You've noticed this pattern, have you? Well, there's a good reason for it.

Norvell B. DeAtkine, a retired U.S. Army colonel, draws upon many years of firsthand observation as a military trainer in the Middle East to reach conclusions about the ways in which they go into combat. His findings derive from experience with Arab military establishments in the capacity of U.S. military attache, security assistance officer, observer officer, as well as some thirty years of study of the Middle East. I'll take you right to the punchline, but the whole article in UNC's American Diplomacy magazine is totally worth a read:

"...armies fight as they train. Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that transforms civilians in uniform into warriors."

Victor Davis Hanson often makes this same point. He even has a book on the subject. Why does this matter here? Back to DeAtkine:

"It would be difficult to exaggerate the cultural gulf separating American and Arab military cultures. In every significant area, American military advisors find students who enthusiastically take in their lessons and then resolutely fail to apply them. The culture they return to - the culture of their own armies in their own countries - defeats the intentions with which they took leave of their American instructors."

But surely this is implausible! How could people be so dumb? To which I reply: ever been a corporate trainer in a big company, especially for a training program that attempts to change the way people work without changing the way management manages? If you have, you know exactly what he's talking about. And it's highly relevant as we contemplate what's coming in Iraq.

Take everything you've heard re: Saddam's war plans, including urban combat. Retain respect for havoc, mischance, and individual bravery, but filter the data through this...

"Arab officers are not concerned about the welfare and safety of their men. The Arab military mind does not encourage initiative on the part of junior officers, or any officers for that matter. Responsibility is avoided and deflected, not sought and assumed. Political paranoia and operational hermeticism, rather than openness and team effort, are the rules of advancement (and survival) in the Arab military establishments. These are not issues of genetics, of course, but matters of historical and political culture."

Co-ordinated urban warfare? Under those handicaps? Recall Den Beste's articles on soldiers vs. warriors. They may do it, but they won't do it very well. Or anything else, for that matter. Overconfidence is unwarranted. But Desert Storm I and the Israeli experiences weren't an accident, either, and we should keep that in mind as the debate unfolds.

(Thanks to Stephen Den Beste of USS Clueless for pointing me at this one)