Absolutley amazing to read the post and comments about Hepititus B sufferers in China on Asian Labour News.

I've never seen anything like it, especially not on a blog. That was probably the most moving thing I've read about China for many years.

Many, many thanks to Stephen Frost for his excellent work and for allowing real mainland Hep B sufferers to eplain their problems.

You have just earned yourself a new daily reader Stephen.
Very, very moving.

Regarding Taiwan, it's interesting that there is no mention of the shooting explanation I find most likely: East-Asian mafia had bet heavily on the election, known to be a close one, and were therefore very interested in skewing the results. These folks are really the only violent elements around with both the capability (poor) and motive to shoot Chen Shui-Bien.

I also would like to criticize your coverage of the election. The "absurdity" link is skewed heavily against the KMT (hardly balanced) and itself offers absurd analysis of the referendum defeat. Everyone in Taiwan knew that despite its agreeable text, it was a referendum on independence. Not voting on it is a message in itself as a majority of the population prefers a stable status quo, and does not support Chen's pushing of the independence subject. Taiwan's voters acted purposefully, stating clearly that they do not want to declare "independence" and provoke China. (It's doubtful that Chen heard them.)

Taiwan is now reportedly considering countering mainland Communist China's deployment of new missle units across the Straits, with new indigenous surface-to-surface tactical and intermediate missle development and deployment. Undoubtedly, in addition to China's coastal or near-coastal cities and milfacs, BEIJING itself and many interior Chicom cities and milfacs will likely become a de facto SSM target. This new situation plus America's proposed Global and Theater GMD systems plus Japan's new policy of militarization plus Vietnam's POTENTIAL new pro-America focii definitely does not bode well for China's ambition for East Asian, China-centric regional and transregional hegemony!

Bull-fiddle, JosephMendiola, China will be a superpower and you know it. Taiwan may have missiles pointed every which way, but people trading across the straits will tie the two sides inextricably to each other. It's the same with Vietnam, Singapore, and Japan -- all the satellite states of China. India may be the only counterweight to all this, not America.

Chinese officials from Deng Xiaoping onwards have made no secret of China's desire to "rise to it's rightful position" in the world.

In addition, the Chinese population is brain-washed into a very skewed view of China, it's history, anti-foreigner feelings and a sense of "victim mentality".

Some of the things I've heard Chinese people say (and believe) is incredible. They can basically explain away anything with a warped logic built upon xenophobia and paranoia.

China is already beginning to assert itself using diplomatic/economic "carrots" and petulant threats and arrogant "history" lessons.

It will be interesting to see how things will pan out over the next 10-20 years.

Taiwan Observer: China certainly will vie for regional hegemony in the future. However, classifying it as a potential superpower is misleading. The Chinese military, however well hyped, is lacking in its C4I, doctrine, logistics, and force integration. While reforms are underway to correct its flaws, China's military is not even strong enough to defeat Japan, let alone India or United States forces in the region. In the future it will be powerful enough to challenge any Asian military, of course, but it will never be strong enough to compete with the full capabilities of the US military. The US is too far ahead, and innovates too rapidly, for China to come close.

As for Japan or Singapore being a satellite state of China... well, that's an extremely erroneous proposition. For one thing, the Japanese-American alliance is extremely strong. Japan has, at US request, begun to militarize, and current US-Japanese doctrine focuses not only on containing the DPRK, but also for a future China. Japan might trade with China, but its instructive to note how strong US-Japanese trade ties are, both in terms of exports / imports, and in terms of corporate cooperation. As for Singapore, they may become closer to China that Japan will, but they will never become a satellite state in any sense of the word. Their defense doctrine revolves firmly around retaining the ability to efficiently destroy any attackers, and to control the sea around them. China would have a hard time attacking the city, let alone controlling it.

Joshua Harris -- why all the military analysis? Superpowerism isn't confined to military strength and it especially shouldn't be with regards to China. China has the longest continuous history of any major civilization, even with the Mongols, Manchus and Japanese tryin', and there's a mighty good reason for that: No one wants to manage China, except the Chinese, and even if you try, you become Chinese. At most the military there is going to fight back, or maybe take over Mongolia, perhaps one of the Koreas, etc. (Worst case scenario for everyone in the world: civil war or revolution.) But the cultural/social/historical implications of that aren't going to play out according to the Western nation-state mentality. Why? Because all those other folks are culturally speaking satellite states of China. That's the fact of it. They're going to be drawn to the country/civilization in a way that they aren't with the West, and there's not much we can do except try to benefit from the sidelines (which the West has always done). The West has no idea what it's dealing with over there.

"why all the military analysis?" Probably because, as I realist, I tend to view the world through the prism of military (and economic) power, which China is fairly deficient in at the moment, and will be deficient in in the future (behind both India and the United States).

As for cultural power, you give it too much emphasis. Perhaps Chinese culture is alluring to some of these states, but nation-state politics form the functional reality of the region. Historically (19-20th century), culture has not prevented divisive war in the region. The two Sino-Japanese wars, and particularly the organized Japanese brutalities, come to mind immediately. In fact, Japan has consistently played power politics with China, and currently firmly follows a doctrine of supporting the United States, and counterbalancing China. Certainly there is trade, but when a rising power is trying to dominate the region, trade and culture become irrelevant. China, like every other great power, will try to seek power. You can see this already in the realignment of Chinese doctrine and forces aimed at exploiting US / Japanese weaknesses.

Asian politics really isn't that fundamentally different from power politics elsewhere, I think. If you look at the various policies and doctrines of the powers in the region, they are pretty clearly aimed at maximizing relative power. It seems that with the possible exception of Taiwan, Asian states have formed strong national identities distinct from China.

Joshua Harris, you ignore the long view, which is what the Chinese have. They've got patience -- they've been developing it for thousands of years -- and little fear of anyone besides internal enemies. The leadership is pragmatic. Of course Japan is supporting the United States -- China and Japan are cultural antagonists; there's no trust between the two. But Japan wouldn't even be there without China and don't think in the minds of Japanese citizens, Taiwanese citizens, Vietnamese citizens, and all the rest, that doesn't make a difference. The distinct identities they have forged are similar to the ones within China herself (greater China is huge), but the center around which they all revolve is clear.

If you're not Chinese, I don't expect you to understand. But to ignore culture in the case of analyzing China in the context of East Asian politics in the long-term is foolish. The rest really are details. It's only a matter of time.

Perhaps what you say will come to pass in the very long-term. I still think that China will never be able to become that powerful, especially since India is set to become the dominant power in the region (over China). But I digress...

India is a heterogeneous subcontinent with social and cultural disorder, that while dynamic, is intensely chaotic; I really wonder if they can get their acts together. Contrast to China, a rather homogeneous (in comparison) civilization with a strong social/moral/cultural work ethic to pursue group good, and I think you have a better deal. It's a race. The Indians have got English, but the Chinese have pragmatism. Oh and the Chinese would probably rather trade with their neighbors than wage war on them, which isn't really the case with India/Kashmir/Pakistan.

No offence Taiwan Observer, but I get the impression that you haven't spent much time in china, right?

On the contrary John, I'm Chinese, and I have spent most of my life in China.

I stand corrected, please accept my apologies Taiwan Observer.

T'is okay. A last thought: America and China will inevitably clash because of cultural reasons -- I'm speaking of the great masses of citizens on each side. Americans in a political capacity need to understand (for their own good) that Chinese will share little in common with them in terms of principle, and the only way to get along is really for both sides to think pragmatically -- deal with practical issues, and avoid the theoretical. China, for instance, has little use for human rights, and therefore the UN, and views it solely through the prism of power politics. It's entirely Chinese (i.e. not related to the political power of the moment) to do so, and I doubt you can get them to budge. They do, however, want to get rich, and will get along swell with others to achieve that goal. America would do well to leave moral grandstanding to the West and its other political domains, because the Chinese could care less what the West thinks of their moral behavior. Trade, on the other hand, that's where a deal can be made!