What is a sheik?
In Arabic, sheik means leader, or simply a venerable male elder, and each level of tribal organization--tribe, clan, and house--generally has a sheik at its head, says Iraqi tribal expert Amatzia Baram, a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington and a professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa in Israel. Because there are so many sheiks, finding one with a significant degree of authority can be a challenge for U.S. occupiers. Another problem: Saddam subverted the traditional tribal hierarchy and elevated many sheiks in return for their cooperation.
What is a sheik's traditional role?
Sheiks are traditionally responsible for protecting their people from harm and guaranteeing them a basic level of economic well-being. They also act as mediators and judges, settle disputes, resolve property claims, and suggest marriages, among other roles. In exchange, they have their people's allegiance, Baram says. For centuries, sheiks were appointed by a council of elders within a tribe, and a sheik's authority was not unlimited. The British— who ruled Iraq between 1920 and 1932— eliminated some of these checks and balances to exercise stricter control over Iraq's tribesmen. In essence, this turned tribal sheiks into the sole source of law and authority in wide stretches of Iraq's countryside.
Many unconventional warfare specialists, mostly Army Green Berets and some US Marines, have been urging American tactics in Iraq to focus on cultivating tribal sheiks, bringing them into alliance by hook or by crook, including outright buying their loyalty (not considered improper there).
[A] young captain serving in Iraq's violent Al Anbar Province has offered a simple explanation of what the problem was in Iraq and how to solve it. Among his observations is the importance of having a moustache in Iraq.
In a military known for its sleep-inducing, graphically dizzying PowerPoint presentations, the young captain's presentation, which has been unofficially circulating through the ranks, stands out. Using stick figures and simple language, it articulates the same goal as the president's in Iraq.
The creator of this PowerPoint presentation, "How to Win in Al Anbar," was Capt. Travis Patriquin.
But Patriquin will not see victory in Iraq. He was killed by the same improvised explosive device that killed Maj. Megan McClung of the Marine Corps last Wednesday [Dec. 13].
Patriquin had fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. A gifted officer, he spoke numerous languages, including Arabic.
In PDF format, Capt. Patriquin's slides are here. His principal arguments are that young men are reluctant to volunteer for the army because their primary protective loyalty is to their tribe, under the sheik's direction, and the army will send them away from their tribal area. But, says Capt. Patriquin, young men will readily join the police because they are a local force. The implication is that the police should be strengthened at the expense of the army while co-opting sheiks into supporting that effort and goal. I am forced to bow before Capt Patriquin's superior training and expertise, and agree that co-opting sheiks is a good idea. But we have been trying to do that, perhaps not very programatically, for quite awhile. The CFR also cautions,
What are the arguments against working with tribes? Engaging closely with tribal sheiks across Iraq shores up their power. Some scholars argue this could hurt a longer-term effort to create a unified national identity and a political party system in which Iraqis do not vote along strictly sectarian lines.
Okay, those are pretty brief and fairly weak counterpoints. ABC says, ""How to Win in Al Anbar" may not make it to the desk of the president, but maybe it should." Okay, I am imagining I am the prez and this plan, more fully fleshed out than a stick-figure slideshow, does make it to my inbox. Here are my questions:
1. Would Capt. Patriquin's strategy lead to a heavily militarized police force, more powerful than the Iraqi army? And would that be a good thing?
2. Does his plan risk bringing police forces more under local sheiks' control than is wise, perhaps leading to heavily-armed, near autonomous police units under little non-tribal authority?
3. If so, why would that be a better status quo than the militia forces operating now?
4. On what basis can we be assured that we can win the loyalty of the sheiks over appeals or bribes by al Qaeda or Baathist revanchists? How will we know we're not being played?
5. Do the appeals and tactics for dealing with Sunni sheiks differ from those dealing with Shia sheiks? How do we deal with competing religious loyalties while trying to engender a stronger Iraqi national identity?
6. Can sheiks undercut the popular authority of religious strong men like Moqtada al Sadr? Or the Islamist appeal of al Qaeda recruiters?
7. Does this plan offer near-term advantages, mainly the suppression of tyhe insurgencies, at the cost of longer-term goals, such as the democratization of Iraqi society? Is the tradeoff truly in US national interest?
8. What are the resources required - financial, materiel and manpower?
9. How long until this plan, if energetically implemented, begins to turn the tide? And what do we do otherwise while preparing to implement it, and while it is put into place?
10. What relationship does this plan have to the implementation of the new Iraqi national constitution?
11. Will Iraq's national-level, elected leaders support this plan?
I am sure there are dozens of other such questions. God rest Capt. Patriquin's soul, would that he were still alive to tell us more.
Crossposted at DonaldSensing.com
I think the point is to make the force work in concert with some sort of national police presence. If some sort of working relationship can be formed now, you will have a better foundation for finding a political solution in the future when the time comes for many of these tribal forces to leave police service. In any event, right now the security question should trump any concern about a tricky transitional period off in the future. Lord knows the sheiks should be easier to deal with than the insugents (of whatever stripe.)
I take your point that the devil (or djinn) will be in the details, but everyone would trade stability for your list of potential headaches.
I am one of those who has long advocated that. In 2003, for example, I wrote The Black Mail on the subject. I still think it is the way to go.
Jason at countercolumn made similar observations about the time his unit was posted in the Ramadi area back in 2003-2000 before the arrival of the Marines. His comments, which I don't recall exactly, were that one of their officers was a political type in civilian life and worked with one of the local sheikhs, giving him preference in job contracts and such in return for cooperation. When the Marines arrived they put an end to that sort of thing as a corrupting influence and apparently the sheikh just sorta drifted off and changed sides. Jason thought the Marines made mistakes in their handling of the local politics that may have exacerbated the trouble developing in the area. Because he was no longer there he was loath to say that that was definitely the case, but he raised it as a possibility.
That is just the gist as I recall it. There is no way I can see to search Jason's archives, so if you want a more accurate take on the matter you will have to contact him through his blog at Countercolumn.
all of your questions are about whether or not this plan advances US interests....
Patriquin's plan was about providing a level of security for Iraqis that would make self-determination (and a US withdrawal) possible. It was not about setting up Iraq as a client state dedicated to neo-con ideology.
"...the office and role of tribal sheiks, for which there is no very close Western analog, is crucial."
How about the office and role of University Presidents?
University president is a hereditary post?
luka:
Of course the question is does this plan advance US interests. US soldiers are risking their lives, US taxpayers are footing the bill, the questions are being raised in a (predominately) US forum. What other basis is there to judge upon other than does it advance US interests?
This doesn't mean that US interests are inherently in opposition to Iraqi interests, but if the two interests are in conflict, from a USian perspective the correct choice is to advance it's own interests.
Of course there's plenty of room to debate on how US interests would be best served, but the thought that that's not an appropriate framework on which to judge is troubling. Assuming you're an American, of course. I'd fully expect an Iraqi to judge any proposal on the basis of how it best serves their interests.
Interesting that the Iraqis are more about 'getting justice' than securing democracy. How can Bush complete his mission of a sustainable government when it is counter to what the Iraqi's want. They want justice, and I say...move out of the way and let me have it.