Winds of Change.NET: The epilogue of my epilogue to Eric Martin

September 13, 2005

The epilogue of my epilogue to Eric Martin

by Dan Darling at September 13, 2005 5:04 AM

Everybody get all that?

I realize that only 5 people probably even remember my numerous posts to Eric Martin concerning his series of posts on Iraq, et al.

Still, in the interest of Platonic harmony and all that I figured it might be a nice thing to actually finish replying to Eric.

To begin with, a lot of what he says about leveling with the American people I agree with:

Credibility gaps are dangerous disconnects to create between a leader and his or her public when trying to conduct a protracted war. The entire Iraq campaign was built upon a wobbly edifice of mismanaged expectations in terms of justifications, costs, difficulties, the reception we would receive, the duration our troops would be in Iraq, the political ramifications for the entire region, etc. The Bush administration has been slow to correct the early propaganda, instead relying on a series of events designated as the next tipping point, such as the deaths of Uday and Qusay, the capture of Saddam, the transfer of limited sovereignty, the election and the now-delayed Constitution. The more the American people hear about "tipping points" that never tip, corners that never turn and last throes that last forever, the more they will lose patience. To echo Joe Biden, Bush must at long last come clean about the struggle that lies ahead, the likely duration, the prospects for "success" (a term he should define somewhat) and the tenacity needed to realize any and all of those goals. And he must ask the American people to sacrifice - more than the soldiers and their families.

There are of course some definite distinctions that need to be stated here between myself and Eric. Eric, as I understand it (and he is more than welcome to correct me on this) never bought into the administration rationales for war, which is one the things that probably gives him and others like him credibility in critiquing the administration rather than many of the people that Robert Kagan wrote about that supported the war while things were looking good but then proceeded to drop that support when things went south. This probably applies as much to conservatives as it does liberals if one heads back into the late 1990s when the Clinton administration was quite frankly preparing to launch its own war against Iraq.

Whether or not the rationales for war were sound, honest, or whatever is not my primary concern here. I can debate those (and have, though not with Eric) until we're both blue and the face. For those who want to accuse me of trying to kick this issue further down the road, my answer is that you are entirely correct! You can make all the criticisms you want about the honesty, credibility, and what not that you like, but short of impeachment (which Eric has already stated he does not favor) we are more or less stuck with the current administration for the next several years for better or for worse. Moreover, the endless debates over the rationales for the war in many cases only serves to obfuscate discussions of what we do now, in part because it's a lot easier to wax eloquent about the benefit of having deposed Saddam Hussein (or inversely to rail against the administration for having lied and/or manipulated intelligence with regard to WMDs) than it is to come up with substantive ideas about what we do in the here and now.

Eric then argues that Bush rescind his tax cuts:

Bush must, absolutely must, ask the wealthiest Americans, who have benefited so immensely under his leadership, to forsake some of their multi-tiered, multi-packaged, multi-trillion dollar tax cuts so that we can continue to fund this war, purchase the armor for our troops and their vehicles, pay their medical expenses, and not run up the deficit to dangerous levels so that it itself becomes a national security issue. There are more than a trillion good reasons why no nation in the history of the world has cut taxes during a time of war. Bush and his fellow Republicans have done it three times (at least). Time to admit your error Mr. President, and attempt to right the ship. If Iraq is truly as important as you've said it is, then show us the money.

To which I will defer this point to those far more knowledgeable in economics than I whom I know read this blog, as my ignorance on this issue puts me in a position in which I do feel comfortable making a definite statement. Or to put it another way, I am all for spending as much money as is necessary to pay for what we're doing in Iraq, but I do not want to see the issue of paying for Iraq used as a bait-and-switch for enacting liberal tax policies that should be debated the same way we do any other domestic issues.

Eric then proceeds to advocate a "winning hearts and minds approach" by zeroing in on the issue of detainee abuse:

In other words, you must appeal to the actual people you are trying to....well, appeal to. A practical application of this could be informing how we conduct and oversee our detention facilities. We simply must do better than we have done at Bagram, Abu Ghraib, Gitmo and elsewhere if we want to even make a dent in the effort for hearts and minds. War supporters, most of all, should be leading this charge if they truly value success. But all too often they are the ones shouting the loudest that the horrific treatment of Iraqis, Afghanis and other Muslims is really nothing to be concerned about. "They're all terrorists," they say, despite the fact that many at Gitmo are innocent of all charges (12 year old boys?), Abu Ghraib releases between 70-90% of its captives, and that story of misidentified innocents is similar at Bagram and elsewhere. Here's the self-fulfilling prophesy: if you treat every Iraqi like a terrorist/insurgent, pretty soon every Iraqi is going to side with the terrorists/insurgents in one form or another. Apply that lesson to the battle for Muslim hearts and minds generally speaking. This is not, or shouldn't be at least, a controversial suggestion.

As far as the interrogation debate is concerned, I will say what I said back in June. That is, the issues of detainee abuse is not only one of morality but also one of effectiveness and propaganda, that too little of the debate on interrogation techniques is being conducted by actual interrogators, and that we have to conduct this discussion in a rational manner. As far as all of those issues go, I'm with Eric 110%.

One thing I will quibble with him on, however, is something that needs to be stressed, is that al-Qaeda doesn't abide by the very Western idea that you're only an adult when they turn 18. One of the "children" now being held at Gitmo, for instance, is the Canadian Egyptian son of a founding member of al-Qaeda who killed a US soldier in Afghanistan. 12 year-olds are also perfectly capable of acting as couriers, throwing grenades, etc. Such is the inhuman nature of the enemy we now face that age is unfortunately not a standard that can be used to determine whether or not a child or teen who is found the scene of a battlefield was one of the combatants. This is certainly not the case with the majority of those who detained in US sweeps (which is why they've been released), but it is the case with some of them.

Then, take this lesson and extend it to all conduct of our military and intelligence operations - to the best of our oversight abilities - from roadblock/checkpoint rules of engagement, to intrusive home raids, to the use of anti-personnel cluster bombs in populated areas to name but a few. We must try to minimize and mitigate the alienation and creation of enemies that would result from otherwise callous policies.

I think that we've already been doing this in Iraq to a certain extent, at least on the local level, based in large part on anecdotal evidence from friends and soldiers who have served there. One of them, General Petraeus, is now our commandant out at Fort Leavenworth and he'll be more than happy to tell you about how everything we do in Iraq is done with the intention of not upsetting the locals. The problem is, and Cordesman works to make this quite clear, that in order for our strategy in Iraq to work, we need to have the Iraqis be the one doing the heavy lifting because no matter how well US forces conduct themselves in Iraq, they are still foreign troops and going to be regarded as such. I would add that Cordesman also stresses that the new Iraqi forces must be as respectful of human rights as they are effective if we want to do this correctly.

He then proceeds to cite Nadezha, who in turn cites a paper published by my own CGSC on how to fight a counter-insurgency campaign. Since both of us agree on those basics, let's move next to Eric's citing former CPA official Larry Diamond, the author of Squandered Victory, who makes the following recommendations:

There are four key elements to a political strategy for diminishing the violent resistance in Iraq. First, the Bush Administration must declare that the U.S. will not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. Second, we should declare some sort of time frame (but not a rigid deadline) by which we think we can withdraw militarily - if Iraqi groups that are supporting or tolerating the violence will instead help build the new political order. Third, we need to talk directly to the (largely Sunni) political groups connected to the insurgency, some of which have been seeking to talk to the U.S. for almost two years. Fourth, we need an honest broker to help mediate these discussions and build confidence in the process; this might be a small international contact group including representatives from the United Nations and one or two of the European embassies in Baghdad.

To which I reply:

1. It is not entirely clear to me how announcing that we are not seeking permanent bases early on is going to reduce violence in Iraq one iota, particularly among those most involved in causing it. Now granted, we certainly shouldn't have gone in presuming that we were going to have them, but I see no reason to unilaterally rule them out altogether. Moreover, this strikes me as far more of an American political issue than it is an Iraqi one, particularly when one looks at how Iraq plans to defend its territorial integrity over the next several years, to say nothing of its complete lack of an air force.

2. Again, this looks more to me to be a domestic concern as it is an Iraqi one. Any even tentative deadline that we set is going to turn into a rigid one for political purposes in the current climate, with the end-result being that we won't have room to maneuver that our current stance allows us.

3. The US is and already has been in active talks with insurgent groups not operating under Zarqawi's aegis, though perhaps not at the time that Diamond was writing his book. Allawi even had some grand plan to negotiate the surrender of the ex-Baathists in Syria that didn't pan out. As for why we're not talking with the people most responsible for the violence (al-Qaeda in Iraq), Cordesman is quite clear that the only real option there is to destroy them. Period.

4. I'm not terribly certain how bringing the Europeans or the UN into negotiations with insurgent groups are going to add anything to the presence. Most of the ones that are willing to talk just want to go home with a guarantee that they aren't going to be killed and/or ethnically cleansed for their actions and those of the former regime. What Iraq probably needs is an Algeria-style amnesty followed swiftly by a deathmatch war of attrition against Zarqawi and Co, call it holding life in one hand and death in the other if you like. Any such amnesty, however, is ultimately going to be up to the new Iraqi government by virtue of their new-found sovereignty.

Diamond then critiques the administration's approach as follows:

The Bush Administration is refusing to take any of these four steps. It won't renounce the bases because it wants them. It won't consider any kind of timetable, even without fixed deadlines, even dependent on the cooperation of the other side, because it doesn't want to look weak, and it doesn't really know when Iraqi forces will be ready to assume the burdens of maintaining order (against an insurgency that is fueled in part by the lack of an Administration strategy). It has refused to talk to the insurgent groups because, again, it fears this being misinterpreted as a sign of weakness, and because, once you have said about the insurgency, "Bring them on," they are just "evildoers," what is left to discuss? They have taken steps to bring the marginalized Sunnis into the political process. The Sunnis have a place on the constitution drafting committee in large measure because of American pressure. I do give the Administration credit for that. But this is only the beginning of a political strategy.

To which I reply:

1. There still hasn't been any real explanation from Diamond as to why bases are either a bad thing or should be rejected unilaterally. Eric gives one later, but Diamond doesn't in the excerpts he provides.

2. Not wanting a timetable if we really don't know when the Iraqis are going to be ready strikes me as a very realistic and real-world concern.

3. Is simply untrue.

4. Khalilzad has done everything in his power to work in the interest of Iraqi Sunnis since taking up the position of US ambassador, to the point of bending over backwards and doing everything in his power to reach a compromise with respect to their demands. If this isn't a visible political strategy of Sunni inclusion, I'm not sure what is.

Eric then explains why he thinks that Diamond's advice is wise:

First, it is built on the notion of "marginalizing" the insurgents. By making our intention to leave, eventually, clear we could separate the nationalists and Baathists (who want us out of Iraq no matter what), from the foreign fighters, thus driving a wedge between the camps and better isolate the die-hards. Appealing to the Sunnis politically, and through offers of amnesty, would further support this effort. Synergistically, this should be our goal in the broader War on Terror as well, and I recommend Nadezhda's post on the subject of marginalization strategy as an excellent resource. The question is, will the Bush administration relinquish its designs on permanent bases in order to try to weaken the insurgency? It is becoming clearer every day that a decision will have to be made here one way or another.

To which I reply:

1. Near as I can tell, the majority of the insurgents in Iraq are not fighting because they are angry over the prospect of US military bases but rather because they view themselves as being under foreign military occupation that is currently serving to back up a puppet government. If they think Jaafari is an American puppet, there isn't much that foreclosing the option of bases is going to do to satisfy them. This perception crosses boundaries among various insurgent groups, with the only real difference between Zarqawi and the Baathists being what they want to replace Jaafari with.

2. Political appeals to Sunnis (which we're doing now - see Cordesman's writings on the National Dialogue Council) are a good idea and something that Khalilzad has stressed, as are amnesty offers, which really helped to deflate the insurgency in Algeria and PULO in southern Thailand during the 1980s. Any amnesty offer, however, is going to have to be cleared by the new Iraqi government and as such is out of our hands to a certain extent.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, our armed forces cannot stay in Iraq indefinitely, or much past the end of 2005 at its current troop levels, and our allies are heading for the exits, one after the other. Thus, if we do not contain the insurgency in some meaningful way prior to our impending troop reductions, the situation will deteriorate. If you think it's hard to whack a mole with the current troop levels, just wait until we have half that amount in country, relegated to remote bases. This makes Mr. Diamond's recommendations more than a passing criticism. Something must be done soon, because like it or not, many of our troops will be coming home in the next year.

While I've found a lot of the liberal criticisms of the administration as far as the use of the National Guard and Army Reserves are concerned to be quite candid and true (and we can go back to my criticisms of Rumsfeld some othe time), I can't help think that there has to be some way to maintain troop strength without breaking either group. One of these would be the DLC proposal to increase troop size, which has a great deal of merit for me and would be an area that I think Republicans would really do well to embrace. We should have embraced it as soon as the insurgency started when it became clear that we were going to have to have a large number of US troops tied down in Iraq for the immediate future, but that's another rant altogether. I also think that an American version of the French Foreign Legion is also well worth considering, as are more actions along the lines of the Pan-Sahel Initiative to bring our allies up to par now that we recognize that every European state outside the UK probably has about a total of 10-20,000 troops that can be deployed outside the Continent at any given time.

In Part I of this series, I said I disagreed with Matt Yglesias' column which called for a withdrawal of US forces after the finalization of the Constitution and the subsequent elections. Instead, I argued, we must stick around in Iraq in order to stabilize the situation and forestall potential widespread violence. But perhaps I was being unfair to Yglesias. I mean to say that if the Bush administration has no intention or plan for altering the flow of events in Iraq, if they are not willing to make the hard choices to try to tamp the insurgency, then I think we should withdraw ala Yglesias. The current strategy is unwinnable, and will only result in a further bleeding of money, military assets, lives, credibility, intelligence assets, and collective foreign policy brainpower that could be better utilized in other hot spots around the globe.

Well if that's Eric's opinion then there's probably not all that much that I or anyone else can do to change his mind. One of the things that I think do need to be considered by all those now advocating or even considering withdrawl is just how valuable all the money, military and intelligence assets, and foreign policy brainpower is going to be deployed elsewhere when Iraq explodes. I am also at something of a loss to see how withdrawing from Iraq serves to preserve US credibility - if anything it would seem to pretty much shed what standing we have among the Iraqi government, the Iraqi people, and their counterparts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world as a whole. If we can't be trusted to stay the course in an area that countless leaders of both parties have invested so much value in, on what basis can we be trusted to stay the course anywhere? Faced with what is going to universally look like a weak US, a lot of people are going to see us running and come to the conclusion that bin Laden and his acolytes are right about everything they've been saying over the last several years.

Unfortunately, this time they'll be correct and not all the redeployment in the world is going to be able to counter-act that. This is not to say that I think criticism of our current policy is a bad thing or should be dismissed off-hand, but I also think that the ultimate goal of such criticism should be to promote a positive outcome in Iraq. This isn't like in domestic politics where if things go south you can revisit the issue in the next Congress or presidential election - there are a lot of people's lives at stake here and if the current policies are so completely unworkable as some suggest, isn't it at least worth trying to fix them before we just throw up our hands and give up? If not, that kinda runs in the face of the argument that we actually care about the people of Iraq we've been talking so much about since the Gulf War. Or is American blood thicker than Arab, Kurdish, or Turkman?

Ultimately, that's something the American people are going to have to decide.

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Comments

#1 from Glen Wishard at 8:51 am on Sep 13, 2005

Bush must, absolutely must, ask the wealthiest Americans, who have benefited so immensely under his leadership, to forsake some of their multi-tiered, multi-packaged, multi-trillion dollar tax cuts ...

Does Eric Martin really think we're going to run out of money, or does he just like those good old "Eat the Rich" taxes?

I sure wish that some people would figure out that millions of low income Americans work for "rich" people - or for giant, greed-crazed, blood-sucking corporations - that when taxes go up and less money is available for capital and investment, those poor people don't get jobs, raises, etc.

At the same time, as profits go down the government collects less tax revenue. So this business of eating the rich for the fun of it is expensive. We can't afford that kind of nonsense when we've got a war to pay for.

Sure wish that some people would figure that out some day. Wish, wish, wish. In the meantime, people who want that kind of thing should get a drug that makes their brain pump out more dopamine. Same result and nobody else gets hurt.

First, the Bush Administration must declare that the U.S. will not seek permanent military bases in Iraq.

I almost judge the seriousness of a war critic by how much they go on about bases in Iraq. Such talk makes little sense outside of warped leftist fantasies about imperialism and neocolonialism.

Assuming that anyone wants such bases, the sovereign government of Iraq - which the left has treated with utter contempt, to their own eternal discredit - has the right to negotiate bases on their own soil with anyone they choose. Renouncing their rights as a sovereign nation, or having the United States renounce their rights for them, does not in any way enhance the stature of the Iraqi government. Nor would it discourage their enemies in any way.

On the contrary, it would greatly encourage their enemies - foreign and domestic. Among their foreign enemies are those who insist on treating Iraq as an extension of the Bush Administration, which must be undermined and discredited at all costs.

#2 from Joe Katzman at 9:50 am on Sep 13, 2005

Epilogues of epilogues... shades of The Who's farewell tour....

#3 from praktike at 2:28 pm on Sep 13, 2005

On the basing issue, I think the best way to explain it is that the idea that America is seeking a permanent military presence in Iraq is a powerful motivator for the insurgency. The satellite channels use the same word, "ihtilel," for the American presence in Iraq that they use for the Israeli presence in the West Bank, mish keda? And since Iraq and Israel tend to dominate the headlines, the two occupations tend to run together in people's minds. So I think it's important to convey by word, deed, and symbol, that the US is not interested in an Israel-like "ihtilel," fahim?

#4 from michael ledeen at 3:08 pm on Sep 13, 2005

It is impossible to have a serious strategic discussion so long as the basic failure of strategic vision continues. This is a regional war, not a war for/in Iraq alone. There will never be good security in IRaq so long as the Assads and the mullahs rule in Damscus and Tehran.

Questions like 'should we have bases,' or 'should we announce a departure date' have to be evaluated in terms of the overall regional strategy. which does not exist, and which has yet to be debated seriously.

Finally, within Iraq, isn't it clear that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis hate the terrorists? They have lost the battle for hearts and minds. That, too, should be a pillar of any serious debate. But it isn't.

#5 from davebo at 4:13 pm on Sep 13, 2005

"Does Eric Martin really think we're going to run out of money"

Well, we've done it every year so far. And looking to be around 500 billion in the hole for this year.

And this is more than just a domestic economic issue. It's very very much a national security issue.

"This is a regional war, not a war for/in Iraq alone."

Not among the vast majority of Americans it isn't. And they are the ones you need to convince.

Unfortunately you and those who continue to espouse that grand vision have even less credibility than the president at this point.

#6 from Dan Darling at 4:28 pm on Sep 13, 2005

praktike:

I have no doubt that the average Iraqi involved in the insurgency believes that the occupation of their country is the same as Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories. The problem is that this perception isn't a simple matter of US military presence because the people who believe that also don't see the country as sovereign, believe that Jaafari is an American puppet, etc. It is not entirely clear to me how foreswearing bases is going to end the occupation perception among insurgents and their supporters.

Moreover, there are a number of Arab states that currently house US bases at the request of the government where their presence is not regarded as akin to occupation: Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain spring immediately to mind. If the Iraqis through their elected representatives want to discuss basing rights with us as some point in the future, that's their right and I think we're shooting ourselves in the foot to unilaterally foreswear them without first talking to them.

#7 from PD Shaw at 4:36 pm on Sep 13, 2005

Davebo: Would you also support eliminating the prescription drug program to close the budgetary gap?

#8 from PD Shaw at 4:40 pm on Sep 13, 2005

If President Bush "foreswore" permanent bases in Iraq, how many would believe him? I'm not sure I would. Circumstances change as do administrations. And those are some of the less conspiratorial reasons.

#9 from davebo at 4:59 pm on Sep 13, 2005

Absolutely. Or at a minimum make major modifications to dramatically decrease it's cost.

Of course the list of possible cuts goes on and on. And I think given the disaster that is Katrina we should be revamping the transportation bill.

But little of this is on topic.

#10 from Glen Wishard at 5:12 pm on Sep 13, 2005

praktike: I think it's important to convey by word, deed, and symbol, that the US is not interested in an Israel-like "ihtilel," fahim?

Seriously, praktike, I think it's much more important that we assert - by word, deed, and symbol - that Israel is our friend, that we do not abandon our friends at the request of our enemies, and that we will not play their judenhaas politics in the name of "sensitivity".

We need to stop pretending that there is a reasonable anti-Zionism out there that we are obligated to respect. If such a thing exists, it is hopelessly entangled with conspiracy theories, apologism for terror, and pure and simple Hitlerism.

In the long run it will do no good for the positive elements in the Arab and Muslim world if we play along with the idea that Israel is the cause of all their problems. They're the ones who've paid the heaviest price for that delusion. Don't give it another inch of rope.

#11 from liberalhawk at 8:18 pm on Sep 13, 2005

1. Money - I personally think that further tax cuts are NOT needed to grow the economy, and are in fact harmful. But this is about more than that - its about a sense of shared sacrifice. If we're serious, we should be spending more on the WOT, and not using our resources to cut taxes.

2. Ledeens point about a regional war. I think he himself has made clear that we shouldnt launch a conventional attack on Iran. Now there may be more things we can to support Iranian resistance than we have, but i see no evidence that even if we do more, it can assure a revolution in Iran. Similarly Syria, when we pressure them, is very good at doing just enough to stay alive. We have to have a strategy to win in Iraq that doesnt rely on regime change in Syria or Iran.

3. Not being like Israel. Well I suppose we could not set up American settlements in Iraq. Of course it helps that Iraq is not within commuting distance of any American cities (which reminds one of the dilemma Israel faces on the West Bank, as well as the temptations) Come on, the differences between our situation vis a vis Iraq and the Israeli situation in the territories is clear. That Al Jazeera chooses not to see the differences, just reinforces the idea tha Al Jizz is a propaganda organ. I think Iraqi Shia and Kurds, and those Sunnis who are seriously interested in a modus vivendi with the Shia and Kurds, can see the difference.

4. The big issue continues to be the training of Iraqi forces, and how many Americans we can/have to withdraw as Iraqi forces stand up. Jaafari is now saying the US will be able to withdraw 50,000 troops soon. I doubt thats a good idea - it may be that Iraqis can take over patrol duties in Mosul and Baghdad, and some units can engage in offensive action (as at Tal Afar) but will there be enough Iraqis to WIN in Anbar province? I suspect the 50,000 is some combination of the optimistic style of speech charecteristic of the region, and pressure from Washington.

#12 from praktike at 10:17 pm on Sep 13, 2005

I'm seeing a lot of unwillingness to believe that people in this region actually believe that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the American occupation of Iraq are similar. Wishful thinking. Enjoy your bubbles, folks.

#13 from AMac at 10:40 pm on Sep 13, 2005

Regarding Eric Martin's point:

perhaps more importantly, our armed forces cannot stay in Iraq indefinitely, or much past the end of 2005 at its current troop levels, and our allies are heading for the exits, one after the other. Thus, if we do not contain the insurgency in some meaningful way prior to our impending troop reductions, the situation will deteriorate. If you think it's hard to whack a mole with the current troop levels, just wait until we have half that amount in country, relegated to remote bases.

It's worth reading Fallujah a lesson in counter-insurgency by Pamela Hess of UPI. Excellent article, providing information and perspective without axe-grinding (via the indispensible Fourth Rail).

praktike #12:

I'm seeing a lot of unwillingness to believe that people in this region actually believe that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the American occupation of Iraq are similar.

Not disbelief here--just resignation. To some extent, people are gonna think what they're gonna think. As the on-the-ground reality changes, the perceptions of the Arab and European media elites--rather hostile to US policies, whatever they may be--may also slowly change. The bubbles ahoy criticism seems more apropos when directed at those who suppose that this decision or that policy change will cause opinion makers to have a series of Aha! moments, right on schedule. I don't seem much in the way of precedent to support that notion.

#14 from Dan Darling at 10:41 pm on Sep 13, 2005

Praktike:

Chalk it up to that whole faith vs. reality-based thing ...

I more than understand why Iraqis think that the US is an occupation force - Cordesman discusses this in some detail as far as the need to replace American with Iraqi forces. What I'm not seeing, however, is a reason why we should unilaterally foreswear bases in Iraq without conducting discussions of them the same way we do every other country on the planet. Are US forces in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain regarded as occupation forces akin to the Israelis?

Another thing that needs to talked about, and liberalhawk zeroes in on this, is that if the Arab satellite channels are saying that what we're doing in Iraq is the same as what Israel did in the Palestinian territories then it's a little hard for them to claim that they aren't serving as a vehicle for enemy propaganda, a claim that many an Iraqi official has made over the last several years.

Moreover, it still isn't clear to me that those now believing that we're equivalent to the those icky Israelis are just going to cry out for joy and throw down their weapons if Bush comes out and foreswears bases. And if it isn't going to accomplish anything, then what is the point of the whole exercise?

You want to accuse all of us of living in bubbles separated from reality, that's fine, but I don't think that removes the need to answer legitimate questions about what you're saying.

#15 from Theseus at 10:47 pm on Sep 13, 2005

So because out of their own impotence, weaknesses, self-delusions and self-pity, many in the region choose to believe in and continue to propagate lies and/or conspiracy theories, we should be basing
our policy on these delusions? Yeah, that makes perfect sense. Is that more of the "reality-based" foreign policy?

With regards to how this may translate into actual policy, let me see if I understand: in order to appease the delusions of the so-called "Arab Street", we should, potentially, abandon our Iraqi allies to the likes of Zarqawi and/or the rest of the neo-Bathists thugs and/or the other vipers in the region. Does the Iraqi government not have a choice in the matter? Or should their wishes/needs/choices be completed ignored?

As far as I'm concerned, this should be an issue when the Iraqis themselves make it an issue.

#16 from AMac at 10:53 pm on Sep 13, 2005

Theseus #15:

Lord knows, there are some on the Left who wouldn't lose sleep over throwing Iraqis and Iraq to Zarqawi's wolves. But I don't think that's a fair or helpful characterization of praktike's or Eric Martin's views.

#17 from davebo at 11:01 pm on Sep 13, 2005

"Are US forces in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain regarded as occupation forces akin to the Israelis?"

Not that I'm aware of. But then they didn't enter the country as part of an invasion force.

Slight difference I'd say.

#18 from Dan Darling at 11:07 pm on Sep 13, 2005

davebo:

Ah-ha, but therein lies my point. The belief that the US is occupying Iraq and intends to do so in perpetuity is directly linked to a belief of the illegitimacy of the new Iraqi government. In other words, it's basically an American rump state run by Quislings and sychophants of the US government.

Simply foreswearing bases in Iraq is not going to do anything towards solving that perception problem.

As to the issue of us entering Iraq as part of an invasion force, as I recall that was exactly how we entered Kuwait in 1991.

#19 from Theseus at 11:15 pm on Sep 13, 2005

AMac:

Fair enough, but I did say "potentially", meant as unintended consequence. I apologize if I came off sounding way harsh and/or unclear. I do take both praktike and Eric's criticisms and points seriously though, something I've stopped bothered doing with most other "constructive" "liberal" critics.

#20 from PD Shaw at 2:35 am on Sep 14, 2005

If we're serious, we should be spending more on the WOT, and not using our resources to cut taxes.

Liberalhawk, I still don't get this. Is it equally true that if we are serous about the WOT, then we should cut spending? Certainly, if the issue is money or sacrifice, then it could take many forms (say, reinstating the draft). Yet, the gist of the argument appears to be that because we're in a WOT, Republican policy preferences should be sacrificed. Davebo's answer (#9) appears to be the exception to the rule (but one could say his policy preference is defecit reduction).

So far I've had to conclude that tax cut opponents are merely fighting domestic disputes "by other means."

#21 from praktike at 6:28 am on Sep 14, 2005

"What I'm not seeing, however, is a reason why we should unilaterally foreswear bases in Iraq without conducting discussions of them the same way we do every other country on the planet. Are US forces in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain regarded as occupation forces akin to the Israelis?"

Well, clearly, the difference is that US troops in the Khaleej are on their bases and not engaging in offensive operations and MP-like duties, setting up checkpoints and so forth. And as you suggest in citing Cordesman, that's what needs to change. As to the relative importance of basing rights in the pantheon of insurgent motivators, I'd have to know more about what kind of pamphlets get circulated in the streets.

BTW, what I'm saying about the satellite channels is more subtle than what some of you seem to be grokking. The two major news stories that nearly always run back to back here are Israel/West Bank and Iraq. The same word is generally used for both, although I believe al-Hurra uses "at-tahrir al-Iraq" (liberation of Iraq) rather than "al ihtilel al-Iraq." As it happens, al-Hurra is not very popular here as it's seen as an American propaganda instrument. In the real world, Arabs mostly watch al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya (and in the real real world they mostly watch booty-shaking Lebanese singers on Melody Arabia) which are inevitably going to tilt toward the viewers in order to gain market share.

#22 from Dan Darling at 6:53 am on Sep 14, 2005

praktike:

I think it's a given that any bases we acquire in Iraq are going be agreed upon with the understanding that they are there with the purpose of defending Iraq's territorial integrity. We've had bases in Turkey since the Cold War, yet we've never helped Turkey militarily in internal operations against its communist, Kurdish, and Islamist incarnations.

As to the issue of Arab satellite coverage, I think (and this goes back to the issue I was trying to touch on as far as the view of the fundamental illegitimacy of both any US presence in Iraq and the Jaafari government is concerned) that we're dealing with a far bigger issue here than just the fact that we might want bases in Iraq. I doubt that anything'll change as far as the coverage is concerned if Bush came out and foreswore permanent bases in Iraq.

I'm just sayin'.

#23 from Robert McDougall at 7:50 am on Sep 14, 2005

Dan Darling:

Near as I can tell, the majority of the insurgents in Iraq are not fighting because they are angry over the prospect of US military bases but rather because they view themselves as being under foreign military occupation that is currently serving to back up a puppet government. If they think Jaafari is an American puppet, there isn't much that foreclosing the option of bases is going to do to satisfy them.

Bloodless bass-ackward analysis. The insurgents don't "view themselves as being under foreign military occupation" becauses they consider Jaafari "an American puppet", but because of doors kicked down, automatic rifle fire splattered about the streets, bombs dropped in their neighbourhood by foreign military personnel. If they count Jaafari as "an American puppet" or the Government of Iraq as "Quislings and sychophants", it's because they perceive (accurately) that they're not with them but with the foreign forces.

I have no doubt that the average Iraqi involved in the insurgency believes that the occupation of their country is the same as Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories. . . if the Arab satellite channels are saying that what we're doing in Iraq is the same as what Israel did in the Palestinian territories then it's a little hard for them to claim that they aren't serving as a vehicle for enemy propaganda . . .

Besides the many dissimilarities, which the average Iraqi insurgent sympathizer could probably reel off more fluently than the average U.S. warblogger if he were so minded, there's the big similarity they care about -- that in both cases Arabs/Muslims are being pushed around at gunpoint in their own country by foreign kaffir interlopers.

[The persistent refusal of highly nationalistic U.S. commentators to take realistic account of nationalist sentiment among Iraqis is a never failing source of amazement.]

It is not entirely clear to me how announcing that we are not seeking permanent bases early on is going to reduce violence in Iraq one iota, particularly among those most involved in causing it.

A fair bit of truth in that. The Iraqi insurgents are motivated by far more immediate concerns than the size of the U.S. footprint in Iraq 10 years out; the international brigade by far wider concerns. In short, in Iraq it's a secondary issue.

It's more salient outside Iraq, with non-Iraqi Arabs and Muslims and neutrals and U.S. allies generally. Permanent bases have a lot to do with whether the U.S. is perceived as following a "forward strategy of freedom" or a forward strategy of military domination (though frankly I think even with the bases the "strategy of freedom" would be a hard sell in most places). It'll likely have some (diffuse) effect not on the already committed jihadis themselves but on the size of the pool for future recruitment.

. . . there are a number of Arab states that currently house US bases at the request of the government where their presence is not regarded as akin to occupation: Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain spring immediately to mind.

Two factors: first, the governments there have vastly more control than the Government of Iraq; second, most of the citizenry is on board with a strategy of keep your head down, stay onside with Mr Big, let the money roll in. And yet, even so, it's a sensitive issue. If the governments lose their grip to anything like the extent of Iraq, it's very likely to be a contested issue.

If we can't be trusted to stay the course in an area that countless leaders of both parties have invested so much value in, on what basis can we be trusted to stay the course anywhere? Faced with what is going to universally look like a weak US, a lot of people are going to see us running and come to the conclusion that bin Laden and his acolytes are right about everything they've been saying over the last several years.
Unfortunately, this time they'll be correct and not all the redeployment in the world is going to be able to counter-act that.

On your analysis, three logical possibilities: (1) The U.S. can prevail real soon, before the Reserve and National Guard melt down; alternatively, real cheap, with much lighter forces than at present. (2) The U.S. can summon up the will for a much larger and more sustained presence in Iraq than possible under present arrangements. (3) The U.S. will indeed fail (very visibly) to "stay the course".

If (1) isn't practically possible -- and it's not looking good right now -- and neither is (2) -- and no one seems to think it is -- then (3) is what you're left with; and you may as well chalk it up as one more foreseeable cost of W's excellent adventure, and start figuring out how to live with it.

[I don't myself think the alternatives are as stark as that, but I do think the U.S. is going to end up looking like it's bitten off more than it's willing to chew -- because that's exactly what it's done.]

#24 from AMac at 3:48 pm on Sep 14, 2005

Robert McDougall #23:

[The persistent refusal of highly nationalistic U.S. commentators to take realistic account of nationalist sentiment among Iraqis is a never failing source of amazement.]

People like me are in somewhat similar fashion astonished by essays--by Westerners and Arabs both--that demonstrate indifference to the contrast between:

understanding the legitimate grievances of the freedom fighters so that the perfidies of America and its puppet regimes can be brought to light and combatted by the mighty pen, and

understanding the perspectives of the jihadist and Baathist/fascist Enemy so as to fight them, and their evil doctrines, more effectively.

As we've never met, I only know what you write. I'll stipulate that you're a nice person and, when prompted, that you are willing to denounce certain suicide bombings and other non-Queensbury tactics in the freedom fighter's toolkit. Still, comment #23 contains the standard rhetoric of the Edward Said "they hate us for excellent reasons and I would too" diatribe. Lengthier and more eloquent embrace of exotic dhimmitude by Molly Bingham, here.

Some readers will note a certain contrast between the tone of McDougall's and Bingham's writing and that of William Shawcross, as quoted (italics) on WoC commenter Glen Wishard's blog.

The selective indignation that followed Abu Ghraib does not excuse Abu Ghraib, but Shawcross points out that it speaks volumes about who Iraq's friends are:

... the new Iraqi minister for Human Rights criticized the abuses at Abu Ghraib, but asked where the Arab protest had been during the long Saddam years when Iraqis were being tortured to death.

The difference was also shown in the response to the abuses. Saddam murdered and tortured hundreds of thousands of people - millions, indeed, over decades with impunity. And with no consequences.

The anti-war position on the horror of Saddam's regime is: Nothing.

...Shawcross is equally direct when dealing the sources of Islamic terror. Neither an isolationist US policy nor a Palestinian "solution" will appease the jihadists in the slightest, as their war is existential, not reactionary. For each step back we take, they will take two steps forward:

They live to kill. The most determined live to die. Or, perhaps more often, they brainwash others to do so ... That incitement, reiterated constantly in Arabic press and television, is at the root of such terrorism and to pretend otherwise is a hypocrisy and a delusion.

The anti-war position is the insistence that resisting terrorism breeds more terrorism. The old cynical European view was more honest: Resisting terrorism attracts the terrorist's attention. Leaving terrorism alone makes it more likely that the terrorist will kill someone else. Most likely a Jew or another Arab, but not one of our people.

Those who have grown committed in their world-view and are unlikely to alter it on the strength of a blog post. Still, open-minded, skeptical readers may happen by these comments. One service we can all perform is to see that viewpoints and their implications are stated clearly in the ongoing debate. In that regard, Robert McDougall deserves as much credit as Dan Darling, Eric Martin, and praktike.

#25 from liberalhawk at 9:13 pm on Sep 14, 2005

"Liberalhawk, I still don't get this. Is it equally true that if we are serous about the WOT, then we should cut spending? Certainly, if the issue is money or sacrifice, then it could take many forms (say, reinstating the draft"

I dont have the figures handy but my sense is that discretionary domestic spending in real terms since 2001 has been declining, if you exclude the prescription drug benefit. If you ask whethet it made sense to hold off on that benefit during war time, I'd say it was - and to keep domestic spending down - ALONGSIDE reversing the tax cuts, or at least not pursuing any more.

As for the draft, my sense is that the military really doesnt want that (though a wider mandatory national service, with military enlistment as ONE option might answer some objections) - and it focuses sacrifice on young men, not on the whole society.

#26 from Dan Darling at 10:41 pm on Sep 14, 2005

The military doesn't want a draft because it tends to hamper with the effectiveness of having a professional army to begin with. Conscription forces like the kind we had in World War 2 are not the best suited for the kind of assymetrical counter-insurgency battle we're fighting right now. Russia fields a conscription force in Chechnya and, even when ignoring the corruption and unthinking brutality inherent in the Russian military, they still do a pretty good job.

That said, AL's proposal here has a lot of merit, at least to me:

(though a wider mandatory national service, with military enlistment as ONE option might answer some objections)

But again, that's just me.

#27 from Eric Martin at 3:05 am on Sep 15, 2005

Wow, I missed the party.

A few thoughts.

liberalhawk said:

"I dont have the figures handy but my sense is that discretionary domestic spending in real terms since 2001 has been declining, if you exclude the prescription drug benefit. If you ask whethet it made sense to hold off on that benefit during war time, I'd say it was - and to keep domestic spending down - ALONGSIDE reversing the tax cuts, or at least not pursuing any more."

I agree. I don't know if Glen W or any of you understand that my position on tax cuts was not exclusive of spending cuts. I thought the Medicare Bill was extremely poorly timed, and would be willing to trim much of the pork that the Delay Congress has stuffed into every bill to pass through chambers (Alaska's senior Senator and the bridge to nowhere anyone?).

As for Glen's discussion of taxes increasing revenues, I say not so. When you cut taxes the way Bush has, revenues drop. If you raise them responsibly, you don't necessarily lose jobs and production. People used the same arguments about Reagan's tax cuts, yet revenues dropped and deficits ballooned. Reagen proceeded to raise taxes 7 times, then Bush Sr., then Clinton until finally the budget was balanced.

And when Clinton proposed raising taxes, conservative economists warned of economic meltdown. Well, that didn't happen either.

As for other clarifications: Dan, I was against the invasion from the onset.

Regarding the last paragraph I wrote on withdrawal, it was more an impassioned plea to adjust our policy than it was to withdraw immediately. But if no alteration is in the cards, alterations that I think even you advocate, then I don't see this as winnable.

As for permanent bases, I don't see that one issue as a magic bullet, but I think it can improve perceptions that we are an imperial power out for oil. It would work along the margins, but that is part of the "marginalization" strategy that makes sense to me. It's not bases per se, but bases after an invasion, as was pointed out above.

#28 from Robin Roberts at 3:47 am on Sep 15, 2005

I believe that the prescription drug benefit is not itself "discretionary" spending.

#29 from Dan Darling at 4:17 am on Sep 15, 2005

Eric:

On the tax thing, here again I cite my ignorance of economics.

I thought reading that you were against the invasion from the onset over at Liberals Against Terrorism or Belgravia Dispatch, but I didn't want to be putting words in your mouth.

This is my main quibble, though we seem to be in agreement that it isn't a magic bullet. As far as marginalizing the imperial power argument, that's certainly something to be concerned about, but I don't think that should necessarily exclude us from engaging in statecraft as normal with the new Iraqi government the way we do every other nation. There is also the issue of what happens if Iraq wants US air bases until they get their own air force up and running or if they want US forces in Iraq to protect their territorial integrity from say, the threat of a nuclear Iran. These are very valid concerns that I think need to be taken into account when we're talking about the issue of bases in Iraq.

#30 from Glen Wishard at 6:41 am on Sep 15, 2005

Eric Martin: People used the same arguments about Reagan's tax cuts, yet revenues dropped and deficits ballooned.

You can say revenues dropped, I can say revenues increased, and we can each cite our favorite experts. Then we can argue about adjustments for inflation, unemployment, etc.

But I say that when you kill growth, you kill future revenues. And the tax orgies under Bush I and Clinton cut growth to the lowest level since Herbert Hoover.

HOWEVER: I am glad that you believe that tax hikes are a positive good, because it convinces me that you're not just another one of those grabby get-the-rich people (who are apparently just too lazy for a real proletarian revolution).

So I gladly cede whatever is left of that argument.

If I understand your argument about the bases, it is the same as praktike's argument about assuaging those who compare Iraq to Israel/Palestine, and I disagree with it for the same reason.

There are two kinds of people who believe that the US is a Zionist-imperialist oil-sucking monster:

1. People who frankly know better, but who are willing to exploit irresponsible arguments for political purposes
2. People who really believe it, and who are likely drenched in other negative thought-forms as well

Neither of these groups will be rationally persuaded by any overture you make to them. In fact, the more you feed them, the more frenzied they will get. Therefore, I say we defy them to our last breath.

#31 from Robert McDougall at 8:13 am on Sep 15, 2005

AMac (24):

Biggest load of silliness and irrelevance I've seen in a long time. Evidence in favour of Ford Prefect's theory, that humans keep talking because if they stopped their brains might start working. All the prattle about Bingham and dhimmitude and Abu Ghraib may have served to conceal, even from yourself, that you don't address let alone contest anything that I actually said.

[The persistent refusal of highly nationalistic U.S. commentators to take realistic account of nationalist sentiment among Iraqis is a never failing source of amazement.]

It's become a cliche, even among war supporters, that the U.S. before the war underestimated Iraqi nationalism. Every serious piece on the insurgency acknowledges nationalism and resentment of the occupation as major motivations. E.g. Cordesman:

The US was dealing with a mixture of Iraqi nationalism, Sunni resentment and anger, and popular opposition to any form of Western occupation. The problem was broad support, not a small group of "bitter enders." (p. 11)

Many insurgents are motivated by tribal or family grievances, nationalism and religious duty. Others are motivated by the U.S. occupation . . . (p. 39)

If you think you know better, by all means give us all the benefit of your lights.

People like me are in somewhat similar fashion astonished by essays--by Westerners and Arabs both--that demonstrate indifference to the contrast between:

understanding the legitimate grievances of the freedom fighters so that the perfidies of America and its puppet regimes can be brought to light and combatted by the mighty pen, and
understanding the perspectives of the jihadist and Baathist/fascist Enemy so as to fight them, and their evil doctrines, more effectively.

Perhaps one day you'll have an opportunity to bring up that contrast where it's relevant. But in this context, since I don't discuss jihadi strategies and bring no charges of perfidy against the United States, neither arm of the contrast is relevant. What is in point is whether or why J. Random Anbari is liable to sympathize with, support, participate in the insurgency.

You might care to note that the sources of resentment I mention -- coercion, arrests, etc. -- are not Abu Ghraib style abuses but the normal stuff of counter-insurgency. Even the best disciplined counter-insurgency is a powerful source of bitterness and offence, and standard counter-insurgency doctrine takes account of that (unfortunately the U.S. Army seems to have resisted absorbing standard doctrine, but maybe Petraeus as per Dan's head post is helping to do something about that).

If it will help to clear your mental miasma at all, I might mention that I tend toward the pottery barn view myself, so it's not as though I have a holy horror of Western violence in Eastern countries. I just don't expect the recipients of that violence to be pleased or grateful, however necessary it may be in the larger interest.

Still, comment #23 contains the standard rhetoric of the Edward Said "they hate us for excellent reasons and I would too" diatribe.

I'm not concerned to call their reasons "excellent", but I will admit to this: that the popular support for the insurgency needs to be and can be explained in terms of natural reactions by psychologically normal people. You (if I read your drift correctly) seem to feel it necessary that support for the insurgency should be pathological; as if otherwise, the justice of the whole enterprise would be in jeopardy. But wars, even just wars, aren't generally like that.

#32 from Dan Darling at 8:29 am on Sep 15, 2005

Real briefly, I summarized Cordesman in his entirety over on WoC in a series of installments and will just say that he also notes that Zarqawi is the most effective insurgent leader regardless of however much support he has and that his attacks are the ones that are affecting both the security situation and the general perception of it the most - with today's Baghdad bloodbath as sorta Exhibit A. He also notes that Zark and his crew simply have to die and that we're in for another year of violence from them even if the Iraqi Sunnis all came to table tomorrow.

#33 from Glen Wishard at 9:28 am on Sep 15, 2005

Robert McDougall: The persistent refusal of highly nationalistic U.S. commentators to take realistic account of nationalist sentiment among Iraqis is a never failing source of amazement.

We have heard the nationalism lecture here before. Many times before.

One would think that "nationalism" consisted of nothing more than murdering children, shooting poll workers, setting off IEDs, and yearning for the right to be butchered by a dictator of your own nationality.

I think you are failing to take realistic account of a healthier form of nationalism, practiced by Iraqis who are working to build a free and democratic nation.

#34 from praktike at 1:28 pm on Sep 15, 2005

Silly me, Glenn, and here I was thinking that the 90s were a prosperous, high-growth decade ...

#35 from Fred at 2:46 pm on Sep 15, 2005

Praktike,

Silly me, I thought the 90s prosperity was akin to that of the 1920s, a whole lot of paper wealth generated by a stock market bubble that evaporated in 2000 before W became president.

#36 from AMac at 4:05 pm on Sep 15, 2005

Robert McDougall #24:

Insults, sly and otherwise, and ad hominems, clever and otherwise, acknowledged.

Onto substance, disagreements first. You wrote (your words in italics throughout):

Bloodless bass-ackward analysis. The insurgents don't "view themselves as being under foreign military occupation" becauses they consider Jaafari "an American puppet", but because of doors kicked down, automatic rifle fire splattered about the streets, bombs dropped in their neighbourhood by foreign military personnel.

Tell us more about these insurgents. Let�s stipulate that Minutemen, KKK lynchers, the Polish Home Army, Sudeten irredentist Nazis, French WW2 Resistants, Mafia dons, etc. etc. all had grievances that they felt were wholly legitimate.

Care to discuss what the ideological provenance of the insurgents--Ba�athism and Wahhibism�says about their legitimacy?
How about their respective histories of violence towards kaffirs, heretics, and the umma?
Any thoughts about their style of participation in public policy debates? Kidnapping, beheadings, assassination of political rivals, suicide bombs into gatherings of children, or day laborors, or folks sitting at cafes that serve beer. That sort of thing.
Comments on their political and social goals? Sharia, re-imposition of censorship, stoning accused gays and adulterers, punishment of heresy and apostasy by death, women back to the 8th century, extension of the Caliphate to dar al-Harb.
The plain implication of your contrast of the insurgents with Iraqi Prime Minister Jaafari the �American puppet� is that the insurgents are the Iraqis who are standing up for their country. Let�s grant that most Arab Sunnis of al-Anbar feel that way, and many Sunnis in Baghdad and elsewhere as well. What about the remaining 80% of the country--Shia, Kurds, ethnic and religious minorities? How about the parents, siblings, children, and friends of those who have been bombed, shot, and beheaded? Does the insurgency speak for them as well?

You wrote:

the average Iraqi insurgent sympathizer could probably reel off more fluently than the average U.S. warblogger if he were so minded, there's the big similarity they care about -- that in both cases [West Bank, Iraq] Arabs/Muslims are being pushed around at gunpoint in their own country by foreign kaffir interlopers.

Yes, that is indeed a big similarity that the insurgents and their sympathizers care about. I can think of a few differences as well; see above points for some hints. How about you? Is your sympathy with the victimized Iraqis, or with the insurgents and their sympathizers? I hope it�s the former--but how would the reader know?

Some context for the reader. All of the above is in response to Mr. McDougall's quip

Perhaps one day you'll have an opportunity to bring up that contrast where it's relevant.

That he penned in response to what I had written:

People like me are in somewhat similar fashion astonished by essays--by Westerners and Arabs both--that demonstrate indifference to the contrast between:
* understanding the legitimate grievances of the freedom fighters so that the perfidies of America and its puppet regimes can be brought to light and combatted by the mighty pen, and
* understanding the perspectives of the jihadist and Baathist/fascist Enemy so as to fight them, and their evil doctrines, more effectively.

Whether or not Mr. McDougall sees the connection, I expect many readers will.

On to our points of agreement, after stripping the snark off the substance of what you wrote. As before, your words in italics.

The Iraqi insurgents are motivated by far more immediate concerns than the size of the U.S. [permanent military base] footprint in Iraq 10 years out; the international brigade by far wider concerns.

Yes. It�s the morality of the Iraqi insurgents� agendas that are at issue, as outlined above. As Darling, Cordesman, CENTCOM, and many others have noted, negotiation and agreement with insurgents resisting foreign occupation qua foreign occupation is possible. Acceding to the demands of Al Qaeda in Iraq or the Ba�athists is to accept a total defeat.

[Other ME governments] have vastly more control than the Government of Iraq; second, most of the citizenry is on board with a strategy of keep your head down, stay onside with Mr Big, let the money roll in.

Fair description. If the post-Ba�athist Government of Iraq develops the attributes of a successful State, it becomes of historical interest only.

(1) The U.S. can prevail... (2) The U.S. can summon up the will for a much larger and more sustained presence in Iraq than possible under present arrangements. (3) The U.S. will indeed fail (very visibly) to "stay the course".

In (1), I substituted an ellipsis for � real soon, before the Reserve and National Guard melt down; alternatively, real cheap, with much lighter forces than at present� so that I could claim agreement. Your �meltdown� is a premise masquerading as a conclusion; not supported by the analyses I read, e.g. the link-rich Fourth Rail.

You might care to note that the sources of resentment I mention� are the normal stuff of counter-insurgency.

Even the best disciplined counter-insurgency is a powerful source of bitterness and offence, and standard counter-insurgency doctrine takes account of that.

the U.S. before the war underestimated Iraqi nationalism.
I tend toward the pottery barn view myself.
I don't expect the recipients of that violence to be pleased or grateful, however necessary it may be in the larger interest.

Agreed.

support for the insurgency needs to be and can be explained in terms of natural reactions by psychologically normal people.

Much post-1933 German support for Nazi policies has also been explained by the reactions of normal people. That hardly rules out the participation of sociopaths, psychopaths, etc. in either movement. The psychological status of those tasked to beheadings, the murder of children, martyrdom operations, and simple assassinations is doubtlessly interesting, but not the subject of anything I�ve written.

#37 from Eric Martin at 4:51 pm on Sep 15, 2005

Dan,

I agree that if the Iraqis want bases, then we shouldn't rule that out a priori. But to the extent that we haven't made it clear that any future arrangement would be contingent on such requests, we should. And I still think there are wedges to be driven in between nationalists and Islamists - especially if nationalists tire of the constant violence and see openings in the political arena.

Of course, the lack of Iraqi air force is a concern in terms of bases, but providing them their own Air Force isn't really in the cards yet - for any number of reasons. One concern is that we are creating a forced dependency that will breed resentment.

As for the economics discussion, again, I think tax cuts at certain times and in certain formats are a positive. I am also in favor or spending restraint, and thought that the "pay as you go" model as applied to tax cuts and new spending was brilliant. Unfortunately, the new GOP leadership disagreed. For the record, Clinton also cut taxes at various points in his tenure.

When Bush entered office the argument for an upper bracket tax cut was probably the soundest. Since the economy of the 1990s was overheating, tax cuts targeting the top would not spur more consumer spending (which makes up two-thirds of our GDP) and thus would not pour fuel on to the fire so to speak. Of course, I could think of about a billion other things to do with the surpluses, but if you prefer such cuts, this was the time to implement them. I would note that Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill thought that the surplus would be better spent shoring up Social Security, but that was not the choice chosen.

The problem for me arises when the economy slowed down, but Bush still insisted on two more rounds of top heavy tax cuts. At those times, the economy called for a middle class tax cut to spur spending and growth. The same style tax cut is not proper in all settings. Not to mention the Estate Tax repeal which was a non-sequitur insertion into the dynamic.

Then, of course, there was the issue of the two wars and vastly increased expenditures - including the Medicare Bill regardless of how it is classified in terms of discretionary spending. Thus, the ballooning deficits.

I don't know how you could say that such cuts have not contributed to the deficits. The Laffer theory on cuts creating increased Treasury revenues has not been supported by empirical evidence. That is why "pay go" requires tax cut legislation to be offset by corresponding spending cuts. It recognizes the fact that cutting taxes will cut Treasury revenues.

#38 from Eric Martin at 4:58 pm on Sep 15, 2005

I would also note this from Tom Delay (via the Washington Times):

House Majority Leader Tom DeLay said yesterday that Republicans have done so well in cutting spending that he declared an "ongoing victory," and said there is simply no fat left to cut in the federal budget.

Mr. DeLay was defending Republicans' choice to borrow money and add to this year's expected $331 billion deficit to pay for Hurricane Katrina relief. Some Republicans have said Congress should make cuts in other areas, but Mr. DeLay said that doesn't seem possible.

"My answer to those that want to offset the spending is sure, bring me the offsets, I'll be glad to do it. But nobody has been able to come up with any yet," the Texas Republican told reporters at his weekly briefing.

Asked if that meant the government was running at peak efficiency, Mr. DeLay said, "Yes, after 11 years of Republican majority we've pared it down pretty good."

My thought is, if Delay is right and the fat has all been trimmed, then wouldn't some repeal of the latest round of Bush's tax cuts be in order in terms of balancing the budgets? How else is that supposed to happen?

Didn't the GOP used to be in favor balanced budgets? Why isn't that important any more?

http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050914-120153-3878r.htm

#39 from AMac at 6:08 pm on Sep 15, 2005

Eric Martin (#38):

The wisdom of "cutting taxes" or "raising taxes" has to relate to something; the point of reference is almost always "the current level of taxes." Whatever that may be. But if the arguments for cutting taxes are excellent in some transcendental sense, than it becomes obvious that the best policy is to bring them down to 0%. The identical argument for raising, and 99.9%.

Or, we could refer to other standards, such as debt as a percentage of GDP, estimated future obligations towards today's and tomorrow's retirees and indigents (S.S., Medicare/caid, &c), the future value of current spending, the effects of marginal rates on productivity. We could even use Teddy Roosevelt's metric of leaving the country in better shape for our grandchildren.

Pointy-heads from Krugman to Laffer clearly think in these terms, but your dopey DeLay quote seems to exemplify the seriousness with which they are taken by the Republican-dominated Congress. Diatribes delivered by Democrats seem to delve no deeper.

I'm no economist, but the case for raised taxes in the face of raised spending makes some sense, in a way that the contrary position does not. A bit less on the massive unfunded entitlement side (e.g. Rx benefits) wouldn't hurt either.

#40 from Eric Martin at 6:31 pm on Sep 15, 2005

agreed.

#41 from Dan Darling at 6:50 pm on Sep 15, 2005

Eric:

I definitely agree that we should make the issue of bases contingent on the requests of the new Iraqi government. The issue of creating dependency is a perfectly valid one, but if they want us based there to maintain their territorial integrity in the face of their not-so-friendly neighbors (a concern that I think is perfectly valid now and will become even more so if Iran goes nuclear), I think that's a valid concern.

As far as trying to divide the nationalists away from the Islamists, I definitely agree that there are fault lines to be exploited.

On the issue of tax cuts, I again repeat my ignorance on these matters. I also disagree heavily with DeLay's characterization that there isn't more pork that can be cut.

#42 from Eric Martin at 10:29 pm on Sep 15, 2005

I think we are close to agreement on most of this - save for the ideological differences which aren't really so pronounced. Kind of encouraging.

#43 from Dan Darling at 11:07 pm on Sep 15, 2005

Careful now, we're getting dangerously close to being back into the whole bipartisanship thing here ...

#44 from Robert McDougall at 9:44 am on Sep 16, 2005

AMac:

Yes, that is indeed a big similarity that the insurgents and their sympathizers care about. I can think of a few differences as well; see above points for some hints. How about you? Is your sympathy with the victimized Iraqis, or with the insurgents and their sympathizers? I hope it�s the former--but how would the reader know?

Of course, the reason I discussed the attitude of the insurgents' sympathizers is that I was responding to Dan Darling's remarks (comments #6, #14) on that topic (and see implicitly Theseus comment #15). Attitudes of other sections of the Iraqi population were not the topic. But in general, in seeking to understand the course of events, of course one would try to take account of the Kurds' desire for independence, and the Shi'ites to take their destiny at last into their own hands, along with the Sunni Arabs' antipathy to the occupation.

The plain implication of your contrast of the insurgents with Iraqi Prime Minister Jaafari the "American puppet" is that the insurgents are the Iraqis who are standing up for their country.

"American puppet" is not my characterization of Jaafari, but Dan Darling's characterization of the insurgents' view of Jaafari. I'm happy to agree with him that that is more or less how they see him; I take issue with his suggesting (most strongly in comment #18) that this is a major motive for opposition to the occupation (or, if you prefer, "occupation"). Far more important are the strong negative emotions aroused by U.S. counter-insurgency operations. You seem to agree (comment #36) that those emotions are strong and negative -- so what's your problem?

Care to discuss . . . How about . . . Any thoughts about . . . Comments on [a bunch of stuff irrelevant to the point under discussion]

Yeah, sure, some time on a fresher thread, where they're actually on topic.

Insults, sly and otherwise . . . acknowledged.

I'm sorry, and surprised, that you find anything "sly" in my comment #31; I had not intended to be anything other than forthright. But if I haven't been forthright enough for you, let me try again: your comment #24 was a wretched piece of yahooism, a good deal less than worthless as a contribution to debate. In particular:

It doesn't advance consideration of the points under discussion; rather, it utterly fails to address them. In fact, a reader coming in at comment #24 would be quite unable to determine what they were.

More broadly, there's not one argument in the whole screed that bears any logical relation to the comment it's supposedly addressing. Instead, besides the red herring "contrast" (to be discussed further below) there's a gratuitous dragging in of Edward Said and one Molly Bingham (hint: if you want to take issue with what someone says, take issue with what he says, don't remark how it reminds you of something else someone else said that you didn't much like), an offensive and sleazy (and of course entirely unsubstantiated) imputation of "embrace of dhimmitude", and a lengthy passage from Glen Wishard that, leaving aside its intrinsic defects, is in context another sackfull red herrings.

Is it necessary to point out that this is not how debate is advanced?

You comment #36 at least contains identifiable arguments and in large part addresses itself to what was actually said. On the other hand:

Your statement "It�s the morality of the Iraqi insurgents� agendas that are at issue" is a blatant untruth. It's not what's at issue, it's what you've dragged in where it wasn't at issue to no apparent purpose other than to muddy the waters and to substitute smear for argument.

[Back to your precious "contrast" from the beginning of comment #14] This "let the reader decide" stunt (which you've pulled before) is cowardly and dishonest. You're challenged on a specific point, with specific arguments; in this case, that the comment you were criticising didn't do either of the things listed in the contrast: "since I don't discuss jihadi strategies and bring no charges of perfidy against the United States, neither arm of the contrast is relevant". If your case is valid, you should be able to point either to some discussion of jihadi strategies or to some charge of perfidy by the United States. Of course you can't do either. But instead of admitting candidly that you're in error, you throw in some further obfuscation, then invite the judgement of the reader. The pose is that you've pursued the question to the uttermost, the reality is that you've run away from the argument.

You feel insulted? What you should feel is ashamed.

#45 from Robert McDougall at 9:51 am on Sep 16, 2005

Dan Darling (if your comment #32 is in response to my #31): I'm perfectly well aware that you're perfectly well aware if Cordesman's remarks; also, I don't see anyone here suggesting that there's any negotiating with al Zarqawi.

#46 from AMac at 3:41 pm on Sep 16, 2005

Robert McDougall (#44):

Life�s too short to spend much time engaging with your poison-pen online persona.

1. Style

You wrote:

let me try again: your comment #24 was a wretched piece of yahooism, a good deal less than worthless as a contribution to debate.

[you drag in the morality of the insurgency] to no apparent purpose other than to muddy the waters and to substitute smear for argument.

[your] "let the reader decide" stunt (which you've pulled before) is cowardly and dishonest.

Is it necessary to point out that this is not how debate is advanced?

2. Readers

You aren�t a fool, so your animus towards my use of the phrase �let the reader decide� seems disingenuous. If not, I will explain. You seem to enter into debates in order to convince others of your insights. Writing thusly to the readership here is fine. However, I am not obliged to take getting Robert McDougall to change his mind as the measure of my writing. Your characterization of my intention to write to the readership as a cowardly and dishonest �stunt� is thus more specious than offensive.

3. Morality

You reported amazement that highly nationalistic U.S. commentators persistently refuse to take realistic account of nationalist sentiment among Iraqis (#23). The point is broadly relevant to the subject, if not applicable in its particulars to remarks made by Dan Darling, or Eric Martin, or, for that matter, me.

In a similar fashion, I stated my dismay that some essayists attempt to channel the legitimate grievances of the freedom fighters so that the perfidies of America and its puppet regimes can be brought to light and combatted by the mighty pen. (#24).

This reflection was prompted by your remark

The insurgents don't "view themselves as being under foreign military occupation" becauses they consider Jaafari "an American puppet", but because of doors kicked down, automatic rifle fire splattered about the streets, bombs dropped in their neighbourhood by foreign military personnel. If they count Jaafari as "an American puppet" or the Government of Iraq as "Quislings and sychophants", it's because they perceive (accurately) that they're not with them but with the foreign forces. (#23)

For some Westerners, understanding the points of view within the insurgency falls under �know your enemy.� As Martin, Darling, Cordesman, Scheuer, and many others have written, a �marginalization� strategy starts by contrasting the beliefs and interests of the core Ba�athist and Islamist insurgents with those of their sympathizers and potential sympathizers.

For other Westerners, �the enemy� is not the insurgents, but the imperialist occupiers and their puppets. This stance is predicated on a set of judgements that usually remain unstated in their advocacy pieces. Typically,

the essayist elides issues of the morality of insurgents� tactics and strategic objectives, and

the essayist presents events as a simplistic conflict between �the insurgency� and �the foreigners and their puppets,� implicitly conflating �the will of the Iraqi people� with �the objectives of the insurgents.�

I linked to Molly Bingham because her column provides readers with examples of these characteristics.

You stated that the insurgents perceive accurately that they ["Quislings and sychophants" of the Government of Iraq] are not with them [the insurgency] but with the foreign forces.

I state that they [the foreign forces], in alliance with them [the nascent Government of Iraq and Iraqi civil society], are opposed to them [the murderous, fascistic insurgency].

Despite your inapt choice of words, you may share this view. It might be more useful to readers if you would put more effort into clarifications, and less into vitriol.

I expect that each reader will judge the relative merits of our respective positions for him or herself. Even hypothetical readers coming in at comment #24 would be quite able to determine what they are.

#47 from SPQR at 3:50 pm on Sep 16, 2005

Amac, here here.

#48 from Robert McDougall at 8:21 am on Sep 17, 2005

AMac:

Is it necessary to point out that this is not how debate is advanced?

When someone debauches debate as you did in comment #23, absolutely it's right to call him on it. Genuine debate depends on flushing such stuff out of the system.

. . . your animus towards my use of the phrase "let the reader decide" seems disingenuous. . . . However, I am not obliged to take getting Robert McDougall to change his mind as the measure of my writing.

No one ever said it was. What's wrong is your use of the phrase to conceal your own forfeiture. You claim, in effect, that my purpose (in comment #23) is to "bring to light" "the perfidies of America"; I point out that comment #23 makes no allegations of U.S. perfidy; your claim is evidently refuted. So what do you do? You don't admit that it's been refuted; you don't attempt to contest the refutation; you do your best to hide the your inability to contest under a heap of irrelevant words, and then say "let the reader decide" as if you had contested not forfeited. Whether you're writing to convince me or third parties is not in point; either way, your conduct is a cowardly and disingenuous evasion.

You reported amazement that highly nationalistic U.S. commentators persistently refuse to take realistic account of nationalist sentiment among Iraqis (#23). The point is broadly relevant to the subject, if not applicable in its particulars to remarks made by Dan Darling, or Eric Martin, or, for that matter, me.

First, the point was not addressed to you or Eric Martin but to Dan Darling; second, the point is relevant precisely to Dan Darling's remark cited just above it:

. . . if the Arab satellite channels are saying that what we're doing in Iraq is the same as what Israel did in the Palestinian territories then it's a little hard for them to claim that they aren't serving as a vehicle for enemy propaganda . . .

As I pointed out, from an Arab Nationalist perspective, the two are alike in one very salient respect. Darling is of course well aware that there is such a thing as Arab nationalism, but it seems to me that he fails to reckon with it sufficiently here.

For other Westerners, "the enemy" is not the insurgents, but the imperialist occupiers and their puppets.

One could spend a great deal of time discussing who and how many those "other Westerners" are, and whether in particular Molly Bingham is one of them; and it would be a great mistake to do so, since the statement's just a distraction. Either my account of the motivations of the insurgents is accurate or inaccurate. If it's inaccurate, you needn't concern yourself with "other Westerners" motivations, or the alleged "embrace of dhimmitude" by Molly Bingham; you can just point out where it's inaccurate. Likewise, if it's accurate, it's accurate, whether or not I'm one of your alleged gang of anti-imperialists.

You stated [P] that the insurgents perceive accurately that they ["Quislings and sychophants" of the Government of Iraq] are not with them [the insurgency] but with the foreign forces. I state that [Q] they [the foreign forces], in alliance with them [the nascent Government of Iraq and Iraqi civil society], are opposed to them [the murderous, fascistic insurgency]. . . you may share this view.

(Once again) "Quislings and sychophants" is not my characterization of the Government of Iraq, but Dan Darling's characterization of the insurgents' characterization.

You suggest that I may hold not only my original position P but your position Q; this implies that P and your position Q are consistent; that makes your reiterated complaints against my asserting P seem rather foolish. As it happens, I don't hold Q. The essence of the situation in Iraq is that civil society is divided: one section favours collaboration; another smaller but still considerable section favours resistance -- in fact, you conceded that in #36 (unless you think there's no civil society amongst the Sunnis of Anbar). In a week in which U.S. forces have depopulated Tel Afar, Peshmerga continue to expel Arabs from Kirkuk, Zarqawi's Holy Warriors are massacring Shiites in Baghdad, and Sunnis near Baghdad are kidnapped and murdered by unknown assailants in police uniforms, it's pretty clear that civil society in Iraq is copping it from all directions.

#49 from AMac at 2:14 pm on Sep 17, 2005

Robert McDougall (#48):

As it happens, I don't hold [that the foreign forces, in alliance with the nascent Government of Iraq and Iraqi civil society, are opposed to the murderous, fascistic insurgency].

Thank you for the clarification.

Ignoring, again, the ad hominems that pepper your remarks: there is little or no basis to most of your critiques of what I've written. Some of your comments have merit. The rhetorical sleight-of-hand that conflates points on which we may agree with points I have conceded to you speaks to your views on the proper conduct of debates.

You and I have taken this thread far afield from the post's topic. Email me if you want to continue this exchange as private correspondence.

Have a nice weekend.

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