The ISG report has branded our efforts in Iraq "grave," "deteriorating," and "not working."
The American people aren't too happy with the situation, either. Results of recent polls indicate:
Just 9 per cent expect the war to end in clear-cut victory, compared with 87 per cent who expect some sort of compromise settlement...
But what would "clear-cut victory" actually look like in the case of Iraq (or Iran, or Syria, or any number of other places, for that matter)? Do we know? To achieve "victory," is it necessary to have a country completely at peace, with guarantees of civil rights for all and a smoothly functioning democratic process?
Well, that would be victory, all right. But is anything short of that failure? Probably not. But, if not, where do we draw the line between the two? After all, a nation running as smoothly as that was always a highly unrealistic short-term goal for Iraq--and by "short-term" I mean anything less than a few decades, or even longer.
So, how should we define a realistic and relatively short-term (a couple of years) victory in Iraq? Although it's difficult to do so, it seems necessary in order to know whether we ever achieve it, or even come close to it.
Our early definition of victory in Iraq was simple, but very incomplete: deposing Saddam. That was done with relative ease, but had we left at that point the country would have devolved into chaos. Leaving prematurely is a big problem; in fact, the current Iraq War can be seen as an attempt to deal with the situation left by the very unfinished business of the first Gulf War, in which "success" was too narrowly defined.
Commenter Ymarsakar had this to say recently on the subject of success in this war versus previous, more traditional, ones:
The thing you have to remember about WWII...is that people could know whether victory or defeat was close by, by casualty lists and whether a battle was won or lost, territory gained or won. In a guerrila war as with Iraq, that doesn't seem very clear. I mean, the US won all the battles so far, and yet we have violence every day, but we control all the territory, but and but and but. The human mind is not wired for this kind of fight and flight, fight then flight then fight then flight then fight schism. Because it pulls you from one way to the other, and eventually you will shred.
One part of your mind says you are winning. No attacks, US soldiers winning battles, etc. Other side of your brain sees you are losing, loss of support, violence, more violence, American deaths, demoralizing stories, etc.
I've mentioned this before of course, but the agony of defeat in WWII or even the threat of it, actually galvanized morale and support. You don't have that now, because America itself is not being attacked and the world doesn't "look" like the terroists are gaining ground...
I think you know that the loss of the Pacific Fleet left the entire Western seaboard of America open to Japanese invasion. It was a palpable sense of dread and DEFEAT, the idea that you could lose. You NEED that for resolve. In Iraq, the idea that we will lose, is not there, but the idea that we "aren't winning" is there. So it creates friction.
One of President Bush's major communication failures was on the subject of what success would look like in this particular war. Some say it should have been limited to toppling Saddam, although that would have left the country in chaos. The traditional realpolitik solution would have been to have backed another strong man as replacement--a dictator, but "our" dictator--and hope for the best (the Shah of Iran was an example of this approach in the past).
Our venture in Iraq had a more lofty ultimate, long-term goal (although the amount of time and effort necessary to achieve that goal was poorly defined): to help the Iraqis towards a functioning democracy rather than a dictatorship, somewhat resembling the occupation of Japan and West Germany and the establishment of democracies there after WWII (and yes, the differences between Iraq and the those countries, as well as the perception of defeat by the populations involved, are profound) . Whether or not that goal could have been achieved with a more forceful and committed occupation in Iraq (see this for a discussion), or could still be achieved, there's no doubt that it has not been achieved at this point in time.
But Victor Davis Hanson points to the fact that the jihadis don't seem to think they've achieved success yet, either:
We forget that the jihadist websites are still worried about Iraq, both the losses suffered there, and the emergence of a democratic government. We think we are not winning, but so do they think they aren’t either.
Recently President Bush was careful to refer to the "pace of success" in Iraq as being too slow, rather than mentioning the "F" word, failure. He said:
You want frankness? I thought we would succeed quicker than we did. And I am disappointed by the pace of success.
Semantics, right? Not entirely. How something is framed does indeed affect our view of it.
There are many, of course, who would consider that comment of Bush's ludicrous: to them, it's obvious that our venture in Iraq is a failure already, and to speak of a slowed "pace of success" is merely Orwellian gobbledygook meant to keep us in a losing endeavor, spilling more blood and treasure just to protect Bush's pride.
There are others (and I am among them) who consider that failure (and premature withdrawal) in Iraq would not only be a tragedy for the Iraqi people and for the world, but would not even accomplish the goals its proponents think it will. This enemy and this fight cannot be avoided, and failure in Iraq (however it's defined) will only set up the next, and greater conflict.
The question of "will" in this war is one I've tackled before (here, for example). Part of will is to consider that failure is not an option, and to do whatever needs to be done to make sure it does not occur. But without defining either, we are at sea, especially in the sort of murky situation presented by asymmetrical wars.
In World War II the goals were so obvious there was no real need to define victory: unconditional surrender of the enemy, nothing less. In Vietnam things became more foggy, and part of the shock of the Pentagon Papers was that the goals the American people had assumed were those of our war effort there were revealed to have not been taken all that seriously by the Pentagon. Post-Vietnam, goals have not only been poorly articulated, but in the current conflict they are inherently difficult to define--this enemy will never formally surrender.
[Part II, planned for tomorrow, will be an attempt to explain why victory has been especially difficult to define and to pursue in this particular war.]
[ADDENDUM: Shrinkwrapped on a related theme.]
We can definitely tell what unambiguous defeat would look like: Iraq falling to jihadist Islamism.
If democracy survives in Iraq, even after a long and brutal struggle, then it could not be anything but victory - UNLESS the victory is judged to be too expensive, and this is why the opposing camps will never, ever agree on Iraq.
My view, and the traditional American view, is that freedom is worth any price you pay for it, however bitter. It's all in the Gettysburg Address. Furthermore, there is nothing that we enjoy as Americans (freedom, democracy, equality under the law, prosperity, independence, etc.) that all other peoples are not equally entitled to enjoy. That is, none of these things are peculiar American entitlements, and there is no such thing as a race of people who are unfit to enjoy them also. Finally, democracy is morally entitled to assist the growth and defense of democracy, and perhaps has a moral imperative to do so.
I don't need to name any names, but obviously the other side just doesn't agree with some or all of the above. In their view, either freedom is not worth it, or the Iraqis are not worth it. Since the acceptable sticker price was exceeded long ago, the future cannot hold any result that will be anything but defeat to them.
So we'll all carry this argument to our graves, which is fine with me because I'm on the right side.
What would failure in Iraq look like? Somalia and Pakistan's Waziristan.
Links are to compilations of Bill Roggio's reporting on each subject.
The funny part of defining victory as defeating Saddam was that in the run-up to the war, there were a lot of people who made it clear that the WMD furor was not all that important except as a cover, and that the important thing as far as the GWOT was concerned was introducing a functioning democracy to the ME.
To be honest, I'm not certain what the Jihadists hope for once the Americans leave. I suspect the best they could hope for is a total failure of government, allowing them a free hand in remote regions, but in that scenario there's nothing preventing the Americans from attacking any camps they discover.
It's quite possible that American withdrawal might spell the end of Jihadi ambitions in Iraq as their volunteers dry up and Iran and Shia numbers make themselves felt. For certain causes, surviving "victory" can be more difficult than surviving "defeat".
The traditional realpolitik solution would have been to have backed another strong man as replacement--a dictator, but "our" dictator--and hope for the best (the Shah of Iran was an example of this approach in the past).
Nonsense. The traditional realpolitik solution was that Saddam didn't need replacing. He was essentially neutralized by sanctions while keeping down Jihadist elements in his own population.
Exactly. He was a paragon of "stability", like Tito, like Enver Hoxha of Albania. As for the poor people who had to live in those awful places, it's like Mr. Pink said: "I'm very sad about that, but some guys are lucky and some ain't."
The whole talk of "winning" and "losing" really has no point except for propaganda, both for domestic politicians and on the international stage. The main point of the war was to ensure a WMD-free Iraq. That's why I think most people supported it. At least it's true in my case. Regime change was long a policy that supported that goal. The idea was to have a regime that would not attempt to acquire WMD. We "won" in that sense.
To me, the talk of democracy in Iraq did not seem necessarily unrealistic (and still doesn't, long term), but I also did not anticipate the chaos, given the wealth potential of Iraq. That said, however, it was clear to me, at least, that democracy was secondary and long-term goal that's obviously been oversold. The basic problem is that disorder is simply too profitable for too many parties (and I'm speaking mostly of the Sunnis) -- and that is a political not a military problem. The police and military can attempt to control it. They can even solve it, but only by ruthlessly destroying not only the "combatants" but their civilian populations, because, as should be clear by now, as long as the civilian population continues to believe it can profit by the chaos, they will continue to provide insurgents and suicide bombers to make chaos.
The cost of "solving" the problem militarily comes with a price that is too high for America to pay: it's morally abhorent and, in terms of US domestic politics, rightly impossible.
Controlling the problem with military and police forces treats the symptom but does not cure the political problem. That problem can be solved in only one of two ways: the first (already mentioned) is to destroy the trouble-makers. The second is to remove their incentive for making chaos.
Some folks say democracy as we know cannot exist in Iraq. A history of Iraq in the seventies belies that to some extent -- Iraq was arguably on a path toward secularization, prosperity and democracy. Its problems stem from Saddam.
We should first take stock of what we've accomplished: (1) there is no longer any danger that the Saddamist regime will develop or supply others with WMD - victory in our primary aims; (2) we have, or better put, the Iraqis have, a legitimate, democratically-elected government - we shouldn't overstate it, but that is progress toward to our secondary goal.
The biggest problem in the path to progress is, as stated above, the existence incentives to create chaos to gain political leverage, not a political problem not with democracy per se, but a political problem for any form of government. Fact is, the legitimate and democratically elected government in Iraq is our greatest asset. It is not the case a dictatorship is keeping down the masses by brute force. The majority is on the side of the government.
The solution, then, is to allow the government to do what all governments attempt to do above all else -- survive.
Basically, the Sunnis see the chaos as their (nondemocratic) lever to regain disproportionate power, and we have made that lever too valuable by agreeing that chaos is the worst possible thing. The Sunnis are demanding appeasement and will stop only when they get it or it becomes clear that they won't get it.
Should they be appeased? I don't know and, as a matter of realpolitik, I don't care. That is a question for the Iraqis, and they have a sovereign, legitimate government whose whole function is to solve political problems like that one -- our soldiers (including my brother in law) -- died to get the Iraqis a democratically elected government -- we should not be afraid to let the Iraqis use it. The alternative to appeasement for the Iraqi government to remove the incentive for chaos is to ethnically cleanse the Sunnis, or make it clear that they will do so unless the chaos stops. That is the spectrum of choices: appeasement, ethnic cleansing or the threat of ethnic cleansing ending with a negotiated solution.
There has been a lot of talk about whether there is a "civil war" in Iraq. There really isn't. There isn't even a threat of civil war. What there is is a strong possibility of civil war, though not necessarily a long one, if the coalition ceases to keep it from occurring. And exactly that condition is what keeps the Sunni insurgency in business.
We are putting too little faith in the Iraqi government. We need to get out of the way. Hand its troops over to it, hand its provinces over to it, on its terms, and let it decide whether to appease the Sunnis or start killing them, the latter of which is probably what will occur, but not for very long, since at that point the Sunnis will see that they've lost and will seriously negotiate for peace and stop the BS that they're pulling now.
Ironically our present role is protecting the Sunnis, who are causing the chaos. If we would get out of the way and let the government deal with it, it would find the right incentives to convince the Sunnis to stop. We may not be able to stomach participating in a civil war, but we don't need to. That's why they call it a civil war. And it, or at least the threat of it, is probably a precondition for peace, prosperity and further democratic progress.
Our role should be express confidence in and to support the actions of the democratically elected goverment government that we can support in good conscience support and try to be a friend of the winners (so as not to allow Iran to gain too much influence), which, if we believe that the government has the support of most people in a contest with the insurgents, will be the government. We should try not to make enemies of the Sunnis, but they have and will bring their fate on themselves. The government has long been patient.
We can provide an external security guarantee. That doesn't necessarily mean patrolling the borders, but it might mean giving covert aid to the internal enemies of those who would interfer in the internal affairs of Iraq. We should, of course, also support the forces of enlightenment -- secular institutions, etc., and continue to provide arms, training (if they want it) and some economic and technical assistance, etc.
I don't think an Iraqi civil war would be much like that in Lebanon. The forces are much more lopsided. Even if it is, we can do as little about it as we were able to do there. They had to / have to sort it out. Pressure should be put on Syria and Iran, not dialogue.
Tom #4 "It's quite possible that American withdrawal might spell the end of Jihadi ambitions in Iraq as their volunteers dry up and Iran and Shia numbers make themselves felt. For certain causes, surviving "victory" can be more difficult than surviving "defeat"."
It's possible, sure. That's not what most analysts predict, but analysts are wrong sometimes. That's not what I would predict based on the 20-year history of crazy secular and religious fighters from the ME, but yes, it is possible.
A lot of things are possible.
Glen #5 - "He was a paragon of "stability", like Tito, like Enver Hoxha of Albania. As for the poor people who had to live in those awful places, it's like Mr. Pink said: "I'm very sad about that, but some guys are lucky and some ain't.""
That's all fine and dandy, but from a realist perspective, it wasn't working. The use of dictatorships to control idiots in the ME is coming to an end, whether we liked "the old way" or not. Just today a Saudi prince said the region is ready to explode, and I tend to agree with him. Bottling up people while preaching intolerence and hate to them can only end in massive bloodshed, as Iraq, Lebanon, and Palistine is beginning to show. In my opinion, it is more realistic to have the people vote in representatives who can try to guide them through this purge than it is to switch dictators to run the same old game plan again. My argument has nothing to do with morals -- if you checked your morals at the door then fine. Pragmatically, the status quo was not working, either with containment in Iraq, or with the political situation in many ME countries. To me, that's realism. Trying to wish it away does not seem very practical.
A few notes
One of President Bush's major communication failures was on the subject of what success would look like in this particular war.
I don't think this is really true --- the reason why only 9% of Americans think that a "clear cut victory" is possible is that Bush succeeded in his efforts to convince Americans that "we would be greeted as liberators", and that by now Iraq would be a beacon of democracy in the middle east quite quickly. It was a vague but glorious vision (as you put it "a country completely at peace, with guarantees of civil rights for all and a smoothly functioning democratic process")
-- and one that the vast majority of Americans now recognize is unachievable.
Thus, when you ask " is anything short of that failure?" the answer is a qualified "yes". (Something somewhat short of that goal could be considered "not failure", but the further you go from that goal, the more it looks like "failure" -- and we are now well past the point where our efforts can be defined as anything but a "failure".
We can, as you appear to suggest, redefine "success" --- but in order for that new definition to have any weight, an admission of failure is necessary -- otherwise, the "new definition" will just come off as more spin (or as you put it "Orwellian gobbledygook) from an administration that has lost the confidence of the American people. That confidence cannot be regained absent unambiguous proof of "lessons learned" -- but instead what we are hearing is "progress is slower than we expected."
You think that "sucess (redefined) is possible" -- I disagree, primarily because I don't think the Bush regime is capable of taking the steps necessary to achieve success, and my opinion isn't going to change. But my personal opinion isn't what's important -- your new definition of success cannot be achieved without substantially more support from the American people -- and that isn't going to happen as long as adnitting failure is not an option.
I believe Daniel Markham has suggested (though I'm not sure he's fully endorsed) the view that this is a peacekeeping mission. It seems to me that other countries use the term peacekeeping, though this might be because their assignments are in areas of Iraq where this is more appropriate.
Peacekeeping may seem Orwellian if you feel that the peace doesn't exist to keep. But peacekeepers have been sent to countries (like Somalia) without a cease fire. I suspect that the real reason peacekeeping is not accepted is that Americans would be less likely to support activities in Iraq, less likely to commit resources and less likely to feel that the mission was imperative to the larger WOT.
I'm not sure how I feel about the term, but to the extent it is appropriate, then victory is the absence of certain events: (1) invasion from a neighboring country; (2) military coup; (3) popular revolt, or (4) genocide. It also can be measured in terms of how the negotiated status quo is enforced. Here, that is the Iraqi Constitution, approved by nearly 80% of Iraqis in a referendum. That means to me that the U.S. can't achieve its mission by undercutting the elected officials.
luka.
Take some time, go to whitehouse.gov, and read the speeches.
Bush has ALWAYS said it will be a long, tough process.
Perhaps you are conflating Bush with the pundits on all half-dozen or more sides (neocons, paleocons, 'realists', mushy middle, centerleft, center-right, etc) who claimed to be influential?
The 'will be greeted as liberators' lines were written as op-eds by lower functionaries who didn't really have any say, usually... and yet, in some areas we were, in fact, greeted as liberators.
Then when we weren't able to wave the Great American Magic Wand and cure all their problems right away...
Bush has ALWAYS said it will be a long, tough process.
no he didn't. While he warned that the actual "overthrow" might take a while, he never told the American people (and never considered the possibility of) a civil war.
I mean, on of the most notable aspects of the Iraq disaster was the virtual absence of planning for the post-invasion period.... How could Bush have been telling Americans BEFORE THE WAR that it would be a "long tough process" if there wasn't even a process defined for him?
"I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm. A campaign on the harsh terrain of a nation as large as California could be longer and more difficult than some predict. And helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country will require our sustained commitment."
George W. Bush
#8:
Yep. Well put.
#12:
Mission Accomplished.
PD....
your quote is from the announcement of the war. The "campaign" referred to was the overthrow of Saddam. (you know, the one that was over with "Mission Accomplished".) And "sustained commitment" did not mean that Americans would still be dying in Iraq four years later... it isn't even necessarily a military commitment (although in retrospect, Bush was doubtless referring to the creation of permanent military bases in Iraq --- something that he didn't want to actually say out loud at the beginning of the war.)
I'm sure that you can find other out-of-context quotes --- here are four pre-war in-context quotes from Bush administration officials...
Not even there. There are all kinds of murky moral and political questions around the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. It was a controversial policy during the war and still is.
takhallus,
Out of context misrepresentation.
luka,
All of those quotes appear to me to be in the context of the invasion, not the term of the occupation subsequent. Especially the Feb 7 and March 4 quotes. The March 11 and 16 quotes are not incorrect from the point of view of most Shiites and all Kurds, which would constitute the majority of Iraqis.
It's my contention that, after the Gulf War, Saddam would have been considered a loose cannon even by some practitioners of realpolitik, who might have replaced him with someone more tractable, if they could have. He was no longer "our" dictator, a position he occupied during the war between Iran and Iraq, for example.
"luka, All of those quotes appear to me to be in the context of the invasion, not the term of the occupation subsequent.
My point was a rebuttal of the contention that Americans were told what to expect, i.e. that Iraq we would still have Americans and Iraqis dying in Iraq four years on, etc. We weren't told that.
Especially the Feb 7 and March 4 quotes. The March 11 and 16 quotes are not incorrect from the point of view of most Shiites and all Kurds, which would constitute the majority of Iraqis. "
Its not a question of being "not incorrect", but of what Americans were told to expect within the context of defining "failure" and "success". (the "liberator" quotes were also provided in rebuttal to an earlier commenter who said such claims were made only by lower level officials and pundits).
Let's assume the left line is correct. Heck let's assume that the President lied through his teeth, promised a short war followed by parades and what-not.
I sometimes wonder if they follow their own reasoning.
Let's rephrase the Bush Lied, People Died line a little...
I support pulling out of Iraq and abandoning the people of Iraq to the wolves because the President lied to me and hurt my feelings.
???
Do you honestly support throwing those who do support the vision of a free and democratic Iraq ( especially the Kurds ) to the wolves because your government underestimated (or even lied about) the cost? It seems terribly petty.
Glen is right, freedom doesn't appear to be worth dying for anymore...maybe pay for, if it isn't TOO expensive of course...
"But what would "clear-cut victory" actually look like in the case of Iraq (or Iran, or Syria, or any number of other places, for that matter)? Do we know?"
When the enemy's will to fight is annihilated, that is success. When the enemy still hopes for victory and therefore persists in fighting or in preparations for fighting (such as military maneuvers and war propaganda), success has not been attained.