Martin Indyk, Tom Friedman, and many others believe that the United States should try to sever Syria’s relationship with Iran and “bring Syria back to the Arab camp.”

This makes no sense.  This theory rests on assumptions that make no sense.

Do these analysts believe Syria’s many agendas will change once separated from Iran?  How will severing relations between Syria and Iran further isolate Iran in any meaningful way?

The main assumption seems to be that Syria is an Arab dictatorship which would act in the mold of Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia if separated from Iran.  At worst, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would resemble Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, but without the oil; his efforts easily thwarted, his position within the Arab League minimized to the point of absurdity, and his fiefdom thoroughly contained.

Unfortunately, this is an inaccurate portrayal of the Assad regime.  Even if it was accurate, I have trouble understanding how the end result - a significant decline in regional power - would interest the Assad regime.  

Syria has an inordinate amount of power in the Middle East for a country with such a small GDP and an outdated, untrained military.  The Assads worked hard for this position, and are unlikely to forfeit it.

Most Western analysis presumes to know what the Syrians desire: peace with Israel, a return of the Golan, access to Lake Tiberius, a rise in GDP, normalized relations with the West.  These are all issues that the US, Israel, and the Arab world can offer to the Syrians in return for a change in Syrian actions.  These assumptions empower Western and Israeli diplomats, who then further rationalize the judiciousness of their claims with theories about Syria's "secular" regime and its "peaceful" relations with Israel since 1973.

However, what if these assumptions are completely wrong?  What if Syria actually wants Lebanon, and cares less about the Golan?  What if the Syrians like their ceasefire with Israel, but do not want to make peace?  What if relations with Iran provides Syria with more money and fewer strings attached than the EU or US would willingly provide the Syrians?  What if Assad, like Saddam and Qaddafi, enjoys his power and the conditions inside Syria?

These claims are just as legitimate as the others, however they come from American allies in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia who have significantly more experience with the Syrians than most American, European, and Israeli diplomats.

The Syrians have specifically said that they will not forfeit their relationship with Iran.  They want to have it both ways.  In fact, the Assad regime wants to position itself similar to Qatar, the tiny Gulf Arab state that brokers deals between Iran, the Arabs, and the West.  The Assads know there is much power gained in being the middleman.

Unlike Qatar, however, the Syrians have very little to offer as a middleman.  The new US administration might deal directly with the Iranians.  After the Iranian presidential elections, the Iranians might tack in an entirely different direction.

In the end, Syria is not as important as it might appear:

1. Syria does not directly threaten American interests, and could be easily dealt with if it tried.  This was seen in 2008 when the US took military action on the Syrian side of the Iraqi border.  Israel attacks targets in Syria time and time again with no immediate repercussions.

2. Iraqis no longer tolerate Syria's manipulations of their politics.  Iran's actions in Iraq are not coordinated with Syria.

3. America's allies in Lebanon are slowly empowering themselves against Syria's proxies, while Iran and Hezbollah reinforce their positions in Lebanon without Syrian participation.  

4. Syrian support for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Syrian-created and sponsored militant organizations is something for the Lebanese, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Israelis to deal with.  Syria should not be rewarded for intentionally spurring on violence.

The Syrians are a mere annoyance to the US, while Iran is the actual cause for concern.  Some members of Israel's defense establishment like the Syrian regime and fear that its collapse will harm Israel.  It is the Israelis who believe that breaking Syria from Iran might help their cause, regardless of the paucity of evidence to support their claims.  

There is far more to lose in negotiating with the Syrians than there is to gain.  The US should not reward bad behavior, especially when its closest Arab allies will be the losers in the bargain, and Israel's gains will be little to nothing.

America must first define its Iran policy.  Iran's relationship with Syria should be the least of America's concerns when addressing relations with Iran.  Until a policy is formulated, the US should leave Syria alone while continuing to provide support for American allies in the Middle East.