The article that really caught my eye was from the Weekly Standard that included these two paragraphs:

The problem is that we cannot maintain such a large force in Iraq for a year without seriously damaging the Army and harming our ability to pursue other critical objectives. Given the normal requirement to have two units at home for every one deployed, the 11-division-equivalent U.S. Army could support a three-and-two-thirds division commitment to Iraq indefinitely--at the cost of having no forces available for operations anywhere else in the world. But the current deployment is the equivalent of more than five divisions (the 101st Airborne, 4th Infantry, and 1st Armored divisions, two brigades of the 3rd Infantry Division, the 2nd and 3rd Armored Cavalry regiments, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and elements of the 1st Infantry and 10th Mountain divisions).

The above also fails to mention that the 82nd Airborne is rotating a brigade through Afghanistan right now and had one brigade in Iraq for combat operations that has now returned stateside. The 2nd Infantry Division is split between Korea and Ft. Lewis Washington. I understand from one of my e-mail lists that the 1st Cavalry is the reserve for dedicated for "Korean contingencies" and that the 25th Infantry Division (Light) is now the Army's strategic reserve. The USA is sucking wind in terms of deployable ground forces. At a minimum we should be activating National Guard heavy divisions like the 49th Armored Division of the Texas National Guard and the 40th Mechanized Infantry Division of the California National Guard for two or more years of active duty service including a year's rotation through Iraq. Which brings up Frederick Kagan's next point:

"It is time to stop pretending that the United States can prosecute a war on terror, conduct peacekeeping operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, and maintain the security of the homeland without a substantial increase in the size of the armed forces. General Shinseki, the recently retired Army chief of staff, warns us to "beware the 12-division strategy for a 10-division army"--and even he understates the problem. In truth, the armed forces need an increase in size of at least 25 percent."

I think Mr. Kagan is really underestimating the problem in terms of the US Army's body shortage, plus he is making the same mistake as Rumsfeld and Shinseki in talking about combat forces. Kagan's 25% increase in combat troops isn't going to cut it. Adding 480,000 active Army troops plus ~160,000 active duty marines yields 640,000. Twenty five percent more is adding 160,000. That is nowhere near enough troops. The US Army don't need more combat "super troopers" in Iraq. It needs support force "garri-troopers," the sort the Army has done away with in the active force, moved to the reserves, abolished or contracted out. And the Army needs a lot of them. Borrowing again from a Washington Monthly article I have quoted before:

"Over the last 50 years, American strategy has made increasing use of effective technology, substituting machines for men, both to reduce casualties and to outrange our enemies. But this trading of capital for increased efficiency breaks down in the intensely human missions of peace enforcement and nation-building. American wealth can underwrite certain aspects of those missions: schools, roads, water purification plants, electric power. But it can't substitute machines or money in the human dimension--the need to place American soldiers (or police officers) on patrol to make the peace a reality."

To administer Iraq effectively, given the foreign fighters being fed in by Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, the USA needs a garrison of at least 250,000. It has ~160,000 in Iraq now (counting the British Army) with two divisions worth of various Europeans and other allies (including Mongolians!!! Mongolians in Baghdad?!? Talk about bad historical memories!) headed for Iraq right now. So if the USA has a force of 250,000 in Iraq just for garrision. Just how large a force structure are you going to need for an on-going mission there? The ratio of two units preparing for or coming back from a peacekeeping assignment means an on-going commitment to Iraq will require 750,000 troops in the force structure and they are not combat troops. Add 750,000 to 480,000 and that gets an Army of 1,230,000. Force structure wise, I was told by e-mail that we should be aiming for 2-3 COSCOMs (Corps Support Commands) and a TAACOM (Theater Army Area Command). A COSCOM is a roughly division sized force of support units and a TAACOM has several COSCOMs under it with additional support units of its own. This is the ending text of a series of e-mails:

"That's right. The mix of logistics, medical, administrative and MP units that would support combat-arms forces of corps size (or theater army level) could also serve, sans combatants, as a ready-made, tailorable relief force (with the field combat units still occupying able to more fully utilize their own COSCOMs and TAACOM without hardships to our own combat troops)."

To get that number of trained soldiers in 18 months to two years is going to take a draft. Whether the politicians or the public likes it or not, America is half way to a draft already with the US Army offering two year enlistments for new recruits. The refusal to admit this by the professional American military and the politicians is going to give us a burnt out "hollow military" ground force inside of two years, due to tubing re-enlistment rates by reserve troops and regular non-coms unless something drastic is done. I saw one such drastic proposal to address the problem. It called for the reorganization of the seven heavy divisions of the US Army National Guard into just the sort of military police, civil affairs, civil engineers and other COSCOMs and TAACOM support forces we need for the War on Terrorism. The problem here is that the State Guard Bureau's have killed every US Army proposal to do that since 1989. The last time it was tried the acrimony got so intense that the US Army attempted to place all National Guard officers under speech restrictions of a full time serving soldier just to kill the lobbying ability State Guard Bureaus with the Congress. It failed in both that and in reorganizing the Army National Guard. The National Guard insists on retaining its nominal Cold War relic mission of armored force combat in Europe despite the fact that its real mission is, as always, paramilitary in nature and as such highly useful in nation-building/security abroad. Changing the Guard’s nominal mission to its historic real mission is a fight which both the President and Congress (primarily the Armed Service committees) want to avoid. So what are our other alternatives to the Draft? The unsettled security situation in Iraq, and the general bi-partisan political distaste for armed mercenaries, precludes contracting out to private military companies like Sandline in the peace enforcement role or repeating the unarmed mercenary logistical support like in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and East Timor. This leaves three other options besides the draft: local armed auxiliaries similar to pre-World War Two Philippine Scouts (and mentioned by Max Boot here), an American-raised foreign legion; and/or client/allied militaries. Local auxiliaries are a long term solution which would require long-term assignment of a significant proportion of our Special Forces, with the possibility of refugee Iraqi-Americans acting as a useful personnel bridge if the Army recruits that manpower pool heavily. That would, however, be a long-term solution such that the Bush Administration and Congress won’’t want to go there as such would require (a) admitting the problem and solution are long-term and, worse, (b) binding political decisions, commitments and responsibility for possible errors concerning the changed nature of the US role in the world which neither the President nor Congress want to face, let alone make happen. I.e., it can't happen until our enemies inflict far worse than 9/11 on us at home. The easiest way to recruit an American foreign legion would be raise it from Latin American recruits trained by our armed forces’ many Spanish speakers. Offering them citizenship after a successfully completed long-term enlistment (at least five years), plus optional re-enlistment in our regular forces for those demonstrating suitable skills and character, would probably obtain all the recruits needed. Yet the same political problem of decision avoidance applies to this foreign legion concept. President Bush and Congress don't want to go there, though for different reasons. It is in the last option with allied or client forces running long term nation-building/security that Rumsfeld's "Coalition of the Willing" breaks down most, and for more than one reason. I touched on the problems of allies before. Their interests and ours will diverge too greatly over time for this to be a long term solution. Allied/client forces are at best a stop gap, if they are an option at all. The contingency planning for Iraq included the use of the Turks as a part of the post-war Iraq occupation force. That failed miserably for Turkish domestic political reasons unrelated to the war on terror. The French and Germans have since convinced the Turkish political class that Turkey will never be admitted to the European Union if it supports American policy in the Middle East. The Turks are now pursuing their own agenda in Iraq at American expense. The idea of using other countries’ armed forces in nation-building/security missions was also tried in Somalia and the Balkans with awful results. Pakistani forces in Somalia were so incompetent that one of their units was wiped out by a local warlord’s disorganized goons. Our European allies there were little better, and some, notably the Italians, aided the local warlords against foreign peace-keeping forces. The French were actively on the Serbs’ side in Bosnia and Kosovo, even after NATO became involved in the latter, and it was the abject inability of European NATO to keep order in the Balkans which made American intervention there necessary. So if we can't trust the forces of our NATO allies, let alone others, for nation-building/security in the Middle East, who is left? Eastern Europe has cut back as much or more on defense than the Western Europeans and they have weaker economies besides. It isn't going to be the South Koreans as they have both a nuclear-armed nutball regime to the north plus a popularly elected anti-American government. The British and Australians have worse manpower problems than we do. Yet the biggest problem with reliance upon allied/client state forces isn't so much that their interests will diverge from ours as that we have repeatedly demonstrated our own lack of political will in security operations in Iraq. Why should foreign governments put their forces in harms’ way, and take domestic political risks doing so, when the United States government won’t do what is necessary to protect American troops and potential Iraqi friends from terrorist attack in Iraq? Early on after the fall of Baghdad Americans were not serious about establishing order. The policy of dealing with looters and other agents of disorder could best be described as "Catch and Release." There were no attempts made to detain and screen these people for Ba'athist connections. This was a horrible mistake because it is now known that many of the so-called looters were Ba'ath party men executing sabotage contingency plans on government facilities, records power plants and other infrastructure. I thought this article from the Christian Science Monitor by Ann Scott Tyson was a particularly egregious example of the bad press reporting on Americans troops by clueless/opinionated reporters we have been seeing since the media embed program ended. Until, that is, I saw this over on Strategypage.com:

July 8, 2003: Marine and Army troops in Iraq are upset over Rules of Engagement (ROEs) being implemented by Army commanders. While Marines are allowed to carry their weapons, both rifles and machine-guns, ready to use, Army units, especially non-combat ones (including Military Police) are being increasingly restrictive rules regarding the use and handling of weapons. Unlike the Marines, Army convoys do not display any weapons, making it appear as if the convoy is unarmed. For the Marines, this is madness. Marine convoys bristle with weapons, making it clear what will happen if anyone should be so foolish as to attack them. Army MPs are under orders not to handle their machine-guns while on roadblock duty unless they received orders from their headquarters. Army troops are allowed to carry only two M-16 magazines, the rest being kept locked up. Marines are incredulous when they encounter this. Since Marines and Army troops control adjacent sectors, there is ample opportunities for troops from the two services to run into each other and compare notes. It has not gone unnoticed by American troops, or the Iraqis that are attacking them, that nearly all the Americans attacked are Army troops. The Army ROEs tell the Iraqis that Army troops are an easier targets, equipped with an ROE that also serves as a virtual placard saying "shoot me, I have a hard time shooting back."

Why the hell should any Iraqi, let alone a foreign government, trust their lives or the lives of their troops to Americans if the American Army is playing a peace time "I don't want an accidental weapon discharge even if it kills my soldiers because it is less of a threat to my Army career" games those rules of engagement represent? Robert Kaplan latest interview over on the Atlantic makes clear when you see screwed up American rules of engagement, power politics and institutional CYA is involved. That is why we need more real American support troops in Iraq ASAP to replace combat troops with political/institutional ROE that will only get them killed. Too quote a member of my e-mail list of usual suspects:

"The whole POINT of deploying MPs is that they already know when to shoot: no need for cookie-cutter ROEs or limited ammo. This situation is FUBAR."

Yep, it sure is FUBAR. We have a President inviting attacks on our troops while careerists with stars tie one hand behind those troops back. The US intra-governmental factional in-fighting over how to administer Iraq is also killing American troops and Iraqi civilians who might otherwise have lived. Decisions made by committee or not made at all are worse than the wrong decision made by a single man in charge executed and abandoned quickly when they fail. I wrote in the comments section of "U.S. Military -- Back to the Future!" the following:

"Rumsfeld's malign influence in Iraq is his resistance to establishing a McArthur-like "Shoganate" that is directly responsible to the President. This is what we did with both Japan and Germany. These "Governors-General" were overseen by the Joint Chiefs for day-to-day policy and operations questions. Rumsfeld's problem is that he does not trust the Joint Chiefs to do this job and won't let anyone else do it. This issue can only be resolved by President Bush. Bush should appoint a Governor-General answerable to him and establish an oversight board made up of Jim Baker as chair, VP Cheney, one or more retired generals Rummie trusts, and a senior level State Department official Collen Powell trusts. This would answer Bush's problems of getting the mission done without too much impact on his limited span of control. Posted by: Trent Telenko on June 20, 2003 05:23 PM"

There were others on that discussion thread that disagreed and many in the journalistic sphere in places like NRO and NewsMax that blame the State Department and not Rumsfeld. I think this comment by reader Tom Holsinger captures the situation best; it isn't just Rumsfeld or the State Department's fault. It is ultimately President Bush's:

"Trent's point about Rumsfeld is that his empire-building is perpetuating disorder in Iraq, and delaying its reconstruction, not that Rumsfeld is responsible for creating the disorder. Iraq caused the disorder. We need one man in charge to speed the recovery. Rumsfeld and just about every other faction don't want one man in charge unless it's their guy and they own him, i.e., they don't want one guy in charge. This is how power games work, and it isn't intentional. President Franklin Roosevelt had the same problem with the economy/military production in World War Two, and things just muddled through until FDR finally put one of his best and most trusted operatives, Jimmy Byrnes, in charge. An alternative is to use someone with less actual independent power (though apparent total independent power) who is subject to close supervision by a trusted committee. Trent notes that this was done in Japan after World War Two, and named potential members of such a committee for Iraq. Both should work, but both require President Bush to make a command decision here, and he don' wanna. The person to blame is him. Posted by: Tom Holsinger on June 20, 2003 06:36 PM"

Too sum this post up, WE ARE AT WAR! In this war there is no substitute for American troops to fulfil the mission of killing terrorists and terrorist supporting states, rooting out weapon of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure and human capital, and reforming Arab culture at gun point. The only way we are going to get enough American support troops in Iraq fast enough is via a draft. Too pacify Iraq there needs to be one man in charge of Iraq answerable to the President with full powers over all the agencies of the US Federal government to govern and reform Iraq. His authority and powers need to include the ability to issue death warrants and apply collective punishement to Ba'athists clans and tribes a'la the Israeli destruction of the homes of suicide bombers in the West Bank and Gaza (I will address the reasons for this in another post). Given the shortage of American ground troops, their deployment anywhere must meet this test: 1) Does the troop deployment kill terrorists or destroy terrorist supporting states. 2) Does the troop deployment directly reduce the threat of a WMD attack on the American homeland. 3) Does the troop deployment reform Arab-Muslim culture at gunpoint. It is notable that an American troop deployment to Liberia fails all three tests. This isn't an accident, it is a conscious policy choice on the part of those in favor of the intervention. American troops in Iraq looking hard across the Saudi Arabian border will do more to cut back money laundering to Al-Qaeda than stopping the illegal diamond trade in Liberia ever will. A Liberian intervention is how Americans who oppose the War on Terrorism or blindly opposed the Bush Administration can play political hawk. Unfortunately for them, the American people see right through these Liberal "Chicken Hawks." That is why Bush is able to screw up the Iraqi occupation by the numbers and still be trusted far more by the American people than Democratic Liberals. Frankly, if the Liberal Chicken Hawks really care about Liberia. I suggest that they go join the Peace Corps, go to Liberia, and get eaten, if they really care. It will do just as much good for Liberia as 2,000 American troops and it won't distract from the war effort. Meanwhile the rest of us have a real war to fight, with not enough troops to fight it, a passive-aggressive President in reelection mode who wants to avoid the troop issue and a Democratic political opposition that has checked out from reality for the duration.