The appointment of Leon Panetta to head the CIA has certainly touched off a wave of head-scratching, second-guessing, and speculation.
Key Democrats on the Intelligence Committees like Feinstein and Rockefeller have protested openly at his lack of qualifications. One could go farther, and point to the facts that this is the guy who helped gut the CIA's human intelligence capabilities as Clinton's Budget Director, then ensured that the CIA had less access to the President than was the case for any administration in recent times when he was Chief of Staff, and finally seemed to define "torture" as "anything a terrorist doesn't enjoy" in more recent days. Former intel officer Ralph Peters does, in "An Awful Pick." Given those indicators, it's easy to see the appointment as a signal that President Obama is gutting US intelligence during an intelligence war, while openly politicizing it and cementing lethal political correctness as the norm for the CIA. The Moneyball theory of politics has to agree with that view, and CIA employees certainly seem unhappy. If this view is correct, Panetta's appointment certainly looks like living proof that all the things said by the Left and the Democratic Party about using improved intelligence instead of military action were lies, plain and simple.
Surprisingly, Panetta's appointment is getting support from people who might be expected to take the above view, including Michael Ledeen, Jack Kelly, et. al.
I'll explain their take - and also the problem. Because both views miss The Elephant in the Room.
- The Sunnier Side?
- The Elephant in the Room
- Shoot, Cage, or Train?
The Sunnier Side?
People like Ledeen and Kelly are characterizing the appointment as risky, which is absolutely true if we get another major terrorist attack, but also as being very smart. Jack Kelly sums the view up:
"But as a skilled bureaucratic infighter whose loyalty will be to the president and not to the CIA, Mr. Panetta may be, thinks Michael Ledeen, just the right guy "to watch Obama's back at a place that's full of stilettos and a track record for attempted presidential assassination second to none."
This is meant in a political sense, rather than the grassy knoll sense, but remember it.
Kelly added the suggestion that the National Directorate of Intelligence, headed by retired Admiral and former Pacific Command head honcho Dennis Blair, is where the action is anyway. According to this view Blair seems competent, the CIA's main role has declined to analysis that's increasingly performed elsewhere and ground ops that are increasingly military, and so the CIA appointment doesn't really matter.
The Elephant in the Room
Really, it's not surprising that there are so many diverse opinions on this. When an action makes no obvious sense, people try to make sense of it based on their own preconceptions of how, perhaps, it ought to work or might be working. That inevitably reflects their own views, rather than the views of the person doing the deciding somewhere far away. In intelligence, the trait is called "mirroring," and is seen as dangerous from a quality-control point of view.
The CIA National Intelligence Estimate that said there were no missiles in Cuba, in 1962, because that wasn't what they would have done if there were the Russians, is perhaps the most infamous example of mirroring.
It's happening with analysis of this appointment - and the honest answer is that between Peters and Kelly, we have no idea who is right. But all of it, all of it, misses the real Elephant in the Room.
Here's the elephant, the one Panetta's appointment may be pointing at:
A national intelligence agency that has significant involvement in domestic politics is not compatible with the long term survival of a free republic. Period. In the end, one or the other must go. Will go. The only questions are which one, how, and when.
That's a sobering thought. But if Ledeen and Kelly are right about the reasoning behind President Obama's pick, that's about where we're at.
Barring a position as the sole source of effective physical security for the country, there is no countervailing benefit for a free society that justifies the continued existence of an intelligence agency fitting Ledeen's description. A watchdog that bites the kids will be put down. It might be forgiven once, but cannot, must not, be forgiven a second episode.
I'll say it again: if the CIA fits Ledeen's description, it must be put down. In a "disband, plough, and sow salt in the earth so the lesson is clear" kind of way.
Yes, the members of the CIA exist to protect the American people, who make up the state. "We, the people." That seems to go beyond the government, and the CIA deals with severe threats to those people that involve thousands of lives. I understand the impulse. But remember America's Oath of Allegiance:
"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands..."
To the Republic for which it stands. Because that's the continuation that matters most. Political idiots are always apt to blather on about threats to it, usually identified with the partisan hysteria of the day. But here we have a President who may believe that his #1 priority regarding the CIA is to defend himself against it. The fact that I don't like him doesn't matter. If he really thinks that, to the point where it determines his choice for Director, "the Republic for which it stands" is in trouble. Big trouble.
Predictably, not a single partisan voice that I'm aware of has picked up on that nuance.
Shoot, Cage, or Train?
There may be options here. First, one might argue that descriptions of the CIA as a domestic political player are wrong. I suspect that may be a hard row to hoe, but it's a possible argument and deserves a hearing.
Second, it might be possible to structure the process of intelligence better, in order to remove existing temptations to cross the line. For instance, there's a good discussion to be had re: whether dissenting views should have some sort of official mechanism they can use to put their case in the public arena alongside public official views, similar in concept to a court's minority opinion. This creates a clear line between reasonable dissent that can get one's views heard, and turning the skills and techniques used against belligerent foreign governments, against your own.
It may also have policy value. For instance, USMC Intelligence had a dissenting and much darker view on Pakistan a couple of years ago. The CIA disagreed, for reasons that didn't have much logic to them. And the USMC view has become pretty much the conventional wisdom in the last year or so. The trick is how to find a way to do this that doesn't force the majority view to reveal its intel hand to the public (and hence, one's enemies), in order to defend its viewpoint.
That's part of a "train the elephant" approach. Possibly in combination with what the Panetta appointment looks like, which is a 3rd approach of "cage the elephant." But cages don't hold forever, organizational patterns are persistent, there's still a job to do out in the real world - and some things simply may not, must not, be borne.
So I hope Obama, Blair, and Panetta work to create a safety valve that clarifies where the red line is, and train the elephant. Why? Because as incompetent as the CIA has been on many occasions, the work it is accomplishing matters.
We are in the middle of a war that is, in many respects, an intelligence war. I think Kelly is wrong on a couple of factual points, points which make the CIA more important.
For one thing, Its top source of information is not interrogations, it's foreign intelligence agencies. Which is why the lack of HUMINT (in English, spies) is so dangerous - how can you do any quality control on that information without it? Fortunately, the CIA's HUMINT field networks have received a lot of effort, and appear to have been improved considerably since 2001. Their officers are often found on the ground in foreign countries these days, in less pleasant conditions, instead of on Virginia tennis courts or in well-appointed embassies. The role they play cannot always be played equally well by a member of the military.
The CIA's analysis wing is still very questionable, vid. their poor performance predicting Pakistan, and Pakistan is also a HUMINT exception because the Taliban and al-Qaeda have executed most of the CIA's network in the last couple of years. The sole intelligence bright spots left in Pakistan ironically trace directly to the invasion of Iraq, but that's another discussion. There's a war beyond Pakistan, Pakistan itself has some efforts going on that may mater a great deal, and while I'm not happy with the CIA's performance, I think it's doing a better job than Jack Kelly believes. Which means that it matters more than he believes.
So, contra Kelly, disbanding the CIA, informing all staff above a certain level that they will receive pensions starting now but can never work for any federal agency ever again, taking bulldozers to the building in Langley, digging down 10 feet, laying a concrete pad, and integrating 40 foot tall concrete spikes into that pad to discourage future buildings on site before restoring the 10 feet of ground cover... would have a significant and negative impact on the war. And if we're being real with ourselves, that probably means dead Americans. Maybe thousands of them. We can't know.
And even so, the watchdog may have to be put down. Even so, the bulldozers and concrete may be justified. Or even necessary.
If this kind of relationship with the CIA is indeed real and becomes a pattern with future administrations, or if the red line is clarified and then crossed, my view will escalate to "definitely necessary."
"A republic," said Benjamin Franklin, "if you can keep it." Even if that keeping costs.
Your thoughts, gentle reader?
I hope that the CIA will be eliminated in a way that makes an example of it. It's unacceptably political, both the Left and the Right dislike it, its international reputation is not good, and it's costly. Also, I don't believe that George Tenet deserved the Presidential Medal of Freedom. I think empty, grandiose political honors being given to the top spy boss is a bad sign.
The CIA has to go sometime, and if there is no answer on "when?" surely the right answer is: "whenever the occasion offers". I don't think it works to say "not now, because there are difficult foreign policy issues in play". When will there be nothing wrong in the world, so that the CIA can safely be gotten rid of?
Sharon Bridger: We're the CIA, something always goes wrong.
-- The Siege (1998)
Meanwhile, the best of luck to Leon Panetta in defending the elected American President against his nation's un-elected espionage machine.
I have thought that several sections of the government have been slipping the leash and have written so on my own blog in a series titled the mandarinate strike back starting in 2003.
The problem you point to is real. You have underestimated the problem set. A further problem is that the Dems were content to let the mandarinate strike without supporting President Bush. If the GOP follows suit we are lost.
Geez Joe, I'm at sea. This is a career consideration for a lot of people I know, and it's not clear what their best options are under the circumstances. My take is probably rather idiosyncratic, but hinges on the kinds of circumstances that ruled during the Ellsberg situation. The crux of the problem is that Ellsberg was commissioned in order to find flaws in the way the Pentagon was handling the Vietnam War, which was a commission that didn't sync very well with politics. It was a laudable enterprise, but only so long as it could be kept secret until the Pentagon had digested the information and acted upon it. Ellsberg's methodological ignorance allowed politics to push him over. Ellsberg and Panetta are, unfortunately, alike.
Intel could easily be better structured, but the problem is that adopting a "Type II" method (which assumes the worst, because of the consequences) requires that you commission investigators to look for reasons to reject "the worst." (For instance, you can assume Saddam has WMD, but you ought to be looking for reasons to reject that hypothesis rather than reinforce it. The problem is that there's no way to amass a database of such evidence without compromising the political situation. The method presumes a reasonable threshold, but the public is used to "assuming the best" as the operating hypothesis, so any leaked information that supports complacency will undermine best methods. And there is just no way to stop leaks, because the political benefits of leaking information than opposes authority are just too great... and there are no appreciable negative consequences. (Ellsberg could have been prosecuted for treason, but never was. And most executives shy of Andrew Jackson would never do so. Politicians are too timid to be intelligence pros.)
I'd say the public needs to "grow up," regarding their expectations about Type II situations, but I really think that's asking too much. So I think it's entirely possible that Panetta could seriously harm US intelligence operations, simply because of the way he deals with political situations. He is not an intelligence professional, but rather a political operative, and in this case I think Feinstein is closer to the truth than Ledeen.
Really wish it were not so.
Everyone seems to be making the assumption that, despite lack of any obvious qualifications, Panetta is actually capable of reforming the CIA, or that he even has a chance of doing it. My first thought on hearing the appointment was that he has no chance of doing it, and his appointment was a signal to the CIA saying, "You don't hurt us, and we won't hurt you." Which is unsettling.
Other than that, your points about the possibility of dissenting views within the intelligence community is very good. I instinctively distrust all information bottlenecks. Now, there's no reason that I as a private citizen need to be privy to the debates inside the intell community (although, y'know, I'd kinda like to be.) But there's also no reason that one part of the community needs to have the President's exclusive ear. That's just silly.
Just don't think there's any evidence that we're ready for that, although the public's ignorance hasn't really done the intelligence community much good. It's sort of like surgery. "Will plunging this knife into my vitals really cure me of this pain in my gut?" Yeah, it's conceivable... but the odds aren't random normal. Success requires... something else.
#4 from Marcus vitruvius:
There's no assumption the CIA is reformable by anyone.
The maximum expectation of its director is that he will be the President's man and not the CIA's, and he will dedicated himself to blocking efforts by the CIA to attack his boss and undermine his foreign policy.
The CIA has only ever performed up to scratch during one period during it's entire existence, and then the recipients of it's intelligence ignored it.
When and why. It was during the Vietnam War, and the CIA was the only organization to get it right on the PAVN and Viet Cong, but they had stuffed everything else up so badly since WWII, especially when dealing with military intelligence, the Pentagon and in country command ignored them.
Since then they have continued along their merry way of getting it badly wrong way more often than getting it right.
Larry, that's a really fascinating comment. Can you point me somewhere that I can read about what the CIA had to say about the PAVN and Viet Cong, the back story, etc.? It sounds like it would make an interesting read. I'd also like to compare it to their failures to see if I can understand what was different that time.
Nicholas, I came across it in print some years ago, written by a former US Army intel officer during those years. I discussed it at the time with some acquaintances of mine who had been Australian Army intel and operations officers with the Aust Army Task Force Vietnam and the Aust Army Training Team, and they confirmed the accuracy and ignored comments.
Sorry I can't be of more help, but I believe there have also been comments about it on line during the debate over the CIAs failures in the late 90s with regard to Al Queada
Not super-informed on the actual functioning of the CIA, but I thought I'd pose a question:
The last politician to head the CIA was George H.W. Bush. How is the nomination of Panetta any different than the nomination of H.W. Bush?
It seems to me that they would have similar implications for the CIA, and yet no one has talked about this move in relationship to the directorship of H.W.?
alchemist -
Bush was not the most qualified CIA chief ever, but he at least was a former China envoy and UN ambassador. Panetta has never been anything but a domestic political hack.
He's the perfect choice for a party which, as I keep saying, utterly despises foreign policy.
People who claim that Panetta don’t have any intelligence experience are not serious.
He does.
Panetta has the best kind of intelligence experience. He has been the highest of the high of intelligence consumers. Both as White House chief of staff and as Congressional Office Management & Budget director.
Note that as OMB director, Panetta had all the tickets–which very few people do–to know about ALL the secret programs of ALL The Intelligence Agencies.
So Panetta consumed information from all the secret programs that as OMB director he funded. Thus he knows the money in versus the useful intelligence out equation better than 99.9% of all the people in the American Federal Government.
Now add to that the fact that Panetta was one of the Clinton Administration’s hatchet men. That makes Panetta a political heavyweight of the highest caliber.
If you think that the CIA is capable of providing good, reliable, intelligence in time of war, you assign a political heavyweight to see that the job is done.
If you think the CIA is incapable of providing good reliable intelligence to the rest of government in the time of war, you assign a political heavyweight there for damage control.
The key thing is that Pres-Elect Obama is taking the CIA SERIOUSLY in terms of the man he wants in charge.
The last time we saw a political heavyweight of Panetta’s caliber assigned as DCI was when Bill Casey was placed there by Pres. Reagan.
To understand what that means, you have to know that Panetta’s basic tactic as a Clinton’s Chief of Staff was to provoke pigheaded people into being pigheaded, and then sack them for pigheadedness.
As Obama’s outside DCI, Panetta’s White House constituency of one would rather see him break up CIA via some silent throat slitting of pigheaded senior CIA officials, than save them from their pigheadedness.
Obama wants SILENCE out of the CIA so he can do his domestic spending programs.
Silence is defined here as keeping national security/foreign policy off the front pages.
Panetta’s appointment out of the box as Obama’s DCI is a message to the CIA bureaucracy that they either deliver silence or Panetta will slit the throats of senior CIA empty suits.
This makes House and Senate Intelligence Committee Democrats nervous over the fact Panetta knows where their bodies are buried (cough >China< cough) from the Clinton era and could use that, plus Presidential sponsorship, to remove a great deal of their political patronage and information trading powers.
The traditional way the US Federal government has done in dysfunctional bureaucracies is to create new bureaucracies to do the mission that the dysfunctional bureaucracy used to do, while slowly starving the dysfunctional bureaucracy of funds and political clout.
The CIA’s rebellion under Bush has marked it for replacement by the Defense Department in the roles of HUMINT and intelligence analysis.
This couldn’t happen to a better agency or a nicer Congressional Committee.
"Can you point me somewhere that I can read about what the CIA had to say about the PAVN and Viet Cong, the back story, etc.?"
Every CIA thread I point to Legacy of Ashes as the definitive primer on CIA history. There is a great section of Vietnam, where indeed the shoe was on the other foot for once and the White House short shrifted the CIA instead of vice-versa in a lot of ways.
My thoughts: if Panetta intends to chop the CIA down to size or try to render them irrelevant, well, better men have tried and been ruined in the process. Times are a little different now that the CIA already answers to the DNI, at least nominally, so we shouldn't forget Panetta is NOT going to be the ranking head of US intelligence.
Regardless, my bet is that as Trent suggested Panetta will be simply translating CIA 'speak' to Obama, at least for the early years. This is probably a pretty good idea. Obama isnt in a position to give the CIA the kind of overhaul it desperately needs. Perhaps in his second term. For now he needs someone with a sharp political mind to get an overview of what the hell is going on over there as much as any outsider can (and every CIA director since William Colby has been an outsider by their estimation).
The CIA needs to desperately be reinvented as a purely intelligence gathering vehicle, particularly humint (we have the NSA for signals, its a waste of resources). All the black ops nonsense needs to be permanently assigned to the Pentagon where it belongs, and ideally the CIA subordinated to the Pentagon as much as possible.
Mark,
Panetta isn't there to translate CIA-ese into Obama speak or vice versa.
He is there to make sure CIA don't get on the front page of the NY TIMES.
Hmm, good luck to him on that one. Are the Plames still on payroll, crafting their own foreign policy?
Boy, I really can't disagree with almost a single word Trent Telenko and Mark Buehner have said. Keeping the lid on is the operative mode here, as Trent has suggested. Obama has the heart of a community organizer in every fiber of his being and the domestic agenda (be afraid, be very afraid) is what is truly close to his socialist (at best) heart.
Virgil,
To quote a friend of mine:
That is why Panetta is at CIA.
Trent:
Having a clearance so you could ignore the briefings and/or throw them away doesn't make you a consumer. Panetta may have had the clearance, but there's little evidence that he ever did much with it - and a fair bit of evidence that he paid little to no attention.
If he was closely involved with reading the briefings and fitting them into White House priorities, however, I would concede that you would have a point.
I'll add that there are 2 ways to keep the CIA out of the New York Times, if that is indeed Panetta's job:
[1] Wait for the Times to go broke - it's apparently fairly close, with a very high debt load; or
[2] Make sure the CIA does almost nothing, and initiates nothing.
Which sounds a lot like Peters' criticism, and worse.
This do nothing approach (and the NYT unwillingness to report negatively on its favored candidate) may work, as long as there is in fact no terrorist attack on US soil.
But then, if there is a significant terrorist attack on US soil, the Panetta appointment will become the controversy that eats Obama's Presidency anyway.
"2 Make sure the CIA does almost nothing, and initiates nothing."
Easier said than done, if history is any guide. I think we need to realize exactly the manner of monster we have allowed to evolve here.
You have an organization that:
1.By its nature has a secret budget so convoluted that it makes the tax code look comprehensible
2.Since its very inception has made a habit of conducting its own foriegn policy with its own objectives often at odds with the WH.
3.A culture that truly believes the CIA is the cornerstone of American security and hence whatever they do (with or without government blessing or even knowledge) is justified
4.A disfunctional leadership mechanism by which a new politician (usually with minimal knowledge of intelligence, much less experience) is appointed every few years and generally quits or is relieved before he can even learn the full layout of the organization... which usually works around him quite adroitly anyway.
5.And finally, that no-one can be held acountable when their blunders are discovered (usually decades later), even if they are done in direct defiance of the WH and/or the law.
All the levers of accountability we rely on in our system are nonexistant in the CIA, and what oversight there is has traditionally been the least effective and easiest to circumvent. The CIA is almost certainly doing what it has done for decades, whatever it deems appropriate.
Mark,
This is is why Panetta's reputation as a professional career throat slitter is important.
Does the CIA need a J. Edgar?
Rhetorical question, Farley - of course they may not have one. The Bunny People would faint dead away at the mere suggestion.
Joe,
Obama being visibly "soft on Islamic terrorists" as his first offical act on his first day in office as President (via an E.O. closing Gitmo) -- and then getting attacked by them at home -- will far overshadow anything Panetta did or didn't do as DCI.