There are no easy answers, and what makes it worse is what one might call "expectations creep." No serious person believes that Pakistani or Nigerian units can "replace" American units. Unfortunately, there are some non-serious people out there, and some of these occupy decision-making or -influencing positions.

Other unsustainable expectations that seem to be gaining currency are: (1) by this time, American soldiers shouldn't be dying in Iraq; (2) there can be and should be enough troops on the ground to prevent major terrorist attacks.

Our ground forces in Iraq will continue to sustain casualties. What matters is that these troops be committed to doing what they do best -- going after the bad guys. Using American soldiers and marines to stand guard at every potential soft target is a dreadful idea, and surely just what the enemy hopes for.

I wonder if we've asked the Brazilians? or Argentines? or Chileans?

If there is one place that needs to be Brazilianized, it's Iraq.

I'd say Iran is far more in need of Brazilianization. Quick Quiz: how many people would like to see CNN newsbabe Rudi Baktiar in a Brazilian outfit? See? I rest my case.

How's your son doing over there, Klaatu?

Send in the Iraqis!

The "end state" has to be Iraqis taking responsibility for their lives and their societies.

I have no inherent problem with less-capable international troops providing security in areas, so long as they remain under command of the US, and so long as the US continues to provide non-security services (e.g. institutional development, infrastructure construction, etc.). It may even give the locals a clear idea that the Americans / Brits are a pretty good deal compared to the alternatives.

I think GEN Abizaid's strategy is correct: Limit the US footprint, as it is sufficient for its missions. Enhance indigenous forces. Improve intelligence networks.

The Iraqi road is yet quite long. Car bombs will continue to kill people in Iraq. Our soldiers will continue to die from hostile fire. The real wildcards are whether the thugs can successfully set Iraqi against one another, as they seem so far unsuccessful in setting Iraqis against the occupying powers.

MG

PS: I don't think we are stretched as "thin" as some suggest. Considering the likely combat missions (N. Korea, Afghanistan), we are okay for a while yet. OTOH, if causus belli against Syria and Saudi were to develop, then we would need to mobilize further.

Yes, Joe, we need to Brazilianize Iran and Saudi Arabia, too. As an amateur Brazilian, I think we should Brazilianize the USA a bit, too.

As you understood, I meant replace demented plans to kill your religious, ethnic and political enemies as the national obsession with o samba, o sexo, a praia e futebol. Not make a society with gross income inequality.

But I'm a bit serious. One thing to remember about Brazil: Bigger GDP and population than Russia. Plus might be able to talk Lula into it with some UN resolution, after the national grieving over de Mello.

Thanks for asking about my son. He's a medic. He treated some of the UN bombing victims, as well as many other gunshot and bomb victims in the past few months, US and Iraqi. He does a lot of guard duty on the compound perimeter, too, and some patrols, missions. Basically 16 hour days.

He's reading a lot, including Makiya's "Republic of Fear," which he has discussed with Iraqi guards, who he says, really hate Saddam because of what he did to their families.

I sent him some toys to hand out to the local kids. It caused a bit a mob scene with Iraqi kids at one of the local clinics they were visiting when he and his buddy were handing them out. In fact, the sergeant in charge made them write an imaginary letter to the parents of a fellow soldier who he said could have been killed by their breach of security.

Sort of a metaphor for a lot of what's going on. Gotta be nice, but you can't relax.

The US has sufficient force to handle Iraq currently if all of the following hold:

1) We can put a substantial uniformed Iraqi presence in the field (Police and Army) in the next six to nine months.
2) We can get at least one more NATO or other division to relieve the 101st in Kurdistan next Winter (Turks or French need not apply).
3) Kim Jhong-Ill is just bluffing about the nuclear arsenal thing.

If #1 doesn't hold, we have to resort to forming lots more Iraqi paramilitaries to fill in the gap. While I personally like the prospect of having Kurd warlords patrolling the Sunni Triangle, it may not bode well for those trying to keep Iraq unified.

If #2 doesn't hold, we have to send the 25th or 10th divisions to releive the 101st, which reduces our ability to respond to point #3.

If #3 doesn't hold, just forget about all of the above and mobilize the rest of the National Guard, because we're going to need that much more force before we are finished.

I'm too zoned from sleep deprivation to have anything intelligent (intelligent by my standards, not, say, Foresta standards) to say that I haven't already said in other threads or elsewhere.

I will, though, add this link in addition to the post of mine that Joe was gracious enough to link to. It's more general and theoretical than that one, but is pertinent IMO to the situation in Iraq.

Brazil is interesting and worth considering as a potential partner - IMO, and just IMO, more in the medium-run future than the immediate now. Personally, I'm taking a "wait and see" approach to the current Brazilian administration (Lula!'s); he's said some interesting things, from time to time, but also a lot of dubious stuff.

In any case, from a logistical standpoint Brazil is no different than the other nations on offer (or really "non-offer but lets pretend they are"): so in other words, no change.

Putting Brazil into the mix doesn't alter what I've already said.

(Btw, on the tangent of who to Brazilianize: IMO, Iran is mostly fine if the thin-but-crusty-and-tenacious layer of Mullahcracy could be removed. Brazilianizing Arabia would be interesting, though.)

Btw, getting down to brass tacks, how much of its own spending (cost of activities) do people think Brazil would be willing to contribute to the effort?

A) About $15 billion

B) About $10 billion

C) Little or nothing right now - they're fairly cash-strapped at the moment and have more pressing things at home to fix in the wake of last winter's near-complete financial meltdown.

My guess is "C".

Brazil has a surprising domestic military industry, including local aircraft production (AMX), tanks (Osorio), and APCs (Cascavel, Jararaca, et. al). We know they work in Iraq, as some were exported there under Saddam.

Wonder what might be possible if the New Iraqi Forces were to re-order enough Cascavels to equip a light cav brigade along the lines of 2 Armored Cav with its appropriate complement, in return for the commitment of a battalion or two of Brazilian peacekeepers (with Cascavels in tow) up north near the pipelines, and a set of trainers to help get the new army's Light Cavalry. Would be interesting if it was set up as a "business deal fixer" with the new Iraqi Council and New Iraqi Army command, and not so much an effort by the Americans... wonder if they'd bite?

Besides, those scout cars are good for fast response when guarding infrastructure, patrolling supply routes, and are well suited to adding extra punch as backup in urban areas. All important missions. Based on their specs, they also look more airliftable than the LAVs or even the new Strykers.

I'm aware of Brazil's arms industry. They were probably the second or third largest arms supplier to Saddam prior to the Gulf War (90-91). They could inexpensive stuff to Iraq when Iraq is able to afford them. But as far as the kind of help being bandied about here, that is Brazil extending some help, my previous comment stands.

Selling arms to the new Iraqi army is a year or two down the road, at least (it takes awhile for arms transactions to be processed); if what we're talking about is the here-and-now security needs, that's not a solution.

To reiterate what I wrote in my post Sunday, which y'all were gracious enough to link to, I still think we're asking the wrong question. Back in the early 90's, before the big defense drawdown, we had a fair amount of MP's and Civil Affairs battallions. Most of them simply went away.

We've been making do with infantry as occupation troops, but it's klunky. It irritates the infantry, and reduces their effectiveness as infantry, to the point where they need to train up to the role again when rotated out (if what I've heard about the peacekeepers in the Balkans is correct).

Rather than worry about where we're going to find enough infantry, American or otherwise, to function as MP's (and that's what a lot of them are doing) perhaps we should be looking to recruit police to help stabilize the situation.

Changing the subject to Brazil, slightly, didn't Lula send oil up to Venezuela during the strike?

P, of course we'd have to pay for it, but what's money for? We can just borrow more.

As a matter of fact, I think we paid for the Forca Expedicionaria Brasileira in WWII, but they helped out in several battles in the Italian campaign. More than 400 Brazilian soldiers were KIA.

Maybe we could pay for it in purchases, as Joe suggests.

It's just that Brazil has a large army (200,000, according to globalsecurity.org, of which 125,000 are conscripts) and no external threats right now. Probably could put together 20,000-30,000 credible troops easily.

Ain't too many other options in the world. Better than Russians or Indians or Pakis.

Won't happen though: 1. Rummy will ride the razor's edge of ruin chancing that his indigenous forces will be ready before the shit really hits the fan (al Hakim's death or the UN bombing not being enough to rouse him) before he is willing to cede any control;
2. Brazil never has shown any desire to punch above or at its weight internationally, except in futebol. Just wants to look inward and party.

The US has sufficient force to handle Iraq currently if all of the following hold...

When I began this thread, I was of course hopeful that some useful insights would find their way into these comments. But having given up trying to understand what Brazil has to do with Iraq, I am now less hopeful.

Nevertheless, 'SPD' has suggested certain criteria that must obtain if the US is to successfully "handle Iraq." I see some merit in what he (or she) proposes, but it begs the question -- what (as America’s erstwhile president Clinton might say) -- does SPD have in mind by “handle”?

Getting a “substantial uniformed Iraqi presence in the field” would be desirable, assuming this presence is both competent and humane. But US ground forces can “handle” matters, if it comes to that (and all other things being equal), with uniformed Iraqis -- though I’ll admit it might be a close call.

As for having “one more NATO or other division to relieve the 101st,” this seems like condemning the enterprise to failure from the outset. The militarily-capable NATO countries (other than Britain) are indifferent or hostile to the project of bringing freedom to Iraq. If we must count on them, we are lost.

SPD’s final requirement, that “Kim Jhong-Ill is just bluffing,” is a good point. It would not be, um, ideal for the US to be militarily engaged with both Iraq and North Korea simultaneously. But the military forces the US would call on to deal with North Korea are (except for the poor, bloody 2nd Infantry Division) quite different from those essential to success in Iraq. If Kim Jhong-Ill seriously acts up, he may quickly learn about things like strategic bombers, intercontinental missles, and ballistic missile submarines -- force elements of no immediate use in Iraq.

South Korea can take the North in a month with or without our help. But it won't be a military nightmare. Rather the North's neighbors are all terrified of indundation by millions of starving North Koreans. They expect the place to totally fall apart whether or not it is pushed.

The North's economy is an old Yugo that hasn't had any maintenance in ten years. The tires went bald and then flat - it's been running on the rims for the past few years. It doesn't matter how much free gasoline the Chinese pour into the Yugo at this point - the engine has seized up for lack of lubrication, radiator fluid and everything else. The Yugo is jerking to a stop as a total loss.

I repeat that the North's economy has started end-run production. They're using up existing stocks as new ones aren't being produced. I expect the final collapse to come within 6-18 months.

Klaatu wrote:

"P, of course we'd have to pay for it, but what's money for? We can just borrow more."

Then we concur that, as far as "burden sharing" goes, this is more superficial than substantive;

1) Brazilian troops, fairly inexperienced, are not really trained for such opperations. So we'll still have to do all the "heavy lifting" (as discussed in previous threads).

2) They, likewise, lack force projection logistical support capabilities, again as discussed in the previous thread. So we'd have to provide that.

3) They can't pay for the deployment of their own forces, much less contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq. So we'll have to do that.

Given that, it's easy to put what we would gain from that on one side of the balance and see how much would be reasonably worth compromising with, say, France, Russia, and China in the UN to get it: a statistical nullity.

As far as the size of Brazil's army, size isn't really the relivant factor, as I pointed out in comments to this post.

What is becoming increasingly apparent is the reality that the prospects of substantive "burden sharing" don't really exist out there - there are phantasmical ones that we are being enticed to jump at so that we'll sacrifice something of substance to the UN and its partners-in-crime in exchange for getting the bag.

So it's easy to see why the villianous, snidely-whiplash-like Rumsfeld, along with Bush and the rest, aren't exactly jumping at their One Golden Opportunity to buy snake oil.

George Peery wrote:

"When I began this thread, I was of course hopeful that some useful insights would find their way into these comments."

This is sort of for Joe, too, who wrote:

"So, there you have it. The debate, the options, and the official position. What do you think?"

I think in many ways this post came too quickly on the heels of earlier discussions along the same lines. The usual participants, myself included, haven't had a space in which to digest, ponder, and perhaps come up with original stuff. So there's a fair bit of reaching - plugging Brazil in is, on the surface, interesting, but fundamentally "no change" from some of the other options. IMO we probably need a breathing space to let our minds work before really returning with a fresh perspective. A week would be better.

George: I started with Brazil just as a half-joking speculation. But really, why not have help, at least "to stand guard at every potential soft target," as you say, or at least some targets important to the rebuilding of Iraq.

P: No, I don't agree that the "burden sharing" would be more "superficial than substantive" if Brazil or any other country provided troops and we paid for them and their support. Assuming we paid for and provided the logistical support for the FEB in WWII, was the FEB "more superficial than substantive?" Of course not: the Brazilians put their own at risk and bled, and more than 400 died.

Blood is priceless. Money is just money.

And Brazilians are probably better than Indians, Ukranians, Turks or some of the others we have or want to have.

But here's a quote from Robert Kagan's column in the WaPo yesterday which I think reflects the truth of why we should be begging a country like Brazil to send their own:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8782-2003Aug31.html

WHY IRAQ NEEDS MORE U.S. TROOPS

"The little secret, moreover, is that neither France nor any other of our leading NATO allies has more than a handful of troops to spare for Iraq. France and Germany are tapped out in missions in Africa, Afghanistan and the Balkans. The British and Spanish are tapped out in Iraq. Polish public opinion is already turning against the deployment in Iraq, and the mounting security problems in Iraq understandably discourage other countries from wanting to participate. The administration's search for a U.N. resolution isn't even aimed at getting European forces but at bringing in the larger forces available from Turkey, India and Pakistan. Never mind whether Turkish and Indian troops in Iraq are really the answer to all our problems in Iraq -- or would instead become part of the problem themselves. The fact is, we may never get them. The Turkish public remains hostile to any deployment. The Indian government is reluctant to take part without a U.N. resolution. And the French have little interest in passing a U.N. resolution solely to help the Americans get Turkish and Indian troops to relieve the American burden in Iraq.

The administration's hopes for getting a capable Iraqi force in place in a timely manner may be misplaced, too. Today there are about 37,000 Iraqi police officers spread around the country. The Bush administration plans to put 28,000 more on the streets -- but only over the next 18 months. Even assuming all goes according to plan, this gradual increase in Iraqi capabilities is not going to make a big difference before next spring.

The problem is, the next few months may be critical to the fate of Iraq and to the American mission there. Insecurity and instability in Iraq will make it difficult if not impossible to bring real improvements in the average Iraqi's standard of living. And as the administration well knows, Iraqis want and need to see progress right now, or more and more of them may turn to opposition, in both its passive and active, violent forms.

There are good reasons why the administration is not sending more troops to Iraq, of course. But they are not the reasons outlined by U.S. commanders. Those generals are saying we have enough troops in Iraq chiefly because they know full well they dare not ask for more. The price of putting another division or more of American troops into Iraq will be high. It means mobilizing more reserves and using more National Guard forces. It either means pushing the Army to the breaking point or making the very expensive but necessary decision to increase the overall size of the American military, and fast. Right now administration officials don't want to think the unthinkable. Unfortunately, they may be forced to in a month or two. And, unfortunately, by then it may be too late."

Klaatu a scrito:

"No, I don't agree that the "burden sharing" would be more "superficial than substantive" if Brazil or any other country provided troops and we paid for them and their support."

You only reach that conclusion by ignoring two of the three points I made; neither having the training nor the logistical capabilities, they would be a burden rather than an asset.

Also, you are perhaps deliberately trying to back me into a discussion of the Great Brazilian Contribution Without Which World War II Could Not Have Been Won; the real fact is, there as here, the Brazilian contribution was more political ("look at all the countries lining up to fight NAZIsm") than substantive to the war. Does that slight the 400 Brazilians who died and the ~1500 who were injured?

I'm sure that will be the hysterical response "you're devaluing their sacrifice". But the cold truth is that had those Brazilians lived their lives to old age in Brazil, it would not have changed the course of a war where almost a thousand times more Americans died (so the relative contribution is close to 1,000:1, as it would be here). Had FDR needed to make a major policy concession, as you're asking GWB to do, in order to get Brazil into the war on our side, he would have passed, as GWB is passing on the prospect (phantasmagorical and unreal - Brazil isn't offering, but we're acting, again, like it's a gimmie and only Rumsefeld's wickedness and the uncomprehending stupidity of people like me who don't perceive the value of Brazilian sacrifice in Iraq, stand in the way of what would be the margin between success and failure, just as Brazil's contribution in WWII was the margin between victory for the Western Allies and defeat at the hands of the Fascist Axis).

So, in order to be sensitive to the sacrifice of the 400 (or so - that's a neat, round number. I suppose it's possible that just by chance 400 died, rather than, sauy 398 or 407) Brazilians who died fighting in WWII, we're to "make-believe" that this is a real, realistic, and potentially very significant option - when it isn't. It's a rhetorical trap - thus the palpable resentment in my post.

IMO, if we need more troops - and I'm more than half convinced we do - they should be U.S. troops and substantive concessions shouldn't be made simply to get a "rainbow coalition" in order to serve the illusions of the "Multilateralism Now" crowd.

But that's just me. I can tell from the excited tone of this post that I need a break before frustration (on my part) gets out of hand.

(Oh, and yah - I know I'm right about the FDR analogy because FDR could be and was a coldhearted, calculating sonofabitch when he needed to be and never sacrificed substance for sentimental reasons when it came to our interests as he saw them to be. He would make trades & deals with Stalin, but given the significance of the Soviet contribution to victory, that was a rational calculus).

Sorry, I just don't like emotional blackmail, whether it be in policy debates or not.

Klaatu wrote that "of course we'd have to pay for it, but what's money for", but now I'm confused. I thought Klaatu was against hiring mercenaries?

No, I don't want to get off on a tangent about the FEB in Italy. I read it was "more than 400" killed. They were totally supported within the 5th Army logistical effort.

But this argument about "training" always flummoxes me.

From what I hear, a lot of what your average 19 year old PFC is doing in Iraq is standing around on guard duty. At coalition compounds, at government buildings, power stations, transformers, refineries, wells, etc. My son pulls eight hours of just guard duty most days. Then there's checkpoints, etc.

Just having more troops hanging around the streets is going to make Iraqis feel better.

All armies have training on guard duty. Basically, you learn your "General Orders," draw a weapon, look vigilant and threatening if necessary.

The problem is where the army itself becomes a problem, which is why I wonder we want Turks. I would wonder about Russians, too, but then I just finished Beevor's "The Fall of Berlin."

I keep circling back to the idea that the Iraqi Army (general army, not the Guards) is an untapped resource. E.g., I've gathered from both press reports and sources like Chief Wiggins, that we have profiled a number of ex-generals and other senior officers. Further that many of these men are smart and want to help build the new Iraq. From that I got to liking the idea of exploiting a "chain of trust" as follows:

If those premises are valid, I infer that these officers could name enough trustworthy mid level officers to form the leadership - a leadership who could recruit back the trigger pullers who would be reliable. I can only guess at the quality of training the infrantry-level soldiers had - so I'm just reasoning that the ex-troops are better trained than guys recruited Friday at the mosque. And of course I'm speculating that the "reliable officers" know who the competent recruits are. From a pool of 400,000 how many suitable troops, border patrol, security police could be recruited? Just 50,000 could have a significant impact if fielded quickly.

Bottom line, Iraqis should be the most motivated resource, they speak Arabic, know the customs, and should allow the US to maintain unity of command (vs. UN troops).

If you buy that logic, what would you do with the potential recruits? E.g., to address local security needs, could we create security teams of, say, Najaf men, to be stationed back to their home area?

What do you think?

Igor:

Soldiers sent by their governments in support of their national objectives are not mercenaries, even if another country picks up the tab.

If they were, by your definition a lot of U.S. soldiers in Gulf War I were mercenaries because of the payments made by Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the USA.

Steve D, I agree with you: we disbanded the Iraqi army way too quick, and are starting them up again way too slow.

All we had to do is mix them up a bit, retrain them while using them for some things, give them new uniforms and pay them.

Oooh, can't wait to read White's book.

I just came across this quote from an Iraqi relevant to the training issue:

http://www.vcorps.army.mil/www/News/2003/sep2_inspect.htm

"The Iraqi inspectors who’ve chosen to help guard American gates may deal with discontent from some local Iraqis, but it’s a choice they made willingly.

'It’s a job I can do instead of being a farmer, and the Americans are taking care of me,' said Ahmed Said of the town of Al-Dujail. 'It’s an opportunity to work with the coalition forces.'

'This was easy training for me. I was in the military before. I had the basic knowledge, but it gave me more knowledge and more training on how to be a real security force.'"

It isn't as easy as klaatu suggests to just put the Iraqi army back, of course.

But it is interesting to explore possibilities, wondering if they may be phantasms or not. Put them to a test of public discussion, and find out. Is there something there? Followed by: is the price acceptable?

The problem with the liberal criticisms, the core problem that just won't go away, is the screaming lack of options thast pass both tests.

Failing that, the USA will manage on its own. And hopefully learn something. They've managed it before.

As for White's book, all I can say is: pass the salt shaker. For reasons I've explained before.

Klaatu always says stuff that makes me scratch my head and wonder how much military experience he really has. I know he has it. But there seem to be great voids. This is one of the things that has me scratching my head:

"But this argument about "training" always flummoxes me."

To imply that standards of training are indestinguishable, that NCOs don't vary (and your PFC gets his guidance from such) from army to army, that military cultures don't vary, that in effect a Brazilian unit would be interchangable for an American one, is flat out bizzare.

It implies either a woeful gap in your military knowledge/experience OR something deliberate and worse.

Btw, drawing guard duty in Iraq goes beyond looking vigilant to being vigilant and knowing how to handle a crisis if and when one happens, without over or under reacting or doing something that simply makes matters worse. For most armies in the world, a harsh response is the "General Orders" response. That's not really what we're looking for here. I would recommend you follow up on some of those links that Joe provided in this post and which were made available in other posts, and comments such as those made by Trent (or was it Tom? Sorry if I'm mixing things up) in the previous discussion I have already linked to about the different military cultures responses to given situations.

At least you half save yourself here:

"The problem is where the army itself becomes a problem"

Which alludes to the very real and significant point I was making.

As for Beevor's book, I haven't had the chance to read that one. I saw the Booknotes discussion with him, not the same thing I know, and it did make me interested. Last fall I re-read some of Cornelius Ryan's books, including my personal favorite A Bridge Too Far (IMO fairly healthy reading to tamp down over-confidence) and The Last Battle - the latter, indeed, informed some of my thoughts and posts and fears, thankfully unrealized, about what a battle for Baghdad might be like. Beevor had access to materiel Ryan did not, but then Ryan was able to personally interview some of the combatants on both sides (like Heinrichi). In any case, what both books demonstrate is the very great significance that attaches to different military models, and how it infuses the entire Army. American troops in Baghdad, well perhaps one might say many things about those 19 year old lads, but they behaved nothing like the battle-scarred 19-year old Russians in Berlin. One doesn't even have to go back so far - comparisons with 19-year old Russians in Chechnya serve the same purpose. Difference does relate to the quality of training each receives, and it affects even how reliable they are in being vigilant on Guard Duty.

Now, Brazilian troops aren't Russian, but it would be laughable to claim they're up to the standards of American troops. Btw, what is Lula's general attitude towards Brazil's army? Trust it a lot? Here I don't know - I'm asking.

Steve D:

As for the idea of Iraqis, I'm all for it. It is, after all, their country, if nothing else. Joe is on point, though, if also because the Iraqi army's standards weren't exactly high, nor were the methods of discipline that the Iraqi army became accustomed to ones we want to perpetuate.

Igor:

Klaatu is right. Brazilian troops wouldn't be mercenaries as such. They would instead be akin to the Foederati of Late Rome - foreign troops bought and paid for, not so much on account of the nation (Brazil's) national interest but because of cash. A rather dubious path to follow, though. (And no, Klaatu, that doesn't make American troops in Kuwait '91 the Foederati of the Japanese et al. The distinction here is that we were interested in the mission on our own account, while I still see absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Brazil has any enthusiasm and confidence in the mission, Dave (sorry, I couldn't resist the 2001 reference. It's a weakness of mine) for going into Iraq.

Joe wrote:

"The problem with the liberal criticisms, the core problem that just won't go away, is the screaming lack of options thast pass both tests. "

Well, the surreality of these discussions is the extent to which many who airily make such proposals with a handwave just refuse to grapple with the "tests" you mention in a realistic fashion, grounded in the real world, and deal with them in a clear-eyed fashion.

Which brings me to a suggestion: Perhaps if Klaatu could talk to Lula and get him to vollenteer, then I'd take the offer of Brazilian troops more seriously, though the other problems I've mentioned would remain an issue that would have to be dealt with in a pragmatic manner. Till then, though, it's "pie in the sky, by and by" and implying that the reason we aren't getting them is because Rumsfeld (and his boss) is a stubborn, obstinate jerk who won't refuse the help that is being offered by allies who share our interests, goals, and aims but are in a pet over our 'tude doesn't cut the mustard.

(Sorry, correction - Heinrici's name is spelled without an "H" between the C and the i at the end. I always make that error and wanted to correct it because it's a bad error).

My point, a bit clearer (I hope):

1) Those 19 year olds on patrol or guard duty are one of the key determinant factors to whether our policy succeeds or fails.

2) It matters a great deal the training they've received, the leadership they've had, the guidance they get via the culture of the army they are in, which will determine how they react at that split instance when it makes all the difference.

3) A blase attitude, a "peacetime guard duty" attitude, an attitude that these 19 year old PFCs are essentially interchangable, is one of the problems one side of these debates has.

The fact is, it will likely make all the difference in the world. Especially if we act like it doesn't. Murphy's Laws of Warfare will kick in and the wrong guys at the wrong place at the wrong time making the wrong decision can cause big problems. Problems we'll be responsible for no matter if the soldier is ours, or Brazil's.

This is also one of the problems one side of these debates has - a somewhat problematic relationship with the idea that it is Iraqi, then us and our actual allies (such as Great Britain) who have strong stakes here AND understand how grave the stakes for us are, though I suppose it's possible to question that. However, we understand it better than those who are showing little interest in the mission except to the extent of what concessions they might wring out of is in exchange for their participation on their own terms, evidencing attitudes I don't consider very positive as far as being MOTIVATED - a word I'm using in its U.S. ARMY meaning - in their efforts to make a go of things there.

These are the all-too-often ignored "intangibles" that make a big difference. Sure, Brazil's military may be about the size, a bit larger I think, than the U.S. Marine Corps. But who are you more likely to rely on in Iraq, man for man, to understand the job and be motivated in doing it? Anyone who flips a coin between the Marine and just about anyone else is - well, you know those rides at Carnivals, with the bar saying "must be this tall to ride"? IMO, for these debates, anyone flipping the coin - and that'd include distinguished Vietnam War Vet John Kerry - between the Marine and some soldier detached to Iraq by the "international community" - isn't tall enough to get on this ride.

And that's the best way I can explain the distinctions, "training" and otherwise, I am talking about. And yah, Klaatu, I know you - among others - are flummoxed by this, but that, to me, is your problem and theirs, one of the things that disqualifies people for leadership in this era is they are flummoxed by points like this, or wave them away or don't even consider them. Even people, like Kerry (to gratiutously whip that boy a bit more), who one would think should know better.

Quite possibly they do know better, which means their public assertions and statements are contemptable.

Suppose the request for troops from other countries is just a jaw-jaw while we slowly advance Iraqi reconstruction.

First we spend 6 to 9 months on who will provide forces. Then we spend another six to nine months working on the command structure. Then another equivalent period training the new troops.

Bush is re-elected. The urgent need passes.

I'd say this whole manuver is for domestic political consumption.

Hmmm, since the papers today are full of items about the US going to the UN asking for troops, I guess I won the debate. I knew Colin was always with me.

Unless M.Simon is right about this UN move just being "jaw-jaw." If it is, though, it militates against Bush being re-elected. The People of America are already tired of this "jaw-jaw," shuck-and-jive, blow smoke BS.

In this case, to paraphrase Churchill, "jaw-jaw" is not better than "war-war;" it's the same, in that blood flows as a consequence of both.

You heard it here first: Bush is going to lose in '04. I haven't picked my candidate yet, but I'll double the $500.00 I gave to Clinton when I do.

P, I'm proud to see that you manage to question or denigrate both John Kerry's service and mine.

But I'm not really in his class, him having a Silver Star, a decoration which provokes real notice and respect when seen in a row of ribbons.

Klaatu:

"Hmmm, since the papers today are full of items about the US going to the UN asking for troops, I guess I won the debate."

A specious and deliberately annoying assertion having nothing to do with the merits of what we're discussing here. Especially comming from someone (Klaatu) who often things the administration makes mistakes and doesn't consider that as settling the matter.

"P, I'm proud to see that you manage to question or denigrate both John Kerry's service and mine."

If you consider that pointing out failures to grapple with significant points "denegrat[ing]" your service, then that only helps re-enforce the fact that you simply refuse to deal seriously and honestly with certain issues, either from a void of knowledge or willful omission and intent to deceive. Has nothing to do with either your service and Kerry's except to the extent to which you should both be reasonably expected to be more informed on these things than, say, Howard Dean (who can use ignorance as an excuse, to some extent).

In any case, since what I really wrote about Kerry's service is:

"that'd include distinguished Vietnam War Vet John Kerry"

If you are asserting that by saying his service was distinguished but then daring to question his political policy statements is somehow "denegrating his service" then that just shows the extent to which you and your ilk try to squelsh reasonable discussion, debate, and disagreement with emotional blackmail. Next you'll throw out that other canard that because I'm critical of you and he I'm "questioning your patriotism" - again as a tool to avoid really discussing the issues in a serious rather than flip (Klaatu wrote: "I started with Brazil just as a half-joking speculation").

Klaatu, you invoked the concept of honor in a past post of yours in another thread, but you never display any in these debates - your discussion tactics are dirty and underhanded rather than forthright. That is why I find you annoying and obnoxious. Disagreement on the merits I can take. But you don't do that.

As far as your base and ignoble implication that my position is driven by concern for Bush's election prospects rather than (unlike you) principle on the merits of issue rather than personality, I will direct people to what I wrote yesterday evening.

Check out Josh Marshall on this topic today:

http://talkingpointsmemo.com/

I don't care what anyone says, guard duty is not rocket science. That's one thing I learned walking a missile site perimeter at 0300 in December.

Is Josh Marshal one of your military experts? Defined by the fact that he's Politically Reliable?

Zampolit.

As for this:

"I don't care what anyone says"

I know you don't care what anyone says if it doesn't fit with your preconcieved notions and partisan alignment on these matters. That's part of the point. Your entire role here isn't a give-and-take discussion on the merits with reasonable discussion of all the relivant factors on straightforward, forthright grounds. It's to sneer, jeer, decry anyone who disagrees, and make unsupported (and apparently unsupportable) assertions on behalf of the partisans whose victory next year you favor. You put your military record before you as a shield while you act as nothing more than a propagandist rather than engaging in honest discussion.

Porphy, I think you're being too hard on Klaatu. I always turn to Talking Points Memo when I need military expertise and insight. Josh Marshall is a modern day Sun Tzu!

I guess Porphy doesn't want to play along with Klaatu anymore, but I'll bite.

The guard duty you pulled, klaatu, where was it? Iraq, or South Dakota?
How did you handle dodgy situations like telling who were just over-excited locals and who might be terrorists trying to get close to put a bullet in your head?

How many car bomb attacks did you foil? How did you handle irate locals who didn't think you should be searching their car in their country? How did you deal with the language barriers? With irregulars who used civilians as shields while they approached what you were guarding?

I'm loath to submit to your questioning, but I'll indulge you this once.

My guard duty was in Germany, and no it didn't include any of the factors you mentioned, except for the occasional alert for Baader-Meinhof in the area.

But I could talk about my son's experience. Besides his basic training, he got two weeks extra training in Kuwait before he started pulling guard duty and doing checkpoints in Baghdad. Wow!

It really is perverse to try to build up US soldiers into some kind of super trained supermen, just to maintain that no other country's soldiers can do the job that they are doing in Iraq, just so not one iota of control will be ceded by Rummy to any other country or the UN, so no contracts will be awarded to any foreign companies, so those self-same US soldiers will not be relieved, augmented or reinforced by anyone else.

And please tell us about your guard duty adventures.

Klaatu wrote:

"I'm loath to submit to your questioning, but I'll indulge you this once."

If you're going to be constantly invoking your personal experience as a debating "trump", then people have a right to know the extent to which it applies and doesn't apply.

"And please tell us about your guard duty adventures."

Funny, I don't remember Igor or anyone else playing the rhetorical games you are playing, of invoking his personal experience as a catch-all trump and then getting your nose bent out of shape when it is probed.

So your response here is not applicable.

"It really is perverse to try to build up US soldiers into some kind of super trained supermen"

Overheated rhetorical straw-man that is your hallmark in debating, since you will not and most importantly cannot deal with people's arguments on their merits and thus put this doppleganger in the place of the full and rather real points I made.

You're full of hot air, bluster, and bloviation but utterly lacking in substance when it comes to a willingness to honestly and straightforwardly deal with the issues. In that, I'm glad a man of your character is *not* on my side.

I wouldn't have it any other way.

Klaatu, you open the door to questions if you are going to make a point of it yourself. For someone who plays the "your denigrating my service" card whenever you are losing the argument, you're the one denigrating the abilities of American servicemen. Arguing that the training American NCOs give them are no better than what an average third-world soldier receives would be funny if it was not done for such pathetically and transparently partisan reasons. That just makes it disgraceful.

<sharp whistle>
Guys. Chill. I have a question:

Abizaid’s explanation for why we need foreign forces is even more remarkable. American troops, he explained, were fueling Iraqi nationalism that was morphing into anti-Americanism: “You can’t underestimate the public perception, both within Iraq and within the Arab world, about the percentage of forces being so heavily American.”

Is this really an accurate picture? McCain came back from Iraq saying the exact opposite about the UN. Does Abizaid really believe that Turkish or Indian troops are going to make his job easier? I'm having a hard time understanding this.

I just did a Google News read through stuff that my man McCain said, including a Aug 24 WaPo op-ed piece, and I didn't see any denunciation of the UN or the idea of other countries' troops going to Iraq. His main theme was that more troops and more money were needed.

I don't think we (the USA) really have too many more troops to deploy to Iraq, unless you simultaneously expand the size of the army by two divisions or so. And start right now, so those troops are there for the next rotation.

Now that would be a gutsy move, maybe not the right move, given what Abizaid said, but better than doing nothing and trying to muddle through, and it would raise my opinion of Bush.

Here's McCain's piece:

Looking at it again, he does say that Iraqis do not trust the UN and that UN primacy would mess things up, but does say we need more foreign troops.

I would say that if you're diplomatic, you can get UN help without UN primacy.

klaatu,

You say, "I would say that if you're diplomatic, you can get UN help without UN primacy."

If you read Josh Marshall again, you'll find he argues, convincingly I think, that our leverage with the UN is very weak.

You think we don't need to offer them (the UN, esp. the UNSC members France, Russia, China) "primacy". What should we offer them?

Oh, I agree our leverage with the UN (the Security Council members France, Russia and China, and probably the majority of the General Assembly, that is) is weak. But you can have hope, can't you?

What's the price of the UN signing on? I don't know, but it's going up. A cut of the action, certainly. Some say in what's going on.

This is at the heart of the arrogant cock-up the Bushies created. A little bit of softer treading and sweet talking months ago could have produced a real coalition.

As Marshall says, we're in a "jam."

I hope Porphy & Klaatu reduce the flames; both have reasonable points. But I think Steve D.'s point was best, though in the wrong direction. Here's a quote from Baghdad's burning:

"For a while, the men in certain areas began arranging ‘lookouts’. They would gather, every 6 or 7 guys, in a street, armed with Klashnikovs, and watch out for the whole area. They would stop strange cars and ask them what family they were there to visit. Hundreds of looters were caught that way- we actually felt safe for a brief period. Then the American armored cars started patrolling the safer residential areas, ordering the men off the streets- telling them that if they were seen carrying a weapon, they would be treated as criminals. "

The most realistic force increase starts from her complaint. It's clear to me that there was a mistake in disbanding, rather than registering/ legitimizing, and working on increasing the accountability of local home protection security forces.

Local Iraqi Deputy/ paramilitary forces should be greatly increased, much more than foreign forces. But NOT top down -- bottom up. Starting from housing. Including identifying & registering the men, where they live, who else lives there, etc. Tiny mini-local neighborhood watch units.

Register first, document, some pay. Then additional register-checking. Census info collection. Let those in the safer areas do more about taking care of their own areas, with Iraqi police as first backup, and the US as second backup.

And pay a little more than unemployment, but something. Let them stop strange cars, etc. Let them really keep safe the safer places, so the increasing Iraqi police and the US/ multi- forces can increase safety in the slums.

By the way, formalizing local neighborhood watch "councils" should also be an excellent step towards democracy -- and allow the local newspapers some local new personalities to write about.

I've been thinking over Tom Grey's Sept 4 post. I understand Tom's proposal to be somewhat similar to Grim Beorn's idea of supporting local militias, but Tom is suggesting the militias be armed:

*Grim's Hall on Iraqi Militias*

Quoting from Grim: "In Iraq, there are a number of people calling for Shi'ite militias to guard holy sites from US plundering and unfortunate accidents . For now, calls are for an unarmed militia. I think the CPA will probably view this as an unacceptable challenge to their authority, but I think it would be wiser to embrace and work with it. With some negotiation, we could probably reach an agreement that would allow these unarmed militias to do just what they want to do, which would remove a source of friction between US forces and the Shi'ites. More importantly, these unarmed militias represent an organic movement that could begin providing stability and security to parts of Iraq. If we reach out to them and provide a space for them straightaway, they become a useful tool for our goal of founding a stable, independent Iraq that we can eventually leave.

If we suppress them, on the other hand, two things could happen. At best, we could lose that potential pillar of support for a stable and independent Iraq. At worst, they become like the Black Panthers: originally a scrupulously law-abiding militia movement designed to protect citizens against abuse by the authorities, when suppressed it became an underground guerrilla movement."

Certainly local neighborhood forces like this could be extremely effective. I have been puzzling over how to cause such local forces to happen really-really-fast, and how to minimize the attendant risks of "legalizing" hundreds of private armies.

1) First, the risks of the bottom-up strategy: I would like to know what the local US commanders think about encouraging patrols of armed men of which they know nothing. I don't know the answer, but it seems reasonable that the most practical approach for the troops is what I think they are doing: "guys with guns bad, unless guys wearing insignia we honor (clearly identifiable from a safe distance)", as in Riverbend's complaint that Tom quoted.

Now Grim was talking about unarmed militias, which solves that problem. Would that work? I think Riverbend would say no - just from reading her posts. Would I want to stop a suspicious car entering my patrol zone armed with just my sunny smile?

If we support the armed militia approach it feels to me like we're going the wrong direction - undermining a key element of the US strategy, which is to end up with only the state having lethal force. Do we want to encourage "Gangs of New York" (ala Kandahar) in Mosul (Riverbend's home city)?

Bottom up means not-vetted, which I think also means not-identifiable. Suppose you are an Iraqi policeman in your squad car driving into Riverbend's Mosul neighborhood. A block away you spot five young men carrying assault rifles. Is that the neighborhood militia? Or is it Ali Baba's gang from Sadr City? What do you do?

2) Implementation: my assumption is that the CPA (or CENTCOM) is radically understaffed to recruit, train & administer any kind of Iraqi-staffed local forces. So whether bottom-up or top-down the job of assembling local forces rapidly has to be done by Iraqis. My previous proposal was intended to address this problem by pyramiding just like Tupperware or Amway. We've already vetted a number of ex-Army senior officers. That gives us a strong start on our pyramid game - give them a clear definition of the mission, the money to pay troops, buy easily recognized uniforms/insignia for the troops, then hold the officers accountable for their security results by area of responsibility.

To me, one of the most appealing aspects of the militia idea is that the troops are locals. They should know who are the good guys/bad guys. So can we take advantage of the pyramid scheme, and also the militia idea by forming up "militias" out of already trained and vetted (by their officers) troops. I.e., send locals back to their home turf, lead by an NCO-equivalent.

Somehow I don't these ex-Army guys are going to have any problems furnishing their own arms & ammo. So another benefit is to dry up more of the too-many weapons floating around. Every guy that signs up is one less unemployed, one less disgruntled potential resister/attacker. Even if paid $50/month, the cost is in the round-off error. And putting money into Iraqis hands is for sure a good thing for the economy.

What do you think - is it too late to undo the mistake Bremer made of disbanding the Iraq Army?

I do wish Riverbend would just once make an actionable suggestion of how to do things better. I was hoping for better when she started her blog, which now I think is more aptly named "Baghdad Whinging".