I found the latter article very interesting. I think Drezner makes a mistake though, in under-estimating the influence neo-conservatives and democracy pusher have in the White House. There are many people who have the President's ear who do not hold cabinent positions, yet still have influence. While not a neo-con, Bernard Lewis certainly has influenced Bush. Others have as well.

A happy Pesach to all.

Now for some disagreement.

There's some good stuff in article #2, but like all political science typologies, it is less useful than it seems.

First, I believe that despite the rhetoric of his speechwriters, Bush is more of a Cheney/Rumsfeld than a Boot/Wolfowitz. Operation "sovereignty no matter what" would seem to indicate this, as would the limited nature of our Afghanistan commitment and the ongoing Operation "Don't Support Latin American Democracies." But in any case, the exigencies of responding to a continuing series of crises and operating in a hyper-political environment makes it difficult to pin Bush down ideologically. At a minimum, Drezner is too glib here.

European elites are skeptical that even a concerted effort will lead to genuine transformation in the Middle East anytime soon.

Now, as Drezner hints, the major reason that specific neoconservatives have lost influence in the administration, and will continue to do so, is that their rosy postwar scenarios did not pan out and their allies in the INC have proven to be an embarrassment to the administration. There are already reports that Bush is siding with the CIA wrt Chalabi. As such, the necons have become not only political lightning rods, but also their judgement is suspect. For instance, Condi's NSC-Iraq power grab was probably indicative of a loss of confidence in Wolfowitz at the top. Anyone know what Feith is up to these days?

As for the rest of the article, I disagree with the way Drezner is characterizing Kerry's constraints. Too narrowly construed and too narrowly focused.

I would stipulate that Kerry has more options for bringing in outside help at this point than Bush, who is political poison to just about any European politician he touches right now.

Then, Drezner's limited framework forces him to ignore the two most serious constraints common to both politicians: an American public not eager for further adventures, and a military stretched and unhappy. Whether we are suceeding or not, it sure looks increasingly to the general public that we are not, as the latest PEW results show. The latest deployment orders aren't going to sit too well, and the Special Ops guys are going to wear out if they don't get a breather.

I won't get into the Israel stuff.

A good analysis praktike. I agree with your last part especially, Bush is poison to most Euro politicians, and Kerry is not. However, I would argue that anyone but Bush would have a much easier time, largely because the media, mostly in Europe and a little less in America, has demonized him. Someone with similar politics but a different face to the Euro media would not have the problems Bush would have.

FH- There is no reason why the POTUS job should be "easy". In fact, most people vote for who they think can make "hard decisions".

praktike- If you avoid the Israelis, you've just avoided a prime example of genuine transformation in the Mid East. Notwithstanding the regional issues which Zionism poises, internal Israeli politics have been transformed radically over the past decades, largely speaking for the better. If the Arabs ever got over their ethnic and religious prejudices, they might look at Israel as an example rather than as an adversary.

A second issue is in your summaries of the American public and military. I work for the military, and in aggregate they are stretched but not unhappy. Media reports about low morale often forget that it is a major function of the enlisted ranks to complain about virtually all aspects of service life. That is how change is usually initiated. Your analysis of the US public's appetite for foreign intervention forgets that in 2000, GWB's principle critique of WJC's foreign policy was that it had dissipated US forces on non strategic interests. Consequently the initial controversies over NATO relations prior to 9/11. Who wudda thunk it possible for GWB to spin on a dime and get majority support for one of the most radical series of US force projections since WW II?

Tom, perhaps you're right about the enlisted folks, but I think the reservists are probably a little less upbeat. But if the point is that our current rotations are a constraint on action, I think "stretched" is probably an adequate condition, no? The fact that we have 130,000 guys in Iraq and 13,000 in Afghanistan no doubt ties our hands a bit.

... Who wudda thunk it possible for GWB to spin on a dime and get majority support for one of the most radical series of US force projections since WW II?

(1) September 11th
(2) WMDs

Otherwise, no dice.

I tend to agree with praktike's analysis of the Drezner article. I have never been an optimist about the prospects for a quick reformation in the Middle East. I would go farther by asking this question: who are the likely members of a Kerry administration cabinet? Clue: there won't be any Senators.

I think it's overwhelmingly likely that President Kerry will tap Democrats for key defense and foreign policy roles. And given the prevailing positions within the party they are likely to be multi-lateralists as well as former anti-war activists.

Extra credit question: did Clinton tap Cohen for Secretary of Defense in a gesture of bi-partisanship or because he couldn't find any credible Democrats willing to take the job?

Drezner is a smart guy, and write interesting analyses, but I have a quibble with a statement from the second article:

These nations [France and Germany]will be happy to cooperate in the immediate matters of blocking terrorist financing and curbing nuclear proliferation.

Considering the track record of the countries in question (specifically regarding sales of "dual use" technologies to dodgy regimes) I think the proliferation issue isn't as cut-and-dried as Drezner implies.

Dave, I think it's fair to say that Clinton suffered from a dearth of talent on the Democratic side, after 12 years in the foreign policy wilderness.

praktike:

My point exactly. Will Kerry fare better?

Will Kerry fare better?

There's some quality out there at this point: Strobe Talbott, Richard Holbrooke, Rand Beers, Anthony Lake, Michael O'Hanlon, Bill Perry, Wesley Clarke, Biden, Bob Graham, Sandy Berger, etc.

I'm sure there are some shots to be taken at these guys, but at least they aren't convicted criminals, eh?

Hi.

I really liked Dan's article -- it was clear and eloquent -- a rarity in political discourse nowadays.

I take issue with it, in two ways:

1. He says that because there is largely agreement on the substance of foreign policy, we won't see much difference betwen Bush and Kerry, except of course in rhetoric, tendancies, etc. This is wrong. Foreign policy is relatively stable across administrations because it is largely event-driven. There's agreement on the substance of policy because of that. So, to vote on foreign policy is to vote on three things which determine any reaction to events abroad, in order of importance:

- the character of the candidate
- the experience of the candidate
- the people the candidate will attract, hire and get help from ("advisors")

Dan largely ignores the first two, and concentrates on the third. This is a mistake in the case of an analysis on Bush and Kerry because the third factor -- who your advisors are -- is first of all, less important than the first two factors (character and experience) and second, will be far more important in the case of Bush than Kerry, as Kerry has far more experience in foreign policy -- factor two -- than Bush. (Experience as in depth of understanding of the issues, depth of thought on the issues, and interaction with them.) So, far more important to understanding how foreign policy will be run is to examine first, character, second, experience, and then advisors.

It's like character is the core of decision-making, experience is the vertical foundation relied upon, and advisors are the horizontal support. If you think of it in simplistic hawk and dove terms, you might get something like this:

Bush -

Character: Hawk
Experience: Dove
Advisors: Hawk

Kerry -

Character: Hawk ("hero")
Experience: Hawk
Advisors: Dove

Analyzing all three together, or even just the first two (and in the case of Bush, include the third), would be far more informative in determining the direction Bush or Kerry's foreign policy will take. Also, it should be noted that inertia from his first term will probably largely determine Bush's path, whereas Kerry has the right to set a new one, within the constraints provided by the incumbent and events abroad.

2. I read somewhere concerning the Greater Middle East Initiative that the Europeans, excluding the French, were delighted that America was showing interest in using soft power to reform the Middle East. (The French were weary not of the initiative but of the person who was advocating it.) Indeed, that the Europeans already had numerous initiatives underway and were really looking forward to talking to the US about cooperation, though they were slightly afraid that America's involvement might taint chances of success. I would really like to know more and since I didn't keep the article, don't know names of people or organizations, though certainly Fischer of Germany was excited about it. It was clear from what they were saying (ministers) that Europe was aware of the problem and had already been pumping money and people into it, though how involved they were wasn't clear. This is definitely something that can be expanded upon.

Actually I'm not very satisfied with my hawk/dove analysis above. Certainly it's simplistic, so that's annoying, but also I believe Bush may be a dove in character and Kerry may be a dove in experience -- this latter one I don't know since I don't know enough about his past, though I know he protested the Vietnam War after coming back to the States. But then he's best friends with John McCain who doesn't strike me as someone who would jive well with dove characters, and supposedly Kerry can play mean ball politically. He also hunts, plays hockey, other extreme sports, etc. which from my personal experience says a lot about character. Others have opinions?

praktike,

Do you really think the Saud clan will continue to rule Saudia Arabia ten years from now?

If the Saud clan is not in power in what is presently called Saudi Arabia ten years from now, how would that not "constitute genuine transformation in the Middle East"? (for good or ill)

Follow the money.

Dave & praktike,

The Democrats had and have a dearth of qualified people for civilian DOD positions, which is a narrower set than "national security" positions. Les Aspin commented on this when he was Secretary of Defense.

The reason seems to have been that the whole defense/military area of government was abandoned by ambitious Democrats after the Carter administration, possibly as a result of the Vietnam War. An argument can be made, however, that these ambitious types simply preferred domestic policy issues for their career tracks. Either way, the Democrats clearly are hurting here.

Do you really think the Saud clan will continue to rule Saudia Arabia ten years from now?

Yes.

But you're splitting hairs.

Drezner clearly means positive progress. The collapse of the House of Saud could bode very ill indeed. I'd rather see it slowly reform from within, if such a thing is possible, than see Saudi Arabia turn into the Sunni version of Iran.

praktike,

Collapse of the "House of Saud" bodes ill only for those who like the Middle East's status quo. The U.S. government no longer favors the latter. The U.S. is now a revolutionary power.

Sure slow reform of Saudi Arabia from within would be nice. So would a lot of things. But when the Saudi Ministry of Labor reports that only 10% of the 5.8 million Saudi labor force consists of Saudi citizens, and there are @ 19 million Saudi citizens, any pleasant outcome here is unlikely to say the least.

BTW, the major oil-producing areas of Saudi Arabia have majority Shiite Arab populations. Can you think of any major powers who are trying to secure alliances with Shiite Arabs?

Praktike, you certainly have a different idea of what "quality" means than I do! What a sorry list of names...

I suspect Drezner underestimates how far democratisation as a policy has it's own dynamic. Realists (at least the more realistic ones :) may decide to adopt it as the 'least-worst' option.
They may fear it will fail (I certainly fear that) but stasis has already failed; unless a way is found out of the current socio-political logjams in Middle Eastern states, then it seems inevitable they will fester, fuel radicalism, then erupt.
The ruling elites are attempting to play a complex game of diversion and repression that is unsustainable in the long term.

Saudi Arabia is the exemplar of this; Islamism is simultaneously a safety-valve, a partner, an alibi, and an enemy.

The best hope is that if a constitutional, law-based democracy can emerge in Iraq, other regimes can be persuaded to reform of their own accord. If so, no further interventions may be necessary.

But that is a huge IF. The rulers may well be either too fearful (ie Egypt), too institutionally psychotic (ie Iran), or both (ie Saudi Arabia and Syria). If Iran cannot be deflected from to pursuit of nuclear weapons, by internal revolt or deterrence, is almost certainly a war waiting to happen.

As for Europe, Kori suggests that "the French were weary not of the initiative but of the person who was advocating it."

I believe this is incorrect; the Quai d'Orsay is taffed by professionals. To them "it's nothing personal, it's just business."

They're pursuing the French national interest as they see it, within Europe first, in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world secondly.

IMHO this is based on a massive miscalculation, one that has it's roots at some fifty years back, and is the fundamental divergence of British and French foreign policy: France sees the US as a competitor and a challenge.

Changing that deep-seated attitude is not going to be easy. The best way to modify French behaviour, if not policy, is going to be by wooing Germany. But that is going to be extremely difficult, for any President. Germany will always shy away from war and troop deployments, especially with a weak left-of-centre government.
The pacifist streak and related 'bombing psychosis' is a mainstream element oif german politics; while the more radical German left has long had an even stronger element of anti-militarism entwined with anti-Americanism and 'Third-Worldism'.

In a crisis, a German government will be strongly drawn to grasp the 'European' security blanket of saying 'me too' to France.
A good deal of French policy since the pre-invasion crisis at the UN has been aimed at both keeping Paris and Berlin together, and maximising discord between both and Washington.

This is not going to alter just there might be a Democrat in the White House. Similarly, European initiatives have had a component of encouraging social development in the Middle East. But insofar as France has been able to influence it, this has played a distant second to concrete economic gains, and achieving a diplomatic edge over the US with whatever regimes are in play.

It's a silly game, but one France has determined to play. Of course, this does not rule out coperation on anti-terrorist security and intelligence.
It does make any attempt to agree on a strategy to lance the boil of underlying problems immensely difficult.

My conclusions; Drezner may be right about short term differences due to advisors etc.
But in the longer run any US foreign policy strategy is likely to follow lines determined by underlying realities.
Problem could be, if either excessive 'unrealistic realism' or pursuit of elusive multilateralism lead to delay that making problems worse when they have to be faced.

John Farren:

An extremely strong comment. Thank you.

This is not going to alter just there might be a Democrat in the White House.

I think that many of Kerry's supporter will be bitterly disappointed at this. Not the least of these will be John Kerry.