Quick points on Eric's reply to my half-reply to his second epilogue post. My internet is supposed to be fixed shortly, but before I begin might I marvel at the similarity for those us like myself who are not the best at understanding the inner workings of computers and many an inhabitant of Greco-Roman antiquity? In both cases, we seem to rely on a class of individuals with specialized skills (whether they are ancient priests or the tech support people) to mediate between ourselves and powerful forces we could never comprehend on our own and keep them from doing as harm (system malfunctions) as well warding off evil spirits (computer viruses). The more things change, I tell ya ...
That said ...
- Pure promotion of democracy by means of military force (as opposed to expected happy result whenever military force is employed) is something that I don't think the American public ever really had much of a stomach for, since the end-result is that if you look at the 2004 Freedom House map you get some idea of the scope of the problem.
- Kristol's calls for action against Syria are not democracy-oriented (though that certainly doesn't preclude them) but rather concern the role that Syria plays in the Iraqi insurgency, which is to say that Syria is complicit in the murder of American nationals inside Iraq. One can disagree with Kristol's possible recommendations (bombing Syrian military facilities, occupying the immediate border area, taking control of Abu Kamal), but they are all based around the idea of stopping what he and many other people view as Syrian complicity in the murder of American servicemen in Iraq. Eric may not agree with that paradigm, the stated rationale for such action is about as realist-oriented as one could hope for.
- I think he's misreading the neocons and what they want to achieve (at least in the case of An End To Evil), so I will be more than happy to indulge him in breathing a sigh of relief.
- As far as the application of military force is concerned, I think that you need to differentiate between how local populations adjust to military presence, military action on their turf, etc. Cordesman dealt very carefully with the issue of how Iraq got to be the way it is today, how much support the insurgency actually has (not even a majority in places like al-Anbar), and while he didn't say, I would note that even on the occasions in which Shi'ite forces like Sadr's Mahdi Army have risen up against the US, they haven't been able to achieve anything resembling a mass following among the Iraqi population. Another thing that needs to be pointed out (and this comes from someone who has lived on US military bases for most of his life) is that in those countries where we do have permanent or semi-permanent bases they tend to be pretty isolated from the general population. I think part of this comes from the fact that local populations are more likely to accept or at least tolerate the presence of foreign troops when they are doing something positive for them (driving out Wahhabis who want to set up the municipal Taliban or running Sadr out of An Najaf, for instance), whereas they tend to take a more negative view when they aren't seeing as much of a daily threat and the view that US troops are there to control rather than protect them becomes a lot more plausible.
- In the comments, there is some discussion as to what lesson should be drawn from the US defeats in Somalia and Lebanon, with Haggai saying that the true lesson is "if you can't successfully convince most of the public that a potential military engagement is worth sticking with if the going gets tough, then don't get involved in the first place." I don't think that this is a particularly good idea because it enables domestic squabbling to preclude the need for decisive action. The majority of the American public, driven in no small part by the CNN coverage of the Somali plight, only to flip around after the graphic deaths of 18 US servicemen.
- Eric raises the issue of whether or not what happened in Lebanon and Somalia were the reason we were attacked on 9/11, to which I would say no, though they were certainly contingent factors as far as convincing al-Qaeda and other prospective international terrorists that the US doesn't have the stomach to fight a real war of attrition and can thus be overcome with minimal effort. They also occurred during a period in which most of the US political culture was focused on domestic policy (remember when OJ Simpson was the biggest story anywhere?), attacks or attempted attacks against US and allied targets went mostly without response, and a number of al-Qaeda and other terrorist front groups were able to operate logistical infrastructure on US soil with virtual impunity. All of this contributed to the belief that the US could be hit hard in an event like 9/11 and was unlikely to seriously retaliate in response.
- On this point I definitely agree with Eric:
In Iraq, the Bush Administration is confronting a different specter: people are beginning to wonder why we got involved in the first place, was there deception involved - a form of "bait and switch" to borrow from Dan - was it truly necessary and a last resort, and what is the purpose in staying? Right or wrong, those questions, and the erosion of the various pre-war and post-war rationales, is the problem, not necessarily the loss of human life - though that is clearly the impetus that gives rise to such questions. Unfortunately, once those question enter the minds of enough Americans, there don't appear as many satisfying answers.
I agree with Eric's general characterization of events, though I expect that our solutions are quite different since my solution is for the administration to be willing to fight just as hard for Iraq politically (which I don't think, pace Nadezha requires using it as a wedge issue) as the troops are in the field. Right now, to put it quite frankly, I don't think that they're doing that and it's really starting to show.
This is all very well and good, but you and Eric are begging the central questions, I think.
The war plan rested from the beginning on a failure of strategic vision. If we were going to wage war on the terrorists and their sponsors, we could only do that regionally, not in Iraq alone. It was clear before Operation Iraqi Freedom began that we would face a terror war in Iraq, because the Iranian and Syrian leaders said so. Publicly.
For many reasons we did not want to deal with that problem, even though it was and is the central problem. so I agree with Bush's critics that his vision was faulty, and I insist (sorry to be monotonous) that until and unless we unleash regime change on Damascus and Tehran, we will have no peace in Iraq.
I am all for taking action against the terrorists in Syria--I advocated it in 1983 already! But military action is a bandaid on a wound, while we have to excise a very large tumor. For that, we need democratic revolution.
If there were a Left worthy of the name, it would support the democratic revolutionaries in the Middle East. Instead, the only people who do that are called "conservatives." Mirabile dictu.
I know I'm the reincarnation of Cato the Elder, but there it is. Iran and Syria must fall. The endless debate on Iraq-alone is a dead end, you can't solve it there, you have to tackle the whole problem.
And hey, as you know (for those who always moan about our failure to get Osama), most of those top al Q guys have been in Iran for quite a while...and our only response is the occasional snide remark from Rumsfeld and our feckless embrace of the Europeans' negotiating strategem, which only gives the Iranians more time to work their evil magic.
Dr. Ledeen:
We've both been mentioning the issue of the al-Qaeda leadership operating out of Iran for what, 3, 4 years now? My distinct impression (gained in no small part from my time in DC these last two summers) is that a lot of people really, really don't want to talk about it, either because it requires us to deal with a bonafide Iran policy, because they're afraid it'll make the Euros negotiating policies nervous (though most of the top Euro anti-terrorism judges are saying pretty much the same thing), or because they're afraid that Iran will make things worse for us in Iraq.
Maybe after something else blows up people will start listening ...
I'm just not convinced that democratic revolution is a policy that can be implemented from afar, from the outside in. All too often, the policy of democratic revolution becomes the policy of military invasion, forced regime change and nation building. ML, are you advocating those military steps in Syria and Iran?
If so, Dan can I have my sigh back?
And Dan, I see you addressed my comments re: Kristol and An End To Evil, but what say you of John Podhoretz's WW IV?
Eric:
I would argue that while democratic revolution does have to occur from within that it can also be supported from abroad. What would have happened to the Soviet Bloc refuseniks, for instance, had the West declined to support them or raise their profiles? In the case of Iran, you have that domestic core but they still need international support to achieve their goal. And seeing how unlikely it is for the EU to support them at this junction, that basically leaves us.
I would also challenge this assertion:
The US never invaded Lebanon, Ukraine, Georgia, Liberia, or Kyrgyzstan, yet there seem to have successful democratic revolutions within the last several year in all of these countries with US support (which is different from saying we caused it, incidentally). There are also varying degrees of military involvement and in support of these actions (did we invade Haiti after they ditched the voodoo priest?).
And not to speak for Dr. Ledeen, but my own reading of War Against the Terror Masters (and this goes to a certain degree for An End To Evil too, and I didn't reference the Syria stuff because I didn't remember how the book touched on the subject) he favors the type of external support for internal democratic elements. Iran is seen as the most favorable candidate because of the nature of its dissident movement and, dare I speculate, Ledeen's approach likely influenced Perle and Frum as far as the steps I outlined earlier that are noted in An End To Evil.
As for Podhoretz, I didn't address it because of time constraints so I'll try to do so now.
OK, but trying to occupy Abu Kamal is madness. The locus of organization would simply shift northward to Deir-ez-Zur. I mean, is the US going to occupy Aleppo and Hama? I don't think so. Also keep in mind that much of the support for the Iraqi insurgency is related to tribal and smuggling relations across what is in many places a border in name only. While perhaps the Syrian gov't is hoping to use the situation to gain negotiating leverage with the US, I don't think that essential problem goes away with "regime change." Sorry. And btw, the evidence that those AQ guys in Iran are directing operations is pretty thin, I think, Dan.
I would argue that while democratic revolution does have to occur from within that it can also be supported from abroad. What would have happened to the Soviet Bloc refuseniks, for instance, had the West declined to support them or raise their profiles?
Then again, what happened to Iraq's Shiites in 1991 after we urged them to revolt?
"Ukraine, Georgia, Liberia, or Kyrgyzstan...[--] there seem to have [bben] successful democratic revolutions within the last several year in all of these countries."
Nothing that comes close to deserving the label "successful democratic revolution" has occurred in any of these countries - or in Russia. Such may or may not be in process.
"the Bush doctrine is, at its core, the idea that we should not distinguish between the terrorists and those who harbor them."
But what is the meaning of "those who harbor"? Does the Bush doctrine allow for bombing entire populations wherever some segments of the population have any substantial connection of any kind with the terrorists that Republicans hate (as opposed to the terrorists Republicans are willing to tolerate, even support at times, depending on whose ox is being gored)? What about people who do nothing more than verbally express some sympathy with the cause, but not the methods, of some terrorists? Is that a form of "harboring" that deserves the death penalty? What about people who simply live next door and carry on neighborly relations with those who express such views? Are they fair game? How about Jesse Helms when he effuseively supported Roberto D'Abuisson? Could there be any objection to the FMLN trying to blow up Helm's office?
"Codevilla, Helprin, and Kessler argue that...we should ... smash the whole Middle East and leave an obligatory pile of corpses behind. ... Podhoretz is saying that maybe in a perfect world the US could mobilize itself in that kind of a fashion (though if we're setting out and mobilizing ourselves to destroy an entire civilization, even a failed one, I would argue that you're running down that path to the dark side where you risk proving bin Laden right)..."
That last is a little bit of an understatement. It is no exaggeration at all to say that anyone who defines "a perfect world" in the above fashion qualifies as a full-blooded fascist.
Bill Barnes
Praktike:
You're free to hold that opinion if you want to, I'm just saying that Podhoretz is making the argument based on those grounds.
As far as the al-Qaeda leadership in Iran directing operations, that depends on what you want to call directing once you take into account the decentralized nature of the organization. They're certainly laying the strategy and overseeing the network's logistical backbone if nothing else, which is basically what Garzon said in the interview in question and what Saif al-Adel said in his latest writings. You want to say that you think he's full of it, that's fine, but then I have to ask why.
Swopa:
They revolted and we failed to support them.
Bill Barnes:
If you don't think that the level of democracy in Ukraine, Georgia, Liberia, or Kyrgyzstan has risen dramatically since the fall of their resident strongmen, I don't know what else to say. Democracy isn't necessarily utopia, the US, or Europe either and that's a realization that some people are still coming to grips with. In the case of Russia, it's currently backsliding, but it's certainly a lot better than it was during the Cold War.
As to your question (though the hysterical manner in which it was asked gives me little reason to suspect that this is going to go very far), the Bush doctrine doesn't say that you have to bomb entire populations, but rather that you don't distinguish between the terrorists and the states that back them. As Scheuer has explained in-depth in his books, the whole idea of state-sponsored terrorism was that states could wage assymetrical warfare against one another while remaining able to disavow such activities and thus avoid the consequences of their actions. The Bush doctrine simply repudiates this concept.
The term perfect world was mine, not Podhoretz's, so if you want to call anyone a fascist for making that characterization it should be me. It certainly wouldn't be the first time.
Dan,
Sorry to have breached your comfort level. I'm afraid I must insist that you yourself do not qualify for the "fascist" epithet, given your "darkside" comment. It's not who used the term "perfect world" that counts, but the sentiment. What is fascist is the glorification of the total mobilization of a "nation" or a "people" to engage in the turning of other peope into piles of corpses. And I have been seeing exactly that sentiment expressed on other "patriotic" blogs.
What does and does not qualify as "democracy" is a complicated question - let me know if you want me to give you my views. And whatever formal definitions are given to the "Bush Doctrine," it seems to me indisputable that many of its advocates are extremely careless about drawing the kinds of lines and distinctions that I talked about.
Bill
Bill, I'm not impressed that you are so sensitive to "lines and distinctions" when you throw the "fascist" label about so cavalierly.
The US never invaded Lebanon
except in 1958, and Lebanon was already a democratic country (expect Hezbllah has now more power)
Ukraine, Georgia, or Kyrgyzstan,
All part of the former USSR. Didn't the USA and UK fight alongside the whites against the reds (yes)
Liberia
Former unofficial colony
That in those countries where we do have permanent or semi-permanent bases they tend to be pretty isolated from the general population.
Has a lot to do with land price and the fact that developers get all kinds of crazy ideas if you have a large piece of undeveloped land near a large population center. And what is a military base if not a large and undeveloped piece of land.
So the effective mantra of the left now becomes: "No worse than Vietnam" 100,000 slaughtered after we leave, 500,000 take to the sea (1/2 die) to avoid slaughter. Tyranny for government.
Is this the best the anti-war folks can do?
Michael L.,
Are you sure there is no regional plan? No special forces in Iran?
I believe Iran is still part of the axis of evil.
When Rumsfield says that Iran and Syria aren't being helpful you know the Pentagon must be busy planning.
Bill Barnes:
I' particularly impressed with the levels of democracy found in places call "the Democratic People's Republc of.....".
Praktike,
Smugglers like to be paid. Who pays them?