Iraq: Intelligence Flaws & The "Containment" Myth

by Joe Katzman at February 6, 2003 7:14 AM

Innocents Abroad is an excellent and under-rated blog, penned by some expatriates living in Europe. They're doing an interesting series on American Empire, which I'll cover once it's complete.

In the wake of Colin Powell's speech, however, Jacob's Feb. 2 piece arguing that Saddam is uncontainable adds something to the general debate. Even if you're already convinced, his work will point out some important subtleties that will sharpen your viewpoint. If you're not convinced and you're serious about exploring this issue, you might profit from reading Jacob's post in light of these thoughts...

The problem with containment of a state armed with terrorist links and weapons of mass destruction is that it needs to be perfect - and perfection is a tough bet to make. The problem is one of assumptions, and it doesn't just trip up media commentators. Intelligence agencies also fall victim to these pitfalls, with a frequency that should be frightening in a "mega-terror" age that depends on them for early warning.

The process and pitfalls of intelligence gathering lay many traps for the unwary. One key difficulty is how analysis acknowledges and deals with the unknown, which is always a factor in policy making. That's why asking for 100% proof is a dishonest argument - it never exists. Instead, key questions should revolve around the nature of the key uncertainties. In this case: what are Saddam's intentions, as revealed by his actions? What do we know? On his side, how good is the information coming to him? If that system is flawed, can he be trusted to act "rationally" as we define it? And so on.

If you're still on the fence, I submit to you that serious attempts to research and answer those questions are the minimum requirements for a well informed opinion.

Another key intelligence issue is the danger of "mirror imaging", the multiculturalist sin of analyzing the Other through one's own cultural prism. This is a major mistake; the results can quite literally be disastrous. How far astray can it lead us?

"One egregious example is the NIE (CIA's National Intelligence Estimate) of September 1962... that refuted reports from agents in, and refugees from, Cuba about the presence of Soviet ballistic missiles on the island.... they were watching something happen and saying "This can't be happening, because I wouldn't do it."
(from: Angelo Codevilla, "Informing Statecraft" c. 1992)
Fortunately, the analysts were overruled. But even after the Cuban Missile crisis, the CIA official who signed that fiasco of a report was quoted as saying that his judgment on what Khruschev should have done was better than Khruschev's, and that events had proved it. One small problem: his job was to predict Soviet behaviour, not critique it.

It's hard to find a better example of how deep self-justifications for "mirror imaging" can go. Now think of that kind of mistake, applied post 9/11.

With idiotarianism like that afoot, maybe the CIA does need its own internal blogosphere. Surely its previous record re: Saddam and his nuclear capabilities or the 1994 near-war over Kuwait isn't exactly reassuring. Underneath both of those failures lay the twin flaws discussed here: inability to come to grips with the unknown, and "mirror imaging" as a baseline for the gauging of intentions.

These past failures of intelligence tell us important things about our judgment of Saddam's thought processes, and seem to indicate a serious weakness in our analysis. A weakness perpetuated at great risk. As Jacob notes:

"...no one thinks Saddam or Kim Jong-Il will destroy the United States -- just possibly take out a city or two. Mearsheimer and Walt seem willing to bet those cities against the ability of men like themselves to anticipate the way men like Saddam and Kim think."
For all of the reasons noted above, that isn't a bet we can afford to take. Let's roll.

UPDATE: Ray at Random Thoughts also has a related post on intelligence gathering, based on some of his own experiences. Aside from my complete disagreement with the belief that behavioural profiling is either adequate or empirical, I think he makes some very good points. Parapundit is even more on target.

#2: Good timing today, it seems. Vodkapundit directs us to a post analyzing Powell's speech by Ralph Peters, a former intelligence officer.

#3: Saved the best for last - see the full post with comments, where an exchange is going on that vivdly illustrates what happens when these flawed dynamics I've discussed are applied to the question of Iraq...

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