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February 24, 2004Iraqi Mud Flats Revisitedby Trent Telenko at February 24, 2004 4:15 AM
Joe Katzman: Iraq's insurgency remains something of an enigma. Juan Cole points to a full translation of the now-famous "Zarqawi letter," as well as some outside analysis, to offer a picture that is directly opposed to Ledeen's "Terror Masters" hypothesis. On the other hand, The Guardian says Syria and Iran are giving aid to Iraqi insurgent groups, and that the insurgency is increasingly made up of Islamists rather than ex-Baathists. Parapundit offers a 3rd view - that "US forces, untrained in the local culture and language, are fighting a self-replicating tribal insurgency." Now Trent Telenko offers an additional perspective: it doesn't much matter, because the USA is clearly winning. Mud flats preparing the way for success in future conflicts, or quicksand? Or something in between? Read and decide. Another "I Told You So..." Armed Liberal challenged me a while back to identify metrics for our winning in Iraq. I said then we would know it when we see it because the "Mainstream Media" would be trying hard not to report it. Sure enough, from the Army Times we see the following: 1) We are winning the mop-up phase of the Iraq Campaign. We have developed local knowledge and a local cadre of Iraqi supporters assisting in our operations:
Like I said in my August 2003 "Iraqi Mudflats" post to Winds, Iraq would teach us how to conquer and pacify a Secular Arab Tyranny so we would be ready later to deal with more religious ones. This report makes that a "mission accomplished" given the professionalism of our military. The Ba'athists keep finding this out the hard way. As Neela Banerjee of the NY Tiumes points out:
Yup. 2) We are killing the Islamist terrorists and their Ba'athist supporters as they show themselves increasingly hostile to the Iraqi population, and this hostility is becoming mutual. Just as I said we would in "Mudflats." These passages from Capt. Morgan's article look to be something straight out of Victor David Hanson's The Western War of War
And...
3) Last, you can tell America is winning in Iraq by how hard the "Mainstream Media" is trying to change the subject. The talk about Bush's National Guard Service, the "Unpatriotic Republican attacks" on Kerry's post-Vietnam activism and political voting record and the line that former Senator Max Cleland's Georgia electoral defeat -- due to his Homeland Security votes -- was "illegitimate, unfair and vicious" are all of a piece. They are an attempt to change the subject since the Iraqi "Gloom and Doom" story line is increasingly being given lie by reality. Even Al-Qaeda knows it is losing to America in Iraq. Come spring The American Army will be campaigning in the Pakistani tribal areas in a hunt for Bin Laden and his leadership cadre. In the fall and winter of 2004-2005, preparations for the next major American military invasion in the Middle East will be clear for all to see. Between their nuclear program and their just stolen election, the Mullah's of Iran have just volunteered the "Islamic Republic" -- read Mullah Oil Kleptocracy -- as the target. The American Presidential election of 2004 will be a war election where the American people are faced with the starkest of choices. Do we take the war to the Homeland of our enemies, or do we wait until they strike us again at home. Nothing the Mainstream Media says about that will make a difference. Objective reality will overpower the headlines generated by the propaganda arm of the Democratic Party. Tracked: February 24, 2004 2:00 PM
We are indeed winning from Opinions Galore
Excerpt: Media more interested in John Kerry's 32 year old testimony Trent Telenko has a good piece at Winds of Change...
Comments
Good piece. The foreign (non-Iraqi) terrorists have indeed turned their sights onto local Iraqis and security forces instead of U.S. forces, and this shows they know they have a better chance of winning by doing so. I.e., they are losing, and by definition, we (and the forces for good in Iraq) are winning. The fact that the police chief in Fallujah turned down an offer of U.S. help during the recent police station attack and instead asked for ammunition means they will ultimately prevail in this effort, as long as their morale stays strong. Re: the media, I'm not as confident as you. I think they have shifted to politics because that is what they do; politics is their lifeblood. It's what they live for. And I wouldn't place any bets on objective reality overtaking the Dem spin machine that is the media; when has that ever happened? I fervently hope you are right and I am wrong, though.
#2 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 3:10 pm on Feb 24, 2004
Via TAPPED [LINK], here's a metric in an article from Foreign Affairs, originating in data from Stars and Stripes, that doesn't seem as favorable.
According to a recent survey of U.S. troops in Iraq by the military's own Stars and Stripes newspaper, the Bush administration's approach to Iraq risks doing to the AVF [All-Volunteer Force] what Vietnam did to the conscript service. After polling almost 2,000 troops, Stars and Stripes found that one-third of them thought the war against Saddam Hussein had been of little or no value and that their mission lacked clear definition. A full 40 percent said that their missions had little or nothing to do with what they had trained for. And, most ominously, about half of the soldiers surveyed indicated they will not reenlist when their tours end and the Pentagon lifts the "stop-loss order" now in place, which prevents troops from retiring or leaving the service when their enlistment contract expires.Of course, I realize this is nothing compared to Trent's anecdote of one successful anti-terrorist operation of a type Israel has performed for two generations without establishing personal security for its own nationals. For those of you who don't have an atlas handy, the Mullah Kleptocracy has the allegiance of a considerable fraction of the population that includes most of the armed forces and paramilitary groups. Its armed forces have not been degraded by sanctions nor by catastrophic battleground defeat. Iran has 2½ times the population of Iraq and 4 times the area, much of it mountainous. We seem already to be a little short of personnel, and presumably we will need a substantial force to remain in Iraq in 2004-05 protecting the Iraqi Government (no matter who is in it or how it is established) from civil war. The phrase "unrealistic fantasy" comes to mind, as well as vulgarities.
#3 from Trent Telenko at 3:50 pm on Feb 24, 2004
Andrew, It is more than just one anecdote. See Ralph Peters latest here: THE BEST WE'VE GOT http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/18812.htm "Recall how the pundits insisted that our troops were bound to fail, that Iraq was another Vietnam, a quagmire that would only worsen. Shamelessly, American ideologues who had been too good to serve in uniform themselves pretended that their only concern was the safety of our soldiers, who they wished to bring home immediately. Morale was going to break down, civilian "experts" insisted, our military would dissolve. It wasn't just going to be Vietnam. It was going to be Oliver Stone's Vietnam. Our soldiers' response? They broke the back of the Ba'athist insurgency. They captured Saddam. That deck of cards? Saddam and the boys were playing on credit - and G.I. Joe called 'em. When our soldiers were attacked, they hit back with such ferocity, precision and determination that even hardline al Qaeda operatives in Iraq have admitted to the masters of terror that the U.S. Army cannot be dislodged. But our soldiers didn't only fight. They built. The contractors with their snouts in the Iraqi trough have a mixed record, but our soldiers have been consistently effective - and economically efficient - in their own reconstruction efforts. And yes, damn it. Our soldiers did win hearts and minds. And they continue to do so."
#4 from Trent Telenko at 3:57 pm on Feb 24, 2004
This is what Jim Dunnigan's FYEO is saying about Active force retention: http://www.strategypage.com//fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target=htlead.htm February 16, 2004: Despite the media stories about troops dismayed by overseas service or combat duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, all the services (active duty and reserve) are suffering from the problem of too many people wanting to join, or stay in. This doesn't get much publicity, but it's a very real problem, because the number of people each service can have on the payroll is set by law. If the limit is exceeded, you have to get permission from Congress, and then find the money to pay and maintain the additional troops. It's rare for there to be too many people. But since September 11, 2001, a combination of recession (which always attracts more recruits to the military) and patriotism (which is usually underestimated by the media) has brought in more people than the armed services are allowed to have. The usual way to deal with this problem is to raise recruiting standards (to get better quality recruits) and cut the number of people you actually let in. But since the military is all volunteer, the majority of troops are careerists who want to stay for 20 or 30 years (and qualify for a pension). That means that only about ten percent of the troops leave each year. If a lot more of them choose to stay in when their current contracts (enlistments of officer obligations) are up, you have to quickly choose between keeping more older people, or cutting sharply the number of new recruits. There's also the problem of big surpluses in some job categories, and shortages in others. Typically, high skill (or risk) positions have shortages while more pleasant jobs have surpluses. Thus you don't have enough pilots or network administrators, and too many supply clerks. The military is pretty good at selecting people for what they are good at, and this makes it difficult to turn surplus supply clerks into pilots. So you have to enlist fewer clerks, and even let some go (by not allowing the lowest performing ones to re-enlist.) The military wants to keep it's best people, and is still paying cash bonuses, or other favors (choice of assignment), to get key people to re-enlist. For those in surplus categories, only those with the best performance are kept. This has been increasing the quality of the troops over the past two years, but the surpluses are still a problem. The air force, for example, is now only allowing enlisted troops three months to decide if they want to re-enlist. In the past, you had a year, before your contract expired, to make your mind. Before September 11, 2001, only 53 percent of air force enlisted personnel were staying in. Now it's 67 percent. The Department of Defense expects a booming economy and never-ending war on terror to eventually solve this "problem." But in the meantime, the personnel officers have to keep coming up with more ways to deal with too many troops. This does not relieve the Military's and particularly the Army Reserve's problem with stop loss in speciality units like Civil Affairs, but it is increasingly looking to be the case of "patriotism is managing."
#5 from Trent Telenko at 4:15 pm on Feb 24, 2004
Andrew, I meant to send this with my original "I told you so" to Joe and A.L., because it is so deliciously ironic and a testimate to our impending victory in the Iraqi mop-up campaign. I just wish someone was playing the theme from the TV show COPS while this was going on: New York Times The Iraqi Police Get To Confront An Old Boss By Neela Banerjee http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/20/international/middleeast/20ZIMA.html BAGHDAD, Iraq, Feb. 19 — A bad day is when (1) you get arrested (2) by the people who once worked for you and (3) they tell you exactly what they think of you. Muhammad Zimam Abd al-Razzaq was having a really bad day. Mr. Zimam, a former interior minister under Saddam Hussein and an enemy of Iraq's Kurds, was No. 41 on the American occupation force's most-wanted list in Iraq. He was in his house in the southern Baghdad neighborhood of Saidiya on Sunday, when a squad of Iraqi police officers showed up around lunchtime. No burly, locked-and-loaded American soldiers to hunt down the dangerous; no, this was a bunch of Iraqi cops barely old enough to shave, wearing baseball caps that read SWAT in homemade letters. The indignities were just beginning for Mr. Zimam. Maybe not every crony of Mr. Hussein who has been captured has felt fate coming full circle, but for Mr. Zimam, what had gone around was clearly coming around. Reporters were already waiting for him at the office of the new deputy interior minister, Ahmed Ibrahim. Mr. Ibrahim likes the news media. His walls are covered with photos of him shaking hands with every Bush administration official who has dropped in on Baghdad. Mr. Ibrahim and Mr. Zimam sat together on a black couch. Speaking into Al Jazeera's camera, Mr. Ibrahim said he did not want Mr. Zimam to feel scared. This was, after all, the new Iraq. "Despite the fact that he did so many bad things to the Iraqi police," Mr. Ibrahim said, "we should respect him. He's our guest." Mr. Zimam did not appear to be convinced. "Ahmed, I swear to God, I haven't seen Saddam since before the war," Mr. Zimam muttered. "I don't own any farms, I swear to God," he added, perhaps trying to set himself apart from other top Baathist Party officials who grew rich under Mr. Hussein. "You jailed one of these men," Mr. Ibrahim went on, indicating one of the police officers sitting on the carpet in front of them. Lt. Munaaf Jabber had been recording the conversation between Mr. Ibrahim and Mr. Zimam. "You sent me to jail," Lieutenant Jabber said. He took off his wristwatch and pointed to a place just above his wrist. "These are the scars from the punishment." Mr. Zimam offered a fatherly smile. "No, no," he said. "I don't remember you." The door opened, and another police officer came in. He said he had spent 400,000 Iraqi dinars to repair police cars years before, but that Mr. Zimam failed to reimburse him. "When am I going to get my 400,000 dinars back?" the officer demanded, standing over Mr. Zimam. "Ahmed," Mr. Zimam said, nudging Mr. Ibrahim, "are you going to let these people talk to me this way?" He was. (snip)
#6 from hervé at 4:54 pm on Feb 24, 2004
As a french-iranian (hey, don't shoot yet, i WAS and AM supporting the irqi liberation war!!), i 'd like to clear a few points: Herve, we've been covering Iran in-depth for a while, and we will continue to do so with help from our new Iranian team member Hoder. Many Iranians around the world look forward to the day when their homeland will truly be free - and so do we.
#8 from Trent Telenko at 6:47 pm on Feb 24, 2004
Herve' America is not going to liberate Iran because it loves Persians. It is going to conquer a nutball Mullahocracy because it is a threat to the American homeland because it is I could go on about as to the reasons why this will happen, but I prefer to quote Tom Holsinger's reader response he got published over on WSJ On-Line: Reader Responses http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/responses.html?article_id=110004728 Give Iran the Iraq Treatment The best thing we can do for the people of Iran is what we did for the people of Iraq--eliminate its tyrannical regime by conquest and organize a new democratic government. The truly nut ball faction of Iran's theocratic regime has taken over and reversed all sorts of policies, starting with al Qaeda, which has new sanctuaries there, replacing the ones lost in Afghanistan, from which to attack us. This is an immediate threat to America's vital interests. We told the mullahs after Sept. 11 that we'd invade if they helped al Qaeda attack us. They heeded that warning until we conquered Iraq. Everything which is happening in Iran now is a side-effect of the truly nut ball faction taking over, including the subject of this article. The smart mullahs are getting their money out of Iran right now. The people of Iran won't take risks rebelling against the mullahs when they know we'll do all the dangerous stuff ourselves. IMO, American forces will invade Iran about 9-18 months from now, probably closer to 18. And it will be pretty much a replay of our conquest of Iraq. I expect the Special Forces A-Teams will start deploying in Iraq this summer. The nutball Mullahs are coming for Americans everywhere because that is what they do. So America is coming for the Mullahs where they live, because that is what we do when we are attacked at home. Sic Semper Tyrannus I've heard the line about Iran being too big, mountainous and populated for us to take them on. It's a silly argument. Here are a couple of highlights: Iran is mountainous. That means a totally different kind of fighting. Heavy armor is less effective. You need a lot more infantry and helicopters. We can do this, as we proved in Afghanistan. Operation Anaconda in March 2002 was exactly the kind of large mountainous search and destroy you would expect to see in a campaign in Iran. We kicked ass--against dedicated locals who had (lets face it) better intel. It also showed some vulnerabilities. We lost some choppers and many of the bad guys were able to sneak away. The biggest challenge in a war with Iran would not be its size, population or conventional forces. Rather it would be Iran's missile and unconventional abilities--of course, that's exactly why this needs to happen sooner rather than later.
#10 from Tom Holsinger at 7:10 pm on Feb 24, 2004
My point is that factional disputes among Iran's mullah ruling group have recently resulted in the most extreme faction getting almost total control. I disagree with Michael Ledeen that the leadership has changed its policies. IMO the leadership has changed, and the current dominant faction has implemented the policies it has advocated all along. Those are: 1) Dispense with any sort of free elections on the grounds that "Who Needs 'Em? We'in's got the power! Use that!" It isn't that the nutballs don't understand that force alone can't keep them in power and that their rule needs a veneer of political legitmacy - rather they don't care at all because their nutball state of mind carries with that degree of short-sightedness. 2) Harass the hell out of everyone not like them in Iran over every possible item of cultural looniness, especially female anything but including satellite TV, etc. 3) Build nuclear weapons and any other varieties of WMD possible ASAP. 4) Death to Israel, starting with incitement of Hezbollah in Lebanon to attack across the border. 5) Death to Jews everywhere - help any terrorists anywhere murder any Jews anywhere. 6) Death to America - let Al Qaeda operate secure bases in Iran from which to murder Americans anywhere, including in the U.S. #6 is all she wrote. We're going to take the mullahs out to protect ourselves at home, not to make Iran nice for Iranians. The other mullah factions know what is coming and are taking appropriate action: "... The charge is credible because, as Western governments know well, large quantities of cash — just as in the case of Saddam Hussein — have been moved out of Iran in recent months by friends and relatives of the leading officials." Michael Ledeen six days ago:
#11 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 7:42 pm on Feb 24, 2004
Iblis, reading from his Tom Clancy novel and confusing it with real life. 1. In Afghanistan, we had an armed rebel group to work with, and the allegiance to the Taliban of most of the de facto provincial leaders (aka warlords) was merely expedient. Nothing similar in Iran. 2. The military capabilities of the Taliban and Saddam were much inferior to the Iranians'. 3. The small force we used in Afghanistan is concentrating on finding remnant Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, not on reconstruction of the country. Outside Kabul, we've left the country to the pre-existing warlords on condition they no longer permit global terrorists to use them as a base. 4. The 2½ times population difference is not only for the relative difficulty of deposing the government (let us suppose our technology is so wonderful we rush into Teheran, much as I doubt this), but far more importantly, for the task of occupying and reconstructing the country afterwards. (Unless your interest ends with the bang-bang phase?) 5. Is it Afghanistan or Turkmenistan that is the second land border we can use for invasion? Both, and especially the former, would require securing bases from a hostile native populace. You think Karzai is eager to allow his country to be a launching pad for an invasion of Iran (with which his relations are, in fact, not so bad, given shared hatred of the Taliban)? Shorter Bush/Cheney/Iblis: The Iraq War was good because it showed we're badder dudes than Iraq; all the more so the Iran War. I'm not sorry that I think neither our political will (conscription? taxes?) nor our military capabilities are up to your vision of the United States as overlord of the entire Middle and Near East.
#12 from Tom Holsinger at 7:44 pm on Feb 24, 2004
JPost Confirmation from Shin Bet of #'s 4 & 5: Shin Bet chief "Dichter, who was appearing before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, singled out Iran as the "No. 1" terror state in the world as far as initiating direct and indirect acts. He said Iranian threat on Israel is "significant" and Iran is becoming "bolder" in its efforts. According to Dichter, Iran is operating a channel via Europe to penetrate its terrorists into Israel. Iranian terror is also being operated via the Hizbullah, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians, he said. Syria, on the other hand, is a host country that that allows freedom of movement and operations for terror groups, Dichter told the committee.
#13 from Iblis at 8:30 pm on Feb 24, 2004
So, Andrew has come out to play... Let's see, you don't think our "political will ...[or] our military capabilities" are up to the task of a campaign in Iran. That's interesting, because in your earlier post the problem was "Iran has 2˝ times the population of Iraq and 4 times the area, much of it mountainous." I stupidly responded to what you had said, rather than what you had clearly meant. Well, you can move the goal posts all you like. I'll play along. I noticed in your earlier post you mentioned having an Atlas. That's great. Do you have any other sources for your claims? Would you care to share those sources? I'd be particularly interested in sources for the following claim: "The military capabilities of the Taliban and Saddam were much inferior to the Iranians" Well, not the Taliban, but certainly Saddam. Saddam's Republican Guards were a fairly modern and professional military force, and much of the reason that Iraq (and not Iran) was considered a regional superpower. They learned their skills in the Iran/Iraq war of the 80's, and while they were no match for US forces in the Gulf War, they stood their ground and fought. Iran, on the other hand, used primarily human wave attacks in the Iran/Iraq war. Having been under US embargo since 1979 (more than 10 years longer than Saddam's Iraq), having imprisoned their pilots and professional military officers after the revolution, having been left with US equipment that they could not get training, parts or ammunition for, they had nothing but the bodies of fanatics. Now Iran has made progress in the last decade, but they are still far from a modern army. Maybe their military strength is more a product of a quasi-religious belief in the prowess of anyone fighting against "American scum" than actual hardware and training? Yes, the second land border is Afghanistan. No, I don't think there would be any problem putting a couple of US divisions there. You claim that the Iranians hate us and would resist any US liberation. Yawn. Heard that about Iraq and Afghanistan already. So far no doomsday results, sorry. In any event, I'd sooner take Herve's word on the matter than yours--and he's French! [disclaimer--don't personally know Herve] The Afghan battle I referred to, Operation Anaconda, is exactly what I said it was: a large scale operation in mountainous terrain. I brought it up as an very recent example of how ridiculous it is to claim that the US cannot operate in Iran (or N. Korea) because of mountains. If you want to talk about US capabilities in mountainous terrain that's fine by me. If, on the other hand, you want to talk about US strategy, operation and goals in Afghanistan then I suggest we take it offline. Focus! When you speak of a lack of will it's clearly autobiographical. Many of us, on the other hand, with full understanding of what is involved, are keen to finish the job that was begun in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iblis: The United States does not posses the money necessary to launch and maintain an invasion against Iran. The US will be running a budget deficit of half a trillion dollars in 2005 (when troops will conceivably become available for an invasion), without even adding in supplemental spending for Iraq and Afghanistan (which, if last year was an indication, could run at more than 50 billion dollars). The war in Iraq has already cost more than 100 billion dollars. Such spending can barely be sustained now - where do you expect to obtain the money necessary for an even more expensive attack against Iran (remember that Iran actually has a navy capable of mining the Gulf, and clearing the area, along with destroying Iran's submarines, is an expensive proposition. Also note that Iran's military posses enough of a helicopter and SSM force that it will slow the advance of US forces. In fact, Iran's military will be much more expensive to defeat, because there will need to be many more air dropped munitions expended than in Iraq)? Not to mention that helping the people to overthrow the government covertly or with the assistance of special operators is a much more cost effective solution.
#15 from Iblis at 11:13 pm on Feb 24, 2004
Joshua: You raise some good questions. I'm glad Pres. Bush has plenty of experts to advise him, because I certainly don't have all the answers. Of course, I do have some thoughts on the issues you raise: 1. Money is a real problem. On the other hand, it sounds strange to me to say that Iran is a threat, that it is sponsoring terrorists who are killing Americans, that it is developing nuclear weapons and for all that we'd love to send the troops in to make them stop--but we just don't have the cash. If we are talking about preventing, say, a nuke in Manhattan, then you had better keep me away from the check book. 2. Iran's naval abilities are primarily coastal. They do have mine layers and submarines. They also have coastal anti-ship missile batteries. That's more of an issue when you don't have access to land bases. If you are operating from carriers they have to stay further away, which reduces the number of sorties per carrier per day. In an attack on Iran we would be able to operate from land based airstrips. Our supply lines would also be land based--at least until we had already pushed them back from the boarders and coasts. Once their ports are seized their naval assets don't count for much. Just have to be careful until all the mines are cleared. 3. I don't see how their helicopters make any difference. Anything in Iran that flies won't last long. 4. Iran does have an excellent missile ability. I mentioned that as a potential problem in my first post. I doubt, however, that it poses much of a military threat. We can operate from bases out of their reach. We have a limited ability to intercept missiles. Most importantly, however, would be our speed and air power. If the troops are moving quickly and the Iranians are denied access to the air and thus the ability to watch our movements then hitting our troops becomes really tricky. On the flip side, Special Forces and US air power would be able to deal with the launchers themselves very quickly. Note how limited the missile effect was last March, as compared to the first Gulf War. On the other hand, Iran could use its missiles as terror weapons and target neighboring cities. All the more reason to do this now before the situation gets worse. 5. JDAMs are cheap. The biggest expense is getting them to the target (i.e. operating the aircraft they are dropped from). Bombs and cruise missiles do cost money, but that's a small part of the whole enterprise. As an argument, it's also a rehashing of your first. 6. Agreed. It would be much, much better to help the Iranians help themselves--and not just for monetary reasons. I would hope that this administration is already doing what it can on this front. Sadly, I don't think it's any more realistic than it was in Iraq last year (though in 1991 it could have worked).
#16 from Tom Holsinger at 11:34 pm on Feb 24, 2004
Joshua Harris, Conquering Iran will be less of a problem than conquering Iraq save, perhaps, for logistics due to inconveniently located mountains. OTOH, our forces are quite familiar with the area's geographic features due to World War Two lend-lease construction needs. Our pre-attack psychological warfare campaign, as well as other softening up processes, haven't begun yet. War is not static. The strategic environment our forces will operate in after our pre-attack softening up preparations have matured will be much different than currently exists. The new mullah regime hasn't begun to honk off the Iranian population. The Iranian peoples' hostility to their government will soar when the Basiji, etc., try to take away everyone's satellite dishes and VCR's. 25 years ago, a mob of middle-class Parisian housewives tried to lynch the first Culture Minister of then newly elected French President Mitterand's cabinet when he was spotted alone on the street after banning the broadcast of France's most popular TV show - the American Dynasty. A shopkeeper saved the minister's life by letting him in and then slamming down the security grate most Paris stores have for just such eventualities. Occupying Iran afterwards will be much more of a problem than occupying Iraq. Iran is bigger, far more populated, and more mountainous. OTOH, we'll have a significantly greater amount of active local support, and we won't have to disband Iran's armed forces, so the problem period of our occupation of Iran, and the total occupation period, will be much shorter than in raq. Trent and I are familiar with both such matters.
#17 from Trent Telenko at 12:13 am on Feb 25, 2004
Joshua, The number one job of the Iranian military is too not be a threat to the nutball Mullah's. Its number two job is to look threatening in parades. Its number three job is to be able to shoot at mobs of unarmed civilians at a distance with heavy crew served weapons while the Basiji security goons hold AK's to their heads. I covered the structure and performance of 3rd world militaries like the Iranians in my post The Myth of Chinese Airpower http://windsofchange.net/archives/003628.html The relevant section: All 3rd World States, including China, are a thin veneer of modernity stretched over a sea of abject poverty. This means they are literally one person deep in any given technological or organizational skill. The end result of this is that the average 3rd world regime looks something like this: 1) The dictator/ruling faction is in the capitol and is protected by the REGIME SECURITY FORCES from the Army. 2) The Army is located away from the capitol in the provinces chasing/producing rebels. The REGIME SECURITY FORCE have informers in the Army and visible political officers that watch units for disloyalty. The political officers also function to reduce the military effectiveness of Army units because militarily effective Army units are a threat to the regime. 3)The Air Force is split in two. There are the ground support aircraft in the provinces to chase rebels and there is a unit of air superiority jet fighters in the capitol with zero air-to ground attack capability. The pilots of the capitol protection jets are the best paid and pampered people in the military. They and their families live in grandly built government housing guarded by the REGIME SECURITY FORCES. 4) The air force headquarters is built in a huge high rise building in the center of the capitol city. Meanwhile the Army and REGIME SECURITY FORCE headquarters are built in bomb proof bunkers. This is a great simplification. For example, there are always many seperate REGIME SECURITY FORCES, meant to watch each other, as well as the Army and air force. Saddam Hussein's regime was a prime example of this. In the case of the Iranians, the Basiji are only one aspect of the security forces. The mullah's have the Revolutionary Guards, their own close Persian blooded followers/security. They have Lebonese Arab-Shia of Hezbollah as their ultimate killer mercenary bad boys. On top of that, they have Al-Qaeda for wet work if none of the rest can be used. Our psywar ops took the Iraqi Army off the board before we invaded Iraq. The Republican Guards were either neutralized by psywar or air power. The rest of the Iraqi regime security forces fought stupid and died for their troubles. The Iranian Mullahocracy will follow the same template when we conquer them.
#18 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 1:11 am on Feb 25, 2004
I don't think someone posting his fantasy war plan should say other commenters are "coming out to play". The warlords in Afghanistan adjacent to Iran are on friendly terms with it. Bases for the invasion will have to be secured and maintained against the will of the local populace, and probably against the public statements of the central government, such as it is. The picture of the US invading Iran from bases in Afghanistan, against the wishes of the Afghans, and from Iraq, against the wishes of the Iraqis (has Ayatollah Sistani come out for a secular government in Teheran?) will be very ugly. The difference of opinion is that you can't wait to play the bully with your superweapons, across three large countries, while I expect the whole project to come crashing down with great loss of life on all sides (in the unlikely event that it takes place). How many troops will be necessary to secure Iran compared to Iraq? How does that compare to the number available? (Your analysis of the current strength of the Iranian military mentioned that we haven't sold them any arms, but unlike Iraq they were free to purchase them from Russia and Europe.)
#19 from Tom Holsinger at 1:56 am on Feb 25, 2004
Mr. Lazarus, As usual, you have no idea what you are talking about. We'll all turn inside out and explode, right? Iran's armed forces will be neutralized by psy-ops prior to onset of hostilities. They are more vulnerable to those than Iraq's, and are so politically unreliable right now that they probably wouldn't resist American forces even absent a psy-ops campaign. The mullahs don't trust their own Revolutionary Guards anymore. Few, if any, will resist American forces when the psy-ops boys are done with them. And they lack the heavy weapons of Saddam's Republican Guards. The Basiji will fight - as well as Saddam's Iraqi "fedayeen", i.e., they'll slow down our invasion by cluttering the roads with their burnt-out vehicles. Hezbollah mercenaries will fight. They'll be trapped with almost everyones' hand against them. They might be as effective as Al Qaeda's forces in Iraq. IMO, and I'm good at this, our invasion of Iran will face significantly greater logistic obstacles than our invasion of Iraq, but proportionately less organized resistance. Iran's x2.5 greater population means that total organized resistance might be about the same as in Iraq. I expect that the population difference will be more than offset by our having much greater active support from the population than in Iraq. Our forces are much more familiar with the terrain in Iran than in Iraq, due to the facts that we built so much of Iran's transporation infrastructure (starting before Pearl Harbor) and that we expected to have to defend Iran from Soviet invasion. Practice makes perfect too. This won't be the first time we're doing it. I expect our casualties in conquering Iran will be at least as high as for Iraq due to more transportation accidents - Iran is that much bigger and not flat. Conquering Iran will be the easy part. Tom, Trent, Iblis: You make some excellent points. I suppose you're right about the relative easiness of invading Iran, but I still think President Bush won't invade. Whether or not it is the best option, it requires significant funding. Optimally, you could cut discretionary spending enough to fund the war, but the President seems bent on spending heavily on everything. Even if he wanted to, his projected budgets essentially preclude an invasion. I highly doubt he'll cut discretionary spending, but we'll see. In any case, I also still believe that fostering an internal resistance movement and capitalizing on anti-Mullah sentiment is our best option. Am I wrong?
#21 from Trent Telenko at 2:17 am on Feb 25, 2004
It doesn't matter how many times the American military goes through 3rd world militaries like shit through a goose. The same people are going to make the same improbable claims that the next time will be a bloody American defeat worse than Vietnam. Give me a flippin' break.
#22 from FH at 3:09 am on Feb 25, 2004
Joshua brings up a good point, funding. That is something that will be decided by the state of the economy, whether it is '05 or '06. But it will almost certainly happen, it is only a matter of time before it does. I personally imagine it will look more like Afghanistan than Iraq, with the USAF bombing most of the Mullah loyalists, guided by US Special Forces, who will do much of the fighting and integrating of the disperate anti-Mullah groups in Iran. I think that Bush will be able to sell it, despite the cost, because of Iran's harboring of Al Qaeda. That is something that even Congress can't tolerate. Especially with Iran so close to The Bomb.
#23 from Tom Holsinge at 4:25 am on Feb 25, 2004
Trent, They're like Cubs fans - "Just wait 'til next year!" Joshua, Funding is not a problem. This is America. Tom, As someone who roots, roots, roots for the Cubbies, I resent the comparison.
#25 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 5:34 am on Feb 25, 2004
Mr. Holsinger, we have 550 dead soldiers in Iraq already; we continue to tithe our own soldiers' lives and those of Iraqis who cooperate with us; we will be there for years; our government in Afghanistan controls less territory than the Soviet stooges did at the time of their collapse; our armed forces are operating under a stop-loss order and with normal rotation and refitting schedules in shambles; and into this picture you have the temerity to suggest that I don't know what I'm talking about, that a few Supermen agents and their Magic Death Ray weapons will take on a task apparently much greater than the one we have undertaken. If we need 100K troops to bring stability to Iraq, how many would we need in Iran, even supposing that we overthrew the mullahs in the first place? And which units would they come from? Those summoned at the Stone of Erech? It's possible that I don't know what I'm talking about, but even this is better than writing up your own bedtime fantasies of invincible Americans and calling it analysis. That's negative knowledge, as opposed to zero. We have heard such optimistic drivel before: I recall that by last December we were going to be down to 30,000 troops in Iraq. If it's so easy to run through those Third World armies, then, Mr. Holsinger, what the **** are our 100K+ troops doing there? Working on their suntans as summer approaches?
#26 from FH at 6:17 am on Feb 25, 2004
Andrew is right that we underestimated the number of troops we needed to pacify Iraq. But then again, we underestimated the time it would take to conquer the place. IIRC, the original estimate was around 2 months. The shorter conflict meant that we killed less bad guys, which created problems for us in the long run. In Iran, we would have to be much more careful about rounding up potential trouble makers as soon as the fighting stops. I would ask this: Please try and keep this civil. This thread is heading into a flame war, and I would really like to avoid that. I am enjoying this thread, and don't want it thus ruined.
#27 from John Farren at 2:42 pm on Feb 25, 2004
Andrew J. Lazarus: "Warlords in Afghanistan adjacent to Iran are on friendly terms with it." "Our government in Afghanistan controls less territory than the Soviet stooges." "We continue to tithe our own soldiers' lives and those of Iraqis ... we will be there for years". Depending on how the political cards fall during and after an invasion of Iran, you might not want to occupy at all.
#28 from Trent Telenko at 6:06 pm on Feb 25, 2004
Andrew, Yes, we have had 500 soldiers 'killed in combat' (130 of the 500 you mention were killed by traffic accidents) on the streets of Iraq. Soldier’s lives are made for sacrifice. It is incumbent of the politicians to make sure the sacrifice is worth it. I think it is in this particular case. You don't. Then again, nothing the Bush Administration does in this war is acceptable to you. Pretending there are any other choices is an act of 'September the 10th' fantasy.
#29 from FH at 6:27 pm on Feb 25, 2004
You forget, Trent, that Andrew doesn't think that we are in a war. Much less one that has waged for over a thousand years.
#30 from Tom Holsinger at 9:06 pm on Feb 25, 2004
Trent, "It is a certain sign of madness to do the same thing over and over again but expect a different result." Some here say the same thing over and over again expecting a different result next time. One of those is a Cubs fan. Others aren't. Many of those in Iraq whose lives and money were at stake for guessing wrong got their money out before the US invaded. The same sort in Iran are doing so now. But this is of no consequence for the non-Cubbies here. Their certainty is based on faith, not reason. "My mind is made up - don't try convincing me with facts!"
#31 from FH at 11:46 pm on Feb 25, 2004
The facts aren't the problem Tom, its the analysis. People take in the same date, but reach different conclusions. Its a matter of worldview, what Kant described as our "lens." We can't see the world as it is, but rather as what we think it is, what we believe it to be, and what we think it could be. This is how someone how appears entirely rational can come up with a conclusion seemingly devoid of logic. The data is there, the thinking is there, but the manner in which it is put together is off, and thus you get irrational logic. A tree diagram with P and P-1, for example, where most people think the world is A, while a few think it is B. If the world is A, then choice 'a' is the right plan. Choice 'b' would be the wrong one. But if the world is world B, then choice 'a' is bad and 'b' is good. When people think that they live in A, when the world is in fact world B, you get this kind of thinking.
#32 from Tom Holsinger at 12:42 am on Feb 26, 2004
FH, The following appears in volume II of Anthony Cordesman's Lessons of Modern Warfare, concerning the Iran-Iraq war. Mr. Cordesman quotes Iraqi officers on Iranian military prowess and equipment: "Iranian mine-clearance technology = a boot. Advanced Iranian mine-clearance technology = a stick to hit the mines with." The Iran-Iraq war was a draw. We beat the crap out of the Iraqis twice afterwards. Iran's military forces have tubed in efficiency in the past ten years for the same political reliability/interference reasons Iraq's did. Some here presently contend the battle-hardened Iranian hordes will present much more effective opposition to us than the battle-hardened Iraqi hordes. These same people said here last year the battle-hardened Iraqi hordes would give major battle to our invading forces. "It is a certain sign of madness to do the same thing over and over again but expect a different result. Some here say the same thing over and over again expecting a different result next time. One of those is a Cubs fan. Others aren't."
#33 from FH at 2:02 am on Feb 26, 2004
I suppose I should have addressed the fact that some people will ignore facts that don't fit their worldview. Cognitive Dissonance can lead people to believe the strangest, and stupidest of things. Iraq didn't win because it was outnumbered, and just as poorly led as the Iranians. The only thing that worries me about Iran is the cost, in lives and treasure. Mostly the latter, as I suspect the locals will be more helpful in Iran.
#34 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 2:23 pm on Feb 26, 2004
When people think that they live in A, when the world is in fact world B, you get this kind of thinking.Is it possible that you are the ones in the alternate universe? So far, you've been closer to the truth on the ease of entering Baghdad, and much further from the truth on the difficulty of staying there. That's not a record I would think settles the question. The only thing that worries me about Iran is the cost, in lives and treasure.Well, yes, that worries me, too. I thought that's what we were discussing. If you want to talk about psychology, try John Farren's post above. I especially "like" the part where we tell Ayatollah Sistani to get on board with our plan or die. This isn't about defense of the American homeland; this is about playing out a video game in the Superman role, bullying everyone who stands in our way. Hey— Trent points out, we pay those soldiers to get in harm's way (I see he would make a truly inspiring officer), and besides, we can always hit the reboot button. [Say what, life doesn't come with cheat codes?]
#35 from John Farren at 4:25 pm on Feb 26, 2004
Andrew Lazarus: To threaten Sistani, or anyone else, or carry out such threats, is not a personal preference. Persuasion, political agreements, rational agreement, bribery, etc. are all options. The methods are second-order; the goal is achieving a particular objective. As the objective is, in this case, the avoidance of a nuclear armed Iran, and preventing their giving shelter and support to terrorist opponents of the US, then I should think the costs deemed acceptable to oneself (include breaches of ethics applicable to civil society) are fairly high. Generally speaking, costs to those who can be categorised as enemies are not a concern, and costs to third-parties should be minimised, but if considered unavoidable, may have to be tolerated. That does not mean welcoming such costs, still less failing to avoid them if possible. If practicable, limited military action against weapons-related sites might be better than invasion. As I said, I would prefer orchestrating an Iranian revolt, if possible. Better still, a successful spontaneous revolt. It might even be that the nuclear timeline for Iran, and the scale of threat in Iraq, is such that other areas might be higher priorities i.e. Syria, or N. Korea, or Pakistan, or Sudan... As to the operational military requirements, problems and options, I have not addressed those, as I not as expert in that area as other posters. I would now go and play a video game, if only I had one. Not really my thing.
#36 from Trent Telenko at 5:50 pm on Feb 26, 2004
>I especially "like" the part where we tell Ayatollah Sistani to get on board with our plan or die. This isn't about defense of the American homeland; this is about playing out a video game in the Superman role, bullying everyone who stands in our way. No, this is about your inability to accept the fact we are at war. You are allergic to the concept of American power used to further American national security for what amounts to religious reasons. Tough, get used to it. The alternative to “bullying” and conquest of the Islamic Death Cult infected kleptocracies is killing them all with nukes. It may come to that but the moral path is to try everything else first. >Hey— Trent points out, we pay those soldiers to get in harm's way (I see he would make a truly inspiring officer), and besides, we can always hit the reboot button. [Say what, life doesn't come with cheat codes?] Andrew, I am more than aware of the human costs of war. I am the son, grandson and great grand son of US Army officers. My cousin was in the Pentagon in the action room on Sept. 11th. He served in an armored cavalry troop in the first Gulf War and was part of the CENTCOM staff for OIF. My father was a West Point graduate who served two tours in Vietnam and one in Thailand. My grandfather was the MP Chief Provost Marshall for Puerto Rico in WW2 and suffered a mental break down from the stress of guarding Communist Chinese during the korean War. He died in a VA hospital from medical complications he likely got from observing an open air atomic test. My great uncle served in the Philippine Scouts, survived the Baatan Death March and died in Japanese coal mine in the Home Islands weeks before the war ended. If you were a man, you would apologize, but I don’t expect you to.
#37 from Fred at 8:50 pm on Feb 26, 2004
FH, Actually, what Kant meant by "lens" is not what we believe about the world, but how our minds are naturally structured to perceive the world. Example: Time and space are not entities perceivable by the senses, so a strict empiricist would say we cannot prove they exist. Kant would agree, but say that we cannot help but perceive things in terms of time and space if we are to perceive them at all. If I say "The cat is on the mat," my use of "is" (present tense verb) and "on" (preposition indicating space) presuppose that the cat is in a place at a time. Time and space are the "lens" through which I perceive the cat. However, there is nothing in that lens to prevent me from perceiving a rat on the mat if that is what is in fact there. My point is that our "lens" do not ipso facto make us irrational. Before a theory is tested in the real world, two entirely rational people can draw perfectly logical, if perfectly opposed, conclusions. Only if they stick to those conclusions after the fact are they being irrational. And even then, somewhat differing interpretations are possible in many cases. About the Iran war controversy, with all due respect to Tom and Trent, I don't see it happening any time soon in the absence of an actual attack on US soil with irrefutable evidence linking it to Iran. I do believe bombing attacks on weapon sites and support (financial, propaganda, moral, and possibly covert military) for factions opposing the Mullahs are likely, but not even that before Nov. And with all due respect to Andrew, I think we should be attacking the mullahs in some form. It seems very clear to me, in retrospect, that 9/11 was the culmination of a chain of events that started with our inaction during the Iran hostage crisis. In the Middle East, we're not dealing with people who think like we do. They respect strength even when that strength is used to brutally oppress them, and they despise weakness even when that weakness arises from the compassion and good intentions of people like Andrew.
#38 from Trent Telenko at 10:29 pm on Feb 26, 2004
Fred, Given Iran's: 1) support of terrorism including direct attacks in the Mid-East against our civilians and military (and once inside the USA via car bombing the van belonging to the Captain of the USS Vincennes), it would be an impeachable offense for Bush to not invade and conquer Iran. If the other side in a terrorist war with you is irrational and is certain to have access to WMD in the future. Then Preemptive Conventional War is the only rational answer.
#39 from Tom Holsinger at 11:43 pm on Feb 26, 2004
Fred, There was no irrefutable evidence that Iraq attacked us at home, or that terrorists trained in Iraq attacked us anywhere. There was only significant circumstantial evidence of the latter, and some of the former. But we invaded Iraq anyway. Why should Iran be any different? It is actively developing nuclear weapons, has given Al Qaeda secure bases to use in attacking us, and has overtly murdered Americans abroad. There is a lot more evidence that Iran has, is and will come after us directly than there was for Iraq. The Iraqis had a low opinion of Iranian military prowess during the Iran-Iraq War - what got them was Iran's x2.5 numbers and far greater fanaticism. We went through the Iraqis like shit through a goose twice, so there is no question that we can do the same to Iran. Occupying Iran afterwards will be much more difficult than in Iraq, though, as numbers do count more in pacification campaigns and Iran's terrain is far more favorable to guerrillas than Iraq's, as well as there being a lot more terrain period.
#40 from Fred at 3:48 am on Feb 27, 2004
Tom & Trent, Don't misunderstand me. I think destroying the Iranian Mullahcracy would be a very good thing. I just don't think it is politically or militarily feasible at this particular time. Tom, you're right about Iraq, but at the time we invaded Iraq, we weren't already occupying another country with overstretched military resources. We also hadn't just been through a war that many have concluded (wrongly in my view but nonetheless) that we were duped into. So if we invade Iran (which I still consider very unlikely) it wouldn't be until after the presidential election and not then if we can bring down or even sufficiently scare the mullahs any other way or if, God forbid, the democrats win.
#41 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 6:51 am on Feb 27, 2004
I'm not ridiculing the invasion of Iran because of some fondness for the mullahs, or pacifism. I'm ridiculing it because as best as I can tell from an ordinary newspaper, it's just not feasible, at least not successfully. (Although I'm not so certain as Tom that we would defeat the Iranians as easily as he predicts, as their armed forces are not nearly so degraded as Iraq's and their morale may be higher, he seems to have noticed my points on how difficult it would be to maintain the subsequent occupation.) Now, I also don't think it's advisable, but then, the former compels the latter. If Fred has other, truly cognizable ideas about destabilizing the mullahs (more Farsi radio broadcasts? Setting up web sites for banned newspapers??), I'm all ears. Trent: I'm actually leaning toward Andrew on this one. One of the best predictors in this war thus far has been what President Bush says - and what he has said about Iran is consistent. He talks about different policies for different regimes, which certainly implies a different approach. I do believe Bush is committed to regime change in Iran. I do not believe military invasion is his preferred way of bringing that about... at present. Which makes sense. We've covered how overstretched the U.S. military currently is. Heck, Trent, you've covered it yourself. Our committment in Iraq is not going to shrink quickly, which means the troops for an Iranian invasion and transition will have to come from somewhere. Since Bush et. al. don't seem to be following our advice on expanding the military and creating a para-military corps, they seem to have few options. Which doesn't mean "no options," of course. It looks like we're going to try covert action, and see if the regime will fall on its own. If it doesn't, however, the threat Iran poses is severe enough that decisions like calling up the entire National Guard and enacting Trent's scenario have to be on the table as Plan B. Iran is a more serious threat than Iraq - always has been. But if you look at the logistics, politics, and sequencing, we couldn't get to Iran without Iraq. So now we've covered the preliminaries (too slowly, I thought), while the threat from Iran grew. And here we are. Where we go next is going to be interesting.
#43 from Trent Telenko at 1:49 pm on Feb 27, 2004
Andrew, I never expected you to respond other than you have. It is a symptom of the moral degeneracy of the left that they to resort to ad hominem attacks like "chicken hawk" when their "moral superiority" is blown out of the water. Joe, The Command SGT. Major of the US Army is already telling troops that this war will last 10 years longer and to expect a minimum of a one year tour in a combat theater every five years for the entire Army for the duration. There are 100,000 US Army personnel slots being recoded to move over-worked reserve specialties like Civil Affairs from the reserves to the active forces. The National Guard is being transformed from a combat force to a paramilitary force with the mass replacement of the heavy artillery brigades with military police brigades. Rummie has gotten the Army brass to buy off on his ideas of transformation and the Army will be able to deploy every active combat brigade over seas for 30 days of combat without reservists when this reorganization is competed. The American Military operating on an operational tempo very similar to that of the WW2 Pacific theater. The units that were in Iraq are being sent home to rebuild for the next round of fighting in Iran. Until they are ready the Bush Administration is saying "nice doggie" publicallly awaiting those units readiness for the next campaign while the psywar folks in Special Operations "prepare the ground." That military campaign will 7 out of 8 chances be Iran and it will be spooling up during the fall and winter of 2004.
#44 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 3:14 pm on Feb 27, 2004
Trent, frankly, I don't claim any moral superiority. I just claim that you want to turn America into a reviled nation of bullies. On the right as well as the left, that's a rather eccentric and unusual plan. Rumor that some AQ leaders live in Teheran (our intel has been so good up to now, too </sarcasm>) is not a casus belli. I know, sticking it to Old Europe, New Europe, Asia, Africa and South America is one of the good points in your view, and anyway, Islam Karimov is behind us all the way. From other threads, Trent, you support violating the Geneva Conventions in Guantanamo (at long last we may be coming into compliance) and with Jose Padilla, shredding our own Constitution. The united stream in these policies is to show the Head of the American Government (will he still be called President after a unilateral War on Iran?—one doubts the American electorate would endorse such a measure, without even the illusion of preemption of illegal WMD) is the biggest, baddest mofo on Earth, unconstrained by any law or tradition, even his own. It's priceless that the bully who said I wasn't enough of a man to apologize to him (for what?!) complains of ad hominem attacks. If the shoe fits, my anti-democratic warmongering friend, wear it.
#45 from Tom Holsinger at 4:23 pm on Feb 27, 2004
Joe, Surging forces for a short-term conquest is easy. It is the long-term force commitment for occupation duty which is the real manpower issue. I see no problem conquering Iran but major, major problems holding it. That is why I said earlier: "Occupying Iran afterwards will be much more of a problem than occupying Iraq. Iran is bigger, far more populated, and more mountainous. OTOH, we'll have a significantly greater amount of active local support, and we won't have to disband Iran's armed forces, so the problem period of our occupation of Iran, and the total occupation period, will be much shorter than in Iraq."
#46 from Trent Telenko at 7:55 pm on Feb 27, 2004
>Trent, frankly, I don't claim any moral I see you still have problems with the concept of "War" and America being in one. >Rumor that some AQ leaders live in Teheran (our Things that were "acceptable risks" before 9/11/2001 are no longer...but then again you don't believe 9/11/2001 changed anything. >From other threads, Trent, you support Andrew, Setting up straw men to knock down is part of the moral superiority game your types play. Unlawful combatants have no rights under the articles of the Geneva Convention America has signed. The additional articles that the Europeans and others added later to give terrorists and 3rd world brigands "rights" were never signed or acknowledged by the USA. The "compliance" you speak of is merely for political convenience between the Bush Administration and European allies like the British and is revocable at any time of our choosing. As for Padilla, the 1940’s laws and case precedent were very clear, but Congress in the 1970’s passed a number of laws related to the Nisei reparations mucking up the issue. That is why the Supreme Court chose to hear the case. Tom Holsinger, as a practicing lawyer, can speak to that issue far better than I. Trent - I'd be hella more comfortable if you'd address Andrew and his arguments dieectly rather than tossing sand at 'his types'. I stand directly in the middle on this, with clear awareness of what the mullahs in Tehran are doing as far as for-real nuclear weapons, and what they have done in supporting Islamist terror (a better casus belli, Andrew, than housing some AQ folks). But we're stretched thin militarily and politically, and absent some greater measure of international will and the two divisions I caled for a while ago - which won't be ready for at least 24 months after they are budgeted - I'm not completely sure how we get from here to there in a winning way. So the argument is damn interesting to me, and I'd rather not turn your views off because of the overly aggressive writing style you sometimes employ. A.L.
#48 from Trent Telenko at 11:11 pm on Feb 27, 2004
A.L., You have used, and been caught out on doing so, the same straw man arguement attack style. So get over it. If you sleep with dogs you will wake up with fleas. These so-called 'militants' are our pathological enemies and any we let go to sooth the feelings of some people will come back and kill us or people working for us. We would be far better served if we simply disappear every unlawful combatant we capture into an unmarked graves. Instead we are going to play capture and release games like we did below until it gets a lot of Americans killed. U.S. Claims Spy Led Attack on Pakistan's Leader The man who tried to kill Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in December was a spy in Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency, a U.S. defense intelligence source told United Press International on Thursday. Pakistan officials deny the man was a spy. They say he was an extremist freed by U.S. forces once the spy agency said he was not involved in terrorist activities. Mohammed Jameel, 31, was one of four people who tried to ram two explosive-filled cars into Musharraf's motorcade on Dec. 25 as he was returning to his home near Islamabad. All four are believed to have died in the attempt, along with 12 other people, mostly policemen and Musharraf's bodyguards. The attack came 11 days after a bomb blew up a bridge in the same area shortly after Musharraf's motorcade passed it. Investigators later said the bodies of three others involved in the attack were mutilated beyond recognition. Jameel, however, was recognized by his severed head, which was discovered near one of the cars the men had used. Investigators said Jameel's face was almost intact, which allowed them to identify him. A week after the assassination attempt, Pakistan's Information Minister Shaikh Rasheed identified Jameel as a Muslim militant from Rawlakote, a small town on the Pakistani side of the disputed Kashmir region. Rasheed said Jameel was one of hundreds of Pakistanis who went to Afghanistan to defend the Taliban regime when the United States invaded the country in October 2001. Jameel was later captured and handed over to U.S. authorities in Afghanistan who kept him at Bagram airbase near Kabul along with other prisoners. "Since there were hundreds of such prisoners, the Americans decided to release those not directly involved with the Taliban or al-Qaeda," said a Pakistani official. "They contacted us for information about Jameel and others and since we had nothing on him, we declared him clean. It was an honest mistake." A U.S. defense-intelligence source disagrees. He says Jameel was a captain of the Pakistan Army serving in the spy agency. He says Jameel was sent to Afghanistan along with other spies to defend the Taliban. [snip] As for your point here: >...and absent some greater measure of International will is irrelevant here. Only American hard military power, the President's will to use it and the support of the American public for his war policies matter here. Now that we have Iraqi bases, we don't need allies to take out Iran by military conquest. The occupation and reconstruction campaign could be helped or hindered by the so-called "international community," but only at the margins. The USA would have been far better served in creating an interum government for Iraq rather than wasting time in the U.N. talking about WMD's for the sake of Tony Blair's government. The same is true regards Iran. The best time for us to create an interm Iranian civil government is before we evict the Mullahs. Especially if we use it as a psywar tool to condition the Iranian public to the Mullah's impending loss of power.
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