For reasons I don't entirely understand, I am sometimes labeled as a "Putin supporter" judging from some of the e-mail I get. While I tend to regard this as little more than a misunderstood (if somewhat offensive) smear, allow me to take this opportunity to clarify my position on Vlad I as well as to shed some light on recent events.
For starters, where I stand ...
I am most emphatically not a Putin fan, particularly given his apparent penchant for uprooting the brittle if somewhat corrupt foundations of Russian democracy in favor of a more authoritarian mold. And while I readily acknowledge the links between al-Qaeda and the Chechen Islamists, this should in no way be taken as an endorsement as the brutal policies that the Russians have chosen to implement in dealing with the insurgents. If the US did in Fallujah what Russia did in Grozny, I expect that we would have soon regarded Abu Ghraib as little more than a pleasant memory. As I think I've said before, Russian policy in Chechnya strikes me as being more than just brutal - it's also ineffective, in large part due to the refusal of the Russian military to professionalize their military force.
As mentioned above, I am by no means a fan of Putin's autocratic tendencies, whether it's supporting neighboring dictatorships out of a desire to eventual recreate some semblance of the pre-1991 Russian imperium or taking advantage of what happened in Beslan to centralize his control of the Russian political system. In many ways, I tend to think that Putin is a fairly accurate representation of the caricature that the far left presents of President Bush, but that's probably an argument for another time.
In any case, my various points of contention with Putin in no way change the fact that Shamil Basayev and his Islamist minions are part of bin Laden's International Front and have either sought to assist or taken part in attacks on American and allied nationals in Europe, Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Australia. They're the bad guys, just like the IMU in Uzbekistan are bad guys. It doesn't make people like Putin or Karimov saints just because they're fighting them.
And you brought this up because ...
General Vladimir Mikhail, the head of the Russian air force, is now telling ITAR-Tass that Russia may use its strategic bombers to carry out attacks on state sponsors of terrorism beyond its borders. As lovely as the thought of Bushehr and Natanz being Osiraqed by the Russians might be to us all, he is most likely referring to former Soviet republics like Georgia or perhaps Azerbaijan that are known to harbor sizeable numbers of Chechen and allied Islamist fighters and while I can't speak on Azerbaijan (Nathan, you know enough to comment on this one?), I do know that Georgia's new pro-US government has done a great deal to clean up its act since the US-backed overthrow of Shevardnadze less than a year ago. Attacking them, even in places that are known to harbor Basayev's acolytes such as the Pankisi Gorge, is likely to be a pointless (and bloody) show of force on the part of Moscow.
Another thing that should be considered is that Russia has long (correctly) accused Saudi Arabia of financing the Chechen Islamists, a number of whose key commanders have been Saudi nationals. While a Russian aerial assault on Saudi Arabia at this point is an extremely far-fetched, Russian intelligence did assassinate former Chechen president (and Mullah Omar pen pal) Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar back in February so Putin's reach should not be under-estimated.
And while I'm at it ...
Other issues that it may prove prudent to familiarize yourselves with as far as understanding the complexities of Russo-American relations as they relate to both Ukraine and the war on terror:
* the status of Abkhazia
* Akhmed Zakayev and Russian allegations against him
* the role of George Soros with respect to his perspective on both Putin and the Ukraine
* the ethnic divisions in the Ukraine
Hopefully that should be enough to keep even the most studious Russia-watcher busy till Sunday.








Whatever ... we all know you and Pootie-Poot are Best Friends Forever. :)
"In any case, my various points of contention with Putin in no way change the fact that Shamil Basayev and his Islamist minions are part of bin Laden's International Front and have either sought to assist or taken part in attacks on American and allied nationals in Europe, Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Australia."
The difficulty is that although the Russian government keeps on telling us that this is so, much of the analysis of the actual situation regarding Basayev and his "Islamist minions" has to be done via Russian media sources - in particular the Interfax, Itar-Tass and RIA Novosti agencies, which are heavily controlled by the Kremlin (its voice being heard through mouthpieces like Ilya Shabalkin). The Kremlin has a strong vested interest in trying to persuade the West that its "war" in Chechnya is part and part parcel of the war on terror. And thus, it's necessary to read between the lines of the agency reports on North Caucasus issues and events, almost to the extent that was obligatory when reading TASS on a general and global level in Soviet times. The degree of obfuscation, double-speak, and plain disinformation that's often characteristic of those reports has to be read to be believed. It can be broken through - and when one does break through the smokescreen, one often finds that the situation is very much more complex than one had imagined.
In general, I think it's a bad idea to be too dependent on Russian media reports for one's information on the subject of Russia's neo-imperial adventures under Putin. Sources like IWPR, Prague Watchdog and The Jamestown Foundation often have analysis which, though certainly not foolproof, tends to go more deeply into the issues, strategies, and facts. Organizations like PW have observers on the ground in the North Caucasus, and those observers aren't connected with the Russian government. They can therefore open up aspects of developments from a different and more revealing angle.
I'm not saying that Russian news sources should be ignored - just that they should be treated with a healthy dose of scepticism, and balanced with others that are less partisan.
I'm quite familiar with Russian obfuscation and the like, but at the same time that doesn't change the phenomenon of the suicide bombings or what al-Qaeda itself says about the conflict in Chechnya. More than enough evidence exists, entirely apart from the Russian stuff, to acknowledge the international dimension of the conflict.
That being said, one can at least agree on most of the generals, if not the particulars (i.e. lumping Maskhadov in with Basayev) about the nature of the Chechen conflict that pretty well squares with the Kremlin party line about them fighting international terrorism there.
I'm glad we can agree at least on the general outlines. But I would question your very firm assertion about "the international dimension of the conflict", if only because it's clear, even from reading Russian press reports, that most of the conflict in Chechnya and Ingushetia is local and home-grown.
Some of the propagandizing is banal in the extreme: for example, the "negr" whom the Russian authorities claimed took part in the Beslan attack (they actually used the word "negr") turned out be a corpse that had been blackened by the sun. The many "Arab fighters" who were supposed to have taken part turned out to be only two in number. And so on.
At the very least, this kind of thing makes it hard to take the Russian claims seriously.
I would certainly agree that the Chechen conflict is in sore need of being internationalized, possibly with the intervention of the OSCE or even the UN - and this has recently been argued forcefully by Russian human rights activists such as Sergei Kovalyov, who wrote a very eloquent essay on this theme in Novoye Vremya in October.
Another thing that should be considered is that Russia has long (correctly) accused Saudi Arabia of financing the Chechen Islamists, a number of whose key commanders have been Saudi nationals. While a Russian aerial assault on Saudi Arabia at this point is an extremely far-fetched, Russian intelligence did assassinate former Chechen president (and Mullah Omar pen pal) Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Qatar back in February so Putin's reach should not be under-estimated.
..umm, and why is this a problem? The only question is, if he does this, what sort of gift basket should we send to thank him?
But seriously, Russia makes all sorts of deals with the Saudis and the Iranians, despite the fact that both nations support terrorism. They're as bad, or sometimes even worse than we are.
I actually haven't heard of Chechens taking refuge in Azerbaijan, but I kind of bristle at using the term "harbor" in reference to their presence in Georgia even under Shevardnadze. While Georgia has had a fairly bad relationship with Russia, it has been such an abject failure at projecting its power that I'm not sure it really could have done much about Chechens in the Pankisi Gorge until recently. But, then again, I have an irrational and inexplicable bias towards Georgians (it's the wine and khachapuri, I think).
For those interested in recent events in Abkhazia, it might be worth seeing what Russia is doing there while the world is distracted . And the official Russian position is that they are protecting these poor, downtrodden people from the rapacious Georgians.
And heck, maybe all those accusations of loving Putin should come my way. I've reluctantly defended his domestic policies. His growing assertiveness in the Russian near abroad is pushing me to on balance dislike him. He's become a serious force for instability in the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan's worried apparently), and I see little reason why this won't spread to Central Asia (Russia's shameful role in intentionally fueling Tajikistan's civil war to make the country reliant on Russian troops should prove a warning).
Weren't the Georgians running weapons to the Chechens before the Americans shut that little business down?
I thought that was part of the deal between Bush and Putin after 9/11: we'd get bases, and in exchange we'd give him a free hand and clean up the mess in Georgia. Am I wrong here?
halldor:
But I would question your very firm assertion about "the international dimension of the conflict", if only because it's clear, even from reading Russian press reports, that most of the conflict in Chechnya and Ingushetia is local and home-grown.
If you're talking about the antecedents of the conflict, I more than agree. The same can be said for Kashmir, Mindanao, et al. However, there is a definite international terrorist presence there, personified by such individuals as the late Abu Walid al-Ghamdi and the even later Khattab. Moreover, even though the locals are doing much of the fighting, the locals themselves are also being financed, supported, and trained by outside elements whose agenda has nothing to do with Chechen independence and everything to do with international Salafism.
Some of the propagandizing is banal in the extreme: for example, the "negr" whom the Russian authorities claimed took part in the Beslan attack (they actually used the word "negr") turned out be a corpse that had been blackened by the sun. The many "Arab fighters" who were supposed to have taken part turned out to be only two in number. And so on.
At the very least, this kind of thing makes it hard to take the Russian claims seriously.
Russian duplicity is hardly a new phenomenon, but to be quite honest there's still a lot about Beslan that's unclear, including reports that the number of the hostage-takers was far greater than has been reported by the Russian government, that many of them may have escaped, and that a number of local authorities in the North Caucasus may have been complicit in what took place there. I still don't think we know the full story of what happened in Beslan, nor are we likely to for some time to come.
I would also point out that US and European intelligence agencies that once thought very little of Russian claims about the Chechnya's international dimensions are paying a great deal more heed to their claims.
mary:
..umm, and why is this a problem? The only question is, if he does this, what sort of gift basket should we send to thank him?
But seriously, Russia makes all sorts of deals with the Saudis and the Iranians, despite the fact that both nations support terrorism. They're as bad, or sometimes even worse than we are.
With respect to Yandarbiyev, I don't plan on shedding any tears for Mullah Omar's pen pal. His was a classic example of playing with fire and getting burned. However, I don't see the highly unlikely event of a Russian airstrike on Saudi Arabia as doing much to help matters.
Nathan:
I'll have to go through with you why I use that term (it mainly relates to the late Ruslan Gelayev's relationship with the Shevardnadze government), but let me just say that Georgian politics concerning Russia and the Chechen issue is something of a complicated thing because of problems like Ajaria or Abkhazia.
And Russia fueled the Tajik Civil War? I knew they were involved, but certainly on the rebel side?
praktike:
Among other things. As I said, it's a complicated issue.
And no, the deal between Putin and Bush after 9/11 (or more exactly, after Russian claims about al-Qaeda ties to the Chechen Killer Korps were confirmed by US and European intel) was that Putin got a carte blanche in Chechnya in return for him not taking offense to the basing of US troops in former Soviet states. The Georgia stuff came later, and the Russians did try to offer the US a pass on Iraq if we would let them gobble up Georgia.
Keep in mind the ungoing debacle in Chechnya began as the USSR empire fell. Nation states annexed into the USSR and Czarist Russia immediately began to spin away. There was far too little talk of what this meant in the West at the time when most of the movements were strictly nationalist in orgin. That the New Russia tried to keep the empire by force is what lead to this current diaster. If the Jihadists are to be seperated from nationalist movements where the population practises Islam a more nuanced policy is going to have to be proposed. Otherwise we are going to be constantly creating Jihadists.
No, I understand why you use the term and it's pretty accurate. Georgia can hardly be bothered to care about Russia's separatists when Russia is protecting Georgia's separatists. Like I said, I have an irrational defensiveness when it comes to Georgians sometimes because khachapuri and red wine is the pinnacle of human culinary achievement.
Russia played both sides in Tajikistan. It's tremendously difficult to find a complete account of Russia's behavior in Tajikistan during the 90s but some of the things I've seen referenced in passing are pretty damning. The 201st rented out their armor to whichever side would pay them to use it. One side would take a tank or two for a while only to be attacked by the same tanks the next day when their opponents had money. There are numerous stories of Russian troops ferrying Juma Namangani and Tohir Yo'ldosh from their Afghan camps into Tajikistan to launch raids on Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Russian soldiers also have been caught running drugs across the border posts they guard (as recently as last summer even).
While it's possible that these are the acts of soldiers trying to make a little money on the side while posted in a backwater far from home, Russia's message to Tajikistan has pretty clearly been "you need us." It's kind of like the mafia shooting up your place when you refuse their offer of protection.
Russian duplicity is hardly a new phenomenon, but to be quite honest there's still a lot about Beslan that's unclear, including reports that the number of the hostage-takers was far greater than has been reported by the Russian government, that many of them may have escaped, and that a number of local authorities in the North Caucasus may have been complicit in what took place there. I still don't think we know the full story of what happened in Beslan, nor are we likely to for some time to come.
Certainly, the Beslan Commission is not proving to be a source of information about happened at Beslan. And Torshin's recent vague allusions to "foreign special services" don't make things any clearer. The next meeting of the commission is on Dec. 9.
I would also point out that US and European intelligence agencies that once thought very little of Russian claims about the Chechnya's international dimensions are paying a great deal more heed to their claims.
I think it might be useful for Western intelligence agencies to listen a bit more to what Russian political scientists are able to tell them. For example, Vladislav Inozemtsev recently came out with the following assessment in a panel discussion at CDI:
"Russia is responsible for the curious position it has gotten itself into in the North Caucasus. This is due not only to its policies, but also its rhetoric. Everyone in Moscow is talking about Chechnya as if it were a breading ground for international terrorism. We should note, however, that Russia is the only one being attacked, not Azerbaijan, Ukraine or Armenia. But as soon as someone in the West brings this fact up, Moscow announces: "Chechnya is a domestic issue." But if it's a domestic issue, don't blame it all on international terrorism! If international terrorism is at the root of the issue, then everyone needs to work toward solving this problem together. Russians understand little about the reasons for the instability in the Caucasus, but they are interested in taking advantage of it. They perpetuate this powder keg to stir up fear in others and, if necessary, to ignite it sometime in the future. Russians reason that they may be able to scare the West with something even more horrible. And as far as their domestic agenda is concerned, this works to create a kind of sense of security: yes, it's bad here, but it's worse in the Caucasus. So, westerners, you needn't get involved… "
However, I don't see the highly unlikely event of a Russian airstrike on Saudi Arabia as doing much to help matters.
Well, we know that the Saudis financed and supported the elements who slaughtered thousands of Americans on 9/11. And we know that they continued to finance al Qaeda after 9/11. Our response was for Bush to invite Prince Abdullah to the Crawford ranch.
We make deals with and cajole the people who want to kill us and the Russians do the same. They’re dhimmis, just like us, and it’s extremely unlikely that they would ever strike our Saudi ‘allies’ directly (although high-level Sauds should probably try to avoid bad sushi).
We and the Russians share common enemies, Saudi Arabia and Iran. That's not to imply that we should consider Putin a friend, it's just a simple fact. I’m not an admirer of Putin either, but a least he’s willing to openly state the fact that the Saudis support terrorism. We can’t even do that much.
Actually, mary, we don't that "the Saudis," whatever that means, funded the 9/11 attacks. Point me to a source.
Nathan, I think you're right that Russian troops in Tajikistan kind of did whatever they wanted, ran drugs, etc. Many of them may not have even known that the Cold War had ended, according to Robert Baer's first book.
Actually, mary, we don't that "the Saudis," whatever that means, funded the 9/11 attacks. Point me to a source.
According to the 9/11 commission, 'the Saudis' had absolutely nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. That lie is completely disputed by Dan's own fisking of that report.
Dan's fisking is here, on Winds of Change, praktike. I'm surprised you missed it:
Part I
Part II
Of the 9/11 Commission Report, From Part II:
"This is a pure whitewash of Saudi Arabia and its role in international terrorism and completely ignores most conventional wisdom in this regard outside of the niceties of US diplomacy. That Mohammed Jamal Khalifa and other members of the Golden Chain are still free men in the Kingdom even after the discovery of documents stating their affiliation is testimony enough to the fact that al-Qaeda has at the very least a tacit home in the Kingdom. Combine this with Gerald Posner's investigative reporting claiming that a deal was struck between al-Qaeda and Saudi intelligence in 1991 (a position at least indirectly supported by a UN report on the subject) and there seems to me a good number of other clear-thinking people to be a very damning case against the Kingdom, or at least a sizeable number of the princes. But then, I'm not bound by the byzantine intricacies that are US-Saudi relations"
They supported terrorism before 9/11, they supported it afterwards and they are currently supporting it in Iraq. From Michael Ledeen:
"The globalization of terrorism is an undoubted success for bin Laden. It is sufficiently serious and frightening to induce (Saudi) Prince Abdullah — according to credible secret sources — to negotiate with bin Laden a secret agreement to prevent the fall of the monarchy, based on their common hated of America and Israel." According to Allam[Magdi Allam, the assistant editor of the Italian paper Corriere della Sera], that agreement explains Abdullah's statement, following the May 1 terror attack, blaming "Zionism" for terrorism in Saudi Arabia. Other sources tell Allam the same thing I have heard, namely that the Saudi royal family has prepared a detailed plan to run abroad if the situation gets much worse, and that knowledge of the royal family's intentions is a major component in the recent rise in the price of oil. Meanwhile, the Saudis are buying insurance by supporting the terrorists in Iraq."
Halldor,
>(they actually used the word "negr")
Unless I'm mistaken, you're implying it was somehow wrong. What's wrong with this word, in your view?