The recent "sting" operation of a anti-aircraft missile supplier suggests an approach beyond "flypaper".

Why shouldn't the U.S. intelligence community set up our own undercover "terrorist recruiting" centers in Iraq? A bold and daring, dumb and reckless Saud or Syrian or Jordanian who wants to kill Americans picks up a phamphlet, dials a phone number, and is directed to a "safe house" in Iraq. He's detected, inspected, selected, collected and directed -- Arlo-fashion -- over to the "Group W" bench where some U.S. Army pshrink asks the group if they want to kill
("Kill! KILL! K*I*L*L*!!!!) Americans so much that they are willing to die. (Die! DIE! D*I*E!!!). Those that answer affirmatively are given a plausible suicide mission against a (well prepared ) military target, whereupon the newly recruited would-be terrorist acoomplishes the latter half of his wish, and dies.

(I believe Jim Blair floated this idea on USENET's "sci.econ" some while ago)

Explain to me exactly how this would be morally wrong?

I don't see anything morally wrong with it.
The only downside I see is what would happen if it were exposed. I'm not sure enough people would appreciate the humor.

Don't think I'd choose to deal with Syria that way, especially given the force structure strains at the moment. Did a post a while ago with my thoughts on Syria's future and U.S. policy.

If there's another occupation in America's future, I suspect it will be the oil-producing areas of Saudi Arabia, after that country has slipped into utter chaos or become openly and formally hostile. Both of those triggers are "if" scenarios, not "when" scenarios.

The flypaper theory is a fairly plausible one, and to be fair it would be by far preferred that our troops deal with these jihadis in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Ramadi rather than the good people of NYC, DC, and Chicago. The problem is that what I think we're looking at is a concerted strategy by the Iranians and their agents in the south (SCIRI and Sadr's Mahdi Army) to establish control of the Shi'ites there in hopes of being able to establish a Khomeinist base among the Shi'ite population in order to pull a "one man, one vote, one time" in Iraq once we hand complete control of the government back over to the Iraqis. Iran has at the very least a business partnership with al-Qaeda based upon both parties' mutually interlocking interests as well as their shared desire to kill large numbers of us.

Iran is allowing Ansar al-Islam to regroup, rebuild its forces with the help of the al-Qaeda already in Iran, and then run across the border to attack our troops. That keeps the American troops busy in the Sunni triangle and leaves the Iranian propaganda apparatus that they're trying to set up in An Najaf and Karbala relatively intact. The US is going to have to confront Iran's agents inside of Iraq, and it should be sooner rather than later.

Ultimately, the flypaper approach works so long as we maintain the public will to do so. Once we lose that will and you start seeing calls to pull US troops out of Iraq, we're basically ceding the field to the Islamists. We can't do that, hence the need for perseverance.

Trent, I don't think the US can afford to take the time to invade Syria. We need to stop WMD proliferation. Iran and North Korea ought to be our top priorities.

The 'island hopping' approach to the WoT--dealing with one country at a time--makes a great deal of sense. Putting Syria next on the list does not.

1) Syria can't hurt us. We can deal with the Jihadis they are sending to Iraq. We can deal with their conventional and chemical weapons. Nuke programs in Iran and N. Korea pose a more immediate threat.

2) A Syrian occupation would be difficult. Even though a military victory over Syria would be quick and easy, the occupation would be difficult--not in Syria itself, but in Lebanon, which Syria controls. N. Korea, on the other hand, would require no US occupation at all. The S. Korean army stands at 600,000 troops, all of whom speak Korean, know the culture and have a vested interest in the North. They can and should handle the occupation, leaving US forces free for the next campaign.

3) As a general rule, you start with the hard targets first, not the easy targets. Syria is an easy target. If we topple the Mullahs in Iran, a hard target, could Syria realistically continue to refuse US demands vis a vis support of terrorism and development of WMD?

I don't think Iblis is right in that we should be going for the hardest target. I argued on my blog that one of the primary reasons that Iraq was chosen was because a) it was easiest and b) its central location would allow us to put pressure on so many other nations on our list. It would allow us to pursue an interior lines strategy, even though it is thousands of miles from home.

We did not go straight for Japan in WWII. That was the whole point of the Island hopping campaign. Like in pool, each shot should leave you in a better position for your next shot. Afghanistan was our first shot, and helped us by putting an immediate hurt on Al Qaida. Iraq, as I just mentioned, put us in a fantastic geographical position.

While we can use that position to execute a flypaper strategy, that is merely a situational tactic; useful but not moving us dramatically forward.

When we think about our next target, North Korea is wrong for several reasons. First, how do we get the South Koreans to sign on for an invasion of the North? What possible benefit is there for them? The risks far outweigh the potential gains. The damage to their people, their economy and infrastructure could be very large, even in a quick allied victory. Second, (this follows from teh first) without the support of the South, invading North Korea would be painful for us, considering the degree to which our military is overstretched. Third, there is the risk that they already have nuclear weapons. And fourth, considering how messed up the North is, if we can arrange a total embargo of food and fuel, it could collapse all by itself in the very near future. As I mentioned *here*, if the regime collapses, it could very well implode quietly, which would allow the South Koreans and us to move in and pick up the pieces.

There are three remaining targets - Syria, Iran adnd Saudi Arabia. As Trent mentioned in an earlier post, the game against SA may have already begun. However, I don't think we will move openly too soon, if only because of SA's special place in teh Islamic world.

Of the next two, Iran is clearly a larger threat to us, even if Syria might equal them in terror sponsorship. And Syria seems to have toned down its activities somewhat since the Iraq invasion.

I think our next moves will not involve direct military action, at least not on a large scale. Syria is the lesser threat, and while it would be easy in abstract terms to take it out, we simply don't have the available troops.

Iran offers the most possibilities. There is an active resistance/revolutionary movement, which we could support and nudge into pushing the Mullacracy over. The regime seems nervous and unstable, and perhaps some clever psyops and hearts and minds type activities could reap great benefits. The collapse of the Iranian government would make our occupation of Iraq easier, and would of course be of immeasurable benefit for the Iranians.

Buckethead,

I pretty much agree with all your points.

Strategy generally dictates easy targets first. Weaken the strong then take the strong out.

Iran next!

Well, I don't have a blog, so I can't feign authority by referencing myself. Here are some thoughts, however, in response to buckethead.

Iraq was the toughest regional target--by a wide margin. They may not have been so tough in absolute terms, or even compared to Iraq circa '91. Still, they were a regional superpower.

I will readily concede that other factors, in addition to starting with hard targets, weigh in on prioritizing military targets. Location is certainly one of them. During WWII we simply could not attack Japan until we had taken bases close enough to support such an invasion.

Nothing in it for the South, to take down North Korea? Are you kidding? Let's start with the 1.1 million troops massed on the border, the 10,000 artillery tubes trained on Seoul, the commando incursions, sabotage, kidnappings, etc. How about North Korean nukes? Would you like to live 5 minutes away from a paranoid Kim with nukes? And don't underestimate the desire to reunite the country. I was in Germany in 1987. Asked quite a few Germans if they thought the wall would ever come down. To a man they answered no. Less than 2 years later, well, you know the story.

N. Korea almost certainly has nukes. What they probably don't have is a good delivery system. I could go on and on about this, but the key point is that using nukes is harder than making them. Better to deal with them now than wait until they can put their nukes on a missile, or shrink them enough for terrorists to make use of them.

It would be nice if we could simply starve out the North, but it's not possible. First, the regime there has already collapsed. The people live they way they have for thousands of years. The thugs in charge aren't running a country. They are running a criminal enterprise with an army to back it up. What the North is demanding is that we, the US, guarantee the survival of their criminal enterprise, or else they will support it with bigger and badder arms sales.

North Korea is not self supporting, not has it ever been. Their patron is China, over whom we have little or no influence. As long as China is pleased with its proxy it will continue to support it. If they can extort something from the US in the process so much the better. The implosion theory is wishful thinking.

It may be possible to persuade China to cut NK loose by pointing out how a nuclear NK would lead to a nuclear South, Taiwan and Japan. That would probably work, but involves more brinksmanship than simply attacking NK.

Syria and Iran are most certainly on the list. The issue is priorities. As between the two, Iran is a sponsor of terror. Syria is merely a facilitator. Iran provides arms, money, training, intelligence and a safe haven. Syria provides a transit point for men and weapons, and limited basing. Without Syria, Iran would have to find new ways of moving men and materials. Without Iran, Syria would have a service to provide but few customers. Also, Iran has a mature nuclear program. Syria does not.

Which leaves Syria last on the list for potential military intervention, not next. Military action in Saudi Arabia is a distant long shot, and only worth considering if the House of Saud should fall.

There is an argument to be made for placing Iran before N. Korea (there was an argument to be made for placing Iran before even Iraq). My money is on NK largely due to the more immediate nuclear threat and occupation issues. Also, it would be easy to provoke an attack from the North, sidestepping the need for another drawn out UN debate.

I failed to mention that 4 (or was it 8) Iranians died in violent anti-regime demos a few days ago.

Heh. I wasn't feigning authority, I was demonstrating it. Actually, I was just lazy and didn't want to repeat myself.

I think, Iblis, our disagreement on the relative strength or weakness of nations in the Middle East comes from looking at it from opposite sides. Iraq may have been strong relative to other nations in the region, like Kuwait or Syria. Compared to us, they are low hanging fruit.

As for South Korean opinion, you are correct that they have much to gain from the elimination of the North. Everything that you mentioned no doubt weighs heavily on the minds of those who live in northern Seoul. However, what are they willing to risk to achieve it? The benefits of the North being gone only come after its gone. If in the meantime you have to fight an expensive, destructive and costly war, you might lean toward a wait and see attitude. The South is rich, and has much to lose. Exactly the opposite is true of the North, which is why they are afraid.

We have seen how tentative the Southern gov't is in dealing with the North. The appeasement, I mean sunshine policy is a classic example. Would West Germany have launched an offensive war in 1988 to force reunification with the East? Better to wait.

If the NK's have nukes, they already have delivery systems, as they've launched missiles over Japan a couple times. This reinforces my point in terms of direct confrontation. Granted, the risk of those nukes getting into the hold of Seattle-bound container ship is not something to be discounted.

I have heard that the Koreans in the North are starving, which is not the historical average. Only the army and the government eat reasonably well. Foriegn shipments of food and fuel go directly to the gov't and the army. If these stop, the regime could completely collapse. We only really need to convince the Chinese, as we could arrange the rest of the embargo on our own.

China is the key - if we can show them that it is in their interest to cut their client loose, we could make it work. Implosion might be hard to arrange, but it isn't wishful thinking - look how the Soviet block imploded.

Also, I don't see how convincing the Chinese that a nuclear Japan is a bad idea involves more brinkmanship than a full out invasion of another country that might have nukes. Lost me there.

Finally, I never said Syria should be next.

Its been pointed out by someone who's name escapes me, that South Korea's current policies are influenced by seeing the difficulties West Germany had absorbing East Germany. Besides the enormous risk of a conflict, the South Korean government may be putting off the economic costs of absorbing North Korea.

There ie nothing fundamentally (tactical considerations aside) wrong about the strategic analysis above, but it does not take into account political reality. There is not the political will to make and carry out these hard choices, Bush is as far right as we will likely have in the foreseeable future and even his hands are tied. If one has an invasion with casulties without a smoking gun, (the gun must of had killed many people many times), we get president Dean.

Buckethead:

I'll see your lazy and raise you a lethargic--or at least bullet point response.

-Since the US isn't going to target itself, it's not a valid comparison for the relative strengths of potential adversaries. Of potential ME targets, Iraq was not low lying fruit. It was the largest and most immediate threat.

-The South has the most to lose in a confrontation with the North. Hell, the North will benefit hugely from losing. It's just that we are running out of choices. It may be that in the next few months we decide whether to fight the North or accept it as a new, proliferating, nuclear state. The South has more to lose from that, I think.

-If the North were going to implode any time soon that would be the way to go. Ain't gonna happen. Nor do we have a few years to wait them out.

-NK has nukes. They have missiles. But they don't have a way to put nukes on missiles. Their nukes are Uranium based. Generally only Plutonium based devices are small enough to put in a warhead. Nukes also have to be hardened to withstand the forces of blast off. They need to handle the heat. They need a reliable mechanism to detonate. All the while they are extremely delicate things. Nukes don't explode when you bump them. They break.

So missiles are out. Subs are out (even harder than missiles). Artillery is out (hardest of all). Aircraft could work, but against the US and South Korean airforces, good luck getting a plane over Seoul. About the only thing the North could do at this point would be a nuclear landmine, which is basically a waste of a perfectly good nuke.

On the other hand, even the most primitive nuke can be placed in shipping container and set off in a US harbor. So we have a terrorist threat, but not yet a military threat. For now.

-North was starving in the mid 90's. It's still bad, but nothing like it was then. Didn't implode in '96. Won't implode now.

-If we threaten China with new nuclear neighbors we a) are threatening China itself, b) had better be willing to see it through if they call our bluff, c) are inviting them to deal with Taiwan right now rather than wait for it to get nukes. That, ladies and gentlemen, is high stakes poker.

Iblis, good comments all around. Glad to see you in the comments section.

You're mad!

Ibis,

NK is going down now. End-run industrial production has started, even of transportation infrastructure material - rails for railroads, etc. That alone means it is over.

Conscript enlisted are robbing civilians with weapons taken off-base. Thousands of whole families have committed suicide with rat poison rather than die of starvation. IMO we're 6-18 months out from NK's final collapse.

I wasn't suggesting that we threaten China, directly. It's not like we'd encourage those countries to get nukes. But a fully nuclear NK could force them in that direction.

Hopefully, it will be over before that is a reality. I think, as Tom said, the collapse is imminent. We just need to keep other nations from subsidizing the murderous nutbags in charge, so that the collapse isn't delayed. We need to encourage China to help, and play diplomatic hardball if necessary. If we can get China to even reduce its support of NK, time is on our side - and we should not risk SK just to put them down a little earlier. And hey, if NK collapses, we can take all the forces tasked there and use them to invade France. I mean Iran.

Buckethead,

The only thing China can do now to delay NK's collapse would be to conquer the place and run it themselves. NK's idiot leaders are converting everything they can into hard currency. If they were given all the industrial goods needed to keep their dying economy going, they'd just sell the stuff for hard currency before it could even be unloaded.

I.e., the only way to keep NK going is to forcibly replace its regime. Those idiots are the problem.

And this has happened before. Kim Il Sung was pushed aside by the Chinese and Soviets following Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and didn't regain power until after Chinese forces left about 1955-56. He and his cronies were too incompetent to manage the NK war effort.

The Chinese have already sent signals that they can live with American & ROK conquest of NK provided American forces leave the peninsula entirely a reasonable time afterwards. They know that a unified Korea would be both weak and neutral.

Well, we wouldn't want that, would we. Tom, if what you say is true, the administration is pursuing the exact right course - hold out until the regime collapses under the weight of its own incompetence.

Few political developments in the world would make me smile as much as seeing Kim get the Ceausescu treatment.

I like Tom's comments. Wonder why NK would go down now when they haven't before--even when the famine was much worse. Also wonder why the status of the NK civilians matters at all, given that the regime cares nothing about their welfare and they are in no position to revolt. Am extremely curious about his source for the comments about China's willingess to look the other way.

Come December of this year we'll have 6 carriers ready to deploy. Our troops will have completed their relocation from the DMZ further south out of artillery range. The multinational talks will have ended. Seems like if something is going to happen that might be a good time. CVN-70, Carl Vinson, is in the Sea of Japan, scheduled to return in Nov. If it stays put I'll be looking for fireworks.

Ibis,

It is happening now because the corruption of NK's elites is far more advanced than it was ten years ago, and because there is another ten years of accumulated infrastructure disinvestment. Also check out my article at:

http://www.strategypage.com/strategypolitics/articles/20030129.asp

Tom:

I took a look at your article. Very much enjoyed it. Also read "One Invasion Won't be Enough." I read Strategypage regularly--everyone should read Strategypage--and don't know how I've managed to keep missing your column.

My only thought is that we've underestimated before the abilities and determination of poor, ragtag, half-starved armies. Hope you are right about this.

It's hard to get good info on NK, and not many seem particularly interested. Maybe it's not as sexy as invading Syria, which has badly needed an ass whooping for decades. But in dark moments I think that all our troubles with militant Islam are short to medium term, that the real problem is still communism, and that the fate of places like NK, Cuba and China will guide the course of human events in the 21st century, not the Middle East.

Who says SK even has an effective choice? If we decide it's necessary to our national interest to take out the Norks' nuclear program, that'll probably trigger a war anyway... In which case the South has no option but victory.

Iblis, in certain respects, they are the same problem. Many people have tossed around the word "islamofascist" but the term does hit on the essential illiberality of the movement. And some people in the west still have trouble seeing the totalitarian nature of communism and its degenerate heirs.

Whitaker Chambers thought that Communism was modernity taken to its utmost extremes. I think there is an element of truth to that. And it is ironic that of all the ideas that the non western world could have picked up from the west, the one that so many have adopted wholeheartedly is communism, or its cousin fascism.

The west (at least that part of it that still cares) is still fighting the same battle that we have fought for almost a century - to resist totalitarianism, in whatever form it mutates into. We've killed traditional fascism, we've killed traditional communism. We're working on Arab fascism and islamic fundamentalist totalitarianism. The next ones might be chinese market communism (or simply authoritarianism with marxist baggage) or the soft fascism/transnational ecoprogressives in Europe that Clueless goes on about.

If NK collapses, all to the good (and good articles, Tom). The middle east will not be important forever, especially as more and more oil is produced outside the region. Our next threats will be elsewhere - but that is beginning to drift a little too far off topic.

Btw, Chambers thought that the west could not defeat Communism with pragmatic modern liberalism, or that even if it did, it would lose it soul. He felt that the only way for the west to survive was to embrace and vigorously defend its essentially Christian heritage.

This comment thread is part of what is so great about blogging. Thanks guys -- this discussion has been fascinating to follow!

Someone,

Right, we can make the South Koreans an offer they can't refuse, anytime. We start a war and they finish it.

Daniel Drezner is blogging on the subject too. Here is the URL:

http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/000673.html