehran.
We have to go after the Tehran regime, now more vulnerable than ever, at the same time it draws ever closer to having its atomic weapons.

I don't think anyone reasonable would think that the Bush Administration does not believe this.
And second - surprise! Michael Ledeen thinks we should target Iran. Find me an article, an interview (including this CTA one) where this doesn't happen, I'll be impressed.

All in all - the first half is great, and gives wonderful information that I wish newspapers had more ink to give to. The second half, almost useless.

Did u even read Roggio's post?

link

[Please do not post bare URLs, especially long ones. The recommended format for live links is posted in the text immediately above the text entry fields for comments. Corrected for you, this time.

Also, "u" is not a word in English. If you can't be bothered with proper grammar, the odds increase that we can't be bothered with "u". --NM]

I was going to say this but Roggio said it perfectly:

"Of course, the expectation of immediate success for an operation aimed at clearing densely-populated urban terrain is highly unrealistic. Recent history in Iraq shows this: it took months before Coalition efforts to clear and hold Baghdad showed progress, and even today only 75 percent of the capital city is considered fully secured. Last year the media declared the surge a failure long before the full contingent of forces was deployed, yet the press did not learn from its mistakes. Two popular myths have developed about the Basra fighting: that it constituted a complete failure for the Iraqi security forces, and that it resulted in a major political embarrassment for Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki."

link

We (and by we I mean the American commentariat) have a serious expectation problem on our hands. Much of it comes from a serious lack of perspective, particularly in military history. The rest is an unseriousness where every event is a priori assumed to be bad and the reasoning for why it is is then sought (and found easily enough).

I recommend looking at the Iraqi situation one month ago when Sadr was viewed as the proverbial other shoe, Basra was under control of militants hostile to the government (including the only significant ports in all of Iraq), and Maliki was considered a purely sectarian puppet (of Sadr's depending on who you asked) with no support from the Sunni or Kurds. The situation on the ground has materially changed on all those counts, dramatically changed in fact. The idea that this is a failure because Maliki didnt burn Basra to its foundations chasing militia members is odd to me... particularly when last month everyone was begging for political solutions. This has been a political solution backed by force (to combat force) that has amazingly isolated the most powerful and dangerous militia in Iraq in a short time.

Did it solve the problem? Certainly not! This is one of Iraq's very top most serious problems, it cant be solved in a week or two. This has been an incrimental improvement in the standing of the Iraqi government. It is significant because it follows a long period of stagnation. It is a small bit of momentum.

We need to stop expecting the decisive battle, it is not an appropriate expectation for this kind of situation.

John, do stop being the ugly American for just one minute, and begin to acknowledge that others may do things for their own reasons, acting within the norms of their own culture.

The world gets a lot lighter when it stops revolving around you, and you'll feel better afterward.

Naked URL and spam (3, 4) cleanup on aisle 12....

Excellent discussion of recent events in Basra at CTA by Bill Roggio (recently returned from Iraq), Omar Fadhil (Iraq the Model blog), Lt. Col. Ralph Peters (ret.) and Michael Ledeen.

Yeah, that group has been dead on concerning Iraq for like 5 years now.

Was Chalabi too busy to attend? And I suppose the Germans wouldn't let Curveball visit?

These guys (with the possible exception of Roggio, though he isn't without guilt) has made fools of you guys since 2002.

Don't you have ANY relief pitchers available? Because trotting out guys with ERA's over 9 gives one the opinion you don't really want to be informed.

Then again it's possible that achieving a circle jerk echo chamber is actually the goal here.

But just a reminder, there will be a public panel at the Elliott School this Friday. Marc Lynch will moderate and experts such as Jim Fearon, Pete Moore, Christopher Gelpi and Wayne White.

Now you may not hear what you want to hear from this group of experts, but it's worth your while to listen anyway.

Unlike the distinguished panel listed in this post, these guys actually speak the language, have lived in the region, understand the culture and such.

Then again, none of them have purchased a rug in a Baghdad marketplace so who really cares what they think?

"Unlike the distinguished panel listed in this post, these guys actually speak the language, have lived in the region, understand the culture and such."

So did the Iron Shiek, should we seek out his expert opinion on the current military/political ins and outs of Iraq at this time?

I'm glad Davebo has contributed the heavy snark so I don't have to.

Seriously, do you expect anyone even to bother to read Michael Ledeen? Let's see. A plagiarist. A gun-runner to Iran (I assume some dispute over the swag explains his change of heart). An "expert" on Iran who is reported on my side of the political fence not only never to have been in Iran, but to neither read nor speak Farsi. (Luckily, Ahmad Chalabi speaks perfect English!) By those criteria, I'm an expert, except I don't take money from the Mossad, or whoever is paying Ledeen these days, to make my case.

You know, the traditional academy expelled Ward Churchill. Why are known liars and fabulists like Ledeen and John Lott welcome at the AEI? Is it possible it's more of a propaganda shop than a think tank?

Have the boys over at Threat Watch had any chats about the threats that our present administration and their Neo Con infiltrators have made to our economy, geopolitical situation, political standing in the world, armed forces, et al by perpertrating this political blunder on the United States. Or, for that matter continuing to perpetrate this same blunder for the forseeable future with no clear definition, benchmarks or metric for victory?

The way I saw yesterday´s testimony, Petreaus, being an honest man, could predict no success and no timetable, nor could he even give an opinion of how long it would take to have the level of security an control in Iraq equal to today´s current situation, with the only change being that The Iraqis, themselves, were providing the security. I think this would be a minimum bench mark.

His testimony seemed to be not a message to congress, but one to the Administration about the state of affairs now in Iraq and how bleak the situation was looking forward.

A widening of the war into Iran would be a disaster. We need a rapproachment with our Sunni allies in the area. In Petraeus´ own words, their isn´t any discernable light at the end of the tunnel. One can dig up articles like these at Threat Watch (As far as I am concerned, their very name, threat watch undermines their credibility)from now until the cows come home, but they are no replacement for clear definitions, benchmarks or metric for victory.

I would also say this sort of next day spin does not way very heavily against 5 years of disasterous policy. This Administration has run a war worse than linton has run a campaign and that is saying something.

Sort of a rhetorical contradiction here:

"Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them."

This was exactly the approach tried in Basra. The Brits gradually turned over security to the Iraqi police and army. The police, army and government were too corrupt and factionalized to deliver effective services and security to the population. Thus the gangs and mafias, which are often allied to the political parties.

What's the alternative? The U.S. marines should do it for them? How long would we have to hand hold our local (Dawa) "allies"?

If Maliki had succeeded in taking Basra, he would have just substituted one mafia, the Dawa/SCIRI mafia, for others. It is/was a competition for the Oil money and spoils. Could Malicki deliver government services and security to Basra? He's failed miserably up to now even given the breathing space provided by the decreased violence. He and the government are universally seen as weak, corrupt and ineffective.

Wayne White- former state department intelligence officer (figure that one out). Currently of antiwar.com blog.

Christopher Gelpi- Professor of Political Science at Duke.

Pete Moore- Professor of Political Science Case Western Reserve University

Jim Fearon- Professor of Politcal Science, Berkeley

Marc Lynch- Professor of Political Science, George Washington University

NEWSFLASH- America's academia lining up against war. Former State Dept lifers in agreement.

Average distance between panel and closest Iraqi city? 2816 miles (estimate).

Im perfectly willing to hear what they have to say- but you started the background bashing game. Honestly, just as I take Juan Cole with a large chunk of salt, i dont have a lot of use for academics when it comes to warfare and nation building. These events are too far outside the 'norm' to get good results from just studying cultural tendencies. Wars are great at reversing or destroying these tendencies (remember when Germans liked to fight?)

"This was exactly the approach tried in Basra. The Brits gradually turned over security to the Iraqi police and army. "

This is absolutely not the case. The British never particularly controlled Basra and never turned over security to anyone at all. The militias have all controlled what turfs they could establish since Saddam collapsed. The IA had virtually no presense and the IP was little more then milititants in uniforms.

This was NOT a case of Sadr chasing out the army and than Maliki trying to get back in. The army was never there. This is the first time there has been a signficant government presence in Basra since Saddams regime broke up.

As far as the rest of your post Chew, i think you have a faulty idea of what is now happening in Basra. Government forces has cleared most of the neighborhoods and continue targetting and arresting militants. The also control the vital infastructure points such as the ports. Thousands of local Iraqis signed up for the IA immediately after the fighting, and almost the entire Iraqi parliment has lined up behind Maliki. His reputation with most Iraqis certainly hasnt gotten any worse.

Let me help Mark Buehner out a bit since he seems to like to cherry pick bios.

Jim Fearon, Stanford University. One of the country's leading experts on civil wars and insurgencies, as well as International Relations theory more broadly. He has written widely on the dynamics of ethnic and civil wars, and has some fantastic stuff forthcoming about the duration and prospects for ending such conflicts - most available for download here. For the purposes of this panel, his most relevant publication is probably last year's influential Foreign Affairs article "Iraq's Civil War."

Pete Moore, Case Western Reserve University. A specialist in the political economy of the Arab world, and author of an important book on the politics of the business and financial elites in the region. For the purposes of this panel, his most relevant publication is probably "The War Economy of Iraq",

Christopher Gelpi, Duke University. A political scientist with a broad range of relevant interests, including civil military relations and crisis bargaining.

Wayne White, adjunct scholar at Middle East Institute, will be offering a "reality check" on the academic analysis. White was previously Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia and the principal Iraq analyst and head of INR/NESA’s Iraq team from 2003 to 2005. His most recent commentary on Iraq, "Dark Shadows of Things to Come," can be found at the Middle East Institute.

Now, care to compare and contrast their past predictions with say, Ralph Peters or Leeden?

And by the way, where is Omar living these days?

Mark,

You are complaining because the Iraqi police and army were not up to the task, or were too beholden to the politically aligned militias. That was my point in an earlier post. I don't know why you think that the current Iraqi army is up to the task, or isn't just an adjunct to the Dawa militias.

In any case, the British turnover was trumpeted by the U.S. military and Iraqi government as a historic and positive step in Iraqi taking control of it's own security. Sure many had doubts, but that was the story at the time.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48433

And this about the Basra turnover from Petraeus at the time:

"Iraqi Security Forces in Basra have been successfully operating independently, maintaining their own security for the past four months. Working with local government and military officials, they have demonstrated their readiness to assume responsibility for the provincial security. Today this responsibility is theirs."

You claim:

"Government forces has cleared most of the neighborhoods and continue targetting and arresting militants."

LOL!! Sure. How often have we heard that story before. Just like the Iraqi armed forces were ready to take over security for Basra.

Davebo- thanks for reiterating their bios. Academics and state department lifers.

And lets not forget Wayne White writing for the clearly nonpartisan anti-war.com, Christopher Gelpi author of 'Attacking Iraq Threatens American Security' pre-invation 2003, Jim Fearon- who declared him a leading expert in insurgencies? I'll take Patreus who literally wrote the book for our army over the Stanford professor thank you.

When the closest expert to having any military background whatsoever is a state department official, you might want to think about your panel.

"I don't know why you think that the current Iraqi army is up to the task, or isn't just an adjunct to the Dawa militias."

Because they are the Iraq national army, trained largely by the US and drawn from all over Iraq (mostly Shiia certainly, but there are Sunnis and Kurds). You dont see the difference between those troops answerable to the central government and the local guys working for their cousin the oil smuggler/militia captain/local alderman?

"In any case, the British turnover was trumpeted by the U.S. military and Iraqi government as a historic and positive step in Iraqi taking control of it's own security."

That didnt end up being the case. Whats your point? Are we talking about then or now?

Obviously you can believe what you like. But i will say you will certainly be misled if you automatically assume the bad stories to be true and the good stories to be false, and ignore the sources either way.

Mark,

You say:

"Because they are the Iraq national army, trained largely by the US and drawn from all over Iraq (mostly Shiia certainly, but there are Sunnis and Kurds)."

This was pretty much the same army in December 2007 when Basra was turned over. The current attack force also included elements of the elite 14th Division supposedly the best trained Iraqi army unit.

Yet we read things such as this dated April 7.

"More than 150 Scots soldiers have been embedded with Iraqi forces inside Basra to stiffen wavering government units which last week saw 1000 of their troops refusing to fight fellow Shias and another 400 desert to the opposing Mehdi Army militia,

"He also ordered two battalions of northern troops south to spearhead the push into slum areas dominated by the Mehdi Army, deploying almost 30,000 soldiers and policemen in total against some 8000 militia"

"Units of the Iraqi 14th Division were left in control of the city centre, while the militia retained their hold through most of the rest of the area and even paraded captured vehicles and members of the security forces they claimed had gone over to their side.

At the height of the battles, British artillery at the airport base destroyed a militia mortar position and RAF and US jets carried out limited airstrikes."

link

As against this we have Colonel Peters heard it through the grapevine BS, and Roggio's slanted cherry picking.

It's way too early to claim any decisive victory by any side. Fog of war and all that. I'll be content to wait another 6 years. But if past is prologue, you shouldn't be optimistic.

[chew2, PLEASE do not post bare URLs, especially long ones. The guidelines for posting live links are listed in the text presented above the comment entry fields. If you can't be bothered to conform to the guidelines, future posts might be deleted out of hand. Your consideration is appreciated. Fixed the link format for you this time. --NM]

The most spectacular element of success in the Basra operation goes to General Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), who personally mediated in the intra-Iraqi Shi'ite negotiations at Qom, Iran. In roughly 48 hours time, a working ceasefire was put into effect.

"This was pretty much the same army in December 2007 when Basra was turned over. The current attack force also included elements of the elite 14th Division supposedly the best trained Iraqi army unit."

We're going in circles. Basra was turned over to the local authorities to run. Those local authorities are militias that have since (and before) defied the central government. In one sense, it wasnt the Coalitions role to wrest local control to the national level. That was and is an intraIraqi issue that has now been dealt with by Iraqis.

And to repeat myself there just was no significant IA presense in Basra until last week.

Finally if you read any of the links in this post you will realize that the only IA unit that broke under combat pressure was the newest brigade in the Iraqi Army. Now why that unit spearheaded the assault is an excellent question, but by all accounts the remainer of the army at worst went toe-to-toe with Sadr's goons, and Roggio amongst others details the damage they inflicted in a short time. And the IA is the force still standing on the field you may also recall.

"It's way too early to claim any decisive victory by any side."

Most sensible thing i've heard yet. You'll notice i've been careful to note we shouldnt LOOK for a decisive victory, certainly not in this short a time frame. I've consistantly said this has been a small victory for the Iraqi Government. All the smoke and flame comes from those who INSIST they know its been an overwhelming defeat, despite all evidence to the contrary.

"But if past is prologue, you shouldn't be optimistic."

If you want to do analysis you shouldn't be optimistic and you shouldn't be pessimistic. You should let the facts speak for themselves and come up with the best picture that suits the facts, wherever it leads you. The Iraqi Army is the command presense in Basra now and the Sadrists and other militias have lost their vital hedgemony of the oil smuggling business (as well as control of Iraq's 2nd largest city). Virtually the entire Iraqi Parliment has lined up against Sadr's militia. Those are the facts, if that leads you to believe Iraq is worse off than it was two weeks ago, we obvously have a very different way of processing this information.

Well, it now seems that we are not only wrong calling the Maliki faction a faction, but we should ignore, out of hand, anyone who is an academic or a State department "lifer". Wonderful basis for a geopolitical strategy, don't you think? How about disqualifying anyone who has ever been outside the U.S. and anyone who has ever read a book.

Brilliant!

TOC, i didn't recognize your post because there wasnt a full paragraph ranting about neocons and pipedreams. So I accidently read it.

Reread my posts if you really want the answer. I clearly stated i'd be happy to listen to the academics, but that i dont consider them the definitive word by any means, particularly when they escrew military expertise in a WAR ZONE. And most particularly when and if they claim their own facts are more valid than those reported by people actually on the scene in Iraq.

Joe, I assume #5 was directed at me, but I have no idea what it is meant to say or how it relates to my post.

"When the closest expert to having any military background whatsoever is a state department official, you might want to think about your panel."

Look, if you wish to continue to believe there is a military solution to the situation in Iraq you're welcome to do so. Our political and military leaders disagree, but hey, think outside the box.

As to "career state dept.", he worked in intelligence within the State Dept. If we hadn't ignored the State departments warnings regarding the CIA and OVP's claims on Iraq we probably wouldn't be in this mess today. They got far more right than any other agency short of the Atomic Energy Commission.

It was also the State Departments idea to set up Bremer and the CPA. Now, I still don't know whether that decision was, on balance, good or bad; but, most folks who opposed Bush's decision to invade thought it was a bad idea.

So, just because some dude work in the State Department doesn't provide a determinative indicator of any particular expertise.

#24 from Mark Buehner at 9:20 pm on Apr 09, 2008

TOC, i didn't recognize your post because there wasnt a full paragraph ranting about neocons and pipedreams. So I accidently read it.

did you also accidently reply?

I read you posts. I also understand them. Unfortunately, I understand them all to well.

"Look, if you wish to continue to believe there is a military solution to the situation in Iraq you're welcome to do so."

This in the context of condemning Maliki for not crushing the Sadrists into the dust. This is exactly the goalpost moving that makes this discussion so futile. The status quo is defeat, a military solution is futile, and a lack of military victory is also defeat.

"It was also the State Departments idea to set up Bremer and the CPA"

Not according to Douglas Feith. It was DOD that setup the original Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) which morphed into the CPA.

And Bremer was picked for both organizations because of his close ties to Don Rumsfeld.

As for who created teh CPA, it seems no one is sure.

""15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is."-->TEL

This is a neat paraphrase for current Iranian efforts in Iraq. Consider the Iranian brokered Basra ceasefire an example par excellence.

"This is a neat paraphrase for current Iranian efforts in Iraq. Consider the Iranian brokered Basra ceasefire an example par excellence."

The Iranians got Sadr to ceasefire, perhaps. Maliki hasnt stopped his operations at all, nor agreed to (much less executed) any of the ceasefire demands. I'm not sure what Iran has gained other than not seeing its investment in special groups utterly destroyed in street fighting. Its being destroyed in targeted raids instead.

It was Rumsfeld's idea to quickly turn the whole thing over to Iraqi expats. The ORHA was just supposed to be a vehicle toward that end. Then the state department got involved, and that's when the "morphing" started.

Yeah, that group has been dead on concerning Iraq for like 5 years now.

LMAO! Are serious people still paying attention to these clowns? We're supposed to forget all their prior mistaken pronouncements and allow them back in to the national dialogue? Over my dead body.

"The deal was brokered after negotiations in the holy city of Qom in Iran involving the two Shi'ite factions - the Da'wa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) - which have been locked in conflict with Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in southern Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who was camping in Basra and personally supervising the operations against the Mahdi Army, was not in the loop about the goings-on. As for US President George W Bush, he had just spoken praising Maliki for waging a "historic and decisive" battle against the Mahdi Army, which he said was "a defining moment" in the history of a "free Iraq". Both Maliki and Bush look very foolish.[T]o be able to summarily cry halt to cascading violence, and to achieve that precisely in about 48 hours, well, that's an altogether impressive capability in political terms. In this case, the Iranians have managed it with felicitous ease, as if they were just turning off a well-lubricated tap. That requires great command over the killing fields of Iraq, the native warriors, and the sheer ability to calibrate the flow of events and micromanage attitudes."-->M K Bhadrakumar@Asia Times Online

What is surprising here. We have backed the Shiites against our traditional Sunni clients in the area. We have guaranteed the Iranians gain power. All they have to do is give support to all sides, which, of course they have done.

It also helps if we continue to delude ourselves that we have allies among the Shiites. The Bush clucks about a histroic and decisive wine by one faction who is cozy with the Iranians against another.

The administration was lost when it entered Iraq.

RE: John Q (#25). OK, you have no idea. Thanks.

RE: Mark P (#31). The Iranians have some limitations of their own in Iraq, one of which is the Persian/ Arab cultural dichotomy, and a certain level of arrogance by the Persians toward Arabs. There are also numerous instances of their own forces being directly involved in spearhead roles.

Iran is indeed running a proxy war in Iraq, as they are doing in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and other locales. As the consistent reverses in Iraq during the surge indicate, it has its own weaknesses, missteps, and reversals.

Iran's strategic problem is that they need to decide if they're looking for a reliable client in Iraq (a very challenging goal for all kinds of reasons: cultural, Sunni/Shia, Shia/Shia, et. al.), or just looking to create trouble. Trouble alone eventually becomes self-limiting, vid. what happened to al-Qaeda in Iraq. On the other hand, it can also be continued inexpensively for a long time, and Iran has patiently invested in its own infrastructure for some time now.

The USA, meanwhile, has done some patient investment of its own, and it has begun to pay off. Rather than a simplistic "the Sunnis are our traditional friends" approach (yeah, that great guy Saddam), it's an approach that looks for and cultivates allies across the factional board. It is beginning to produce a level of reconciliation and cooperation across that factional board - for Iraqi reasons as well, of course. But then, Iraqi politics must evolve to that point if it's ever to mean anything.

Enemies have strengths and weaknesses, just as we do. It is human nature to discount the weaknesses of friendly forces, and discount the strengths of enemies. Real understanding demands a grasp of both strengths and weaknesses on each side.

The background and sources of the CTA panel make them very well suited to help round out that perspective. If people choose not to listen, that is their problem, not the panel's.

Interesting blog here. Seems like a bunch war nerds overanalyzing every tiny shift in the wind for a whiff of victory in Iraq.

I believe one post actually recognized what the reality is in Iraq. The gov of Iraq is Iran's main man. Sadr is simply the spoiled sibling who must be kept in check. It is no contradiction at all that Iran protects both movements. They are in the end, on the same side.

And as such, Iran was able to separate the two scuffling brethren with barely an effort.

What you Americans can't grasp, because it would actually shatter your fragile psyches is that the US has already been written out of the script in Iraq. The real challenge for Iran and Maliki is to keep straight faces for the next 18 months rather than bursting out laughing and giving up the whole charade. Of course, it's actually rather pathetic that an entire govt wants to believe the lie so badly that this horribly constructed facade actually worked.

Lawrence had pretty good instincts in some parts, less in others. He didn't recommend the Wahhabi Sauds for leadership in Arabia as Percy Cox and St. John Philby did. He preferred the Hashemites, which had actually aided
the British against the Turks.
Ultimately, the defeat of the Hashemites over the Sauds; appears almost out of the blue; in the credits to Lawrence of Arabia; Thanks to the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He did however prefer the likes of old line Sunnis like the Pachachis and the Ghailani's in Iraq; over the Shia like the Chalabis, Sadr and the Kurdish Askaris. Luckily he didn't live to see Rashid Al Ghailani's Golden Square fascist coup in 1941. Interesting that no one has ever made a film of the real fighter against the Wahhabi Ilkwan who were the predecessors to AQ, John Bagot Glubb's "War in the Desert". For obvious reasons,including the fact that it shows the result of a precipitous retreat from Mesopotamia.

Hasn't the Suleimaini deal; been
debunked already. Hasn't the fact that Sadr has been forced to step down from his perch, by the wider Iraqi community. That his vaunted "Million Iraqi' March fizzled. Hasn't the whole
idea of an Iraqi civil war, been proven to be a flawed interpretation to say the least. If Ledeen is so ignorant of Farsi, why does he continue
to post links to Iranian newspapers?

As to the ORHA would we have preferred to have the same officers (Eagleton,
Bodine) who were in charge of their
relative bailiwicks) when the Anfal campaign against the Kurds, and the Baathist 'itijihad' against the Shia
was going full steam. Sadly we didn't have enough of the caliber of the late
Ambassador Hume Horan; on staff.

I would ask Davebo how much Saudi money is flowing into the endowed professorships at the Universities where his experts work? And how much consulting work they do for Saudi/Gulf princelings and the like? We know the Saudis and others have bought and paid for entire University departments, if not Universities. What did Georgetown get? Was it 200 million from the Saudis?

I ask because if Ledeen is suspect given his past involvement with Iran-Contra, one might ask if Davebo's "experts" are also on the pad of the same paymasters of AQ, either directly or indirectly.

As for Iraq, as long as we are not politically defeated and have significant military forces there, it is to our advantage. Far from "breaking" our military it shows we have too few troops after Clinton-Bush's "Peace Dividend" and need more, lots of things which did not work were found out. Our spending on it is pretty low, both historic GDP and budgetwise. As long as we are seen as the strong tribe in the region we have more cards to play.

Maliki cares only for power/graft, that's clear. We're not going to take from him what he'll pay up in tribute to Iran. So we can rely on his and his tribal backers natural thuggery to play to our advantage. While a lot of our problems were because Iraq was tribal ... tribes always have tribal enemies, and there is always a Navajo willing to track down a Geronimo over past enmities. Sadr seems the loser since he's not getting more men, Maliki is, this conflict acted as a giant vetting exercise (fire those who fled, promote those who stayed) and showed Iraqis they could operate on a limited basis with US help in the background (logistics and air power). Reactions inside Iraq have Maliki+US the winner, Sadr+Iran the loser.

We have a lot of problems with Iran. Chief among them their nukes which 6,000 centrifuges going into use make a bigger, more pressing issue.

Iraq gives us lots of levers over them. They only respect strength and fear, so maybe it's time to counter-terror Qods Force killing Americans and Iraqis inside Iraq with some of their own medicine. Arm and help the Azeris, Arabs, Baluchis, etc. If we want to stop Iran from going nuclear, this is it, and Iraq is the key.

Petraeus highlighted that Iran's cross-border raids, terror, and outright military expeditions with Qods Force (answerable only to Khameni, the top guy) must be dealt with. I suspect the effort against Sadr is part of a larger effort to press Iran as "negotiations" ME style.

Only semi-on-topic, but there's no reason to fear spoiling a high quality discussion here...

From time to time people lay hold of a catch phrase or simplistic idea and repeat it frequently as a "solution" for all kinds of complex problems. The simple idea sounds like it might be plausible, or received wisdom in some way, but it doesn't hold up under examination. When an idea like this comes up, I think it's important to challenge it, to get rid of it if possible as a weed that chokes understanding, even if it may point to practical recommendations you favor.

The multiculturalist simple idea of more "diversity" promoting unity is a prime example of the sort of thing that ought to be uprooted. There is nothing in logic or by the way of empirical evidence to support it, it's just that people were happy to repeat it and imply it, especially in academia, and that bluntly denying it made you a party-pooper at best and a racist/fascist/whatever at worst. With potential career consequences for an academic.

Another one is that nations have no friends, only interests. It sounds hard-nosed, but is simply idiotic. It's the kind of super-skepticism of a rube who is rude to everyone who is trying to be friendly to him, 'cause he's too smart to fall for that city-slicker stuff, and who then gets gulled and robbed easily by someone who exploits his folly, because due to his wise-guy attitude nobody is looking out for him. Again, the idea has nothing behind it. It can't justify itself in the light of history. It just got going early in the wars initiated by the 11 September, 2001 attacks, because the Americans were rightly upset by the behavior of some, mostly fake allies (Germany and France), and reacted to the hurt by in effect rhetorically ditching every ally, including the real ones. This did a good deal to poison discussions about the situation that we, proud Americans and allies and friends of America, were all in together.

Now we have another "simple idea" poisoning discussions on Iraq. As usual it sounds like something that must be right, an unquestionable axiom, and as usual it's desirable to challenge it, regardless of whether it's pointing people towards this or that solution.

The idea is that the government of a state must get / have a monopoly on armed force. You can't have different groups in the state territory - regional groups, cities, religious or ethnic groups - having armed enclaves for their particular defense or for any reason. And if separate militias are too destructive to be endured in Iraq now, that is because the whole idea can't work (nothing to do with religion or culture or the meddling of the Iranians), and the solution must be to bulldoze those militias, not perhaps and if so for local reasons but generally.

It's not so. It's perfectly normal that the state does not have all the armed force in its own hands, and often enough, when there are strong religious or other antagonisms involved, separate armed enclaves are the best deal going. This is not just a Muslim or an African tribal idea either. I think King Henry IV of France and the Peace of Nantes should teach a lesson about how much power the central state can give away, and how good it can be for the nation to cut a deal like that, as opposed to the ruler demanding a concentration of power that almost compels different factions to try to seize that power in order not to be consumed by it.

These darned commentators just won't stop

The next Challenge, then: How best to tear down Taheri limb from limb. Though, it's probably easier just to ignore him....

"Only semi-on-topic, but there's no reason to fear spoiling a high quality discussion here..."

Amen. I want to say something- and this cuts both ways: Whether this war was started justly or unjustly is immaterial to whether it can be ended favorably to US and/or Iraqi interests. The religious fervor with which every shift of the winds is immediately attacked or defended has indeed the air of faith that either our goals are so noble or so despicable that we MUST win/lose, and moreover that every change of fortune must be one step closer to total victory or Hell with no possibility for interim shifts of fortune. That is not a serious way to approach the real world. Bad causes succeed and good causes go down in flames all the time.

Think about who to blame/praise for the past in the ballot box or when writing a book. Think about the present and the future when analyzing the situation on the ground, particularly new events overtake us.

"It's not so. It's perfectly normal that the state does not have all the armed force in its own hands, and often enough, when there are strong religious or other antagonisms involved, separate armed enclaves are the best deal going."

Ask the Bosnians and Kosovars how that idea worked out for them. This isn't a question of state national guards vs the federal government. The idea that the national government must have a monopoly on armed force doesn't imply you have to disarm the populace or can't have local 'militias' or national guards, only that they must be subordinate to the federal government. Otherwise they are by definition in a state of rebellion (which essentially is what the Mahdi army is). Its one thing to have a rifle in the closet, another to set up a checkpoint on the corner.

The world as we know it is built around the sovereignty of the nation-state, and for good reason. The concept has evolved, because it is far more stable than what you suggest. The Edict of Nance is an interesting thing to point to- after Henry was a assassinated the Huguenots rose in rebellion again which prompted the English to invade sensing weakness. The Huguenots were crushed and their military liberties revoked, followed quickly by their persecution. The Edict of Nance didn't survive so much as a generation, it was completely unstable and ultimately led to more control by the French throne.

This entire period of European history was a record of the growing power of the central state and pulling down local lordships that weren't entirely reliable. Armed factions operating outside of federal oversight and control is simply NOT a stable situation.

The original post-invasion plan failed when tens of millions of Iraqis said "Ahmad who?". Chalabi had convinced the gullible marks, i.e., the neocon visionaries, that he had an internal army to match his expatriate leeches. Of course, no such army existed. Can you imagine the US military manpower that would have been required to keep this charlatan in power?

Joe K:
Iran hasn't sustained 50,000+ casualties in Iraq. Iran hasn't spent 500 billion dollars for war in Iraq. Iran hasn't strained its military to the breaking point in Iraq. Yet Iran has attained its war aims from the Imposed War (1980-88), by means of the US invasion of Iraq.

Iran hasn't sustained 50,000+ casualties in Iraq.

Point of information: you know this, how?

Do you propose that Iran has not had any operatives lost or injured in Iraq since '03?

Not saying the rest of your points aren't salient. But if you know Iranian casualty figures with any accuracy, I'd sure like to know what they are, and how you got them.

Nort, presumably if Iran had 50K casualties, a few would have been left behind on the battlefield. Have we, or Sunni allies, found any at, much less the hundreds an attrition rate like this would suggest? Heavy cross-border ambulance and hearse traffic?

I would suggest there's a burden on you to show evidence of massive numbers of Iranian casualties.

I was asking, not telling. I have no burden whatsoever--I made no claim. This was not meant as rhetorical sand-throwing. Sorry you read it that way.

"Nort, presumably if Iran had 50K casualties, a few would have been left behind on the battlefield. Have we, or Sunni allies, found any"

Do they sport 'I heart Ayatolla' tatoos?

I think you are supposed to check the inside back shirt collar... their moms supposedly sew "lost kid" labels there. /snark

Point (such as it is) remaining: I don't know how to get reliable numbers regarding Iranians operating (and being injured or killed) in Iraq, and I would like to know Mr Pyruz's response to my question.

Interesting times continue, Al-Sistani weighs in... sort of:

"Leading figure in Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, Jalal el-Din al-Saghier, said on Tuesday that dissolving the al-Mahdi army is Shiite Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s responsibility, asserting that top Shiite Cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has nothing to do with this militia as al-Sadr did not consult the SIIC when he established it."
“Al-Sistani has a clear opinion in this regard; the law is the only authority in the country,” al-Saghier told Aswat al-Iraq – Voices of Iraq (VOI).
_“The top Shiite cleric had not been consulted in establishing al-Mahdi army, so it could not interfere in dissolving it,” he added.
“Whosoever established the al-Mahdi army has to dissolve it,” he underlined._
“Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr established this army and it is only him who has to dissolve it,” he explained.
“Al-Sistani asked al-Mahdi army to give in weapons to the government,” the Shiite official said."

from Voices of Iraq (link at below link since source has a banned word) via longwarjournal.com and Roggio provides this:

""We, the Sadrists, are in a predicament," Hassan al Rubaie, a Sadrist member of parliament said the day the Political Council for National Security announced the plan. "Our political isolation was very clear and real during the meeting." he said, referring to the meeting of the Political Council for National Security, where the legislation was announced. "Even the blocs that had in the past supported us are now against us and we cannot stop them from taking action against us in parliament.""

Do they sport 'I heart Ayatolla' tatoos?

I take it we make no attempt to ID dead terrorists? Seems unlikely. And as far as captives, Iranians don't speak conversational Arabic.

Iran is a neighbor of Iraq with religious/cultural ties to the Southern part of the country. It suffered grievously from Saddam's invasion. The United States is thousands of miles away from Iraq. Why is it that Iranian participation in Iraqi politics is meddling and ours is commendable?

As with torture, our distinctions are now based on us-versus-them.

Sure, meddling is an equal opportunity sport. What else is new? We are also free to dislike there meddling, as they are free to dislike ours.

Personally, I prefer our goal of fostering Democracy vs. theirs of extending Mullahcracy. YMMV.

Sure, meddling is an equal opportunity sport.

Heh, I always thought the Iranians suffered from a sheer lack of imagination during the whole Iraq invasion. What they should've done was, after Bush got his UN resolution, sign themselves up unilaterally as UN enforcers of the resolution to overthrow Saddam and invaded at the same time we did.

If they played their cards right, they could've walked off with half of Iraq in the deal...

True Andrew, so here's a more germaine (and serious) question- would you believe our government no matter what they claimed?

For women "diamonds are forever",

For rightwing hawks, "occupations are forever".

I personally would pull out all that cash, and put it into America. But that's just me. Hey, let's have health care, hey let's completely rework the infrastructure for power production.

NOT, hey let's piss away 1 trillion dollars down Iraq, after invading on false pretenses.

Heh, Joe, John Quiggin got ya there - sputtering incoherent, illogical, confusing insults, not your strongest suit.

after invading on false pretenses.

You keep saying that, and I'll keep telling you I don't remember that the way you do. Mmmkay?

#43 from Mark Buehner:

"I want to say something- and this cuts both ways: Whether this war was started justly or unjustly is immaterial to whether it can be ended favorably to US and/or Iraqi interests. The religious fervor with which every shift of the winds is immediately attacked or defended has indeed the air of faith that either our goals are so noble or so despicable that we MUST win/lose, and moreover that every change of fortune must be one step closer to total victory or Hell with no possibility for interim shifts of fortune. That is not a serious way to approach the real world. Bad causes succeed and good causes go down in flames all the time."

Amen to all that.

On the issue of the state monopoly of force: I maintain my opinion, but I don't want to argue it now. I accept that you have a sensible counter-argument.

Though I still think it's important to say that "the government must have a monopoly of force" should not be an unquestioned assumption, it is much more important that the interpretation of reports on practical events should not be held hostage to assumptions about which causes are morally right or wrong.

David- absolutely true. The postscript is that there are times when it is morally correct, even required, to overthrow a lawful government. Rebellion isnt always a dirty word, but it is what it is.

Re: Iranian casualties in Iraq --

  • It's clear that Iran has suffered far fewer than 50,000 KIA/wounded/missing/POW, because that is a huge number, implying an even huger direct involvement (invasion).
  • Likewise, it's clear to close observers that Iranians have been very active in Iraq, militarily as well as politically. Persian military operatives have been killed and captured by US and GoI forces over the past couple years, the number that has been made public is probably in the dozens. Rather than links, I'll refer readers to the archives of The Long War Journal (accounts are usually soft-pedaled or ignored in most Western newspapers).
  • Precisely who is an Iranian national is going to be difficult for adversaries to determine in many cases. The Qods Force and other Iranian forces have many non-Persian (e.g. Arabic, Kurdish) Iranians whom they may train and employ. In addition, since the days of the Iran-Iraq war, many anti-Saddam Iraqi forces found refuge in Iran. So Qods Force and other have fully-vetted proxies to send to Iraq, under the guise of plausible deniability.
  • One of first post-2003 reforms that the Iraqis made was to open their border with Iran to foster trade and, especially, Iranian pilgrimages to Shi'ite holy site, especially Najaf and Karbala. This obviously provides even Persian operatives with the Maoist sea in which to swim, undetected.
  • In many cases, the US military has been very reluctant to press specific charges of Iranian complicity in Iraq. Often, compelling cases are left to get buried in following news cycles without achieving resolution in the Western media. Examples are the Iranian-directed kidnapping and killing of US soldiers in Karbala in January 2007, and the Iranian supplying of Steyr sniper rifles to Special Groups forces. Again, see The Long War Journal for a discussion of Iranian complicity that is missing from most mainstream media accounts.

"General Petraeus said the Iraqi government must ensure that its military operation in Basra does not bring an end to the ceasefire declared by the leader of Iraq's largest Shiite militia, Moqtada al-Sadr.

"Clearly, we are concerned that the ceasefire could fray," he said. "That's in no one's interest."

General Petraeus said the ceasefire has been one of the three key elements of the security improvements in Iraq during the past year, along with the U.S. and Iraqi troop increases and the shift of allegiance by Sunni tribes in western Iraq. The general said it is important to differentiate between Sadr, his political party and his militia, on the one hand; and other groups, including some former militia members, who use his name to try to legitimize continuing their attacks.

"I think the way, the best way to characterize Moqtada al-Sadr is that he is the face and the leadership of a very important and legitimate political movement in Iraq," he said. "People cannot cloak their actions in that name.""

Voice of America

In attacking Basra and Sadr's militia, Malicki is pursuing his own sectarian agenda. Thus the Iraqi army only attacks Malicki's current political opponents, the Sadrists and ignores the large militia of his (temporary?) political allies, Hakim's ISCI, and all the other Shia militias in Basra. Thus, he arrests the current Fadilla party governor of Basra province and puts in his own man? All this to strengthen ISCI for the coming provincial elections and the redivision of the spoils in Basra?

What we are seeing is the breakup of the Shia political alliance at the point of a gun by a politically weak and inept politician with autocratic tendencies. Not a good sign for needed political reconciliation. Perhaps autocratic rule is the only way forward for Iraq. But have we backed the right autocrat? Clearly, Petraeus is publicly hedging our bets.

AMac,

Re: the "Iranian" supplied "Steyr" sniper rifles.

Most probably a bogus claim. The U.S. had the rifles but reportedly never even attempted to check their serial numbers with the Austrian manufacturer. Lots of Chinese and other knockoffs on the world arms market. Even if it had been from the Austrian shipment, could easily have been stolen/diverted to the black market.

Most recently the British press is reporting that a single sniper rifle is responsible for the deaths of 7 British soldiers in the Basra region over the last year. The bullets were 5.56mm, manufactured by Lake City Arsenal in the USA. I'm sure we could make a similar case that the Iraqi army was diverting weapons to the insurgency.

PS.

This from wikipedia re the Steyr allegation.

"The U.S. Central Command announced late 2007 that no austrian rifle had been found or seized in Iraq as reported by the Austrian journal "Wiener Zeitung"2 on march 29."

Amac:

It's clear that Iran has suffered far fewer than 50,000 KIA/wounded/missing/POW, because that is a huge number, implying an even huger direct involvement (invasion).

Yes. But hypothetically, suppose that Iran had lost 1000 dead over the last five years. Given Iran's population, would that figure not compare to the 5000 Americans lost? Still wondering what the numbers actually are.

chew2,

I personally suspect that the sniper rifles were indeed ID'd as Steyr-manufactured, but that the US decided not to pursue the matter. Be that as it may, you are right; the record reflects otherwise. I won't trust Wikipedia on any matter as contentious as this, but similar conclusions were reached in June 2007 (allegations made in Feb. 2007) by righty blogger Confederate Yankee.

So, thanks for the correction.

By the way, a search on the subject brought up The Arsenal of the Iraq Insurgency - It's made in China (8/7/07) by John Tkacik of the Weekly Standard. It looks like a reasonable summary of Iran's policy of transhipping Chinese arms to allied Shia militias inside Iraq. There is also a long record of large quantities of Iranian-made munitions turning up in militia caches, e.g. here. It seem as though the Qods Force et al. don't try to disguise their roles in arming anti-government militias, rather, they want their Iraqi adversaries and the U.S. to be very aware of their potential to destabilize their neighbor.

"Iran hasn't sustained 50,000+ casualties in Iraq. Iran hasn't spent 500 billion dollars for war in Iraq. Iran hasn't strained its military to the breaking point in Iraq. Yet Iran has attained its war aims from the Imposed War (1980-88), by means of the US invasion of Iraq."-->Mark Pyruz

The purpose of my casualty count was to point out that unlike the United States, Iran has not sustained 50,000+ casualties in Iraq, since the US invasion in 2003. The actual US casualty count, which includes killed, wounded and evacuated is 50,000+. Furthermore, for all its recent, impressive gains in Iraq, Iran does not show the need to occupy Iraq with large standing military formations, the likes of which are currently stretching certain critical elements of the US military to the breaking point.

aMac,

I followed this story at the time. Later news reports quoted the Austrian manufacturer as stating that it was never contacted by the U.S. So I don't think there is much support for your "personal" suspicion.

Condederate Yankee notes that later report, but doesn't cite it.

Wikipedia is citing to an Austrian newspaper account. It is properly sourced.

"The purpose of my casualty count was to point out that unlike the United States, Iran has not sustained 50,000+ casualties in Iraq, since the US invasion in 2003."

I think Nortius's point is that we dont know how many casualties Iran has sustained, but we do know that if you compare populations each casualty they have sustained is several times more impactful to them. I think an even stronger argument is how much money Iran has spent, which again we can outspend Iran 50 to 1 and they will rue the exchange (our GDP is 50 times bigger than Iran).

"The actual US casualty count, which includes killed, wounded and evacuated is 50,000+."

That number is deceptive. The majority of the wounded returned to duty within 72 hours. According to the latest stats (as of 10am this morning) there have been 3288 Americans KIA, 13,249 wounded, not returned to duty inside 72 hours. By way of comparison there were 12,401 Union casualties (including 2108 killed) in a single day at Antietam. I'm not trying to lessen the tragedy of the incredible people we have lost, but we do need to put it in perspective.

"Furthermore, for all its recent, impressive gains in Iraq, Iran does not show the need to occupy Iraq with large standing military formations,"

What impressive gains would those be, specifically?

Foreign Policy on Why the Surge Doesn't Matter

From Foriegn Policy

"Such critiques miss the larger point. Surge or no surge, it’s extremely doubtful the U.S. occupation can ultimately produce a successful Iraq—a stable, unitary, democratizing state at peace with its neighbors."

Assume your conclusions. Now thats helpful.

"In fact, oil tells us nearly everything we need to know about Iraq’s grim future."

Oh. Ok.

Great piece hypocrisyrules, really insightful. The surge must be a failure because Iraq must be a failure. Why? Oil, or something.

"What impressive gains would those be, specifically?"-->Mark B.

Here are just a few:
-Full diplomatic relations.
-Official state visits by respective heads of state.
-Broad economic ties, in favor of Iran.
-Access to Iraq's holy cities for Iranian pilgrims.
-A US-Iraq political and military stalemate that domestically weakens the US, preventing aggression to be extended into Iran.

hypo, that's from praktike, who was an (extremely smart) antiwar commenter (and occasional contributor) here for quite some time. Prak's views haven't changed, and I'd be interested in asking the antiwar folks the same question that was asked of Petraeus: what facts would convince you that you were wrong? What's disprovable in your hypotheses?

A.L.

AL: Time's arrow, OK? On some issues, there's really no way that the pro-war faction can be right, nor the anti-war faction wrong. As yesterday's example, a MoveOn video of a critical phase within six months—over and over and over again reaching back to 2003. The statute of possibilities has tolled on so many predictions about possible troop withdrawals, Iraqi infrastructure, the establishment of a pro-Israeli Iraqi government, etc. And yet, the same Really Serious Pundits are invited back, without even a cursory investigation into how they could be so wrong so often. (That's 4 different links, BTW.) I still don't see any definition of what "victory" means, especially one attached to a date. It's a little like that silly book Dow 36000, some time before the Earth falls into the Sun the Dow is going to hit 36000, but the authors were completely wrong on when—and denied it later. "Dow" Author James Glassman is still, of course, treated as a Really Serious Person, because credibility is not nearly as important as cheerleading. And, surprise, surprise, he's at the American Enterprise Institute, home of liars and fabulists as well as the merely mistaken.

Nevertheless, even against this backdrop, I think it would be a good exercise for me to state events that might occur that would disconfirm my current view of Iraq. So here is a partial list:

  • The Iraqi government enacts and implements most of the legislation for which the surge was supposed to create breathing room. E.g., oil revenue sharing law.
  • Clear evidence that the Sadrists are weakened, e.g., militia surrender of weapons as demanded by the Maliki government.
  • Any sort of sustained improvement in oil or electricity production.
  • Evidence that the Iraqi police and army could replace American soldiers, who could then come home.
And let me ask again: other than not leaving, what does victory entail, and is there any reason other than praying for a comparative Sitzfleisch advantage to think it is any closer than last month or last year?

[It will be a miracle if I closed all the tags. Preview mode?!]

Norton and Mark,

Seems like a pretty ridiculous and tangential argument that you all are having about the supposedly high costs being incurred by Iran in whatever activities they are engaged in in Iraq. Norton argues that we don't know what those costs are, then you both go on to imply they are somehow high and debilitating. Talk about an argument that needs some supporting data not to be laughable at first glance, and pointless in it's further pursuit.

AJL, I'd feel so much better about your argument if you said, instead:

"On some issues, there's really no way that the pro-war or anti-war faction can be conclusively proved right, nor the pro-war or anti-war faction wrong."

A.L.

"Here are just a few:"
-Full diplomatic relations.
-Official state visits by respective heads of state.
-Broad economic ties, in favor of Iran.
-Access to Iraq's holy cities for Iranian pilgrims.

Not exactly the stuff of Napoleon, eh? Now how does any of that make Iran a stronger nation-state, and more importantly how could any of that not happen indefinately with Iraq being the next door neighbor?

-A US-Iraq political and military stalemate that domestically weakens the US, preventing aggression to be extended into Iran.

That of course remains to be seen. Its also an open question as to whether that was ever a legitimate danger for Iran.

Moreover, you cant discount the fact that Iran has a LOT of chips in this pot. I would equate it to collecting pennies in front of a steamroller. Iran has to consider if they push the US too far (particularly with the nuclear issue on the table) their end results could be anything from an oil blockade to smart bombs raining down on their leadership. That is not in Iran's interest. And short of that a stable, prosperous Iraq friendly to the US would end up as a massive waste of Iranian resources, and apparently Iran's economy isnt so hot.

So Iran has an embassy and the pleasure of seeing a few GIs shot up. Their influence in Iraq isnt what everyone thought if Sadr's current political isolation is any reflection.
I wouldn't call that 'impressive' certainly. A mixed bag at best, and a lot of assumptions to put Iran firmly in the winner catagory thus far.

"Talk about an argument that needs some supporting data not to be laughable at first glance, and pointless in it's further pursuit."

I'm not making that argument. I'm making an assertion: dollar for dollar, whatever resources Iran is devoting to Iraq are more hard won than what the US is devoting, simply by the size, wealth, and power of the respective countries. I think that is indesputable.

Im not saying in absolute terms that Iran is devoting more resources, which I agree is ludicrious. I am saying its entirely possible they are in a worse position to spend them than we are (think the Cold War). Without data, I agree, its an open question.

Mark,

I took it as relative costs; that you guys were implying (in the absence of any data) that the burden was relatively more debilitating to the Iranians than it was to us. It still needs supporting data to pass the laugh test.

I hesitate to mention this, since it may extend the silly argument, but the loss of an Iranian soldier's life is far less costly to the Iranian state, than an American soldier's is to the American state. We are a casualty averse society now.

"that you guys were implying (in the absence of any data) that the burden was relatively more debilitating to the Iranians than it was to us. It still needs supporting data to pass the laugh test."

I'm implying that it is possible. And I am flat out stating that the majority of analysis by the anti-war factions completely ignore the cost to Iran at all, so any cost applied at all will swing the scales automatically to some degree.

I dont find this argument silly, i think Iran's positionn in this is extremely important. And the cost aspect to an Iran with significant financial problems and a weary population shouldnt be ignored as completely as it often is. Fighting proxy wars can be expensive.

A.L.,

Bottom line, with the money spent in Iraq already, we could very far to completely overhauling our energy grid system, over the last four years. You remember that Wired article about the energy grid I linked to, awhile back? That you completely agreed with?

To fund the creation of that, would have taken less money than has been pumped into Iraq, so far. It would have created an umpteen number of green jobs here at home - a lot of which would have supported the type of democratic labor forces which you - claim - to support. And, it would have weaned a lot of our dependence on foreign oil, setting an example that the rest of the world could follow. Additionally, we could have taken on the challenge of global warming, here, and instituted programs with other nations to do similar things.

So we're ALREADY behind the eight ball. We're ALREADY wasting the nation's cash, lives.

As far as "disprovable" - this invasion to Iraq was disproven, with the false linkages of Saddam and Al Queda, the false hyping of weapons of mass destruction, the absolute joke of the post-invasion planning, the clear priorities displayed by the Bush administration, when U.S. troops protected the oil fields, the oil ministries, and little else, right after the collaps of the Saddam government. When 4 million Iraqis have been displaced over the last 5 years, or have left the country. When the U.S., besides killing a lot of Iraqis themselves, kicked off, with the post-occupation FUBAR's, the since deaths of over half a million Iraqis.

Oh, but yes, I agree - the violence in Iraq has reduced over this year. I've studied the charts.

From the article:

Building a decent political order in Iraq has always been something of a fantasy. Even if Petraeus somehow succeeds in bringing violence down to a manageable level, it may be generations before Iraq becomes the “dramatic and inspiring example of freedom” in the Middle East that President Bush has repeatedly invoked. Instead, it will most likely evolve into a country plagued by instability, ethnosectarian violence, weak institutions, and unreliable oil production—if we’re lucky. Few Americans would support spending $12 billion a month in Iraq if they understood that they were buying, at best, another Nigeria, and at worst, Somalia with oil.

On what evidence do you doubt that conclusion? How many more billions of dollars and U.S. lives are you willing to spend, to get that conclusion? As the article says in the next graph:

Supporters of the Iraq war, however, should know better. Many of them seem to have forgotten the work of scholars like NYU political scientist Adam Przeworski, who has written extensively about the relationship between wealth and democracy. Above a per capita income of $6,055, Przeworski finds, “democracies last forever.” But below that threshold, democracies are more fragile. Iraq’s GDP per capita today is a paltry $3,600, but even that low figure is misleading. When a country depends so heavily on oil revenues, its GDP per capita says little about its real level of development (Equatorial Guinea, technically speaking, is the 12th-richest country in the world). Przeworski’s research therefore excludes major oil-producers, which have their own set of problems.

So really, WHAT are you hoping to achieve? What is your definition of victory?

Mark Buehner,

You haven't even TRIED to grasp with what that article says. And in your small graph, you misrepresent. Get back to me when you are advancing a serious argument.

AL

"what facts would convince you that you were wrong? What's disprovable in your hypotheses?

A.L."

That depends on what my hypotheses were. One key assumption that I made was that Sadaam was never a serious security threat to the United States such that a preemptive/preventive war to remove him was required for our national security. I even assumed he had many of the "WMD" that he was alleged to have had, although I doubted those claims at the time.

I read no analysis at the time by any knowledgeable military analyst that he was such a military threat. I had always assumed some study existed somewhere, whether classified or not. I'd love to read it if it exists.

Of course, even if he had had those WMD, we'd still be pretty much where we are now, stuck in a quagmire.

The democratization argument I never took seriously, and saw simply as a rationalization of our good intentions and subsequent required occupation of Iraq. We couldn't install an authoritarian regime could we?

On the other hand if you are asking about the "surge". I will confess I was pessimistic about it even lessening the levels of violence, which it has, because based on conventional COIN metrics it involved too few troops. I did not anticipate the strength of the Anbar awakening. But I argued that once we reduced the surge levels, as we would be required to do because of the burden on the Army, we would be back where we started. Stuck in Lodi again. I'm a little more optimistic that the Anbar Awaking types will stay bought for the next year at least, but then what? Have we now allied with the Sunni's against the Shia.

But strategically the surge is still a conceptual mess. What is the political/military end point? Malicki and what else?

"You haven't even TRIED to grasp with what that article says. And in your small graph, you misrepresent. Get back to me when you are advancing a serious argument."

I challenge anyone who cares to to read that single page claiming to logically destroy the possibility of a stable, democratic Iraq and come away looking at it as anything but assuming its own conclusions as though that wraps everything up in a neat little bow. THAT is unserious.

"But strategically the surge is still a conceptual mess."

Particularly if you dont understand it.

"What is the political/military end point? Malicki and what else?"

Its these things they have every so often in a Democracy. We always do it on a Tuesday for some reason. Oh, yeah, the elections.

That's the little detail you guys keep forgetting when equating Maliki to a dictator and the government to a faction.

Its also another great reason to keep American troops in Iraq. So long as we are present, there will be a democratic government and there will be elections.

And before i get jumped on- I mean that in the context of the surge and the near future of Iraq. Within the next few years the Iraqi government will have established a strong enough democracy with enough federated power devolved to its governates to take care of itself. If we stay the course.

AL, there are certainly some claims of the antiwar crowd that were wrong, wrong in the sense that it is either impossible (because they are in the past) or extremely unlikely that they can occur. For example, the overestimate of casualties that the Saddam Iraqi Army would inflict in conventional warfare. (Of course, we didn't know that Iraqi soldiers had been promised fair treatment if they deserted, just as you didn't know we were double-crossing them when we disbanded and stopped paying the army down to the lowest private—a blunder whose source has never been revealed, but which appears to be a Cheney-Chalabi alliance.) However, I don't see any general symmetry between the mistakes and misjudgments of one group and another. Whatever greater wisdom isolated war advocates may have, the movement as a whole, through the Bush Administration and its B-Team at AEI and other think tanks, has been wrong about everything important. Wrong about the duration. Wrong about the cost. Wrong about sectarian conflict. Wrong about the secular nature of Iraq (status of Iraqi women?!). Wrong about power centers within the country. Here are excerpts from Bush's speech announcing the surge.
To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November [2007]. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's constitution.
I believe that there was partial reform of the de-Baathification lustration law and a complete zero on the other items. Yet somehow, the surge is a "success"?! Perhaps we should look for what Bush was really thinking. The Iraq Study Group called for, basically, admitting we failed in our goals. Just at that moment, the AEI came to Bush with yet another double-down alternative that would enable him to drag Iraq out until the next Administration. For Bush, delay meant he could avoid admitting that he had failed and stick it to his dad's friends on the ISG at the same time. At that, he has succeeded. So what?

"For Bush, delay meant he could avoid admitting that he had failed and stick it to his dad's friends on the ISG at the same time. At that, he has succeeded. So what?"

Its this kind of nonsense that just really ruins a perfectly good argument. Why follow up an engaging post with tinfoil hatism? Dont attribute malice to what can be perfectly well explained by ineptitude, and there has been plenty of that to go around.

But I understand the dilemna- if the policies that ultimately the President was responsible for were horribly flawed for 4 years, what happens when there is a sea change and suddenly competance rears its ugly head? Of course if you an argue that the president is acting in bad faith, that solves your problem. But it does ruin your credibility with most people in America.

Mark, the tone is different, but the same view of the Surge vs. the ISG is available in pro-Bush material.
The presence of former secretary of state James Baker, a longtime Bush family friend, on the commission was viewed in Washington and around the world as significant. [snip] Baker was seen as providing cover for Bush to order a gradual retreat from Iraq. But retreat was the furthest thing from Bush's mind. "This is very trite," he told me [Fred Barnes of the Weekly Standard]. "Failure was no option… I never thought I had to give up the goal of winning." He wanted one more chance to win.
Barnes' acumen may be judged by the following (same link)
But should progress continue to the point that American troops begin coming home in large numbers and Iraq emerge as a reasonably secure democracy, a possibility arises: that because of his surge decision, Bush not only won the war in Iraq but saved his presidency.
It's only about three months since that was written, but it's already acknowledged that American troop levels will stay pretty much where they are to the end of the Bush Presidency. Do you think Barnes will admit this shortfall means Bush didn't save his presidency, or do you think he will move the goalposts and will still call Bush a success as long as he wasn't forced to admit error and withdraw? You don't suppose that if President Obama withdraws American troops and Iraq continues not to be a reasonably secure democracy, there might be a stab-in-the-back legend that we almost did it and just a few more years of Republican grit and determination would have finished the job?

Bush was able to ignore the ISG recommendations and continue with his own long-failed plan. A great triumph over his father, Baker, et. al. Over terrorism, not so much.

Let me remind you of my metaphor from another thread: Bush is like a gambler who has a huge bankroll and he believes that no matter how far behind he is, he hasn't "lost" until he leaves the table, because even though the game is fixed, he might still get very lucky. He can even "defeat" his family and friends trying to drag him away from the table, but that isn't "winning" as it was originally defined. The ISG was an attempt to mark-to-market Bush's results. Needless to say, he wasn't interested.

Mark,

In your democracy assertion, I think the best case you've got to go with, is the Phillipines, in terms of analogy. That's probably the closest American equivalent, to what is happening now. (No false japan or germany analogies).

But even then, Iraq is surrounded by countries that will continue to pursue their own interests in Iraq, and use their influence and proximity, to do the same.

But anyway, what are your examples of an invasion by a larger power, creating democracy, that fits the Iraqi situation?

That's the first thing. How can you think it's not blind faith, on your part?

The second thing - the cost to even have the minimalist government that you are looking for. Why do you prefer to spend 12 billion in Iraq a month, to putting that money into the United States, for universal health care, or for guaranteeing social security, or for fixing and modernizing the infrastructure of the United States? There is a lot of research about how many people die, in the United States, either prematurely, or because of chronic conditions that are hard to take care of, if you can only access emergency coverage. Shouldn't the United States citizens come first?

Not to mention, putting the cost of this occupation on our children and grandchildren. What's the justification for paying this occupation on the nation's credit card?

Not to mention - what about the strain on our soldiers? Either increase the number of soldiers - and PAY FOR IT BY HIGHER TAXES - or leave it.

I really just don't get it.

Chew2:

Norton

That's Nort, or Nortius; not Norton...

Seems like a pretty ridiculous and tangential argument that you all are having about the supposedly high costs being incurred by Iran in whatever activities they are engaged in in Iraq. Norton argues that we don't know what those costs are

I don't/didn't argue at all. I asked: what are the casualty figures for Iraq, if anyone knows.

It's only tangential as a question inasmuch as even the much-thrown-about 50k number for US casualties is apparently not accurate (when speaking about injuries severe enough to involve more than 72 hours off duty), suggesting the possibility that the 50k number is worse than tangential. But I might be wrong about that.

I just asked a question of someone who has so far not responded.

Whatever else you make of what I have written is your problem, not mine, as far as I can see. I already have said I didn't intend to derail the other points such as they were. I still think the question I asked is an interesting and difficult one.

Nortius,

Sorry about the name.

No, I took your "question" as a rhetorical argument, since Mark picked it up and ran with it as such. However, the fact that you keep asking for a response from the original poster suggests you also are also treating it as a rhetorical device to discredit his arguments.

If it was just meant just as a question, then I'll ignore it since I have no useful data, and apparently no one else does either.

hypo,

"Either increase the number of soldiers - and PAY FOR IT BY HIGHER TAXES - or leave it."

That has always been my challenge to the pro-invasion crowd, also. Politically, they've never called for national sacrifice. But that is partly a function of Republican party politics. The low taxes/free lunch/borrow and spend crowd is just too strong a constituency. So they are left with the rhetorical breast beating for "victory", while shortchanging the actual national building effort. They won one election with that tactic, I don't think they can win another.

Politically, they've never called for national sacrifice.

Not like the Carthaginians. In wartime, the Carthaginians sacrificed children to Baal, burning them alive in front of their mothers. The mother was expected to watch without shedding a tear.

But the Carthaginians lost anyway. Three times. In fact, there are no more Carthaginians. That should be a lesson to you - those blood-thirsty pagan looter gods are no damn good.

Chew: If it was more than a question, it was only in an effort to try to point some discussion into actual data gathering as distinct from {rhetorical use of factoids in an effort to hammer the opposition}. I think the numbers later unearthed about how the US serious casualty numbers differ from the 50k number often bruited about was ample payoff. Yeah, let's drop it.

Afterthought: it's of course also possible that long term things like subacute brain damage from IED hits will make the true casualty number different still.

A slightly different take on this, and one I've expressed before (sorry for banging this drum again):

The war in Iraq was a mistake, compounded by the idiotic policies (over-enthusiastic de-Baathification for one) carried out by the occupying forces. But that's in the past, and we are now stuck with the situation.

And that means that money and lives will continue to be spent. Some here have called for taxes to be raised, to be spent on the military. Here I disagree. The central problem of the entire Middle East is astronomical amounts of money in the hands of Dark Ages barbarians that did absolutely nothing to earn it. So any extra money that should be spent, should be spent on prizes (of really significant size - high nine figures to low ten) for various means of achieving energy independence. And the West, particularly the USA, is rich enough to spend at least some on just about all the approaches that might work. (1% of the cash so far spent on Iraq is approximately six and a half billion dollars!)

Once America and the West in general is independent of the barbarians, then who in the name of all the hells cares whether the barbarians kill each other? Simply seize all the assets they have in civilised countries, kick all of the non-citizen barbarians out of civilisation, ban any "religious" practises that we can (example: halal meat), make the building of new temples to the barbarian god illegal, and let them rot. And never, under any circumstances whatsoever, let any of them into space.

I was unsure here whether to use the term "barbarians" or "savages". They are somewhere between the two. Maybe in another thousand years or so, when the civilised West is spread from Mercury to the Oort cloud, they will be ready for democracy. Until then, to paraphrase: "The whole of their stinking country isn't worth the bones of one Western soldier".

"But anyway, what are your examples of an invasion by a larger power, creating democracy, that fits the Iraqi situation?"

The problem with that game is that obviously no two historical examples are ever identical, and that being the case anything you point to can easily be rebutted with a simple 'but that was different because of X'. Unless you are willing to stipulate beforehand exactly what would exclude any given example, its a pointless exercise.

IE- Iraq has oil and Malaya only had papayas, so obviously you cant compare the two.

Fletcher, Amen to most of what you said. I completely agree that the handling of the occupation was a disaster, and I maintain that that is because of the ridiculous notion that you can turn a primitive tribal culture into a modern liberal democracy. And I, too, fantasize about developing energy independence and letting them eat oil. However, at this point energy idependence is just that, a fantasy, and it probably will be for the foreseeable future. I also don't believe the invasion itself was a mistake, precisely because we are dealing with tribal barbarians. They understand nothing but brute force; they can smell fear, and they attack when they sense weakness. After 911 we simply couldn't afford to let them keep their image of us as fearful and weak. We had to put a stop to the feeding frenzy that started, I would argue, in 1979 in Tehran. The tragedy is, it was working. We got Syria out of Lebanon. We got AQ Kahn. We got Libya to get rid of its WMD. But we were hoist on the petard of our own idealism. I think the only answer is to abandon that idealism and support whatever brute looks to be most likely to take charge in Iraq because only a brute can govern in such a place.

It continues to look as though Moqtada Al-Sadr is not doing well. (link)

"Unknown militants had seized Butler and his interpreter from their hotel in the centre of Basra. The interpreter was freed within days.

"The Iraqi army stormed the house and overcame my guards and then burst through the door," said Butler, smiling broadly and surrounded by Iraqi officials in pictures shown on Iraqiya state television."
...
"The kidnapping of Butler, one of the few Westerners who dared to venture out in Basra in years without a military convoy, was a symbol of the rampant lawlessness in a city that controls Iraq's only port and 80 percent of its oil revenue.

Basra has been quieter in recent days and the Iraqi forces have been conducting raids in militia-controlled neighborhoods."

Reuters

An Instapundit Iraq correspondent Major John Tammes (link):

"The sweeps through Basrah continue. I am often at locations where Iraqi Army troops are returning, or heading out to the city. I have attached a couple of photos of them."
"During my work, I watch them to gauge their mood/morale and the state of their equipment and can say that it is "so far, so good". The next days and weeks will be a good measure of the progress the IA has made - can they sustain operations, not just conduct them. We will learn an awful lot about where our Iraqi allies are in terms of their logistical progress. They seem to have the political will, and I hope they have the physical means to continue forward."

It seems to me that as long as political will holds out, the government almost has to be logistically superior. The government-sustained forces don't have to be perfect. They only have to be better than Moqtada Al-Sadr's mob.

_Basra residents welcome Iraq army crackdown
8 hours ago_

BASRA, Iraq (AFP) — Three weeks after Iraqi troops swarmed into the southern city of Basra to take on armed militiamen who had overrun the streets, many residents say they feel safer and that their lives have improved.

The fierce fighting which marked the first week of Operation Sawlat al-Fursan (Charge of the Knights) has given way to slower, more focused house-by-house searches by Iraqi troops, which led on Monday to the freeing of an abducted British journalist.

Residents say the streets have been cleared of gunmen, markets have reopened, basic services have been resumed and a measure of normality has returned to the oil-rich city.

The port of Umm Qasr is in the hands of the Iraqi forces who wrested control of the facility from Shiite militiamen, and according to the British military it is operational once again.

AFP

Wonder what Basra would have look like if Maliki hadnt suffered such a decisive defeat and sued for peace and pardon at Sadr feet...

Leave a comment

Here are some quick tips for adding simple Textile formatting to your comments, though you can also use proper HTML tags:

*This* puts text in bold.

_This_ puts text in italics.

bq. This "bq." at the beginning of a paragraph, flush with the left hand side and with a space after it, is the code to indent one paragraph of text as a block quote.

To add a live URL, "Text to display":http://windsofchange.net/ (no spaces between) will show up as Text to display. Always use this for links - otherwise you will screw up the columns on our main blog page.




Recent Comments
  • TM Lutas: Jobs' formula was simple enough. Passionately care about your users, read more
  • sabinesgreenp.myopenid.com: Just seeing the green community in action makes me confident read more
  • Glen Wishard: Jobs was on the losing end of competition many times, read more
  • Chris M: Thanks for the great post, Joe ... linked it on read more
  • Joe Katzman: Collect them all! Though the French would be upset about read more
  • Glen Wishard: Now all the Saudis need is a division's worth of read more
  • mark buehner: Its one thing to accept the Iranians as an ally read more
  • J Aguilar: Saudis were around here (Spain) a year ago trying the read more
  • Fred: Good point, brutality didn't work terribly well for the Russians read more
  • mark buehner: Certainly plausible but there are plenty of examples of that read more
  • Fred: They have no need to project power but have the read more
  • mark buehner: Good stuff here. The only caveat is that a nuclear read more
  • Ian C.: OK... Here's the problem. Perceived relevance. When it was 'Weapons read more
  • Marcus Vitruvius: Chris, If there were some way to do all these read more
  • Chris M: Marcus Vitruvius, I'm surprised by your comments. You're quite right, read more
The Winds Crew
Town Founder: Left-Hand Man: Other Winds Marshals
  • 'AMac', aka. Marshal Festus (AMac@...)
  • Robin "Straight Shooter" Burk
  • 'Cicero', aka. The Quiet Man (cicero@...)
  • David Blue (david.blue@...)
  • 'Lewy14', aka. Marshal Leroy (lewy14@...)
  • 'Nortius Maximus', aka. Big Tuna (nortius.maximus@...)
Other Regulars Semi-Active: Posting Affiliates Emeritus:
Winds Blogroll
Author Archives
Categories
Powered by Movable Type 4.23-en