Russia’s invasion of Georgia has unleashed a refugee crisis all over the country and especially in its capital. Every school here in Tbilisi is jammed with civilians who fled aerial bombardment and shootings by the Russian military—or massacres, looting, and arson by irregular Cossack paramilitary units swarming across the border. Russia has seized and effectively annexed two breakaway Georgian provinces, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It has also invaded the region of Gori, which unlike them had been under Georgia’s control. Gori is in the center of the country, just an hour’s drive from Tbilisi; 90 percent of its citizens have fled, and the tiny remainder live amid a violent mayhem overseen by Russian occupation forces that, despite Moscow’s claims to the contrary, are not yet withdrawing.
On Monday, I visited one of the schools transformed into refugee housing in the center of Tbilisi and spoke to four women—Lia, Nana, Diana, and Maya—who had fled with their children from a cluster of small villages just outside the city of Gori. “We left the cattle,” Lia said. “We left the house. We left everything and came on foot because to stay there was impossible.” Diana’s account: “They are burning the houses. From most of the houses they are taking everything. They are stealing everything, even such things as toothbrushes and toilets. They are taking the toilets. Imagine. They are taking broken refrigerators.” And Nana: “We are so heartbroken. I don’t know what to say or even think. Our whole lives we were working to save something, and one day we lost everything. Now I have to start everything from the very beginning.”
Seven families were living cheek by jowl inside a single classroom, sleeping on makeshift beds made of desks pushed together. Small children played with donated toys; at times, their infant siblings cried. Everyone looked haggard and beaten down, but food was available and the smell wasn’t bad. They could wash, and the air conditioning worked.
“There was a bomb in the garden and all the apples on the trees fell down,” Lia remembered. “The wall fell down. All the windows were destroyed. And now there is nothing left because of the fire.”
Thank you for these reports.
Michael Totten provides an up-close view of the Russia-Georgia war from Tblisi. The Wall St. Journal has had some good firsthand reporting from Gori.
A separate but related question is the Big Picture; how the parties view the overall issues, and their adversaries, and their actions. American pundits tend to view this from the perspective of "what we did/should have done" to influence events (and preferably to have avoided the defeat of Georgia). Some left-wing American commentary differs in taking an anti-Shakaashvili, anti-Bush, objectively pro-Putin stance, but they, too, seem to think that in a unipolar world, the most important question is how the U.S. plays its cards.
Fabius Maximus regularly calls this shared assumption into question. He is particularly exercised by the growing structural weaknesses in the U.S. economy, particularly by how the large and growing reliance on foreign funding of U.S. debt will increasing limit our policy options.
In his post today, FM reprints an essay by George Friedman of Stratfor. Friedman sketches out why Putin decided to destroy Georgia as a functioning, prosperous state in Russa's Near Abroad.
So, media news coverage notwithstanding, this conflict was not an event that was much less newsworthy than the Beijing Olymics. It was not of interest mainly to people like those interviewed by Totten, with lives caught up in ethnic cleansing and the routine depredations of war.
Shakaashvili somehow came to believe that the West could and would deliver geopolitically decisive actions to protect his country from the nearby bear. We can talk, we can do counterinsurgency training, we can invest in pipelines. But we don't have the will or the way or the desire to interfere with Putin, as his army continues to wreck Georgia. It's not a unipolar world, after all.
We will pay for decades for this strategic blunder. Putin played this adminstration like a drum. It was caught flatfooted in one of the most important strategic spots on earth.
A few months ago, Putin went to Iran and made defense pact with the Caspian countries. Agression against one was agression against all. Now, in a check mate move, he Controls the caspian. If we or the Israelis were to move against Iran, then oil would cease to flow west. Remember the Caspian Defense Pact. The former Cental Asian Republics have no other route to bring their oil to market in the West other than through Russian dominated areas
There is a more good chance that this boner will haunt us far longer than any of this administration's past fuckups.
How is this for a pretty sight, Vladimir Putin sits astride the Caspian and Central Asian Oil Fields and their is nothing we can do about it. Remember where he and Bush were, relatively, when Bush entered office. What a turn of fortune, for both.
Forget the not doing business as usual threats, Europe will see "reason" come December or January at the latest. Look also for an ever stronger Russian-Chinese axis.
But, hey, we're going spend a trillion dollars and tie down an expeditionary force for a decade to solve the problems in Mesopotamia. Hell, we are even going to give them Democracy. Do people actually believe in these fairy tales? Is this what passes for RealPolitik in the State Department and White House these days?
BTW, as far as military action is concerned, take a look at the Physical map in the Atlas. In these situations they are infinitely more relevant that the political lines that are drawn an erased willy-nilly throughout history. Russia has no intention of giving up practical control of Black Sea Ports in Georgia. They may withdraw but the troops will not be far away. Nothing will go in and out of Georgia without their approval.
The Administration should be excoriated for this. Our enemies in the Middle East must be rolling on the floor with laughter at the Neo-Cons and their ridiculous dreams of Empire that got us in this position. Ahmadinejad and the Mullahs must be dancing in the streets, that is if they allow themselves the privledge.
And again Toc chimes in to condemn the administration for 'allowing' this to happen because we havent been sufficiently isolationist enough. Allow the irony to seep in for a moment.
#4 from Mark Buehner at 1:25 am on Aug 22, 2008
And again Toc chimes in to condemn the administration for 'allowing' this to happen because we havent been sufficiently isolationist enough. Allow the irony to seep in for a moment.
Wrong again, Mark. Not for being isolationist, but fot the opposite, letting their eye wander away from what is important to participate in the Stategic blunder that was the the second Iraq War and endless occupation.
The only isolation here was the isolated view that the Administration took on Iraq, isolating itself from its allies. although I do not expect you to notice, the geopolitical landscape has changed immensely in the past 10 days, and not to our benefit.
But there was nothing that the geniuses in the administration could have done to stop it. I remind you again that their was plenty of discussion here about the fixation on Iraq alooing the Russians to regain power in the Middle East. Now that they have done so you continue to stick your head in the sand.
For what it is worth, Administrations are supposed to foresee this kind of theing. If quite a few people on these boardswere able to see this a year ago, how was it that our leaders weren't? Oh I forgot, we were doing missionary work in Iraq spreading democracy?
Don't waste your time on me with the drive-bys.They have become incredibly boring.
Whats boring is your incessent carping with still no actual policy ideas aside from overly broad (and hence useless)generalizations.
I'm sorry, are you suggesting that if we never invaded Iraq we would be in a better position to defend Georgia? How so please?
Or more- that Russia wouldnt have thought the idea up? Thats simply the worst kind of US-centrism, that everything we do or dont do is responsible for everything else. Forget that Putin is a nasty peice of work- our waffling over Iraq would have made him less of a thug? That makes sense.
As yet all i've ever heard you espouse is the tired nonsense that had we sufficiently buried our heads in the sand for the last 8 years nothing would have changed in the world to our detriment.
TOC - Exactly 2 years from now, Russia will invade Georgia's neighbour Azerbaijan. It will begin at 3:59am on August 21, 2009. This is not a guess. This is a guaranteed prediction, thanks to my trusty flux capacitor and an old DeLorean.
Kindly explain what you will do to stop it. You have 2 years, and a compliant American administration.
As they say, put up, or shut up....
Somehow I don't think Putin's hand would be weaker with a Saddam Hussein controlled Iraq still around, a Saddam Hussein no longer "contained" by economic sanctions.
#7 from Joe Katzman:
The question was addressed to TOC but I can answer it.
However, first I want to see TOC's answer.
By the way: thanks Michael Totten for your report, and AMac for post #2.
Any answer that doesnt involve 95% bashing the last administration is preferable, if unlikely.
#7 from Joe Katzman at 6:30 am on Aug 22, 2008
_TOC - Exactly 2 years from now, Russia will invade Georgia's neighbour Azerbaijan. It will begin at 3:59am on August 21, 2009. This is not a guess. This is a guaranteed prediction, thanks to my trusty flux capacitor and an old DeLorean.
Kindly explain what you will do to stop it. You have 2 years, and a compliant American administration.
As they say, put up, or shut up...._
Nice try, Joe.
At the beginning of the present administration, we were at the apex of our power. But instead of consolidating our gains where it mattered, say, in the Caucasus, we went off on ill conceived adventurism in Mesopotamia on the flimsiest of excuses. In the process we strengthened our enemies in the region and let our old friends the Russians back in.
The importance of the region is not easy to overlook. It has been in contention since the Black Sea was called the Euxine and more recently, as part of the Grand Game between the Czarist Russia and and the British Empire. It was also for control of this area and its oil that the Battle of Stalingrad was fought.
So, although the importance of this area may be lost on you, it should not be on lost on the people that run your foreign affairs. This is Geopolitics 101.
You need not worry about Azerbaijan, it has already been conquered. Funny, Irving Kristol started out as a Stalinist, no. Old Joe must be very proud of him and his acolytes now.
Take some insight from an old Paleo-Con, though your fury is just, it is pointed in the wrong direction. I think it may be finally dawning on you Neo-Con worshippers how vapid and naive the whole philosophy was and how at its very base it really never left its Marxist, totalitarian roots.
Here is a quote of Kristol's:
Conservatism, Kristol complained, "is so influenced by business culture and by business modes of thinking that it lacks any political imagination, which has always been, I have to say, a property of the Left." Kristol confessed to a deep yearning for an American empire: "What's the point of being the greatest, most powerful nation in the world and not having an imperial role? It's unheard of in human history. The most powerful nation always had an imperial role." But, he continued, previous empires were not "capitalist democracies with a strong emphasis on economic growth and economic prosperity." Because of its commitment to the free market, the United States lacked the fortitude and vision to wield imperial power. "It's too bad," Kristol lamented. "I think it would be natural for the United States...to play a far more dominant role in world affairs. Not what we're doing now but to command and to give orders as to what is to be done. People need that. There are many parts of the world—Africa in particular—where an authority willing to use troops can make a very good difference, a healthy difference." But with public discussion dominated by accountants—"there's the Republican Party tying itself into knots. Over what? Prescriptions for elderly people? Who gives a damn? I think it's disgusting that...presidential politics of the most important country in the world should revolve around prescriptions for elderly people. Future historians will find this very hard to believe. It's not Athens. It's not Rome. It's not anything." Kristol thought it unlikely that the United States would take its rightful place as the successor to empires past.
This sort of adolescent fantasy is not only dangerous, but despicable and an anathema to American values. These are the comments of a totalitarian, and a Stalinist and not a very bright one.
This is what should be purged from the Republican Party along with Rovian politics. Go ahead, keep on defending these guys, but please dont call them conservatives, call them Bolsheviks. And, by the way, tell them that Americans don't believe in having anyone tell and individual what they need. It gets our back up.
#10 from Mark Buehner at 2:17 pm on Aug 22, 2008
Any answer that doesnt involve 95% bashing the last administration is preferable, if unlikely.
Mark, I am sure you find it admirable that you tow the party line and are proud of how you react in a knee-jerk fashion to any criticism of the party, but I have never been one to march in lockstep with whatever politicians have tried to push on me.
Sorry that I can't accomodate your preferences. You need not continue this drive-by either. Believe me, it will have no effect.
"At the beginning of the present administration, we were at the apex of our power. But instead of consolidating our gains where it mattered, say, in the Caucasus"
WHAT DOES THIS ENTAIL???!!!
Toc, you're so close to making a cogent point, but then you veer off into rants against neocons and various insults to the intelligence of everyone else.
Simple question, what would American power have done 5 years ago to prevent the Russian invasion of Georgia? If President TOC takes office in 2001, what would he have done when Russian tanks crossed the border?
Nice phrase, but I notice it's generic enough that it doesn't counsel for, or against, and particular action we took/didn't take. So, we're still waiting for something concrete from you.
All should hve been done at least 5 years ago when Russia was weak and massive amounts of western capital was pumped into these oil producing areas which the Russians now for all practical purposes control. Again, we were caught flat-footed in a vital strategic area.
For starters
1. NATO entry should have been fast tracked.
2. Economic power should have been used more forcefully throughout the region to make sure that the oil states of the region were persuaded to build pipelines through western routes. The "we tried" excuse can be answered very readily, "apparently not hard enough".
3. Massive all out push to build pipelines through the territory and a clear statement that we and europe see this as a vital interest that will be defended.
4. More military assets should have positioned inside Georgia to back up very clear statements by the United states and the West that they considered the region to be vital to their National Interests and clear penalties would be delineated in response to Soviet adventurism.
5. These moves would coincide with equally massive diplomatic efforts to defuse the separatist problems one way or another. The U.S. probably had the influence to do that at that point. Now that is lost.
This is all boilerplate. Simple, clear moves to fill power vacuums. I wqould expect the State Department, the NSA and a number of other governmment Agencies to come up with something more detailled.
But, I guess the excuse, "How could we possibly forsee the Russians doing something like this?", satisfies some people. I guess they haven't heard the old "Scorpian and the Frog" story.
If President TOC takes office in 2001, what would he have done when Russian tanks crossed the border?
Russian tanks couldn't have crossed the border. They were not only incredibly weak, they were tied down with a terrorist war in Chechnya. Putin was essentially following the West around with a Tin Cup. They were broke, under seige in the Caucasus and were incapable of putting down a ragtag insurgency that they had thought they had wiped out in Chechnya 3 to 5 years before.
The were barely in the G-8 and were attending mostly for hand outs and investments that people like the Germans were giving to them. Yeltsin had left office barely a year before and Putin still looked wet behind the ears. He had not even begun to consolidate power.
Remember all this?
This is what makes me angry at this administration. Putin was in short pants when GWB took office and fell under the Neo-Con spell. Fortunes have turned in remarkable and dramatic way. It is we Republicans that should be infuriated by this, yet it seems the reaction to the Foreign Policy failures of this Administration is Panglossian. And, from what I can see, McCain with his idiotic "We are all Georgians" response is more of the cluelees same.
We ought to stop flattering ourselves by pointing out how softheaded the democrats are and look to our own house. The more I see of the state of the party, the more I see it in desparate need of some time in the wilderness. It has no political philosophy, no clearly delineated strategic vision and is in desperate need of serious self examination.
OIC--you want a shooting war directly with Russia. Let me know how that goes...
Now we are getting somewhere. How would you have addressed our Persian Gulf situation with our forces and diplomacy still dedicated to containing Iraq? Status Quo 2000?
And do you subsrcibe to the argument that Russia's action are in response to the current meddling we've done in Georgia? If so, wouldn't the things you described have precipitated a much earlier incursion? How would we react to that?
And assuming NATO troops were on the ground, would you risk a shooting war? I'm not bashing the gamble, i've advanced the idea something similar.
And of course hindsight is always 20/20. Its easy to say in retrospect that the Caspian is the most critical region in the world, but there are a number of places you could make that argument. If we devoted all these resources into Russia's backyard and they responded by arming Iraq and Iran to the teeth, would you be decrying the folly of ignoring the obvious strategic value of the Gulf and inciting Russia to expand into the region?
Second Chechnyan war was over in 2000. If anything Russia had a veteran army of occupation available to crush tiny Georgia. A single division would have been ample- lets not forget that Georgia was also far different at the time and had no professional military at all.
Russia was deeply embroiled with Abkhazia and South Ossetia all through the 90s and 2000s- there were Russian troops in Ossetia since the mid to late -90s (during the height of the Chechnyan fight). Russian was threatening to go to war on the subject in 1992. I find the idea that Russia was too needy or distracted to intervene wanting. Russia was likely more desperate to retain their influence at that time.
Counterfactuals are always sketchy, but i think the burden is on you to demonstrate that Russia wasnt willing or capable to make this move at the time.
#18 from Mark Buehner at 5:45 pm on Aug 22, 2008
Now we are getting somewhere. How would you have addressed our Persian Gulf situation with our forces and diplomacy still dedicated to containing Iraq? Status Quo 2000?
Containing Saddam might have been an annoyance, but it cost us next to nothing in both lives and treasure. Even as weak as he was, he was a counter balance to Iran. One might complain about the corruption in the Food for Oil program but it pales in comparison to what has been siphoned off during the occupation.
The NeoCons made a blunder that Bush 41, Snowcroft, Jim Baker and the rest never would have made ie, failing to recognize the limits of our power and not taking their eye off the ball vis-a-vis our responsibilities in other areas of the world, most especially Europe.
And do you subsrcibe to the argument that Russia's action are in response to the current meddling we've done in Georgia
Powers, great and small, meddle every where. Whether their meddling is effective is all that counts. We have meddled in Russian affais for ever. They are used to it. What was different here is we allowed ourselves to put them in a position where they could do something about it.
If so, wouldn't the things you described have precipitated a much earlier incursion? How would we react to that?
The whole idea of this particular incursion is not the point. Looking at the situation though this lens is like trying to tell what century it is by looking at the second hand on a clock. I am sure that the Russians didn't like our meddling in the Caucasus, and the georgians probably pissed them off, but I think the incursion was about re-asserting control over an area that is strategically critical and in the Russian mind part of Russia for over half a millenium. and by this I mean, not only Georgia, but the Caucasus and Central Asia.
This was an incredibly bold and decisive move geopolitically and if one thinks it is about Georgia, I think one is missing the Big Picture, big time.
And assuming NATO troops were on the ground, would you risk a shooting war? I'm not bashing the gamble, i've advanced the idea something similar.
If it were handled right in the first place, our Sphere of Influence would have been consolidated and it would have been Russia's decision as to whether to go to war. Not the opposite situation we are in today. We have no choice or many options
Would they have been willing to risk killing NATO troops for South Ossetia. We will never know, but I doubt it.
And of course hindsight is always 20/20.
This is not hindsight. This is Geostrategic dogma.
Its easy to say in retrospect that the Caspian is the most critical region in the world, but there are a number of places you could make that argument.
I never said that it is the most critical region in the world. but it is and always has been one of them. Gibralter, the Suexz Canal, the straights of Hormuz, the Straights of Malacca, the Cape of Good Hope, Jutland and the Mouth of the North Sea, etc
_If we devoted all these resources into Russia's backyard and they responded by arming Iraq and Iran to the teeth, would you be decrying the folly of ignoring the obvious strategic value of the Gulf and inciting Russia to expand into the region??
The couldn't do that, for a number of reasons, not the least of them being that Iran, at least has always been an enemy of Russia and has always been a threat to stir up Muslim nationalism on their southern flank. the Russians too have limits to their power.
My anger at the NeoCon view was how simplictic and adolescent it was. The world is a complicated place. Saddam was tied was tied down by a few F-16s, oil was under $30 a barrel.
Tell me again why did we have to trump up some nonsense about Saddam being an imminent threat to the United States that force our hand to build up six carrier Groups to attack him and occupy the country for the better part of a decade.
Look at the result? who got the better of it. Seems pretty clear that it was Russia and Iran, and Bin Laden is still on the loose.
Whose fault is that? Well, as sorry as I am to say this, it is not the democrats.
#19 from Mark Buehner at 5:57 pm on Aug 22, 2008
Second Chechnyan war was over in 2000.
I disagree with that, even if I didn't when in 2000 do you say it was over. was their power consolidated. were they readiy to start a war with nato over Georgia. Not a chance. this is a Red Herring and not very wel thought out.
If anything Russia had a veteran army of occupation available to crush tiny Georgia. A single division would have been ample- lets not forget that Georgia was also far different at the time and had no professional military at all.
The were barely able to put down the Chechens and had to go back twice to do it. Where do you get this sort of revisionist stuff from?
Russia was deeply embroiled with Abkhazia and South Ossetia all through the 90s and 2000s- there were Russian troops in Ossetia since the mid to late -90s (during the height of the Chechnyan fight). Russian was threatening to go to war on the subject in 1992. I find the idea that Russia was too needy or distracted to intervene wanting. Russia was likely more desperate to retain their influence at that time.
You know, for a guy that eternally criticizes people who question the moves of the administration, you sure have a way of blowing up the strength of the enemy. The Russian GNP hit a low in 1999 of $300Billion U.S. It had grown to a whole 400 Billion by 2001. look at the chart on Wikipedia. It has grown by 4 times under Putin, but in the 2000, 2001 it was broke, without allies devoid of influence its army was demoralized. Its logistics were in disaaray. Its industry had collapsed. Need more.
You know, Mark. You ask me to provide details and you don't take any of them into account. you just use whatever vague recollection whether accurate or not to prove you point and ask then say the burdern of proof is not on you but the person you are in a discussion with.
How about this. do a little research into the state of Russia at that time, militarily, politically and diplomatically, dig up something that backs up your opinions Read a little about strategic bottlenecks, strategic materials, power vacuums, spheres of influence and then get back to me.
"but I think the incursion was about re-asserting control over an area that is strategically critical and in the Russian mind part of Russia for over half a millenium. and by this I mean, not only Georgia, but the Caucasus and Central Asia."
No question. I think my point that even our tepid intrusion into Georgia over the past few years was viewed as intolerable by the Kremlin. 8 years ago i dont see what was different, Russia has been deeply involved (troops, money, influence) in the breakaway regions since the breakup.
The idea that we could have a coup-de-main and bring Georgia into the NATO umbrella so fast that Russia wouldnt have time to respond seems unlikely to me. This showdown would have happened sooner and i dont know how much if any support we would have seen from Europe at that time- lets not forget even talking about Poland was highly contentious and viewed by many as a jab in the Bears eye. I dont think what you are proposing would have much backing, here or abroad. We could surely carry it out unilaterally (obviously), but if Russia responded by staging the same type of show they put on in Georgia a few weeks ago, short of US troops manning the trenches there was nothing to stop them. But deploying US troops is the same option now. I'm not sure how our position would be different materially. Best case it would be Russians divisions staring over the border intimidating Georgia... which would appear to be what is going to be the outcome now.
"were they readiy to start a war with nato over Georgia. Not a chance. this is a Red Herring and not very wel thought out."
War with NATO is the red herring. We're talking about invading Georgia and no matter what you say NATO wasnt and isnt likely to come running to their defense.
"The were barely able to put down the Chechens and had to go back twice to do it. Where do you get this sort of revisionist stuff from?"
I'll guide you to an atlas this time. Georgia is not Chechnya, Georgians are not Chenchnyans. By your logic red tanks never stomped Hungary and Chechoslovakia.
"It has grown by 4 times under Putin, but in the 2000, 2001 it was broke, without allies devoid of influence its army was demoralized. Its logistics were in disaaray. Its industry had collapsed. Need more."
Lets take a glance back at Nazi Germany circa the early 30s shall we? A desperate Russia is not a Russia less likely to lash out defending what you acknowledge is a damned rich and vital area. Whos more likely to roll around in the mud for a dollar, a beggar or a millionaire?
And quit telling me to do research. Youre assuming your own conclusions left and right.
I'd love to debate this further but i have to run. Let me summzarize my points quickly:
1.in the early 2000s NATO was unlikely (read, it wouldnt have happened) to suddenly adopt Georgia. Poland, Czech, and Hungary had just gotten in and that was somewhat contentious. It wasnt until 04 that the first former Soviet province was introduced.
2.Europe wasnt going to rush to deploy troops in Georgia, NATO or no (and it would be no). Europe couldnt bring itself to right the Balkans without the US doing it, they weren't going to stand up to the Soviets in their back yard.
3.Russia could easily have absorbed Georgia in the time period. They lifted a brigade into Kosovo in 99, which Wesley Clark famously tried to attack. The idea that Georgia was too much to handle it laughable, Georgia has NO professional military until recently.
4.The US could have deployed troops unilaterally in anticipation of any Russian trouble. I'll leave it to the readers to decide if that would look any different than the standoff we currently see. Assuming somebody didnt ignite WW3 accidently.
5.I find it highly dubious that back in 2003 TOC was kneeling in front of CNN screaming "you maniacs!! Georgia, Georgia!! We're going the wrong way!!!'.
TOC, thanks for the serious effort to respond to Mark Buehner's challenge of "what would you have done?" That deserves praise, not brickbats.
At its core, the President TOC strategy (#15) would have been, fast-track Georgia's entry into NATO so that it would be protected from invasion by, say 2003.
Protected how? By Article 5 of the Washington treaty, the mutual-defense provision. And President TOC would place U.S. troops in Georgia, in harm's way, to act as a trip-wire. Much as was done in West Berlin, South Korea, and other places.
This is a serious proposal, and its like had been offered up by wonkish policy types. Mostly by internationalist conservative types.
The premise was that Russia would have been deterred from the sort of attack that they successfully executed this month. But would they have been?
If yes, then Pres. TOC's strategy would have been successful, although we would never have known (there would be dozens of explanations of why Russia didn't attack).
If no, then what? Suppose Putin decided that Western meddling in the Near Abroad was (a) a bluff, or (b) intolerable? If Russian tanks rolled, would Pres. TOC have folded his cards? Or would he have upped the ante by engaging in the first direct, non-plausibly-denied U.S.-Russian battlefield bloodshed since before the Cold War began?
Militarily, this would have been in incredibly disadvantageous conditions. Check a map.
Politically, it's certain that Putin would have moved his chess pieces in such a way as to muddy the moral waters--exactly as he did in 2008, by inviting/provoking Saakashvili to send in armor to Tskhinvali. (Putin may not have persuaded many WoC readers, but he's got Russians rooting for the home team, Euros ambivalent, and the sympathy of many Bush/America haters. Pretty good return on a paltry investment.)
There's another problem: apparently ignoring Rice's warnings, Sakaashvili decided to gamble on August 7 with his lightning strike, presumably patterned after the Croatian takeover of Krajina in 1995. If Sakaashvili had formal NATO backing, it seems likely to me that he would have been even more heedless of the consequences of miscalculation. The problem of reckless allies acting according to their own agendas is an old one, and not easily dismissed.
I'm not saying that the Pres. TOC strategy would have been wrong. Just that it would have been risky--extremely risky. It would mean making policy on the belief that our opponents would act as we want them to (i.e., be deterred from attacking). It would mean risking huge fallout if things went sour, because the policy hadn't been completely worked through to account for that old saw: the enemy gets a vote.
Come to think of it, these are some of the exact brickbats that have been justifiably thrown at Bush and his team for their actions! Just replace "Caspian Sea" with "Persian Gulf."
For the record, I am not sure that there was a "solution" to this problem. Putin and the Russians have shown that any measurable "meddling" by the West is taken as grave provocation. If the U.S. isn't willing to credibly show that it's willing to engage in a direct US-Russia shooting war, there isn't a lot of decisive actions available. The geography is too unfavorable. The intermixture of different ethnic villages is too flammable. The grievances, real and imagined, are too easily stoked. Etc.
Final thought -- The top-level debate of the past few years was "Can a weak Russia be influenced to join the world as a regular (i.e. mostly-peaceable) nation, as it becomes stronger? Or, is Russia intractably imperialist, aggressive, and paranoid, so that Containment is the best we can manage, for ourselves and for Russia's Polish. Lithuainan, Ukranian, etc. neighbors?"
We'll never know the might-have-beens. But in playing his Georgian hand, Putin had to reveal it. Thus, going forward, we know the answer.
One also points out that, unlike US intervention in the Middle East, "huge fallout" from a direct military engagement with Russia is not merely a clever turn of phrase. "Oops, we accidentally triggered the extinction of humanity by nuclear fire" is not a risk to court lightly!
There is value in drawing a line in the sand, beyond which we're prepared to risk Armageddon; I'm just not convinced that it's constructive to draw that line at Russia's border everywhere. As has been noted, when we do draw that line, we can't afford to back down from it later; better not to draw it in the first place, if we're not going to back it up.
#25 from AMac at 11:48 pm on Aug 22, 2008
Thanks.
I would rather say that the move would have been bold, not altogether risky. I Russia attacked, maybe we would have withdrawn like Reagan did in Lebanon, but that would be would put the risk taking in Putin's court. I like our odds there because bullies don't like to take risks.
We missed an opurtunity to raise the stakes in the area when Russia was weak, when they could not control the former states in the Soviet Empire. From the outside, it seems that very little thought was given to this area given its importance.
In a lot of ways, it seems that we have lost our carefully built up influence in the area in one bold move. I am impressed with Putin. Sure he is a ruthless and murderous thug, but he has balls. I also think he has played this administration as fools, big time.
In any case, the chance was missed. I make no secret of my distain for the Foreign Policy practiced by this administration and the more I see of McCain, the less I like about him. He no longer seems to be his own man, is an uncotrollable hothead, etc. I am waiting for someone to ask him about the psychological treatment he had after leaving Viet Nam. I have seen things on the Internet that, quite frankly, scare me.
I have even more misgivings about his temperment since the eruption of the Georgia Affair.
One other thing. A year ago I said that the Cold War had never ended. It seems now that, armed with Energy and piplines the Russians have made that perfectly clear.
Ah, actual suggestions. First, I'll note with amusement that some of us have been paying attention since 2002.
Some of us also remember the Left's response to this developing situation, and the exploitation that accompanied it
But the question in TOC's case is the realism/ sanity check re: his specific suggestions.
"1. NATO entry should have been fast tracked."
Not possible, for the reasons pointed out above by MB. Expansion of any sort was still controversial, even to countries like Romania. Which makes Georgia a non-starter. This is a fantasy.
"2. Economic power should have been used more forcefully throughout the region to make sure that the oil states of the region were persuaded to build pipelines through western routes. The "we tried" excuse can be answered very readily, "apparently not hard enough"."
3. Massive all out push to build pipelines through the territory and a clear statement that we and europe see this as a vital interest that will be defended.
What economic power is this?
Look at trade patterns for the central Asian countries, and the strategic situation they face. What, exactly, does America offer them, at any time between 2000 and now, that would cause these countries to snub the Russians for their pipelines?
The EU, with far more invested in this outcome, an economy about America's size, and far better positioning as a potential trading partner, tried. And failed. Even with Turkey's help (since Turkey was to be the conduit country), in a region where many of the peoples are ethnically Turkic.
"Trying harder" won't beat a full house while holding 2 pairs. Didn't for the EU. Didn't for the USA.
Perhaps you'd care to enlighten us with the magic offers that would have won the day here?
4. More military assets should have positioned inside Georgia to back up very clear statements by the United states and the West that they considered the region to be vital to their National Interests and clear penalties would be delineated in response to Soviet adventurism.
Europeans... the guys who wouldn't take on Serbia. Are going to base troops thousands of miles away, deep in Central Asia, and back that with serious threats against a nuclear power.
I want your dealer's phone number and product list.
As for troops on the ground, there were several hundred Americans on the ground in Georgia. It made no difference there.
And let's say the Russians storm in and kill 100 American soliders in the process of invading Tajikistan, in 2 years. Or had done so in Georgia. They apologize, say it couldn't be helped given the situation, caught in the crossfire, etc.
The USA's response to that would be.... what?
There is no military riposte to that which makes sense, or does anything but bring the nuclear war clock less than 1 minute to midnight. American economic sanctions mean nothing, since Russia's main exports are global market commodities, and the Euros will continue to do business regardless. The Europeans are too dependent on Russia to levy any sanctions that matter, as they have been for well over a decade now.
Congratulations, Mr. President, you've manage to completely box yourself in, without options, while blowing American global credibility with a major defeat by a rival nation state that you can't counter.
People in the State Department know all this. Many people in the Democratic Party know this. Which is why declaring a central asian country to be a "vital interest" of the United States, over which the US will escalate militarily with troops, and essentially threaten full nuclear war... would get you labeled as a kook. You'd be facing a raft of leaks from people in the State Department telling reporters you were dangerously unhinged, along with a revolt in the Democratic Party and fire from the Republicans. There are a bunch of ways for the Russians to up the ante, and almost no way for you to do so.
No sane President could see basing troops in central Asian countries, as an open tripwire to Russia, as anything but a gamble that risks their entire Presidency. Which is why it wasn't done, and won't be done.
That's reality. The adults in the room knew this.
5. These moves would coincide with equally massive diplomatic efforts to defuse the separatist problems one way or another. The U.S. probably had the influence to do that at that point. Now that is lost.
No, that's either a fundamental delusion or a lie.
It is not possible for any power to diplomatically quell a separatist movement that is being actively backed and fometed by another great power, especially if the backing power shares borders with the target country.
Repeat: Not. Possible.
It is possible to deploy troops that militarily crush separatist groups and occupy those separatist regions. That would be your only option. Meanwhile, Russia is capable of cheap, deniable support forever, while providing bases and training in Russia itself for the separatists. Which makes military victory impossible, because taking on Russia directly is impossible.
So, no diplomatic solution possible. No military victory possible, even with the tens of thousands of troops required.
Bad move. Care to play again?
I'll play. Here is the deal, whether you are Azerbaijan or Georgia. Your time to take on the Russians with superpower support has not arrived. We like you a bit, but you are not of vital interest to us, we do not have the power to protect you against Russia if push comes to shove, and we are not going to. So appease the bear.
Finlandization is not so bad: after Finland took the deal it did not get invaded, which is not absolute security but more than you'll get from NATO.
I would also make peace with Russia, if I could.
I don't know if it would be possible, because the Russians are paranoid and America's record vs. Russia in the post-Soviet period is bad. NATO has turned into an aggressively expanding anti-Russian military alliance - from which it seems nobody but Russia is excluded - that now stretches from the Bering Strait all the way round the world into what used to be territories internal to Russia - stuff the Great Patriotic War was fought to defend. It's clear that if the only thing stopping NATO was America's will to say "NO" American-sponsored new republics would be fighting their way into Moscow. On the other hand, while nothing but force is of any avail against NATO, if you do resort to force you can show up the spinelessness of the Europeans and the lack of any serious reason for the Americans to fight for this corner of the world with delightful ease. It's a situation that sits up and begs the bear to roar. I would try to defuse it, by treating Russia as legitimately the great power of its region, and a necessary ally in the jihad wars.
Of course, that effort might fail. If it did, Azerbaijan would get stomped whether I liked it or not. And as with Georgia, I wouldn't like it.
#29 from Joe Katzman at 6:49 am on Aug 23, 2008
Why didn't you just summarize by saying, "Nothing could have been done because I say so". Oh, sorry, I forgot about the adults in the room, the one's that gave you such a ringing endorsement.
Were these the same adults that came up with the idea to place missles in Poland to protect against and Iranian attack?
Come up with something better.
Via Instapundit, a useful analysis of the aftermath of the invasion, penned by an American academic who was in Georgia 15 years ago, dealing with those earlier rounds of ethnic cleansing and strife.
Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, by Kenneth Anderson --
#32 from AMac at 5:01 am on Aug 25, 2008
You mean that the good guys don't wear white hats, that client and vassal states don't click their heels stand at attention and do the bidding of their sponsoring powers when asked. Does it mean that what some people call democracy in other parts of the world does not necessarily come with an American style Constitution and Bill of Rights.
I detest what the Russians did. I am embarassed by our government's ineptitude. These are not mutually exclusive and the more we look at them as such, the more we will have our pants pulled down in Foreign Affairs.
We got our nose bloodied. No one is asking the hard questions that have to be asked here. Maybe after the elections they will. Right now, the Forein Policy establishment has some hard thinking to do.
[Duplicate post; second copy deleted. --NM]
For the record, here is useful background reading. Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly. It is a PDF of the ICG's Europe Report No 183, dated 7 June 2007.
Detailed maps of Ossetia are hard to find. The maps at pdf pages 31-33 give many place-names, and show areas of Georgian and Ossetian control (villages) as of 2007.
Concerning the events of 7 August, further useful geography. The locations of the Roki Tunnel, the bridge at Didi Gupta, and the city of Tskinvali can be seen on the page 31 map. Didi Gupta is just north of the 15 km circle drawn around Tskinvali.
Saakashvili claims that the Georgians spotted a 150-vehicle armored column of the Russian 58th army as it was transiting the Roki Tunnel, on its way south to Tskhinvali. The road is claimed to be constricted from the tunnel to Didi Gupta, where a bridge could serve as a bottleneck. The Georgian claim is that their 7 August lunge northward from the Gori area to Tskhinvali was an effort to reach that bridge before the 58th Army force did. The bridge was damaged by Georgian airstrikes and paratroopers, but not enough to prevent the Russians from securing it and transiting it.