Innocents Abroad is an excellent and under-rated blog, penned by some expatriates living in Europe. They're doing an interesting series on American Empire, which I'll cover once it's complete.
In the wake of Colin Powell's speech, however, Jacob's Feb. 2 piece arguing that Saddam is uncontainable adds something to the general debate. Even if you're already convinced, his work will point out some important subtleties that will sharpen your viewpoint. If you're not convinced and you're serious about exploring this issue, you might profit from reading Jacob's post in light of these thoughts...
The problem with containment of a state armed with terrorist links and weapons of mass destruction is that it needs to be perfect - and perfection is a tough bet to make. The problem is one of assumptions, and it doesn't just trip up media commentators. Intelligence agencies also fall victim to these pitfalls, with a frequency that should be frightening in a "mega-terror" age that depends on them for early warning.
The process and pitfalls of intelligence gathering lay many traps for the unwary. One key difficulty is how analysis acknowledges and deals with the unknown, which is always a factor in policy making. That's why asking for 100% proof is a dishonest argument - it never exists. Instead, key questions should revolve around the nature of the key uncertainties. In this case: what are Saddam's intentions, as revealed by his actions? What do we know? On his side, how good is the information coming to him? If that system is flawed, can he be trusted to act "rationally" as we define it? And so on.
If you're still on the fence, I submit to you that serious attempts to research and answer those questions are the minimum requirements for a well informed opinion.
Another key intelligence issue is the danger of "mirror imaging", the multiculturalist sin of analyzing the Other through one's own cultural prism. This is a major mistake; the results can quite literally be disastrous. How far astray can it lead us?
"One egregious example is the NIE (CIA's National Intelligence Estimate) of September 1962... that refuted reports from agents in, and refugees from, Cuba about the presence of Soviet ballistic missiles on the island.... they were watching something happen and saying "This can't be happening, because I wouldn't do it."Fortunately, the analysts were overruled. But even after the Cuban Missile crisis, the CIA official who signed that fiasco of a report was quoted as saying that his judgment on what Khruschev should have done was better than Khruschev's, and that events had proved it. One small problem: his job was to predict Soviet behaviour, not critique it.
(from: Angelo Codevilla, "Informing Statecraft" c. 1992)
It's hard to find a better example of how deep self-justifications for "mirror imaging" can go. Now think of that kind of mistake, applied post 9/11.
With idiotarianism like that afoot, maybe the CIA does need its own internal blogosphere. Surely its previous record re: Saddam and his nuclear capabilities or the 1994 near-war over Kuwait isn't exactly reassuring. Underneath both of those failures lay the twin flaws discussed here: inability to come to grips with the unknown, and "mirror imaging" as a baseline for the gauging of intentions.
These past failures of intelligence tell us important things about our judgment of Saddam's thought processes, and seem to indicate a serious weakness in our analysis. A weakness perpetuated at great risk. As Jacob notes:
"...no one thinks Saddam or Kim Jong-Il will destroy the United States -- just possibly take out a city or two. Mearsheimer and Walt seem willing to bet those cities against the ability of men like themselves to anticipate the way men like Saddam and Kim think."For all of the reasons noted above, that isn't a bet we can afford to take. Let's roll.
UPDATE: Ray at Random Thoughts also has a related post on intelligence gathering, based on some of his own experiences. Aside from my complete disagreement with the belief that behavioural profiling is either adequate or empirical, I think he makes some very good points. Parapundit is even more on target.
#2: Good timing today, it seems. Vodkapundit directs us to a post analyzing Powell's speech by Ralph Peters, a former intelligence officer.
#3: Saved the best for last - see the full post with comments, where an exchange is going on that vivdly illustrates what happens when these flawed dynamics I've discussed are applied to the question of Iraq...
Since Pearl Harbor we are supposed to have used the method of "capabilities" not the method of "intentions" to analyze intelligence.
Intentions are more satisfying because it paints a more definite picture. Capabilities can only deal with probabilities.
Humans do not do well with uncertainty.
An age old problem.
I agree with M. Simon and would add that until this current administration we did not engage in pre-emptive wars. Saddam has neither the ability nor, I believe, the willingess to "take out a city or two" in the US. He has not crossed his borders since Kuwait. He has not threatened the US or Europe. His intentions are to be as big a frog in his pond as he can without risking his own neck. Nothing in this world is perfect, including containment. Surely the results of war are not only not perfect, but not knowable. Especially in that region.
Unlike Cuba, we have people (inspectors) on the ground in Iraq. We control the air space over Iraq. I believe it is not appeasement to take a calculated risk rather than engage in a pre-emptive war.
The idea that Saddam has no ability to attack US cities is obviously wrong. He has weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorist groups. That's a capability.
It's not often that someone writes in to illustrate one's argument so vividly. I can hardly imagine a better illustration of my points re: unwise approaches to dealing with uncertainty and "mirror imaging" than Michael L's comments. I don't actually believe I'll convince him, but going through the argument helps illustrate my key points and their real-world implications more clearly.
** ML: "Saddam has neither the ability nor, I believe, the willingess to "take out a city or two" in the US." **
Note the choice of words. I'm sure that belief is comforting. Before we gamble with the lives of many thousands of our fellow citizens, however, we'd like to know if this belief is based on anything, or tested against anything other than "it hasn't happened yet." Or, more likely, "I wouldn't do that, therefore he won't."
Remember, folks - the goal isn't to critique Saddam's choices, but to predict them. And the margin for error is near-zero.
Michael, if this bold statement is based on some unique knowledge, please report to the Pentagon and CIA. They would dearly like to know what you obviously know about Saddam's capabilities and state of mind. If it isn't based on anything, however, we have a major case of untested assumptions on our hands. Or mirror imaging. Or both. At which point, you'll forgive the rest of us if we step up and take care of business in the real world, where we prefer not to take those kinds of chances.
This prediction becomes even more questionable given that close reading of both Ba'athist ideology and Saddam's history points to less comforting conclusions. See below.
** ML: "He has not crossed his borders since Kuwait." **
Could this be, perhaps, because he doesn't have a nuclear weapon yet? Real analysis demands answers to questions re: how someone will act with a different set of capabilities. That, too, is part of dealing well with uncertainty.
Saddam's history, in Iran, Kuwait, and elsewhere, has been to take huge gambles and begin wars when he believed he was protected in some way and able to get away with it. The fact that his 2 largest ventures of this type (Kuwait, Iran) ended in disaster and the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Iraqi forces is not comforting. Nor is an attempt to assassinate a former American President via covert "cut-outs," an act that would surely have had the most serious repercussions possible given that legally and technically, Iraq is still at war with the USA.
The intentions of his would-be successors are more uncertain still, and his sons in particular are famously unstable. Serious analysis also demands some level of assurance there, since the capability to use nuclear and/or chemical weapons will outlast Saddam. It does not appear that Michael is even aware this issue exists.
** ML: "His intentions are to be as big a frog in his pond as he can without risking his own neck." **
No, that's the French. :-)
Again, confident assumptions in the place of a true answer of "we don't really know." The only way to be sure of Saddam's intentions is to penetrate his inner circle, and even that isn't foolproof. Yet this is the linchpin for Michael's analysis. If it's wrong then everything else is wrong, and leaving Saddam alone becomes a hellish risk. But the sources for the assumption are not questioned, nor are the logical limitations in the ability to make this assessment even discussed.
The record of history is also unkind to this belief. Attacking Iran nearly got Iraq invaded and Saddam killed - only widespread use of chemical weapons saved him. Attacking Kuwait could easily have got him killed - only Bush the Elder's decision not to pursue his victory saved him. Saddam has a consistent pattern of deeply unwise gambles, and we know from defectors et. al. that people who bring him bad news are shot.
Let's see, a dictator with no meaningful political checks, who can't be told bad news in advance, with a record of risky behaviour, and his finger on the button. This is what Michael's analysis (or lack thereof) considers acceptable risk.
Ba'athist ideology, which has strong messianic pan-Arab overtones and an ideological connection to 1930s fascism, is also less than comforting. It certainly doesn't appear to be a stabilizing factor. For ideology, too, must be part of any worthwhile analysis. Here, as is often the case in the CIA, it is not even brought into the equation. Even as pronouncements about enemy intentions are made with unshaken confidence, in an environment where being wrong could mean tens of thousands of dead Americans. Or worse.
** ML: "Unlike Cuba, we have people (inspectors) on the ground in Iraq. We control the air space over Iraq. I believe it is not appeasement to take a calculated risk rather than engage in a pre-emptive war." **
First, the point of my Cuban example is that no amount of evidence will matter if mirror imaging of enemy intentions and unserious analysis are in play. Michael's "calculated risk" is another fine example. It also utterly ignores history, including the fact that despite massive inspections, Saddam's large biological warfare program remained entirely hidden from inspectors for years until a defector brought it to light in the mid-90s. Even more amazing, Michael continues to push this analysis even in the face of the tapes and photographs Colin Powell brought forward during his U.N. speech, showing that the inspectors were clearly not in control of the situation.
This is what Michael calls a "calculated risk." His calculator can obviously count to much bigger numbers than mine.
The scary thing is, Michael's analytical flaws are replicated all too often at the professional level, by the very people we're depending on to help guide American policy choices and help keep the nation safe. Worse, the nature of the conflict we're faced with ensures that situations designed to maximize these flaws will come up again and again over the next few years.
That why awareness of those flaws, so vividly illustrated here, is so important to all of us as we attempt to make sense of the debates and choices before our elected representatives.
The point that I keep coming back to with regard to Saddam's deterability is Iran, Kuwait, and Israel. In both cases he gambled big, was not guaranteed of victory, and lost big. Yet despite all the hurt he brought on his country in the Iran-Iraq war it did not deter him from daring to invade Kuwait. Despite Israel's possesion of nuclear weapons and despite their demonstrated willingness to launch devastating counterattacks (and in one case to preemptively attack within Iraqi territory to destroy their nuclear reactor) he still attacked. Even if we assume that Saddam is not insane and not suicidal he still seems to take very risky actions. How do we know exactly what he won't risk?
What I find interesting is that M.L. agrees with me on the method of "capabilities" vs the method of "intentions". Then does his analysis based on the method of "intentions".
Joes's analysis is more method of "capabilities" with historical factors including psychological "capabilities" based on history. This is how you arrive at an estimate of probabilities based on capabilities.
Very good.
Hey: thanks very much for the link. My first high profile link, ah. savors.
On a more substantive note, your readers might be interested in the CIA publication Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. It's a great book.
Sorry -- I tried to give a hyperlink to it, but it didn't take. Here it is, again.
http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html