Testing The Standard, Part IV: Into Afghanistan

By now, I expect that just about everyone in blogosphere has heard from one source or another about the memo that was leaked to the conservative Weekly Standard that provided a considerable listing of evidence regarding a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda.

What I'm now going to do is to examine the memo excerpts that were provided by The Weekly Standard and endeavor to see whether or not the raw data is consistent with what we already know or can reasonably deduce from reported stories in the press. This is a far from ideal method of verifying the excerpts in the Standard's piece, but short of full declassification of all US intelligence in relation to al-Qaeda (something that might happen around 2025 or so), it's probably the best that we're going to get here in the blogosphere.

Because of the length and detail required, this is a 6-part series. Part 4 deals with the aspects of the leaked memo that deal directly with Afghanistan.

"According to sensitive reporting, Saddam personally sent Faruq Hijazi, IIS deputy director and later Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, to meet with bin Laden at least twice, first in Sudan and later in Afghanistan in 1999. . . ."

The meetings between bin Laden and Hijazi in both Sudan and Afghanistan were reported in the The Guardian on February 6, 1999, more than 4 years before the US invasion of Iraq. The article in question cites numerous US intelligence sources, including Vincent Cannistraro (remember that name - we'll come back to him a little while later) as confirming that the meetings did indeed take place.

"A foreign government service reported that an Iraqi delegation, including at least two Iraqi intelligence officers formerly assigned to the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan, met in late 1998 with bin Laden in Afghanistan."

This was also alleged by Collin Powell during his presentation to the United Nations Security Council. Then there is this curious account (via Instapundit) that states that an Iraqi paper from November 14, 2002 that names Iraqi intelligence officer "Abid al-Karim Muhamed Aswod" as being "responsible for the coordination of activities with Osama bin Laden group at the Iraqi embassy in Pakistan," which would certainly seem to identify at least one of the officers mentioned in this excerpt.

Queer Eye and the Iraqi Guys?

As for these next few:

"According to CIA reporting, bin Laden and Zawahiri met with two Iraqi intelligence officers in Afghanistan in Dec. 1998."

I can't find any open source material to verify this one, one way or another.

"Iraq sent an intelligence officer to Afghanistan to seek closer ties to bin Laden and the Taliban in late 1998. The source reported that the Iraqi regime was trying to broaden its cooperation with al Qaeda. Iraq was looking to recruit Muslim "elements" to sabotage U.S. and U.K. interests. After a senior Iraqi intelligence officer met with Taliban leader [Mullah] Omar, arrangements were made for a series of meetings between the Iraqi intelligence officer and bin Laden in Pakistan. The source noted Faruq Hijazi was in Afghanistan in late 1998."

Farouk Hijazi keeps on popping up as the liasion at all of these meetings, so he should be able to corroborate most of this now that he's in US custody.

"Faruq Hijazi went to Afghanistan in 1999 along with several other Iraqi officials to meet with bin Laden. The source claimed that Hijazi would have met bin Laden only at Saddam's explicit direction."

Given the fact that Hijazi is still breathing 4 years after the alleged meeting took place, my own suspicion is that if these meetings took place, they occurred with the blessing of the Iraqi authorities. The Guardian's account is emphatic in this regard, and we all know that Saddam Hussein was not one to suffer disobedience lightly.

"Reporting entries #4, #11, #15, #16, #17, and #18, from different sources, corroborate each other and provide confirmation of meetings between al Qaeda operatives and Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. None of the reports have information on operational details or the purpose of such meetings. The covert nature of the relationship would indicate strict compartmentation [sic] of operations"

Corroborating sources are more often than not a key piece of evidence within the intelligence community because, especially in situations like this, they increase the odds of truth unless they're a victim of either the "telephone" or the "echo" syndromes. We can confirm at least two meetings with Hijazi just through open sources, so that establishes at least a partial link in the chain right there.

"Iraqi officials were carefully considering offering safe haven to bin Laden and his closest collaborators in Nov. 1999. The source indicated the idea was put forward by the presumed head of Iraqi intelligence in Islamabad (Khalid Janaby) who in turn was in frequent contact and had good relations with bin Laden."

Hijazi reportedly offered bin Laden assylum in February 1999, so if accurate this would be the second occasion on which such an offer was made and could reflect a desire on the part of the Iraqi leadership to bring bin Laden and al-Qaeda far more under their control than the current relationship would ever have allowed them, though this memo notes that the source was only considered, not actually made. And if the name and position of Khalid Janaby is accurate, we now have the name of the second Iraqi intelligence officer working under the cover of the embassy in Islamabad.

Wednesday: Part V - World-Wide Jihad