I've written about the mentality behind many of the Forward Operating Bases in Iraq before, and the poor prioritization that shortchanges the front lines in favour of REMFs. See "FOBbits and Failures in Iraq," and also "Not Enough" in Iraq: A Returning Vet Speaks". Now Bill Roggio is back in Iraq, and doing fine work as usual. He, too, addresses this issue - here's an excerpt from "Inside the MTTs in Anbar":

"One of the greatest complaints heard among the soldiers and Marines in the MTTs (in both Fallujah and Khalidiya, as well as the Police Transition Team in Fallujah) is the lack of support from the rear. While publicly their mission is considered the utmost priority, there is resentment that they are not receiving the resources needed from higher command.... This has created an "us against them" mentality between those outside the wire of the FOBs, and the "Fobbits," the soldiers and Marines living in the rear. This is understandable. Having spent time in both the FOBs and in forward positions, the disparities between the two are easily seen....

Two experiences stick out in my mind which highlight the disparity between the FOBs and the troops serving on the front lines. As I left Iraq in December of 2006, I transited through Taqqadum Air Base (or TQ). I watched engineers and civilians install the gargantuan 20-odd foot high Texas barriers around the transient tents at the LSA (Life Support Area - the airbase where those moving to & from TQ move through). TQ rarely gets mortared, and when it does, the mortar fire is inaccurate at best. When I returned just 3 weeks later, the 20 plus transient tents at the LSA were surrounded, and more barriers were being set up to surround additional tents. This was time, energy, equipment and materials that could be put to far better use supporting the troops outside the wire, where the danger is far greater by several degrees of magnitude...."

See also Roggio's relay of commentary in his article re: 'The PC War,' and 'Detainees and Cognitive Dissonance.'