It has been several months since Saudi Arabia was the lead story or headline, or it feels like it. Winds of War readers will have noted a steady drip-drip of reports of Saudi security forces killing ‘militants’ and ‘gunmen’, culminating in the recent killing of Saleh al Awfi, Majid Hamed al Haseri and Mohammed Abdullah Owaida – all wanted men. According to Asharq Al Awsat, since May 2003, Saudi forces have killed over 100 terrorists.
However, all is not well in the kingdom. After attending a debate on whether or not the House of Saud is a friend of the West (accounts here: one, two, three), I read John R. Bradley’s new book, Saudi Arabia Exposed. Bradley worked for the Arab News as a news editor in the aftermath of 9/11, living amongst Saudis rather than in a Western compound, and travelling the country extensively.
Having read the book, I’ve come to the conclusion that the situation in Saudi Arabia is both better and worse than I’d previously believed. To take one example, homosexuality is de facto accepted by the religious police as preferable to the ‘honour’ of Saudi women being tarnished. On the other hand, it is official Saudi policy to encourage terrorists to carry out attacks in Iraq – which may well explain why there hasn’t been a major attack in Saudi Arabia for months.
John accepted my request that he answer a few questions for me, and below is the sum total.
"On the other hand, it is official Saudi policy to encourage terrorists to carry out attacks in Iraq "
Do you mean unofficial? I havent heard the Sauds publically encouraging terrorism in Iraq, or anything to suggest they are doing so brazenly. I dont doubt certain elements are encouraging it quietly of course.
I am irritated by this usage of the "read the rest" tag. When I see that tag, I expect to stay on this site but to be shown an expanded version of the front page article. I don't expect to be taken off this site to another site.
Mark,
I mean 'official', and I don't mean 'public'.
Kai... the way Winds is headed, that will be more common. Would it solve the problem if it DIDN'T look like the kind that keeps you on Winds, so you could tell the difference?
Hmm, Colt thats a serious charge of course. I havent read Bradley's book so I cant comment on it, but things are so screwed up in that country i find it difficult to accept any definitive claims about what their policy is and who is dictating it. I've seen so many books by so many smart people its just hard to tell. Gerald Posner presented some pretty convincing proof that the Saudis knocked off some of their most radical members right after 911. I just dont see how their can be enough upside for the Sauds compared to the risks of getting caught and losing the Bush protection they covet.
Joe, I think that would be better personally. I dont mind it but if its labeled differently it would be a good thing. I like to skim down the page and open up the items that catch my eye for a quick scan before getting deeper into them. Just my $.02
I show how the Al-Saud are playing a double game with the West when it comes to the Iraq war, including OFFICIAL encouragement for young Saudis to travel to Iraq to join the "jihad", in my essay, "Al-Qaeda and the House of Saud: Eternal Enemies or Secret Bedfellows?", which will appear in the Autumn issue of The Washington Quarterly. I sent Joe and Matt a proof of the essay some time ago; the final version will be posted on TWQ's website early next week:
http://www.twq.com/
JRB
I think I have to call "foul."
We're dealing with two very different definitions of "official," I believe.
What Bradley--and apparently Colt--are claiming by using that word, is that it is a matter of official government policy to send Saudis to fight in Iraq.
That is demonstrably false.
What Bradley is actually saying is that there are Saudi officials--e.g. imams who earn a government salary--who are calling for young Saudis to go to Iraq. There are probably also officials who look the other way when wannabe jihadis leave the country.
That's rather different. The words of an "official" does not make for "official policy." Going off the reservation happens.
Given John Bradley's exploration of the "plight" of Saad Faqih as a "dissident," should suggest some weakness in Bradley's ability to analyze what's happening in the country. That Al-Faqih was named a supporter of terrorism by the USG a couple of months ago (and after publication of the book) can only be an embarrassment.
I offer my review of Bradley's book at Crossroads Arabia.
John Burgess, how does what you wrote above differ from “the Saudi system is different from ours so what is official there and what is official here differ”?
In a monarchy whatever anyone does happens at the pleasure of the monarch.
D. Schuler: your question assumes that Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. It is far from that, as even John Bradley will attest.
It is a third-world country that happens to have a lot of money and a substantially developed infrastructure. Those have nothing to do with bureaucratic competence, nor the ability to convince all state employees of the necessity to stay on-message.
After having dealt with Saudi bureaucracies for many years, I can honestly state that competence in most ministries runs two or three layers down. Once you get past that, all bets are off. The Saudi government had to institute a new rule earlier this year that prohibited state employees from talking to the media without prior approval. Too many were spouting their personal beliefs that were a odds with state policy.
The Saudi government has acted to rein in imams who were encouraging jihad and has implemented--unevenly so far--new regulations governing the transfer of money through charities. It is also the government that has been fighting and arresting extremists.
That some Saudi officials continue to spout off in manners completely opposite of government policy should not be seen as either "official statements" or as examples of speaking out of both sides of their mouths.
I think J Burgess's comments about needing to careful with the definition of "official" are fair enough: I meant officials sanction and sometimes encourage young Saudis to go to Iraq. Does that make it "official" government policy? Not necessarily. But then what is and isn't "official" government policy even when it comes to routine matters is often very difficult to determine.
John risks making a fool of himself by going on -- and on -- about the fact that Al-Faqih was listed as a supporter of terrorism after my book appeared. I suggests he reads again pp. 196-97, where I deal EXTENSIVELY with the accusations against Al-Faqih, leaked to the New York Times; and I state clearly that he now exists in the fine line that divides dissenters from terrorists.
On p. 195 I say Al-Faqih wants to establish a Taliban-stype state; and that his "agenda is inconsistent with liberalization".
I in no way lionise him -- give me a sentence to justify that statement, John!; I merely try to reflect the huge support base he has in Saudi Arabia, which of course you might agree or disagree with. In fact, I personally have no time for the kind of society he would want to create. But I have no time for phoney conspiracies put forward by Washington and London which oh-so-conveniently damn him as a terrorist supporter THE VERY WEEEK it looks like his calls for mass demos inside the kingdom threaten for the first time to cause instability. If he is a terror supporter, they should arrest him, not spread rumors about him.
#5 Mark
The al-Saud probably does approve of terrorist efforts to prevent a democracy in Iraq. A Shi'ite dominated Iraq would surely encourage the Saudi Shi'ites in the eastern province, where much of the oil is, to push for more rights and perhaps even independence.
The Saudis also win in that terrorists who would otherwise be blowing up compounds and murdering Westerners are carrying out attacks elsewhere.
Neither of those is inconsistent with the Saudis knocking off those radicals after 9/11.
Mr. Bradley,
I have a number of questions, of which the first two are off-point but should be welcome.
1) Have you written any other books or articles which we might be able to obtain, if only by inter-library loan? I ask because Saudi Arabia Exposed was so well written - it was never boring, while always being highly informative and often entertaining.
2) Could you tell us a bit about yourself so we can get an idea why you can write so well and knowledgeably, but heretofore have been unknown in America? I’d never heard of you. You seem to represent the best of British journalism.
3) Was Saudi Arabia’s extreme reliance on foreign labor the result of a deliberate policy decision by its regime for political control reasons, or something which more “just happened” with the assistance of policy decisions perhaps made, or not, in response to other issues?
4) Could you briefly state your opinion of the origins of the Saudi reliance on a predominantly foreign labor force? FYI, I recall that the Saudi Labor Ministry estimated in January 2003 that less than 10% (I think it was @ 3%) of its native-born population was gainfully employed.
5) Assume two events which you predict - end of the Saud regime due to political upheaval, say initially disputes within the Saud regime over sharing followed by either regime disintegration or a coup by non-Saud clan groups, AND occupation (i.e., military control) of the oil-producing Eastern Province by American military forces. Please state a brief response to the following questions based on this scenario:
5(a) What is your opinion of the likelihood that further income from oil production will be shared by the U.S. occupation force and/or whoever/whichever nominal local political leadership there is of what is now called the Eastern Province will share a significant proportion of that income with other areas of what is now called Saudi Arabia (either as a real or nominal nation, or a group of successor states such as what became of Yugoslavia).
5(b) If your response to No. 5(a) is negative, how long do you feel a majority of the foreign workers outside the Eastern Province will remain in those other areas? How long will they continue their prior employment in the same or similar jobs? I ask because of the next series of questions.
5( c) How environmentally inhospitable are the more densely populated parts of Saudi Arabia, in particular in terms of potable water? Can the locally born population continue operating miminally necessary civil infrastructure (water, power, sewage treatment, transportation, public health) to support that population density in the absence of most of the presently employed foreign workers? There are two parts to this - how hostile the environment is and the extent of the civil infrastructure necessary to support such a population density given the environment. I am aware of the misconception of applying limited awareness of the Empty Quarter's conditions to the rest of the country. You lived in the country for years. Please educate us concerning its enviromental geography - references to source material would be especially useful.
5(d) What proportion of the estimated $700 billion of Saudi foreign assets do you think the exiled Saud clan will control after their regime falls? Would you entertain us with wicked speculation as to which countries will offer refuge and sanctuary to the Fair Maid of Money, and possible scenarios about attempts by Saud successor states to repatriate some of that a la Imelda Marcos? Note - given your writing ability, here's a story idea offered by someone grateful for Saudi Arabia Exposed - think of the Hollywood possibilities.
Tom:
Thanks for your kind words. I have no idea who you are, either, although readers of these comments will think you are a plant!
Answering all of your questions properly would basically mean writing another book.
The easiest to answer are about myself. Go to my website!
www.johnrbradley.com
Will aim to answer the other questions, but it will take me a while...
JRB
Colt, nice interview. Though you forgot to ask him about his stroll down the Corniche; that was, I think, before your time.
Another good question for him would be what caused the major about face from being Arab News editor-in-chief and friendly face of the dictatorship to the West to being, fairly clearly, not a huge fan of certain things that the regime does.
Mr. Bradley - if you have a chance, I think it would be interesting to hear about this evolution.
J. Bradley - While I never understood your previous support of the Saudi establishment, your decision to stop supporting them is perfectly understandable. Lindbergh changed his mind about the Nazis - lots of other people did too, for good reasons.
Just a quick question. A few months ago, then-Prince Abdullah's employee and friend, chief justice of Saudi Arabia's Supreme Judicial Council Sheik Saleh Al Luhaidan publicly encouraged young Saudis to go to Iraq to kill American soldiers.
According toMSNBC, Supreme Judicial Council Sheik al Luhaidan said:
also according the MSNBC:
Is Supreme Judicial Council Sheik al Luhaidan, employee and friend of Abdullah's officially a Saudi official?
Otherwise, thanks to you and Colt for the very enlightening interview. It's definitely encouraged me to read your book.
Ariel:
I would still like to stroll down the Corniche if giving half the chance. As the reviewing for the New York Times said: "Bradley's heart is in the Hijaz". (see http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/17/books/17grim.html?pagewanted=print). So no inconsistency there.
I never supported the regime. I was, and remain, against people who deamonise all Saudis as extremists. I explain why in this interview with frontpagemag (http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=18690).
Meanwhile, I explain why I lost faith in Saudi reform process in this interview with Arabian Business (http://www.itp.net/business/features/details.php?id=2951&category=).
I hope you will have time to read these interviews.
Meanwhile, I am in the middle of being interviewed in a symposium for frontpagemag on why I amandoned the Left, and the pro-Palestinian claptrap associated with it. It will be out in a week or so.
Mary:
I have a whole section on that maniac Sheik al Luhaidan in the Washington Quarterly essay I mentioned above.
JRB
PS
Have three deadlines looming, so pls excuse spelling mistakes etc in above comments . . .
Mr. Bradley,
Please consider adding publisher archive links to your past articles on your web site, if the publishers agree. This might be a good practice for many journalists.
Tom:
They are all there on my website!
www.johnrbradley.com
I have a whole section on that maniac Sheik al Luhaidan in the Washington Quarterly essay I mentioned above
Thanks. I'll take a look...
Ah, I clicked on the "More Articles" link and got:
http://www.selvesandothers.org/view2163.html
Thanks.
I wish more journalists would do this.
Mr. Bradley - Thanks for the links. I will read them.
Joe (comment #4), yes, changing the tag to show, somehow, that it wasn't just an expanded article but a link to another site would address my issue. Thanks for asking.
#15 Ariel
I remember it, actually. Only vaguely though.
I'm adding this to my Amazon wish list right away. Very interesting.
The Washington Quarterly essay I've been harping on about can now be downloaded here:
Al-Qaeda & the House of Saud: Eternal Enemies or Secret Bedfellows?
If you have trouble reading it, just save as a pdf to your desktop and open again.
JRB
The Washington Quarterly essay I've been harping on about can now be downloaded here:
Al-Qaeda & the House of Saud: Eternal Enemies or Secret Bedfellows?
If you have trouble reading it, just save as a pdf to your desktop and open again.
And now I have worked out how to make the urls into weblinks, here's those for the The New York Times and Newsweek reviews of Saudi Arabia Exposed. They offer less of a "former Western diplomat" (which is to say bordering on pro-Saudi regime) perspective than the review linked above:
A Glimpse of Forces Confronting Saudi Rule
Less than Meets the Eye
JRB
I have a whole section on that maniac Sheik al Luhaidan in the Washington Quarterly essay I mentioned above
Thanks. I'll take a look...