The outcome of modern wars is decided in the mind
Armed combat, of course, is not about to disappear, although it may increasingly take the form of 'asymmetric warfare' as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could also take the shape of proxy war, like the one India is fighting in Jammu & Kashmir and the United States and NATO are fighting in Afghanistan. But days in which armed combat alone decided the fate of wars ended a long time ago: with World War II and perhaps, the India-Pakistan war of 1971.
This is old hat. All out war became unimaginable as soon as the major powers acquired nuclear weapons. Those that didn't have their own usually came under the umbrella of one of those that did. The game of nuclear deterrence--in spite of bizarrely escalating to the level where there were thousands of warheads--kept the peace. The stability/instability paradox argued that while nuclear deterrence ensured stability at the highest (nuclear) level of escalation, it nevertheless created instability at lower (non-nuclear) levels. The United States relied on this to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. But the Pakistani general staff realised just how low the ceiling was at Kargil in 1999-2000. They were fine so long as they were only arming and injecting jihadis into Jammu & Kashmir. But when they decided to take a step further and actually try to capture and hold territory, they quickly found out exactly where the buck stopped.
But the outcome of most of these asymmetrical, low-intensity wars can go either way.
The larger and more powerful combatant uses a fraction of its total available strength in these conflicts and can theoretically fight hard enough to destroy its opponent in short order if it can somehow accept the massive collateral damage that this will inevitably result in. Theoretically, it can also fight long enough to frustrate the opponent into defeat if it can somehow stay in there for as long as it takes. Armed combat is a tool in this war, a sort of a meta-weapon that a state deploys in some fronts. It can, at times, produce decisive results---but is bounded by whether it is given the time and resources to have a chance of doing so.
By most definitions of victory, India won the Kargil war in 1999. But it miserably failed in the battle (yes, it was a battle) of Kandahar in 2000, when the NDA government gift-wrapped and hand-delivered the ransom that Pakistan sought. India is committed for the long-haul in Kashmir: and despite the Manmohan Singh government's confused vacillations, this is unlikely to change. Over in Assam though, the commitment to defeat ULFA waxes and wanes. Meanwhile, India's military intervention in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s is seen as a failure causing an overreaction that has made subsequent governments reluctant to use force in the neighbourhood. The United States too lost in Viet Nam, won in Afghanistan (in the 1980s), in Iraq (in 1990). It now stands on the verge of losing Afghanistan II and Iraq II. In almost all these cases India and the United States were the stronger, better-equipped combatants. Yet they lost some and they won some. Why?
Because the outcome of the war was decided not on the battlefield. It was decided in a battle of minds, in a battle of collective resolve and in a battle in the court of public opinion. Kargil was won because Indians were overwhelmingly in support of the cause. For the same reason, India is prosecuting the long war in Kashmir. Kandahar was lost because public opinion was manipulated into 'saving the hostages at all costs'. In Sri Lanka and periodically in India's North Eastern state of Assam, domestic public opinion was against the further use of force. Similar reasons apply to the United States in its Iraqi and Afghan outings.
That public opinion matters is not new. Public support for the cause and morale during the war itself were always important. What is new is that the outcome of the war itself is increasingly decided by public opinion--with all its uncertainties, vagaries, whims and susceptibility to manipulation. Of course, this has been true in authoritarian states and closed societies for a long time, where the outcome is unquestionably what the regime says it is. In democratic societies with a free (and freewheeling media) the outcome of wars is becoming what public opinion says it is.
This poses a special challenge to open and secular democracies where there is no supremacist religion or ideology that has an irrational hold on the mind, and the media is more susceptible to manipulation by cynicism, populism or worse, by enemy interests. Indeed, technological change has shifted the control over mass media from the government to corporations and eventually, to citizens themselves. No longer can governments use their exclusive control of the "channels" to spread their "message".
What this means, in effect, is that citizens have become combatants in the war of convictions. The side that believes that it has won wins. The side that believes it has lost loses. It is misleading to think of this as being about propaganda or public relations theatre, which though important, can be exposed or seen through. It is about truth, not necessarily the objective truth, but what is widely regarded to be true. The study of how public opinion forms has become all the more important. What instruments should the state have to fight this war? How should it equip its citizens? More importantly, what are the rules of the game? Is it even possible to 'win' wars any more?
Centuries ago, war was all out combat between one group against another; the distinction between combatants and non-combatants came later as a moral upgrade to that ugly business. Wars then largely became contests between armed forces of countries (although non-combatants continued to be killed). In the nuclear era, war became a game played by the strategic elite. The war of the future may go back a full circle--pitting entire populations, combatants and non-combatants alike in a complex clash of convictions.
Nitin Pai: "The outcome of modern wars is decided in the mind"
There is truth in that, but I think it is decided more by demographics.
The side that is eliminated is defeated. The side that multiplies wins.
For examples: Christians are being defeated by Muslims in Iraq, Christians are being defeated by Muslims in Lebanon, and Christians are being defeated by Muslims in Indonesia. In each case, there is no future in the zone of struggle (that is jihad) for the losing side.
This, forced Islamisation in Indonesia, is what victory looks like. (link)
"All out war became unimaginable as soon as the major powers acquired nuclear weapons."
I differ, it was still very possible. Many conflicts are fought all out for ultimate stakes.
The Vietnam War was only limited on America's side. On North Vietnam's side it was an unlimited conflict. A successful one.
"The larger and more powerful combatant uses a fraction of its total available strength in these conflicts and can theoretically fight hard enough to destroy its opponent in short order if it can somehow accept the massive collateral damage that this will inevitably result in."
I differ. I refer again to the Muslim model. Subjugation means unending plight for the defeated, and a delightfully one-sided conflict indefinitely prolonged for the Muslim victor. There is no down side to being stronger.
We are consistently making heavy weather of an even losing position that would be simple wins for Islam.
"In almost all these cases India and the United States were the stronger, better-equipped combatants. Yet they lost some and they won some. Why?"
Lousy doctrine and moral weakness - nothing Sun Tzu would have found hard to understand.
By the way, thanks for posting this, with an Indian focus and examples. This is what makes it interesting.
"This poses a special challenge to open and secular democracies where there is no supremacist religion or ideology that has an irrational hold on the mind, and the media is more susceptible to manipulation by cynicism, populism or worse, by enemy interests."
Indeed, though there is a violently aggressive and supremacist doctrine on offer, and it is making great demographic headway in Europe.
There is no need to settle for merely "swaying" public opinion, as if one was blowing a fan on a sea of wheat to make it bend to one side or the other for a while. Population replacement, with the new population having deep-rooted traditions consistent with the opinions one wants, is the ultimate winning option, if one can play it. Instead of Western wheat, one can plant weeds. Never again will the field "sway" back to where it was.
"What this means, in effect, is that citizens have become combatants in the war of convictions. The side that believes that it has won wins. The side that believes it has lost loses. It is misleading to think of this as being about propaganda or public relations theater, which though important, can be exposed or seen through. It is about truth, not necessarily the objective truth, but what is widely regarded to be true. The study of how public opinion forms has become all the more important."
Indeed.
"What instruments should the state have to fight this war? How should it equip its citizens? More importantly, what are the rules of the game? Is it even possible to 'win' wars any more?"
It is very possible. And common.
I think it is a mistake to see the state as the fighter. These are wars of opinion, and of entire populations. The state is more like a prize and a weapon wielded by this or that population, guided by this or that doctrine.
Of course, if only one side has a fighting doctrine, only one side can win.
David Blue: "We are consistently making heavy weather of, and even losing, positions that would be simple wins for Islam."
This is so simple. It is the equivalent of a dog fight to the death, in which one dog is tethered, muzzled and doped up to the point that it doesn't even realize it is in a fight, while the other dog operates under no such constraints.
As long as you look at one side only, it may be possible to ask, is victory even possible?
But look at the other side, and it becomes obvious that primitive methods (such as those employed by Muhammed (pbuh) himself, in his reign of terror) work fine, the same as ever.
If this was truly a more sophisticated military environment, primitive and savage jihadist doctrine could not win the way it does.
David,
Thanks for your comment.
Actually, the fact that supremacist religious or national ideologies allow some combatants to 'extract' victory proves my point. As long as the military outcome of the conflict is not outright defeat, they will believe they have won. And they would not be wrong.
"is victory even possible?"
Oh, yes, certainly. Though, there are merely a few issues (one really) to consider.
Which country will have to be sacrificed, how many people will have to die, how much destruction will have to be endured, before the steps taken to achieve victory begin to be taken in earnest?
(Afterwards, assuming there is an afterwards, the intellectuals can then discuss whether such a victory was worth it---or whether because of the victors' war crimes, it would have been more ethical to have lost....)
Of course, it would be far better strategy for the wretched of the earth and their progressive compatriots to continue their war of attrition. But, then, they do have a tendency to get a bit punch drunk with "success" which may lead them to be overly bold(though to be fair, we get more than a bit anaesthetized with "ethics").
Nitin,
Thanks for your gracious and pointed reply.
And again, for the Indian perspective and examples. Because of them, "everything old is new again". :)
I'll persist in (partial) disagreement anyway.
Outright victory and defeat, or incremental victories amounting to utter catastrophe for the losers in the long run, are easy to obtain if you are not constrained as we are. Our enemies win absolutely, globally, often and with ease.
Victim populations undergoing forced Islamicization or being gradually and unsystematically wiped from the page of time may reinterpret what is happening to them as a martyrdom and thus a moral victory in some sense, but it makes no difference.
The familiar devices for the destruction of the human spirit - rape, mutilation, arbitrary killing and terror, and so on - work. And anyway, dead and gone is done.
For the bad guys, of course, protected by our rules and our weakness, things are different. Since they remain in place, in growing numbers and with growing domination of the land, they're as victorious as they choose to feel.
Nitin: "As long as the military outcome of the conflict is not outright defeat, they will believe they have won. And they would not be wrong."
That part I agree with.
Shorter NP:
If you get into a war, you have two choices -- genocidal massacres (euphemized here as "collateral damage")which lead to victory, or blaming the media (euphemized here as 'the war of the mind') on the eventual loss.
But the importance of the willingness to inflict "collateral damage" to achieve victory isn't limited to great powers --- Saddam used it, Pol Pot used it, indeed inflicting "collateral damage" is a tool that can be used by anyone to achieve "victory".
In free societies, it isn't about "the war of the mind", its about "the war for the soul" of that society. Free societies generally aren't willing to do "whatever it takes" to win a war -- especially a war of choice -- because decent people refuse to have that much blood on their hands -- and it doesn't matter if that blood is from "massive collateral damage" or a long, drawn out "limited" war.
That's why war advocates find it necessary to "blame the media" in free societies when support for wars decline --- if the nature and extent of the carnage being inflicted upon other nations can be kept from "the people", "the people" don't need to concern themselves with questions about the state of their souls.
Shorter luka:
Offer a caricature sandwich. Polemic exaggeration of the essayist's point of view at the beginning and end, with some thoughful, insightful commentary in the middle.
More beef, less bun, please.
shorter AMac...
Luka may have a point, but I don't like his point of view. :)
Re: #6 from luka...
No, and this is boring. Restating the opponent's position inaccurately to make it a call for genocide is a simple rhetorical trick that gets a lot of use.
David...
How else would you interpret this passage...
The larger and more powerful combatant uses a fraction of its total available strength in these conflicts and can theoretically fight hard enough to destroy its opponent in short order if it can somehow accept the massive collateral damage that this will inevitably result in.
I'm sorry, but this is simply a euphemized expression of the kind of "genocidal" massacres that Saddam used in putting down both the Kurdish and Shiite insurrections. Saddam "destroyed his opponents in short order" by "accepting the massive collateral damage."
Luka,
You read it wrong. The point I'm making is that genocidal massacres were largely ruled out a long time ago. Nor am I 'blaming the media', which is an incorrect oversimplification (even if you were to believe that I'm blaming the media for defeat, I would be crediting it for victory)
Free societies generally aren't willing to do "whatever it takes" to win a war
I agree. And that's the point I make: if the degree of support for the war effort is one of degree ie whatever it takes, then what is it that determines that degree? The upper limit may perhaps be defined by the government--but public opinion may cause the effort to fall short of or exceed those limits.
oh, David, one other thing.... I wasn't accusing NP of endorsing genocide... merely pointing out the implications of the position taken. Personally, I think this post was more about "blaming the media" --- and that NP was merely pointing out that the primary alternative to a long, drawn out campaign that was likely to lose public support over the long term was a short, genocidal one.
My point was that not all wars are justified (or remain justified) -- and that in free societies public opinion will turn against unjustified wars being done in their name. Americans didn't turn against the war in Iraq because of a campaign of false and misleading propaganda -- they turned against it as the truth was revealed.
What disturbed me most was this passage....
It is misleading to think of this as being about propaganda or public relations theatre, which though important, can be exposed or seen through. It is about truth, not necessarily the objective truth, but what is widely regarded to be true. The study of how public opinion forms has become all the more important. What instruments should the state have to fight this war? How should it equip its citizens? More importantly, what are the rules of the game? Is it even possible to 'win' wars any more?
Despite NP's protestations, this does sound to me like an "endorsement" of state run "propaganda or public relations theatre". When we start talking about the "instruments" the state should have to fight a war of "not necessarily the objective truth, but what is widely regarded to be true" we are talking about empowering state sponsored propaganda.
I agree. And that's the point I make: if the degree of support for the war effort is one of degree ie whatever it takes, then what is it that determines that degree?
That ones easy -- the seriousness/nature of the perceived threat determines the degree to which people are willing to do "whatever it takes."
Lots of people still support the use of torture and the long-term detention without charge or access to any kind of justice of people the government has labelled "terrorists." It doesn't matter to them how many innocents are locked up forever along with real terrorists as long as they feel that the threat represented by terrorists is sufficient.
The upper limit may perhaps be defined by the government--but public opinion may cause the effort to fall short of or exceed those limits.
its all about fear -- as long as the level of fear remains sufficiently high, the sky is the limit in terms of what people will accept. While other things (such as "nationalism") can be used to get a nation into a war, only fear can maintain popular support for it.
Gad! Not that old chestnut where we can't talk about morale without endorsing state censorship! Hasn't somebody killed idea that long ago? It sounds like a rehash of sophomore year world history, taught by a reject from Berkley.
Talk about throwing the baby out with the bath water! It's immensely fascinating that the same folks who say "all is lost" don't seem to acknowledge the impact of their words. It seems that instead of ramping up our armed forces, re-adjusting strategies and tactics, that we are supposed to wallow in self-pity, self-loathing, and defeat.
I completely agree that wars are fought primarily in the mind, as I've pointed out before. In fact, no matter which end of the spectrum you are on as far as the Global War On Terror, I can guarantee you are making some kind of psychological argument.
The goal of any war is to make the other side stop fighting. That's it. That means it's all a mind game. Maybe I must eliminate you to change your mind, maybe not.
For a moment do a thought experiment and pretend you are some enemy of a western state.
"Maybe I can get your media to run a lot of stories about how badly things are going -- perhaps to your lazy, cushy, western mind a few killed here and there each day will amount to losing. Who knows? One thing is for certain, your media is not happy with boring stories, and stories about building bridges are boring. Blowing up school buses! Now they love that, and it makes you want to quit all the much earlier. They also love underdogs, and crying children and women. It's very simple, really, a small number of people can create stories everyday that play to the press -- "if it bleeds, it leads" -- right? It doesn't matter what the military situation is, it doesn't even matter what kind of advantage you have. The media wants an even fight with lots of excitement, and whoever feeds the beast the best wins."
As intelligent people, you must be able to acknowledge the truth of that statement without some kind of knee-jerk statement about censorship or "blaming the media" That is, if you want to see the big picture.
Luka is the embodiment of the foolish weakness and sentimenatality that will (probably has already) cost us the war in Iraq. It will also eventually cost us a city or two in all likelihood. You can prattle about our "soul" all you want, but being the knuckle-dragging neanderthal I am, I'd rather see "their" children killed than mine. And I don't advocate genocide. That means the killing of an entire people. I only advocate killing enough of them to make them stop fighting, however many that may turn out to be. That, my friend, is the only way anybody ever won a war. And I don't blame the media; they're just a symptom. I blame the American people because far too many of us think like you.
luka #8, in supposing that the issue is "I don't like your point of view," you miss it. Granted, I disagree with those I disagree with, quelle surprise. I don't like arguments that are based on straw men and over-the-top rhetoric. I rarely say as much, unless the commenter gives evidence that they would have more to offer. Take that as a compliment if you will. Anyway, enough already.
One of the relevant and neglected precedents for Today's Troubles is the Wilson Administration's domestic policies on the US entry into World War I in 1917. The first third of John Barry's The Great Influenza is on this topic; I don't know of an online discussion to link to.
When Wilson swung from Neutrality to Defense of Democracies, he recognized that the country was divided. Some were pro-Allies, many wished to stay out of Europe's war, and a significant minority favored the Kaiser, as there was a large pool of ethnic-German immigrants. Wilson implemented a set of policies that were in some respects more draconian than what Lincoln did in the Civil War. In particular, Free Speech was largely suspended for the duration of the war, and the government encouraged vigilante pro-Patriotism movements across the country, designed to stifle dissent.
Barry treats these phenomena at length because one of his points about the Spanish Flu is that its course was made much worse by these imposed limits on thinking and speech; e.g. if warnings about contagion might circumscribe mobilization of troops, it was condemned as unpatriotic. (I'll stop here, as I can't cite particulars without the book open in front of me.)
----
As is often the case with thorny issues such as the one Nitin has raised in the post, there are potential pitfalls on every side. One way to look at this is to see how "easy" it is for a democracy to fight a war with an ethical opponent like Nazi Germany, compared to an unethical one like the Iraqi insurgency. (Of course, I'm being over-the-top to make a point here.) In May 1945, the Nazis were defeated and Germany was occupied by its enemies. By and large, the Germans knew they had lost, and went on to make the best of it, East and West. Contrast this with, say, al-Anbar, or Baghdad. The Coalition's enemies don't know they lost in 2003. More to the point, they are "crazy" in the sense that their violent actions make the future much, much worse for the citizens of their country. Worse, that is, by our standards--by the standards of luka's "decent people [who] refuse to have that much blood on their hands."
Which points to the logical insurgency strategy: since the Coalition cares more about "the future well-being" of "the Iraqi people," the path to victory is to make it clear that that well-being of Iraq is forfeit for as long as the insurgents are thwarted.
As players within a game whose rules are set by the guerillas, the only logical course is for the Coalition to admit defeat and withdraw. As David Blue has pointed out, general paradigms such as this are very attractive to Islamists worldwide.
As intelligent people, you must be able to acknowledge the truth of that statement without some kind of knee-jerk statement about censorship or "blaming the media" That is, if you want to see the big picture.
as intelligent people, you must be able to acknowledge that a hypothetical that beings with "Maybe I can get your media to run a lot of stories about how badly things are going...." is really about blaming the media -- in this case "blaming the media for falling for 'the enemies' tactics".
Of course, it cuts both ways...
Maybe I can get our media to run a lot of stories about what a threat Saddam Hussein is, and how he's tied into the events of 9-11 -- perhaps to traumatized, fearful American mind half-truths and distortions will result in support for an invasion. Who knows? One thing is for certain, our media is not happy with boring stories, and stories about not finding any WMDs during a UN inspections process are boring. Mobile WMD factories! Now they love that, and it makes you want to invade all the much earlier. They also love underdogs, and crying children and women -- so lets make sure to emphasize what happened in Iraq over a decade ago. It's very simple, really, a small number of people can create stories everyday that play to the press -- "if it scares, it leads" -- right? It doesn't matter what the military situation is, it doesn't even matter if Iraq represents any kind of threat to the US. The media wants pictures of jets taking off and smart bombs finding their targets with lots of excitement, and whoever feeds the beast the best wins."
"is really about blaming the media -- in this case "blaming the media for falling for 'the enemies' tactics"." -- not at all. You ask for a false choice. Good media stories may be those stories that also support an enemy's tactics. It's not an either/or situation.
"Maybe I can get our media to run a lot of stories about what a threat Saddam Hussein is, and how he's tied into the events of 9-11 -- perhaps to traumatized, fearful American mind half-truths and distortions will result in support for an invasion. Who knows?" -- yes, you can. It was done. Hence our presence in Iraq.
We're sitting on top of a 40 Trillion+ economy. We could put ten million people under arms if we wanted to, and that's not even counting non-traditional warfare options. We act, or fail to act, based on public opinion. War is about making the other guy stop fighting. Ergo, those tools of public opinion are actually the primary weapons being used in this war.
There's no blaming the media about anything. It's just being able to understand. As AMac said, there are no easy options here.
Luka,
I was acutely aware of the possibility that one instinctive reaction to this post is to see it as an endorsement of government propaganda. But as I point out in the post, believing that propaganda/spin will work is misleading: because it can be seen through (we're talking about open societies here) and more importantly, because governments cannot ever manage the same degree of control over information anymore even if they wanted to.
Getting into a debate over the merits/evils of propaganda is beside the point, and should not distract us. We know a lot of things we can't do (including all out war and good old propaganda) anymore. So what is it that we (as in the governments and people of open and democratic societies) do to win? It's a hard question you know.
Which points to the logical insurgency strategy: since the Coalition cares more about "the future well-being" of "the Iraqi people," the path to victory is to make it clear that that well-being of Iraq is forfeit for as long as the insurgents are thwarted.
you're making an error of projection here....
Do you really believe that the insurgents think that "the Coalition cares more about the future well being of the Iraqi people" than they do?
The thing is, the insurgents are just as convinced of the righteousness of their cause as you are convince of the righteousness of the Coalition. I'm confident that al Qaeda is absolutely convinced that the Iraqi people are far better off not being under the thumb of "The Great Satan" or its agents, that the Baathists are convinced that their form of non-secular socialism is best for the Iraqi people, and that the Shiite militias are sure that establishing a Shia theocracy is best for Iraq.
I'm also certain that their leadership (and those who support that leadership) feels that their tactics are justified by circumstances -- just as American's leadership (and those who support that leadership) feels that torture and indefinite detainment of anyone the government chooses to label a "terrorist" is justified by circumstances.
I'm personally of the opinion that it is much harder to defeat an enemy -- especially in the kind of war we are facing in Iraq -- if you insist that all sides share the same ideas about what is "best". Some people differ --and conclude that the proper way to fight an insurgency is to kill as many people as possible until the other side realizes that their situation is hopeless. It may well be the most "effective" way -- it certainly worked for Saddam -- but I personally don't want my government to lower itself to Saddam's standards.
***********
one other small point.
The Coalition's enemies don't know they lost in 2003.
this is simply historically false. It should be clear by now that the Baathists knew in advance that they would lose any "tradition" military confrontation with the US, and chose to fight a guerilla war. In other words, just because toppling Saddam's statue meant the war was pretty much over in our minds, in the minds of the Baathists, it was just the first act.
I think public sentiment is being massively overestimated. Both Vietnam and the current war have lasted longer than the US was involved in WW2. In both cases the public didnt become eager (much less insistant) on pulling the plug until years, billions of dollars, mounting casualties, and most important a percieved lack of progress finally pulled the rug out on public support. Its rather like the degenerate gambler who loses the first 10 races and then blames his bank for the fiasco when his ATM maxes out.
This thought process really underestimates the combined wisdom of the American people. There is only so much ineptitude they are willing to stand for, and at some point they arent going to let the same people who created the mess try to fix it when they have shown zero aptitude or creativity to date.
What we really need down the road is a political overhaul of our system for fighting wars. The one thing Iraq and Vietnam certainly do have in common is many of the same blunders in the chain of command. You cant run a war half a world away. Bush and Rummy should have known better. In the future we need a doctrine that will put the political and military power in the hands of a single general with a specific mandate. If he screws up, we have someone to blame. Traditionally this is the most effective way to fight a war. This war by committee 3000 miles away has been forseeably disasterous.
So what is it that we (as in the governments and people of open and democratic societies) do to win? It's a hard question you know.
first and foremost is the question of the justification for the war itself. When wars are based on propaganda, in a free society the truth will (eventually) come out -- and that is going to mean a whole lot less public support for the war.
Secondly, the war has to be well-run, and genuine progress has to be made. Public support can be sustained despite losses if the overall situation is improving -- but not if the overall situation is deteriorating, public support will be lost.
Finally, the war has to be "winnable" -- in most wars, there are winners and losers, and there comes a point for the loser where losing is inevitable, regardless of whether the will to fight on exists in some quarters. Once defeat appears inevitable, public support for a war is going to deteriorate, to be replaced by an urge to "cut the losses" and disengage under the best circumstances that can be arranged.
luka #20 --
luka, read twice before you respond, you are regularly missing aspects of your correspondents' positions.
In my case, no error of projection. Of course the Coalition cares more about "the future well-being" of "the Iraqi people." You shouldn't have deleted the quotes. The point is that Islamists and "children of the Enlightenment" see "well-being" in very different terms.
Yes, I agree that people do things because they think those things are Right. Whether it's enabling the delivery of improved health care, sawing infidels' heads, or burning the village to save it. For what it's worth.
This situation, like the fall of the Roman Empire, is temporary.
Amphipolois, by what unearthly measurement can the fall of the Roman Empire be called temporary? Are you expecting its imminent resurgence?
As for the rest, I see nothing new in the original thesis. Yes, it is quite true that the more democratic a nation, the more its successful prosecution of a war will depend upon the public's acceptence of that war's necessity. Public perception increases in importance as public power increases.
What, may I ask, is "objective reality" when it comes to a) a war's necessity; b) a war's justification; c) a war's progress; d) a war's winnabilit.? "d" is of special importance when we have already agreed that a war's winnability in a democracy is itself partly dependent upon public perception. If objective reality then becomes a product of perception, how objective does it remain.
The Rome will rise again!
I found all of luka's answers (#22) to be lacking. I'm still wondering how any country without a draft, without a national economy mobilized, and only using a couple percent of it's GDP, can say a war is unwinnable?
It's like a beer commerical. Same great flavor as war, only less filling. You right-wing, neocon suckers can pretend like it's some great war on terror, but really it's just designed to string you a long for a bit.
I don't believe the previous paragraph, but I cannot discount those who say thigns like that. The evidence of our seriousness in Iraq is sorely lacking in my opinion. That perception of commitment is as much (or more) important than actual numbers.
If we had 2 million troops in Iraq, maybe we could talk about what was possible and what wasn't. But instead, when luka says "winnable" (let's ignore what 'win' means for a second) what it seems he really means is "winnable under the current political constraints" which is another way of saying that public opinion will win or lose this war! Yikes! There's just no escaping it, luka. (grin)
If we had 2 million troops in Iraq, maybe we could talk about what was possible and what wasn't. But instead, when luka says "winnable" (let's ignore what 'win' means for a second) what it seems he really means is "winnable under the current political constraints" which is another way of saying that public opinion will win or lose this war! Yikes! There's just no escaping it, luka. (grin)
Actually, when I was discussing "winnable" I was talking about whether the resources were available that could result in a victory. (I was thinking more along the lines of WWII, when it became obvious to just about everyone but Hitler that Germany could not win well before the fall of Berlin.)
In terms of Iraq, I don't even know what "winning" means anymore -- especially within the context of Iraq being merely a "front" in the War on Terror. It would be relatively simple to win "the battle" of Iraq -- we can just nuke the whole country, making it uninhabitable, and say "we won" because the enemy would have been eliminated (along with everyone else in Iraq).
I'm still wondering how any country without a draft, without a national economy mobilized, and only using a couple percent of it's GDP, can say a war is unwinnable?
when that "any country" is a free and democratic society, "winnable" is a function of the costs, benefits, and risks to that society.
What is remarkable about the Iraq War is that the American people have turned against it despite relatively low casualty figures, no draft, and all financial costs being deferred to future generations. I would suggest that the American people see Iraq as "unwinnable" because it has lost faith in the basic competence of our leadership to "win" regardless of how many resources are brought to bear.
Apart from the present conflict, or maybe because of the current conflict, I think it is an interesting point to determine when, how, and by what means a war or general conflict is won.
You read Liddel Hart about conflicts from the Greek-Persian wars through to WW-II, and there is this kind of Geneva Conventions idea that wars are fought between (mainly) men in uniform who meet on a battlefield and decide conflicts through a series of decisive confrontations, the outcome of which the civilian populations more or less accept. I guess the issue is that one wins on the battlefield, the civilian population doesn't accept the outcome, and then what?
I guess the "then what" was part of ancient battles but you read less of in the history books. If a side won one of these battles, I guess it was pretty much accepted that the civilian population was massacred or worse if it didn't acceed to its new rulers. But you must have had low-intensity conflict and general unrest among civilian populations back in the day -- think of the Romans ruling the Levant in the time of Christ.
Both of my parents managed to live through the "then what" of Germany attempting to consolidate its rule over Yugoslavia during WW-II, and this informed their opinions that America attempting to intervene in the Middle East by force of arms was a loosing proposition. By 9-11, my parents had lost their ability to influence my views owing to advancing age and illness affecting their ability to communicate, and 9-11 changed my view regarding the wisdom of a military intervention in the Middle East because the Middle East was intervening militarily on our shores, and whether we fought on our own land or a distant land didn't seem to be a big distinction anymore.
A colleague of mine of an anti-war persuasion used the argument that if America were occupied in the manner that America is occupying Iraq, he would be first in line to volunteer for the insurgency. I offered that while neither parent was in an insurgency, they both had front-row seats on what was involved, and being an insurgent soldier was not the paintball battle my friend seemed to think taking up arms in such a situation would be. An occupying power is able to inflict disproportianate causalities on insurgents -- we talk about the losses of American soldiers in Iraq, but we don't have a feel for the losses among insurgent soldiers and how we would react if we were in that other situation.
Another friend showed me a video "Why We Fight" (the current one, not the WW-II one) which suggested that we don't have a clue as to why we fight, the fights we are in are not existential (essentially Charles Lindbergh saying that WW-II Germany was not the Mongol invasion but more a continental struggle), and the real reason we fight is because of the military industrial complex leads us to do so.
It is possible to prevail in insurgent conflict -- some historians even argue that Germany was prevailing in that the various resistances and partisans suffered horrific casualties and while the German casualties to guerrilla action were large, they paled by what direct battle by the major powers was inflicting on them. But do we want to prevail?
Churchill understood the "hearts and minds" bit, and came to understand bombing losses on English cities not as a net loss but as a gain in rallying popular support for the war -- it was not a certain thing that England wouldn't sue for some terms with Germany (think the Royals) and Germany was in a way hoping for this. Maybe we need to withdraw from Iraq, let the enemy see American weakness in this, take the next attack, even a nuclear one (there is historical precedent for a country surviving a limited attack), and rally once more with increased resolve. There was a kind of calculus that the Iraq War would prevent the need for future mass casualties in the U.S. to stiffen resolve and to prevent the resulting retaliatory casualties, but people don't seem to accept this argument.
luka #28 "In terms of Iraq, I don't even know what "winning" means anymore -- especially within the context of Iraq being merely a "front" in the War on Terror."
Best I can tell you, luka, is to substitute "continue our peacekeeping mission until the country is stable" for "winning the Iraq war" The war was won, we are now there keeping the peace (which sometimes means combat operations, as it always does)
"What is remarkable about the Iraq War is that the American people have turned against it despite relatively low casualty figures, no draft, and all financial costs being deferred to future generations. I would suggest that the American people see Iraq as "unwinnable" because it has lost faith in the basic competence of our leadership to "win" regardless of how many resources are brought to bear. "
I would say that the people are so little taxed by the war that it is more easy to snipe at each other in the traditional manner than it is to change gears into wartime mode. It used to be a large percentage of the population understood national service -- duty, honor, country and all of that -- better. They were also closer to the land and to the ways of life and death. Therefore, in my opinion, it was easier for them to make tough life and death decisions. Now everybody wants zero risk, zero sacrifice, and lots of whining and complaining. Give me my world peace, and can I have it by 3 o'clock?
All wars are decided in the mind.
The only question is the required effort.
If we (not just the USA, the entire West) are in a war then we need to start acting as if we are.
We are in a war with an ideology. Fine. Step one; throw out any and all non-citizen members of the enemy. Step two; stop making concessions to them - such as allowing halal (utterly disgusting even to non-vegetarians) and asking permission of mullahs before entering a mosque to apprehend a criminal. Step three; completely ban creation of new mosques, and make existing ones the first target for demolition for redevelopment if such is necessary. Step four; ban the wearing of overtly religious garb in public - especially burkahs and hajibs, both of which are immensely discriminatory against women. As part of this, Step five; stop immigration from countries that declare themselves Muslim, with no exceptions allowed.
Step six; arrest all known jihadist agitators, and throw them in jail. Step seven; restore the death penalty for murder, treason and sedition and start using it, for such things as advocating Sharia. Penalty to be extended to include burial in pigskin. Step eight; immediately suspend negotiations for the entry of Turkey into the EU. Step nine; shut down, immediately, all faith schools operated by Muslims, and make such things as school uniform regulations actually uniform.
There are probably more I haven't thought of.
Quite a lot of Muslims in Western societies are in fact enemy belligerents out of uniform. Even the Geneva Convention recognises the right of a state to summarily execute such people.
It's time to stop playing games; if we don't do so soon, then sooner or later they will destroy one of our cities, and then most of their cities will go up in smoke.
I've come to agree with Paul (#29): Withdraw. Very loudly proclaim, "We're sick of this. We toppled your dictator, the rest is your problem. If you want help, go to the UN."
The "you broke it, it's your's" policy is idiotic. It may be true if you want to keep it, but no one wants Iraq to be the 51st state. Let it rot.
It will be seen as weakness, because it is weakness. However, there just isn't public support for victory, yet.
The next attack will come and they will continue to escalate until finally the lukas of the world will accept that the danger is real - not fabricated fear to generate Halliburton contracts.
At that point, we'll either get the draft the Left wants so badly and have the 10 million in arms or we'll just say "screw it" and nuke them.
If the Iraq war bought enough time, that option may be fine - we won't need the Middle Eastern oil fields.
I don't like this solution, but the Iraq war is lost - in the mind of the public, not on the ground - and if the Left wants to pullout without considering the horror that will follow, on their heads be it. I'm a callous SOB and I'm willing to support later Arab genocide as the cost of pulling out.
Ref no 32, by Fletcher Christian;
I live in the battle zone where this war is being fought. Some truly great perspectives from David Blue & Nitin Pai. The North Western Frontier Province has become the newest battle ground in the war. An analysis of past policy in Pakistan shows that principally the three countries of the region India, Pakistan & Afghanistan are responsible for the creation of a set of circumstances which has resulted in the Taliban (Islamist) crisis for the states in diffrent manifestations; in Kashmir it is Jihadist war; in Afghanistan it is the revival war for the Talibans and in tribal areas is the war of extension for extension of control over more territory and people.
Recently there have been attacks on the police and officers of government. It is all out war and we are failing to term it as such.
I am sorry I disagree with the prescriptions of Fletcher. If these were implemented even partially, it would mean an all out onslaught between Islam & Christians. This is not desirable for many reasons. Since this war will be won and lost in the mind we must be wary of such advice (Fletcher's). The saner elements will have to dig in and eveolve a strategy to fight those who would take the world back to bigoted medievalism.