Winds of Change.NET: On Killing Terrorist Leaders

January 24, 2006

On Killing Terrorist Leaders

by Joe Katzman at January 24, 2006 3:46 AM

Send to Jahannum...

This is a frequent topic of discussion, so I thought I'd log this for future reference. Daniel Byman in the LA Times. Byman is Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University:

"In addition to killing several perpetrators of the 1972 Munich Olympics attack, Israel has killed leaders of the PLO, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.

After the second intifada broke out in September 2000, Israel dramatically stepped up its targeting of Palestinian terrorists, killing more than 200 of them. This campaign worked. Targeted killings - combined with the border security barrier, military operations and improved intelligence - reduced Israeli deaths from a high of 172 in 2002 to less than 40 in 2005.

Even more telling, this decline in deaths occurred during periods when the number of attempted attacks by Hamas increased, suggesting that the organization became less capable even though its hatred did not diminish."

I've noted in the past that any organization's scarcest resource is competent leaders, and that terrorist and Netwar organizations are especially vulnerable if their leadership is churned. Indeed, one can observe a similar decline in the American Mafia.¹ Byman adds:

"The targeted killing campaign also bolstered Israeli morale. In the last five years, Israel has lost more than 1,000 people to terrorism. No government can remain idle as its citizens are slaughtered, and, in a grim fashion, the killings of terrorists created a sense among the Israeli public that its government was striking back and protecting them."

This is actually a non-trivial benefit. One of the key enablers/ goals of terrorism is to spread the impression of precisely the opposite idea: that the government and society are weak and corrupt, and protection is impossible. This was codified in the late 1960s by Marxist terrorists (the predominant kind at the time) like Marighella. Tiptoeing through a number of Osama's videos also show a similar underlying message, for which targeted killings provide a grimly effective countermessage.

In an age where terrorist leaders think nothing of sending children with Down's Syndrome out as suicide bombers, repeatedly (as usual, the Palestinians invented this one), these measures also restore moral equilibrium to the battlefield.

Byman does note that the practice has limitations, however, and that Israel's experience may be instructive. He makes essentially three points in the abbreviated newspaper versions of his February-March 2006 Foreign Affairs magazine article, and they fall into two broad headings.

Capture vs. Kill: The Intelligence Dimension

One of which is that capture is usually preferable to execution due to the information that can be extracted. Of course, it is not always a realistic option, and Byman acknowledges this. Still, when it is possible:

"Moral considerations aside, arrests allow interrogation, and interrogation leads to information that can disrupt planned attacks or lead to the capture of other operatives. And mistakes [in kill-focused operations] are inevitable...."

I would concur, but flag the underlying assumptions: [1] that an effective interrogation regie eexists; and [2] that captured prisoners are not likely be released while they still represent a danger. If either of those assumptions are not true, or become no longer true, his recommendation may suffer a fatal blow.

Byman also raises the issue of foreign governments and cooperation as an additional intelligence consideration:

"Israel operates in a tiny area that it has penetrated with intelligence assets � and still, it has made mistakes. The U.S., in contrast, must operate globally and in regions where its intelligence is weak.

Israel, moreover, could not rely on the Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat to arrest the suspects when Israel identified them. The U.S., however, relies heavily on the cooperation of allied governments in arresting and disrupting suspected terrorists."

This is a valid point, and deciding whether or not to execute a specific operation has to take this into account. On the other hand, once again we must flag the underlying assumption. Beyond a certain point, non-cooperation from a government in policing its own territory can, should (indeed, must) cause the calculus to shift. For "allied cooperation" to be a viabe argument for anything, there must be either sufficient cooperation or serious enough retaliatory consequences to make respect for their sovereign perogatives worth it.

This caveat may become more and more central in some darker scenarios for The Islamist War's future - for instance, as the full long-term consequences of EUrabia become apparent. Meanwhile, one hopes our "friends" the Saudis have been reminded of this often since 9/11.

Clear Policies and the Question of Civilians

Byman again:

"Perhaps the biggest lesson the U.S. can draw from Israel is the need for transparency. Israel has a robust public debate on the controversial policy. While the government does not share specific intelligence, the targeting criteria are understood by all. The result is a broad consensus. In the U.S., in contrast, the process is secretive and, if mistakes occur, a backlash is possible. Although transparency may result in missed opportunities, the result would be a more sustainable policy."

Unreservedly true. In holding that discussion, however, one must raise those missed opportunities and their costs as one discusses where the bar is to be set. Recall, for instance, the failure to kill the Taliban's nominal leader Mullah Omar in the early days of the war, for the ridiculous reason that some pipsqueak lawyer in CENTCOM [a] was goven authority to vet it; and [b] wasn't sure about it.

The Guardian mentions this incident in its Novemmber 3, 2001 article "Winter is coming and the Taliban are strong as ever. What now for the war on terror?" - which is also a useful reminder of the "quagmire" rhetoric at the time. The US Air Force Magazine's November 2002 "An Air War Like No Other" recap of the air campaign over Afghanistan mentions it too. But the original source was The New Yorker in their Oct. 22, 2001 FACT feature:

"That night, an unmanned Predator reconnaissance aircraft, under the control of the C.I.A., was surveilling the roads leading out of Kabul. The Predator, which costs forty million dollars and cruises at speeds as slow as eighty miles an hour, is equipped with imaging radar and an array of infrared and television cameras that are capable of beaming high-resolution images to ground stations around the world. The plane was equipped with two powerful Hellfire missiles, designed as antitank weapons. The Predator identified a group of cars and trucks fleeing the capital as a convoy carrying Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader. Under a previously worked-out agreement, one knowledgeable official said, the C.I.A. did not have the authority to "push the button." Nor did the nearby command-and-control suite of the Fifth Fleet, in Bahrain, where many of the war plans had been drawn up. Rather, the decision had to be made by the officers on duty at the headquarters of the United States Central Command, or CENTCOM, at MacDill Air Force Base, in Florida.

The Predator tracked the convoy to a building where Omar, accompanied by a hundred or so guards and soldiers, took cover. The precise sequence of events could not be fully learned, but intelligence officials told me that there was an immediate request for a full-scale assault by fighter bombers. At that point, however, word came from General Tommy R. Franks, the CENTCOM commander, saying, as the officials put it, "My JAG" � Judge Advocate General, a legal officer � "doesn't like this, so we're not going to fire." Instead, the Predator was authorized to fire a missile in front of the building � "bounce it off the front door," one officer said, "and see who comes out, and take a picture." CENTCOM suggested that the Predator then continue to follow Omar. The Hellfire, however, could not target the area in front of the building�in military parlance, it could not "get a signature" on the dirt there � and it was then agreed that the missile would attack a group of cars parked in front, presumably those which had carried Omar and his retinue. The missile was fired, and it "obliterated the cars," an official said. "But no one came out."

It was learned later from an operative on the ground that Omar and his guards had indeed been in the convoy and had assumed at the time that the firing came from rocket-propelled grenades launched by nearby troops from the Northern Alliance. A group of soldiers left the building and looked for the enemy. They found nothing, and Omar and his convoy departed. A short time later, the building was targeted and destroyed by F-18s. Mullah Omar survived.

Days afterward, top Administration officials were still seething about the incident. "If it was a fuckup, I could live with it," one senior official said. "But it's not a fuckup � it's an outrage. This isn't like you're six years old and your mother calls you to come in for lunch and you say, 'Time out.' If anyone thinks otherwise, go look at the World Trade Center or the Pentagon." A senior military officer viewed the failure to strike immediately as a symptom of "a cultural issue"�"a slow degradation of the system due to political correctness: 'We want you to kill the guy, but not the guy next to him.' No collateral damage." Others saw the cultural problem as one of bureaucratic, rather than political, correctness. Either way, the failure to attack has left Defense Secretary Rumsfeld "kicking a lot of glass and breaking doors," the officer said. "But in the end I don't know if it'll mean any changes."

That was the first major indication I had that the West was in serious danger of losing the Global War on terror, and may be in a terminal civilizational phase.

One should also raise the point very forcefully that deliberately using the presence of civilians to immunize oneself from attack is itself a war crime, and note the applicable rules in the Fourth Geneva Conventions.² CPO Sparky's excellent March 2003 article, "Human Shields or Mercenaries?" goes into more detail, and notes:

"When our leaders decry a practice as a "war crime" but then allow such practices to affect planning (even though we are under no obligation to do so), the enemy now knows that he has successfully affected operations in his favor and he continues to use it. The very success of the tactic encourages the enemy's inclination to not take the "war crime" threat seriously, because "you have to catch me first."

Thus vitiating one of the key purposes of the Geneva Conventions, which was to provide protection to civilians in wartime by clearly separating them from military actors. One described well and in depth in Bill Whittle's essay "Sanctuary."

In other words, the cooperation of "anti-war" and/or co-belligerent elements in making collateral civilian casualties a major political issue as part of their political strategy, simply ensures that the practice will spread and far more civilians will be put in harm's way. The general failure to focus on the war crime dimension of terrorists like al-Qaeda, the PLO, et. al. also exacerbates this problem.

Worse, to the extent that states submit to these gambits, it also creates a false feeling of security on the part of civilians. This, too, has consequences. For starters, it means they see much less of a personal threat when the latest tin-pot dictator or terrorist cabal co-locates military targets among them. If revolutions are dangerous and the terrorists promise to kill you for blabbing, while the West promises not to kill you regardless, what's the incentive pattern here?

The result, of course, is more frequent decisions NOT to take action against a government whose actions may in fact threaten their lives rather directly. Or NOT to risk providing information or support to the authorities re: terrorist elements in their midst.

These are not trivial side-effects, and taking the battle to the Left on this issue is important for the West's long term success in the war.

Conclusion

Targeted killings work. While their ultimate manifestation per Robert Heinlein's "Friday"³ is not possible, they are disproportionately effective against "Netwar" organizations that rely on clandestine recruitment and looser command and control.

Footnotes:

¹ A similar dynamic could be observed in the American Mafia, which was decimated by a series of arrests and convictions. The next generation of leaders were basically a bunch of young punks who couldn't fill the old guard's shoes - indeed, one can trace a steady decline from the Luciano/Gambino era to leaders like John Gotti to his ineffective successors. The Sicilian Mafia, which is far safer from American law enforcement and has done far better against its own local law enforcement, now runs a good chunk of the show in America.

² Note that the Additional Protocols, introduced in 1977, were not signed by the USA. The last portion it signed was the Fourth Geneva Conventions in 1949.

³ In Heinlein's "Friday," he briefly describes a tactic whereby a very good intelligence organization figured out which enemy commanders were competent, and assassinated only those people, leaving only the morons in charge. Needless to say, they went on to win the war handily. To take this idea to a more personal level, it's well-known that weak managers tend to promote even weaker people who cannot threaten them. Look around your workplace (if you work or have worked for an organization of any size), and imagine what would happen if someone pulled that kind of "Friday" stunt there.

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"On Killing Terrorist Leaders"

Tracked: January 24, 2006 1:29 PM

H&I Fires for 24 Jan 06 from Argghhh! The Home Of Two Of Jonah's Military Guys..

Excerpt: Open post for those with something to share. New, complete posts come in below. Note: If trackbacking, please acknowledge this post in your post. That's only polite. You're advertising here, we should get an ad at your place... Ry thinks...

Tracked: January 25, 2006 6:09 AM

Does targeted killings of terrorists work? from Secular Blasphemy

Excerpt:

Comments

#1 from shloky at 4:29 am on Jan 24, 2006

They may work, but the tired cliche of a hydra comes into play. Terror networks are going to adapt over time to where they do not require "strong" leaders.

Anything along the lines of central command and control (and a hierarchy) only comes into play when you have to allocate resources to targeting specific targets ( 9/11).

Not when you're engaged in Iraq style conflicts.

John Robb's open source warfare ; targeted killings have nothing to do with anything when the enemy is attacking as many things as often as possible.

#2 from Peter at 4:37 am on Jan 24, 2006

According to heated debate at frontpagemag.com over Spielberg's Munich, Spielberg plods around in the swamp of moral equivalence and is saying that retaliation is counter-productive, whereas in reality the Israelis managed to kill off the Palestinian terror leaders operating in Europe. This led to a sharp decline in terror attacks on Israelis in Europe. Link. (second page)

#3 from Noodlehead at 5:12 am on Jan 24, 2006

interesting...keep up the good work...
www.savethesoldiers.com

#4 from Jim Rockford at 5:51 am on Jan 24, 2006

shloky -- actual experience in Warfare over the last 2,500 years shows that loss of effective commanders, and small unit leaders, leads to greatly reduced effectiveness. Iraq is no different. There simply has been the lack of political will to target and destroy terrorist leaders who hide among civilians.

There are professional bomb assemblers, emplacers, etc. who work for money. Kill them and their expertise goes away for their organization. This was seen in the Germans and Japanese who kept their fighter pilots in the war until they died or were shot down, as opposed to the US and Brits who made their aces trainers and made sure their expertise was shared.

Without strong command and control networks, force gets diffused over non-essential or useless targets, and it's particularly bad for small forces which need MORE C-in-C. While we don't have the Israeli style intel, we have a lot more machines and money and manufacturing capacity to make them. Swarming UAVs in miniature to find and track NCO and officer level people can defeat an insurgency.

#5 from shloky at 6:30 am on Jan 24, 2006

Jim -

You're making 2 key assumptions -

1) Bomb making/emplacing/whatever is a skill involving expertise and experience.

With the advent of technology the technical aspect decreases in complexity; with the advent of broadband communication networks experience can be transmit in the form of video, step by step instructions, whatever.

2) That some targets are "non-essential or useless" as if the enemy is focusing its attention on what I assume you'd call "essential" or "critical" targets.

When the war is being fought in the moral sphere for the hearts and minds of the populace (fundamental premise of 4GW) there is no such thing as useless targets. Which draws the credibility of the nation state into account - destroying key infrastructure (9/11) or sporadic/multiple effective attacks? (cutting off electricity, water, oil output - all of which we've seen in Iraq)

As a side note - it would seem small units need less c&c; because they lack the resources for the kind of managing you'd see at higher levels in a hierarchical organization. No one gives a damn who has the 10 buck bomb, as long as he blows it up somewhere. And there are hundreds/thousands more like him running around looking for something to do.

#6 from Barry Meislin at 8:07 am on Jan 24, 2006

Alternatives to the oh-so-immoral and/or oh-so-ineffectual (take your pick) policy of targetting terrorist leaders:

1. Full defensive posture. Having your citizens attacked, blown up, killed is perhaps unfortunate, but is a far more moral stance to take (and the world may even applaud). Besides, after the suicide bomber blows himself up (and a dozen or two others), you can always kill the bastard.

Or, build a wall (just where you're supposed to build it) and hunker down on the other side, waiting for those missiles to fly over (or those tunnelers to tunnel under)---perhaps the most moral policy of all.

2. The Grozny-fication of Palestine.

Needless to say, option number 2 is out of the question, as only Russians or Syrians, etc. can get away with that sort of stuff.

(Or is it out of the question? Well, the Palestinians are pretty certain about it, at least.)

#7 from Glen Wishard at 8:25 am on Jan 24, 2006

Good essay, Joe.

BTW, I'd like to welcome you and all your countrymen back from the Third World. Or was it the Second World? Oh well, it's all in the past now.

#8 from Dave Schuler at 3:29 pm on Jan 24, 2006

The blog The Duck of Minerva (international relations scholars) has condemned our recent attack on Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan as being in violation of international law not merely because it took place on Pakistani soil but because, again according to the poster at DofM, such attacks were banned. When I asked for more details, i.e. what international law, he did respond but with no more detail.

This seems incredible to me. Perhaps some smart person can fill me in on this. Is it really a violation of international law to target the leadership of enemy belligerents? Or is the nit that DofM is picking related to Al-Qaeda being a non-state actor?

#9 from Robert M at 3:42 pm on Jan 24, 2006

First good idea you've proposed in a long time. I wish I could see more proof of competence. The attack in Pakistan was heartening.

To Wishard
Go f yourself. Your comment about Canada's election is predicated on the idea without "white leadership" Canada was a waste land. It is offensive and racist.
Many people in the so called "world's" love America for our inclusiveness on the values of freedom which are aprori for a market based society not the pre-market status of trade and/or race/culture. You always seem to forgot that our society has taken 200+ years to get here and you do not realize how much of the developement politically and socially has been tied to both ethnicity and race. so keep your comments moving forward not backwards

#10 from Scott at 3:44 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Interesting essay. But, I think an overly simplistic conclusion.

Targeted killings work, but what do they work for?

Let's say you remove the head of energetic group. The truth is that energy is never destroyed, it simply moves from place to place. I would posit you simply dispersed most of the energy throughout the group. Now, this means as a group they won't likely be mounting a frontal assault on a city, but increasing the energy in the respective members means you've added more long-term risk because you've got more points to track over the long term. And those points potential energy for individual damage just increased.

It may have been true at one time that removing the head of any organization would cause it fail. However, technology makes that less and less true each day. That entire premise was based on the fact the knowledge and the thought dies with the carrier, and this is no longer true. Knowledge today exists far from the realm of one man's mind. You can destroy his capacity to influence thought, you can even destroy his thought, but you can no longer destroy the thought itself. Unless you're talking about reversing the progress of technology, you really can't stop this effect. Look to history, Roman Catholicism in particular, for parallels in failure.

But, while you can't control thought, you can influence it. Targeted killing is a rather brute way of accomplishing this on a small scale basis. Except you haven't really dealt with thought at all. It puts all the emphasis on consequences. Not much effect if a key tenet in one of the thoughts involves 70 virgins upon death. You have to make the thought itself unpalatable for other reasons, or you have to put it in competition with other baser thoughts.

Targeted killings also fail if you consider the strategy they are indicative of. Which is trying to devine/stop what your opponent is going to do, before he does it or contemplates doing it. Instead, we should be trying to draw our opponents into perceived opportunities where we've pre-determined the outcome unbeknowst to them. The key is to open an avenue of opportunity for the opponent so that he commits himself past the point of no return, only to close him into trap you've designed. The feint/counter-attack approach also has more of physcological impact because your opponent failed when he perceives he had the opportunity to succeed.

Scott

"I prefer to ask for forgiveness, not for permission. That is, if I remember..."

#11 from SPQR at 4:05 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Dave,
They are fabricating some nonexistant "rule".

#12 from C-Low at 4:09 pm on Jan 24, 2006

I strongly believe this new era of PC war is going to result in perpetual war. War is ugly it is brutal and it is hell and should be just that, to sanitize war makes war too easy.

Simply put getting in a ring with a big guy with boxing gloves, and a ref is not very scary just sport. However getting in a street fight with a regular sized guy with knives, pipes, brass knuckles and guns is down right life threatening.

War should be prosecuted to the fullest of our ability without restriction short maybe WMD use. The Geneva Convention should be considered a two party contract meaning if they abide by the rules we will but disregard those rules and we will no longer be bound either.

Like it or not I think Abu Grahib, the razing of Falluja, our preemptive war, rendition policy, kidnapping in Europe, and predators strikes in neutral/friendly nations all have done more to help our war effort in eyes of the Islamist than any tech or military capability. In Europe and America that effect may have been the opposite somewhat due to our strong LLL infiltration, but I believe the benefits outweigh the consequences.

The Muslims know full well they cannot match our military prowess on the battle field straight up, they are betting on the fact that our LLL tendencies are so deep that we can no longer stomach what it takes to survive in the real world. The more we prove to the Islamist that we try to be good but if it comes to it we are still the barbaric �big Satan� who in WW2 killed purposefully entire cities amass, fought a gorilla war with the Indians to its un-giving end ect�

It should be made to our current and future enemies that the US will no longer accept any type of loss period. That if our chances for victory shrink we simply turn up the heat until they reverse back to our favor. In short the more you fight the more you and all around you suffer all the way to the extreme of scorched earth.

We don�t need our enemies to like US we just need them to fear US enough to not f*ck
with US.

Some say Warmonger, uncivilized, barbaric, I say if it keeps US from having to fight it works and the goal should be results not some PC warm fuzzy feeling.

#13 from FabioC. at 4:20 pm on Jan 24, 2006

shloky,

No training video is going to replace hands-on experience and knowledge especially in a field as delicate as bomb making.

#14 from Bat One at 4:40 pm on Jan 24, 2006

A fascinating discussion... following a careful and thought-provoking article.

Still, instead of tediously debating the effectiveness of the targeted killing of terrorist leaders and the relative importance of institutional memory and core leadership versus the significance of autonomy of action among terror cells, why not just acknowledge that they are all in fact our sworn enemies, and kill them for that reason alone?

It may seem simplistic, but as any other veteran will tell you, in the final analysis it remains a highly effective approach to the question of threat management.

#15 from PD Shaw at 4:52 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Is it really a violation of international law to target the leadership of enemy belligerents?

I think the argument is that America violated the sovereignty of Pakistan, which is presumably an act of war. There is the hot pursuit doctrine (General Pershing chasing Pancho Villa) that might apply. But more likely the U.S. was working with Pakistan on this one and Pakistan doesn't want to admit it.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

I suppose the U.S. "refrained" in violating Pakistan's territorial integrity, but found the opportunity to good to pass up.

#16 from Scott at 4:55 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Barbarians tatics win long-term?

Why don't you ask Ghengis Kahn, or Attila the Hun how its worked for them all these years?Give me Neville Chamberlain's tatics any day.

War is but one rough tool in the toolbox. It has its uses occasionally, though. There are other, sometimes more effective ways to achieve our ends without having to propose the concept of endless conflict.

Anyhow, the entire conflict isn't about us in an sort of primary way. It's about Islam and its rising to the brink of a schism based on its fascist adherents. Now, should we assist in pushing it there before the area's military capabilities grow into a potentially messy spillover conflict? Perhaps, though you can't accomplish this through conflict, or fear of conflict alone. You have to set the right events in motion. But, that means thinking ahead of events, not reacting to them.

And a true critical mass of thinking ahead in the upper echelons of power is what we sorely lack. Welcome to our version of a intellectually deficient class of nobles...

"Sometimes you have to break a few eggs to make an omelet. You also have to milk a cow to wash it down."

#17 from gibson at 5:02 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Targeted killings is a facet in our overall strategy, it is no less crucial than a plethora of tactics we're already using. The goal of the GWOT is not to end the method of terrorism, that is a fools idea and clearly unwinnable. Our goal is the transformation of an idealogy exacerbated by arcaic cultural norms and victimology. Yes we achieve this by "winning hearts and minds" but we also work towards this goal by destroying the cancerous elements of society, be it targeted killing or otherwise. The killing of OBL or Zarqawi would not be a death kneel for the movement per se, but it would be a step in the right direction.

Along those same lines, human variance matters if not Al Qaeda would be a leaderless organization. Even technology has limitations and as we are learning in several technologically intensive fields in the US, the human element is not easily replaced, leaders aren't either. The PLO hasn't been the same since Arafat kicked the door.

Our goal should be the eradication of terrorist high casualty capability not intent. The concern shouldn't be if some idealogical compatriot decides one day to blow himself up because there isn't really anything we can do about it. The concern should be that these fellas get WMD or military grade explosives and pulls off another 9/11, up until this point we have been generally successful.

#18 from liberalhawk at 5:05 pm on Jan 24, 2006

"When our leaders decry a practice as a "war crime" but then allow such practices to affect planning (even though we are under no obligation to do so), the enemy now knows that he has successfully affected operations in his favor and he continues to use it. The very success of the tactic encourages the enemy's inclination to not take the "war crime" threat seriously, because "you have to catch me first"

Im under the impression that the IDF routinely balances the importance of a terror target, vs the amount of collateral damage, in determining whether to attack a particular target. The need to do so is not the result of a terminal civilization or evil liberals, but an inevitable aspect of a war that has a hearts and minds aspect, and that takes place, as most wars do(Clausewitz, etc), in the context of international politics. I dont see this balancing as a sign of weakness, but as a sane approach to the difficulties in managing a campaign of targeting terrorists, and indeed as something necessary in order to maintain such a campaign.

#19 from C-Low at 6:00 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Myths and mis-perceptions are dangerous tools or weapons.

I am sick of the Hydra terrorist are unstoppable crap.

Just like our LLL media often say the Iraqi terrorist are unstoppable fearless warriors and yet the Iraqi Army Police are cowardice incompetent useless. They are both Iraqi are they not?

Torture doesn�t work yet nations all over the world and people all thru history use it for what?

The myth of kill a terrorist just another steps into his place has to end. In WW2 the Germans replaced their losses right up until the end at some point the resources run out or degrade.

Like the Germans the more replacements the less ability just like the Germans and the Japanese the Terrorist today don�t take veterans back to train the new wave they don�t even have a safe haven to train their men and gather. As a result their vets fight to their death along side replacements that are just trained under fire. These policies will in time result in massive degradation of ability. The Mariana�s Turkey shoot only happened because of Japanese replacements were mere shadows of their old vets who early on cost the Americans much in blood in places like the Coral Sea, Midway, and Pearl.

Not to mention the sheer cost of maintaining a constant war effort on the size and scope we have brought to AQ must be a severe strain on a group that has no secure nation state base but operates mainly at the charity of the same street they now must go out and kill at random to make a show.

If you doubt the terrorist degradation think back they used to attack our troops make suicide strikes costing civilians in the hundreds. Then they were degreased down to attacking the Iraqi police and army taking bases and stations over killing them at will. Now today they are degreased to the point of occasional strikes on small patrols of police or army and suicide missions mainly on innocent civilians that same street that�s charity is their lifeblood. Tomorrow they will be down to occasional suicide strikes here or they�re in the ME.

The terrorist will run out of resources it just takes time. There is no such thing as never ending resources for anyone it�s the nature of warfare. The closest thing to such would be the US in this war (if not for our LLL�s). Fact is that our losses are more than maintainable, the cost is maintainable, and we have a huge relatively secure base of economy, industry, people, and training with our experienced vets training the replacements. In short in the long run our abilities improve and the terrorist will degrade, if we only could check our LLL�s.

#20 from Peter at 6:01 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Is it really a violation of international law to target the leadership of enemy belligerents?

It is questionable whether the concept of international law is valid at all. For a law to be applicable, there has to be an agent enforcing and upholding this law. There is no such agent today. Moreover, the only justifiable reason for our laws is to protect the rights of individuals. I can't see how laws can protect states in massive violation of rights should be considered.

Think it's one giant moral blackmail by the unfree nations of the world on the West. It is clear different standards apply: Syria occupies Lebanon for decades and assassinates its leader? Ho-hum. Steady now. The US (hopefully) knocks out some terrorists. Shriek: That's illegal!

Agreements and treaties between free sovereign nations are a whole other matter. With the free world in retreat, unwilling to assert its moral superiority, the world is regrettably one of might makes right.

#21 from Colt at 6:49 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Im under the impression that the IDF routinely balances the importance of a terror target, vs the amount of collateral damage, in determining whether to attack a particular target.

They get it wrong from time to time. The IAF hit a building housing Yassin, Rantisi and a load of mid-level Hamas and PIJ terrorists with a 500kg bomb. The other option was a 2000kg bomb

The 500kg bomb gave the jihadis some cuts and bruises, whereas the two-ton bomb would have killed everyone inside, and more than a few passers-by.

Targeted killings - combined with the border security barrier, military operations and improved intelligence - reduced Israeli deaths from a high of 172 in 2002 to less than 40 in 2005.

This doesn't quite do the Israelis justice. The security forces get to 90% of terror cells while they are still in the planning phase. A small percentage are hunted down on their way to their target, and a smaller percentage succeed.

Scott says:

Let's say you remove the head of energetic group. The truth is that energy is never destroyed, it simply moves from place to place. I would posit you simply dispersed most of the energy throughout the group.

Energy is fine. In this instance, energetic terrorists with small arms will throw themselves at the IDF. What differentiates a successful terrorist from a failed one is ability. Those are the guys who get their bomber past the security measures. That is getting harder and harder to do, thanks to Israeli counter-terrorism, so every targeted kill or arrest makes it a little less likely they'll succeed the next time.

#22 from gibson at 6:57 pm on Jan 24, 2006

C-low, nice post, I too have grown tired of the hydra rhetoric, its rendered baseless on a cursory look of military history. Westerners have a tendency it seems to overexaggerate our faults and exacerbate our enemies precieved strengths. Adaptibility on the part of western armies, armies which I might add have been some of the most adaptable in history, seem to take a back seat in an almost masochist way to the notion that our enemies are always one step ahead. I don't buy it.

OBL's secret weapon is our self-doubt, which it appears to be largely a symptom of the Democratic party, thus his latest silo sounded more like a Maureen Dowd column than a call to arms. He realises, like many of us, that his only chance at succeeding is a self-imposed destruction, car bombs in of themselves its not enough to win the day. Its quite laughable and altogether sad that liberal westerners are allowing themselves out of a sense of fairness and self-hatred to be "out willed" by their idealogical and morally bankrupt enemies.

#23 from liberalhawk at 7:15 pm on Jan 24, 2006

"They get it wrong from time to time. The IAF hit a building housing Yassin, Rantisi and a load of mid-level Hamas and PIJ terrorists with a 500kg bomb. The other option was a 2000kg bomb

The 500kg bomb gave the jihadis some cuts and bruises, whereas the two-ton bomb would have killed everyone inside, and more than a few passers-by. "

And where are Yassin and Rantissi now? :)

Yup, you its possible to make a mistake, in EITHER direction when balancing. The point remains, it makes sense to balance. Is it worth killing 100 civilians to get one cell leader? Not in most circumstances I could imagine, and I think that has charecterized IDF policy. Yet some might say that to alter ones operations because of that, esp given that the terrs deliberately use human shields, is to give the terrs a success. I would say that to take the political costs of 100 dead civilians in order to get one cell leader, is to hand the terrorists a success.

#24 from C-Low at 7:36 pm on Jan 24, 2006

Khan and Attila were raiders in the beginning and in the end. And by the way before they turned on themselves they controlled territory from China to Africa to the doors of Western Europe if I am not mistaken.

Neville chamberlain has the blood of millions on his hands if in the mid to late 30�s the Europeans would have taken action a small brutal war would have ensued with maybe a few million dead at most. Instead we got WW2 with the tens of millions dead and destruction all across Europe amasses.

I am not advocating Attila style barbarism. Just saying that perception is important our enemies have the impression we are weak due enlarge part in my opinion to our LLL�s policies/restrictions they force down our throat and handicap our ability to wage war. Again I am not suggesting Attila style barbarism just that we look at war as war a horrible ugly thing that must be done at times that is not pretty nor should be. Where does it stop police like regulation on the military, non-lethal weapons only?

In reality Fear and Consequences is a very powerful motivator of people. Like it or not.

Don�t forget Bin Laden himself felt war with America was possible due to our retreat from Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. That impression is a big part of why we are at war today, and will only by corrected by proving it wrong through war and will only worsen by our further sanitization of war.

-Using Mosque, Hospitals, Schools as bases and storage facilities
-Using women and children as human shields
-Killing fellow Muslim civilians amass for the days news headline
-Taking innocent hostages
All are acts of desperation and weakness. That only works because we allow it and by that encourage it.

I think we should leverage all advantages and killing of enemy leadership should be a no-brainer. The fact it is not I would say is a big reason why the perception of weakness is so strong in our enemies.

#25 from Colt at 7:42 pm on Jan 24, 2006

#23 liberalhawk

And where are Yassin and Rantissi now? :)

It took them months to have another shot. There were successful Hamas attacks in the meantime, quite likely involving the people at that meeting.

Very rarely would you need to kill 100 civilians to get one person. If you're using that much ordnance, you only know what block he's on. The Shehadah hit, which killed him, his wife and nine kids and I believe up to seven others. 15 civilians, mostly children, to get one senior terrorist - a guy you don't know when he's going to pop on to your radar again, and how many he'll kill in the meantime.

I would say that to take the political costs of 100 dead civilians in order to get one cell leader, is to hand the terrorists a success.

You'd have to decrease that 100 to perhaps a couple of dozen for the above reasons, but it all depends. The U.S. isn't taking much political damage for the bombing in Pakistan from anyone you wouldn't expect it from. But I'd be inclined to agree that not using force due to the presence of human shields encourages the use of human shields, and you'll inevitably take more casualties yourself than you would if you killed the terrorist and the shields around him.

#26 from Colt at 7:47 pm on Jan 24, 2006

I would concur, but flag the underlying assumptions: [1] that an effective interrogation regie eexists; and [2] that captured prisoners are not likely be released while they still represent a danger. If either of those assumptions are not true, or become no longer true, his recommendation may suffer a fatal blow.

Hell yes. The quick release of 100% known terrorists by Iraqis, as noted by Michael Yon, pissed the troops off mightily. Risking your life to arrest, rather than kill, some murderous bastard who will be free within months (or weeks) will - I suspect - have an effect on morale.

#27 from C-Low at 8:18 pm on Jan 24, 2006

200% Agree the catch and release policy is retarded. Israel is horrible at this they don�t have a death penalty so they divvy out multiple life sentences only thru time to release the guys in either some dum gesture of peace or negotiated trade of kidnapped Israeli citizens. Either way only encouraging more of the same.

I don�t care what kind of work you do the veterans always are going to know those little secrets and advantages that only come from experience. A bunch of rookies short the veterans have to by trial and error learn the hard way what the veterans could have just told them about.

In Iraq terrorist should be squeezed for all the Intel possible then given their ticket to those virgins. I read somewhere the Iraqi gov had said all terrorists and those caught harboring such would be punished with death but I haven�t heard no screams from the LLL�s so it was either a baseless boast or just never enforced.

#28 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 8:36 pm on Jan 24, 2006

I don't see anything morally wrong with Israel knocking off Hamas leaders, but the truth is, the Security Fence appears to be more useful in stopping suicide bombing. Israel's assassination of Hamas' chief bombmaker occurred in 1996, and didn't really accomplish much in the long term.

#29 from mary at 8:57 pm on Jan 24, 2006

The real terrorist leaders are the bankers, the government leaders and the wealthy benfactors who sponsor groups like al Qaeda. They're also the easiest targets.

Some might say that we should capture terrorists for information, but from what I've read, their computers are usually better, more reliable sources of information.

#30 from liberalhawk at 9:10 pm on Jan 24, 2006

"The U.S. isn't taking much political damage for the bombing in Pakistan from anyone you wouldn't expect it from."

Cause we apparently got at least 4 or 5 big terrs, at the cost of at most a dozen innocents. And cause we were gunning for the number 2 terr target in the world, a man whos got not only heaps of US blood on his hands, but Aussie, Brit, Indon, Paki, Russian, etc, etc blood on his hands. And tried to kill Perv twice.
Like I said, its a matter of balance.

"But I'd be inclined to agree that not using force due to the presence of human shields encourages the use of human shields, and you'll inevitably take more casualties yourself than you would if you killed the terrorist and the shields around him."

Like I said, it depends. If you kill 25 innocents to get a midlevel guy, you'll can do such damage on the H and M front that it will cost you long run, and lead to more casualties (not just the 25)

And im not sure i believe 25 is the limit. In a crowded urban area there could well be 100 people in a single building.

And of course a rural compound, where its assumed everyone inside has SOME connection to any terr inside, is a different question from an urban neighborhood.

#31 from Scott at 9:14 pm on Jan 24, 2006

True, the IDF does enjoy a large level of success. But, it is in a very controlled environment in which they operate, commendable nonetheless. Targeted killing some does effective benefits, provided you get your target. As they say, "close only counts in horseshoes."

Still, most of the military methods don't solve the problem that gave birth to the whole mess. They can set the table, sure, but their primary mission is to kill, not destroy fascist ideologies from within. Suggesting this is all "hearts and minds" feel-good circle ringing is also way too simplified.

We can throw dams up with turrets on top, killing people as we see the symptoms of terrorism emerge. In fact, we have more than enough resources to do this for potentially a very long time. All dams leak however, and once in a while you have to open the sluice gates once in a while. So there one facet.

Progress in science demands we keep creating potential targets at an exponentially faster and faster rate. If you don't believe this is true, you've never set foot inside any major coporate data center around this country. Sure, you can implement safeguards to deny capabilities piece by piece, but this happens long after the capability goes active. We are still trying to play round-em-up cowboy with the cold war weapons. Not that we shouldn't expend some measure of resources to do this either, just another facet.

So there we go, facet by facet, resource by resource, commitment by commitment, on and on we go. String by string we weave ourselves deeper into the ME fabric. We should be smart enough to cleave the diamond at its IslamoFacist heart and let nature take its course for a while (nature that our/euro allies dabbling held back for centuries by propping up shaky governments around the region). If that means setting off a war ideas and bodies within Islam, that may be best.

So since I love fantasy sports. My fantasy scenario 4-year instant replay is as follows:

Keep the buildup to Iraq the same, in fact, increase the forces to what those whoever-their-names-are wanted, especially in Kuwait. Not, because we can't take out Stuffed Shirt Saddam, but because your true target is Iran. A longer build-up buys more time in this regard (Unleash a half of your "Shock-n-Awe" on Baghdad). Let your forces invade Iraq except rather than heading to Baghdad, once you've broken through Iraq's border, turn right and head for Iran. Before the ruse is up (i.e. you hit the border), you unleash your true "Shock-n-Awe" on Iran. What play does Saddam have here if you leave him in power a little longer? Not much I think. We had him in our pocket before, we could've put him back in it again, at least long enough to rearrange Iran's ruling government. Pacify Russia & China in $$ and US might have been a clear winner in terms of force, surprise, effectiveness, and in going for the throat of a long time foe, in a true time and manner of our choosing.

Say this was what went all-in on, would virtually anyone be sitting around arguing about this or would we be congratulating ourselves on a potential coup de grace? We'll never know...

"Sometimes you just got to roll the dice"

#32 from Colt at 11:14 pm on Jan 24, 2006

#28 AJL

I don't see anything morally wrong with Israel knocking off Hamas leaders, but the truth is, the Security Fence appears to be more useful in stopping suicide bombing.

Not so. The Israelis get to about 90% of cells planning suicide bombings while they're still in the very early stages - weeks or months before they've got a bomber and a bomb. Besides, the bombers just go through 'humanitarian' unlocked, unguarded gates for farmers, get rides with Israeli people smugglers or bluff their way through checkpoints.

Israel's assassination of Hamas' chief bombmaker occurred in 1996, and didn't really accomplish much in the long term.

He didn't make any more bombs, or teach anyone else how to. No-one was expecting Hamas to change their mind about anything after the kill.

#30 liberalhawk

Like I said, its a matter of balance.

Hmm - I guess Zawahiri does sort of shift that balance a little, so not a great example.

And im not sure i believe 25 is the limit. In a crowded urban area there could well be 100 people in a single building.

The Israelis used a 1,000kg bomb on Shehadah's apartment block. Safety codes aren't what they might be, but even then the building didn't come down. It can happen obviously, but if you know which part of the building (or better, which room - see the use of helicopter-launched anti-tank missiles on individual rooms in Gaza apartment blocks) you don't need to kill that many.

#33 from celebrim at 11:28 pm on Jan 24, 2006

"Why don't you ask Ghengis Kahn, or Attila the Hun how its worked for them all these years?"

Talk about learning the wrong lessons from history. Why don't you ask the Naimans, the Merkits, the Ruzhen, the Tangut, and the Abbasids about Ghengis Kahn? You say you've never heard of these people? I wonder why. You say you can't ask these people, because they are all extinct? I wonder how that happened.

"Give me Neville Chamberlain's tatics any day."

Yeah, that really worked out well. I can see it now, "The Neville Chamberlain Endowed Chair in Conflict Resolution Studies." Gee, if we'd only accomodated Hitler more, things would have worked out so much better??? I mean, in a real way, this conflict wasn't about us, it was about the Germans failure to form a unified national government until the 19th century, right?. The Neville Chamberlain was a master of "setting events in motion", and "thinking ahead of events and not merely reacting to them", wasn't he?

"There are other, sometimes more effective ways to achieve our ends without having to propose the concept of endless conflict."

Ask the Tangut about the cycle of endless conflict. Or ask the Tonkawa. Or the Obodrites. Ask the ghosts of the countless extinct tribes now lost beyond even recollection of thier name about cycles of endless conflict. The notion that all conflicts are a 'cycle of endless conflict' is not one supported by history, nor does history show that a 'cycle of endless conflict' is the worst thing that can befall a people. A great many tribes of the world, would, if you could offer it to them choose to be locked in a cycle of endless conflict if they had the oppurtunity.

A war with only one side fighting is called a massacre, and those without swords can still die on them. And have.

#34 from C-Low at 12:40 am on Jan 25, 2006

Scott

Your 4yr fantasy scenario would be more like this::

After being backed down by the UN the US settle for a containment strategy.

After not even a year the large numbers of foreign infidels stationed in Kuwait and the region as AQ attacks with terrorist strikes in the host states increase anti-Americanism exponentially. Pressure at home gets real loud as our men are killed in �friendly� nations but can�t respond, they are prisoners in the wire. Saddam smelling weakness begins shooting down drones in the South. Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, ask our withdrawal to lessen the pressure.

The Kurds in the North are under daily slaughter by AQ forces cough supported by Saddam. The US finds it hard to continue to have Turkish support especially to protect the Kurds, the Kurds fall.

Daily terror strikes in Afghanistan continue. The huge amounts of AQ money allow a defunct state in the border region to be maintained. Pakistanis Mushariff is under massive pressure from AQ and endures monthly near death misses. He is finally taken out and replaced by a Jihad friendly guy US assistance is ended and NO FLY OVER RIGHTS declared.

Afghanistan suddenly becomes a very bloody place for America. Forced to pay desperation prices for bases in the Stans to corrupt govs. A new alliance with India helps somewhat but outrages the Arab Street even more.

After the revelations of Iran�s nuke program comes to light Saddam petitions his Sunni neighbors to help get the US off his back so he can again be the Sunni defender against Iran. Along with France and Germany they accomplish ending sanctions and even allow large scale re-arming of Iraq for stabilities sake of course. He then starts mass production of Chem/Bio and work on Nukes not openly.

04� Bush is thrown out after his supporters dump him for punking out and his detractors still blame him for all the worlds ills. (Not mentioned but definitely wanted in Scott World fantasy) Kerry�s first act is to declare it all Bush�s fault and bring the forces home from Afghanistan that was obviously a mistake to put troops into in the first place.

Iran declares they have a nuke Saddam declares he will soon follow suite. Egypt declares they will build a nuke, Israel says they will nuke everyone on their way out. Kerry blames all of this on the Bushitler so does Europe and the world.

Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the other Arabs quietly agree to work together for Palestine. The new alliance declares massive oil tariffs for all Israeli supporting nations. Europe declares Israel a liability the US pays $10.00 a gallon for gas as anti-Jewish sentiment grows at a fast click in the US. Kerry again blames all of this on Bushitler who is now known as Super Chimpy

#35 from Scott at 1:30 am on Jan 25, 2006

To go from a rosy scenario in Iraq, to a couldn't get the job done Iran. Is that really sensical?

Do you think if Bush didn't stop at Iraq, he would've stopped if he'd decided Iran was his target? The guy is consistent in trying.

I'm sorry, Kerry's not in any of my fantasy leagues. Perhaps that was a misperception. Intellectual dishonesty permeates a lot of both sides all the way over.

I was hoping they'd figure how to cryogenically restore Reagan maybe even de-tomb Lincoln.

#36 from GK at 1:54 am on Jan 25, 2006

Truman wouldn't be a bad choice for this day and age either.....

#37 from Scott at 2:11 am on Jan 25, 2006

"Kerry again blames all of this on Bushitler who is now known as Super Chimpy"

Is Kerry, or Bush, Super Chimpy? Either way, I like it...

#38 from Scott at 2:24 am on Jan 25, 2006

If you don't like the prospect of $10 gas, perhaps you ought to push for a national objective of renewable minaturized power cell. In say 10 years or less.

Perhaps we could wait for Exxon to build one... I'd rather not.

Perhaps we could build a matter transporter instead. Oh wait, we've already done that in the laboratory. Rapid deployment has nothing on instant deployment.

IBM slowed down light by passing it through silicon to harness its information carrying capabilities. When you're processing data at the speed of light, where do you go from here?

#39 from John Quiggin at 2:57 am on Jan 25, 2006

Let me get this straight. You take a report on targeted assassinations of Palestinian terrorists that took place about 30 years ago, and conclude that killing terrorist leaders is a good way of ending terrorism. Over what time-frame? 100 years? Some of these guys would be dead of old age by now, even if Mossad hadn't got to them.

#40 from celebrim at 3:07 am on Jan 25, 2006

"Let me get this straight. You take a report on targeted assassinations of Palestinian terrorists that took place about 30 years ago, and conclude that killing terrorist leaders is a good way of ending terrorism. Over what time-frame? 100 years? Some of these guys would be dead of old age by now, even if Mossad hadn't got to them."

Would you like to enlighten us with your suggestions?

#41 from gibson at 3:20 am on Jan 25, 2006

If Mossad hadn't gotten them do you think more or less Israelis would have been killed? Nobody is suggesting an end to terrorism, that is silly. But effectiveness and capability matters and on those fronts the Pals have taken two steps back.

#42 from M. Simon at 4:41 am on Jan 25, 2006

Robert M.,

I'm going to speak out of turn for Glenn, but I think he was refering to a culture of corruption.

He did mention second world - perhaps he had the white men of France in mind.

#43 from C-Low at 5:01 am on Jan 25, 2006

Scott

My bad that Kerry crack was probably a stretch. I had a friend the other day try that one on me that if we hadn�t done Iraq we could do Iran today.

My problem with that is, does anyone honestly think that Saddam would not have jumped in anyway if by no other way than Syria style. And if we don�t have enough troops to occupy Iraq now (some claim) how could we occupy Iran (country twice the size of Iraq) and Iraq at the same time? Not to mention 60% of Iraq if we left Saddam and moved on Iran would flip, the Shia.

Not to mention Turkey bases are probably out of the question for Iran if no other reason than the possible counter missile strikes. Kuwait is not that big and moving on Iran through a funnel is a bad idea. You got Saddam on your flank and rear hop skip from your supply base and lines that alone is a bad idea. I like Bahrain but they are going to get hammered by the Iranian missiles. Afghanistan is just a logistics nightmare to base from.

Today we have Iran boxed in Iraq to the West, Afghanistan to the East, the Sea to the South. Iraq has infrastructure and a huge border and bases to strike Iran from. Iraq is closes to self-sufficiency our forces are going to be the buffer maybe in push across the border in strategic areas like oil SW. Maybe some firefighting on old Sadr.

I do agree Bush is going to stick to his word. I don�t think we are going to have a massive occupation of Iran I think we will see a GW1 style op with a decapitation twist. Massive air campaign months or longer then shift to opportunity targeting and no fly cap. See what crawls out if we get those revolutionaries SOF insertion weapons and air support if nothing but Mullahs well we take a settlement like we put on Saddam better worded with teeth and we keep our no fly cap.

Bush is the chimpy/evil genious/hitlerite

#44 from Andrew J. Lazarus at 6:26 am on Jan 25, 2006

Colt, I was comparing the effectiveness of targeted killing versus the Securiy Fence in reducing terrorism inside Israel. Suddenly you're comparing the fence to other methods (e.g., infiltration and arrest). Apples. Oranges. And then, when I mention the Engineer, you say that no one expected that to make Hamas "change their mind". Huh? This is a thread about whether assassination is effective, and you've accidentally conceded that it's useless for that?! That's a stronger position than even I was going to take.

It's hard to tell from a distance, but terrorists seem almost completely unable to get through the Gaza security perimeter, and their ability to do so through the West Bank is diminishing.

#45 from Colt at 6:28 pm on Jan 25, 2006

#44 AJL

Suddenly you're comparing the fence to other methods (e.g., infiltration and arrest). Apples. Oranges.

As tactics? Yeah, but this is about what is effective. Given a choice between regular arrests and killing of terrorist leaders, and the fence, I'd pick the former because that is what is doing the damage.

And then, when I mention the Engineer, you say that no one expected that to make Hamas "change their mind". Huh? This is a thread about whether assassination is effective, and you've accidentally conceded that it's useless for that?!

Anyone who thinks that killing one senior member of Hamas in isloation would convince Hamas to concentrate on playgroups and clinics is delusional. No-one on this thread has made that case, or anything similar. The benefit in killing able terrorists is the loss of ability on their part. It is not easily replaced. Thus, killing one expert bomb maker won't change much. Killing twenty will. That's not an argument against assassination - that's an argument for doing it a lot more often.

It's hard to tell from a distance, but terrorists seem almost completely unable to get through the Gaza security perimeter, and their ability to do so through the West Bank is diminishing.

The army stumbled - quite literally stumbled - a soldier almost fell in - across a tunnel opening near Erez a few weeks back. Two months ago, a terrorist wearing a bomb-belt, carrying an AK and grenades was caught just outside one of the villages inside the security zone. Another suicide bomber made it out of the zone and was only caught thanks to a tip from Gaza.

Unfortunately, the jihadis are going to turn up the heat in the next six months so we'll see how effective the fences can be.

#46 from john ryan at 6:48 pm on Jan 25, 2006

It is much more effective to attack the problem from the bottom of the pyramid not the top. Killing Pablo Escobar did not reduce the amount of cocaine coming into the USA. Was getting rid of the old time mafia leaders such a great idea ? Now, at least in New York City, the weakened Italian mafia is being pushed aside by the much more violent Albanian mafia. There may be short term gains to be had in asassination but what of the long term consequences ? Sometimes I wish that Afghanistan, where I lived 6 months 1976-7, was still Russia's problem. Now look at Iran and the fears of that country going nuclear. It would sorta be nice to have Saddam around again to sic on Iran like we did before. Insurgencies are not powered by expertise, they are powered by motivation. We should attack them with our strengths. Free Lotto tickets !! who wants to go to paradise before you find out that you might be holding next weeks winning numbers. Porn !! who wants 70 virgins in Paradise when you can have virtual sluts now !!

#47 from Colt at 10:11 pm on Jan 25, 2006

#46 john ryan

Destroying the Medellin cartel was undoubtedly a good thing for Colombian democracy, but it at best left a vacuum for the Cali cartel. Removing Saddam has left a vacuum gradually being filled by Iran. And so on. That need not apply to terrorists. For instance, had the Colombians taken on both the Medellin and Cali cartels, there would have been a reduction in the amount of cocaine reaching the U.S. Had the U.S. removed both the mullahs and Saddam, Iran wouldn't be filling the void.

Unfortunately, Israel may be making the same mistake right now by focusing almost entirely on Islamic Jihad.

#48 from Scott at 7:06 pm on Jan 26, 2006

As for the shia in southern Iraq, they'd be in a tough pickle. They don't really want to be Iranian, and they fear Saddam. If we were to leave a force in place long enough, Saddam might consider them complicit later if we let him back south. So, while dealing with us using them as a gateway to Iran might not go over well, their future could be perceived as undeniably worse. We'd essentially be leveraging their cooperation in a psychological manner. We could've left a protectorate force in place in the south. Maybe use the Brit's here like we planned on doing anyhow.

As for stretching supply lines across Iraq. There's no reason you couldn't try to establish additional ones using marine beachheads on the sea border. You wouldn't necessarily have to keep them running the same way forever.

Given we already had air power in place to manage Iraq around the parallels, we could've ruled the skies over both countries. As for long-term occupation, that is a last resort. You basically want to act like Stanely Steemer. Get in, get the junk out from under the carpet, and leave. That is where I agree with Joe, but argue with the timing and sequence of events. If we had proved the willingness to break Iran's government, then smash the Nuke sites and leave, this would have been a hugely powerful lesson to dictator's around the world. We wouldn't want our forces to necessarily stay in that position forever, but the element of surprise can buy you a lot of time.

As for Iranian missiles. We're kidding ourselves if we don't think they're going to go nuts if they think we're on the road to Tehran. They've watched us in Iraq. They'll know a buildup when they see one. They have the chemical weapons we haven't faced and we don't have the air power (minus tact. nukes) to knock out everything before they get their missiles off. Especially when they see us coming.

The question is whether we could've surprised the Iranians enough in an Iraq feint to make a go of it. Instead, we took the safe route and knocked off the weakest of the terrible trio. This was a bad play on our part. Go for the strong enemy first, because the weak will fall in line for a time. Intead one down (but not necessarily out), and two still standing, we might have knocked one out, and reduced another to a 1/2. Geez, who's Kim Jong Il gonna sell his weapons to now...?

But, seeing as how we've got somewhat poor military choices left on Iran, maybe we should take the approach of the earlier guy. Porn, booze, and drugs. Let's just airdrop them into Iran.

As for Super Chimpy, we all know he didn't play Avalon Hill strategy games growing up. Consistency is fine, but even a fool is consistent.

#49 from Scott at 7:25 pm on Jan 26, 2006

Here's the preface to the earlier statement:

Yes, while we do have the strategic advantage of sitting on 3 borders now. We already were sitting on 2 borders prior to the Iraq gambit. I'm not saying we could go for Iran now if we left Iraq alone, we've already missed our window of opportunity in that regard. I'm saying we should have faked Iraq, drove Iran. With the forces we used, no we couldn't. We could have built up our forces more without tipping our hand. Turkey was off limits anyhow, and we don't really need them to get to Iran unless you coming from Europe or the Med. Sea. Not a requirement. Saddam could have got involved, true, but if we have the guts go via his country to take out Iran, he'd still be in shock for quite a while. Pin him down from the north with paratroops and moderate forces from the south.