Bush and Co. are off in Cloud Cuckoo Land, but that just makes it worse. The ISG principles were lawyers and bureaucrats: none of them could claim to speak with authority on History, Psychology, Economics or Military Science. There is no evidence whatsoever that we can, or could ever positively influence the outcome in Iraq. There is no evidence that we could ever have succeeded as described by the Bush administration. Their is no successful model for what they want to do. The only evidence we have is that a nation cannot occupy a foreign people that are nationalistically self aware. The models of "success" are few, and filled with, bloodshed, internment camps, and ultimate withdrawal anyway. Not every question has an answer, there is no possibility of a western oriented, democratic unified Iraq. Pretending otherwise is a sure road to greater failure. And failure comes without regard to acknowledgment by interested parties. “Stability” is a meaningless concept when it isn't downright asinine. There are very few options left to us, but none of the successful prospects include staying in Iraq and accomplishing a damn thing.

Added this post to a recent roundup of Iraq strategy writing. I've been having some trackback trouble, so took the liberty of commenting here.

Joe, is your "catch and release" concern addressed by changing (loosening) rules of engagement?

Joe,

On your first point, Eliot Cohen and Bing West have commented over on the AEI site (under Short Publications). Their article also linked from the Real Clear Politics site on Monday.

On your other points, we are badly hampered when it comes to thinking our way out of the current bind because we do not permit US foreign policy to have a global end-game. The assumption is that foreign policy is a perpetual middle-game and that regional and functional problems can be managed as more or less departmentalized concerns over relatively short (or eternally unending) timeframes.

I don't know whether we will survive the current situation with this operational assumption again preserved, as we have in the past, making consideration of deeper assumptions unnecessary. But I wonder if it wouldn't be useful to begin to think about present commitments and possible future challenges in terms of (1) what the world will look like in 50-100 years and (2) what kinds of commitments and aims we will have the ability to sustain over such a long period.

Tom Perry (#1) offers a version of the classic leftist-Fanonist mantra, which fits into the broad strategy begun immediately after 9/11 that repeating the mantra of defeat often enough using the megaphone of the media et. al. will make it so. Bush is an idiot, Iraq was better under Saddam. You can't beat the Sunni minutemen as they blow up women and children in mosques like true freedom fighters. Yadda. Yadda. Yadda.

Statements like "There is no evidence whatsoever that we can, or could ever positively influence the outcome in Iraq" are simply asinine, and say far more about the mental state of those who make them than they do about the real world in which influence is real, enemies are real, and defeating them is possible.

Having said that, poor strategy and denying reality will cause one to lose even without the Left's assistance to its co-belligerents. Exhibit A, the lack of any grasp in Washington - or, for that matter, CENTCOM - re: the death-knell that Moqtada al-Sadr has always represented to the Iraqi democracy project. Along similar lines, see as Exhibit B the denial of reality re: Iran's activities and lack of any response to them. Both have had massively negative consequences, and continue to do so.

Mistakes are made in every war, of course - al-Qaeda has certainly made its share in Iraq, among which its seismic failure in Anbar continues to pay dividends for the USA. The war usually hinges on which side makes fewer mistakes of consequences, and/or fixes them faster.

Compounding one's mistakes is, needless to say, a bad idea. Readers can judge for themselves whether the coming Bush plan represents an example of that, though we won't really know until we see it. Perhaps it will actually address some of the concerns raised here.

Or not.

Re: Timothy's question (#2)... loosening rules of engagement would help some - but really, it comes down to changing the rules so that unlawful combatants are treated per the Geneva Conventions and shot. A view taken by Ralph Peters for some time, and one with which I agree. "Intelligence value" is an argument that means very little in the current catch-and-release situation, returning killers to the streets is bailing a boat with a sieve, and if anything the imminent threat of death unless there is a commuted sentence ought to get a lot more people talking.

If not, it will at least lower recidivism, up the risk odds for the money-motivated (thus lowering supply and increasing the cash outflow for the jihadists), and so lead to improved public order and security in areas where Americans choose to be.

"The only evidence we have is that a nation cannot occupy a foreign people that are nationalistically self aware."

This is the most laughable statement I've heard in years.

Iraq is not a nation. It's set of Tribes.

Back to reality, the only choice for GWB is to go wide. Hit Iran. Now. Before they have nukes. Put fear into the hearts of the neighborhood. Sink Iran's navy, destroy it's airforce, and above all hit it's nukes even if we kill a lot of people in the process. Then go after whatever troop concentrations form in Iran. Go big with the trump card (air power) after anything larger than a squad of men.

Hit Iran, hit it hard, hit fast, hit it often and minds will turn. Particularly since it will alter the balance of power (Sunnis and Shias realize that Iran as Shia patron is gone, and the US could use the power on THEM). With tribes only strength works.

And yes, follow Geneva Convention. Non-uniformed combatants shot out of hand.

Tom Perry states "...a nation cannot occupy a foreign people that are nationalistically self aware."

This is debateable.

It may be that permanent imperial rule of a nation by foreigners is impossible, provided said nation is reasonably large and cohesive, and said foreigners are distant and/or disinclined to impose their rule by force (see e.g. Tibet, Kurds etc. where the dominating powers have been both close and callous).
But nations have been occupied temporarily, and dominated for long spells, with reasonable success (depending on goals and willingness to impose obtain them by force).
Notably there are the two contrasting models of post-WW2 occupation, American and the Soviet. Both, by their very different standards and objectives, achieved considerable success in defining the parameters within which nation-states operated either temporarily or permanently.

In regard to Iraq, though, this is beside the point.
The problem is precisely that the Iraqis are not "nationalistically self aware".
More precisely, it seems their are two opposed concepts of Iraq, those of a Shia and a Sunni/Baathist dominated state. (And, as Jim Rockford says, for many Iraqis in practice tribe/clan trumps nation as a focus of allegiance.)

Despite this, it may be that Tom Perry is in practice correct: that "there is no possibility of a western oriented, democratic unified Iraq."
That ideal outcome might be achievable if the US was able to impose security and determine internal politics by force.

However, it seems highly likely that at this point, given the deterioration of Iraq, that the US simply does not have the manpower or willpower required. Even given changed rules of engagement and willingness to dictate term to the Iraqi government, I fear that to suceed it would need an occupation force increase of 50,000 to 100,000 or more, for a year or two at least.
This is not possible. Even if the political will was there, the troops aren't.

If this is the reality, it might be better to try de-facto partition and limited stabilisation, and clear out of the populated areas ASAP, rather than waste forces on a "too little, too late" effort.
At least cutting loose could regain the initiative and have forces to hand to coerce Iran rather than as potential hostages to Iranian actions as at present. As of now, in a confrontation with Iran develops Iraq looks likely to be more a liability than an asset. For instance, would Basra be of any use today for running lines of supply from the sea?

Joe, Jim , etc

For all the liberal-baiting and blah blah... you have failed to point out one successful example of what you propose. You fella's have no idea what you are talking about. You have pre-existing biases, that require you to find your side to be 'good' and 'right.' My own bias is for what works, and against what doesn't, I care little for the current popular name for any of it.

I am not a leftist, or rightist that I am aware of, I have as little use for the Democratic as the Republican factions of our one party state. I have no attachment to any group in the Mideast. I do not need to know the faith, ethnicity, or locale of a person to know whether he acts in a moral or immoral fashion.

Military force has utility, but not in Iraq, and not to subdue foreigners in the country. Iraq has two major ethnicities Kurd and Arab, and it has two major religious factions Sunni and Shia, that do not follow ethnic lines. The difference is analogous to the Monophysite/Orthodox schism in Christianity. Iraq had to implode when invaded. Saddam's were methods were necessary to hold the country together, axiomatically Iraq should not exist.

I wish one of you guys could refute me, but you talk around the issue, unable to unlearn wrong info or process new info that clashes with your biases. Good luck with that. Is there one person who can A/ understand my point and B/ refute my point without resort to irrelevant liberal-baiting, sloganeering and talking points? Can anyone provide a model for success? short or long term? Is there anyone who can see that continued fighting works against our interests?

#6 John

I appreciate you point. How are you defining Nationalistically self aware? I would say it is a sense of identity that requires sovereignty for dignity and self respect.

In order to dominate a foreign people over time the foreign land needs to be A/ proximate B/ vastly smaller in scale C/ acquiescent. Iraq is none of those. The Arabs are very nationalistically self aware, as are the Kurds. As Kurds and Arabs not Iraqis. Baathism is a political tactic not a force of its own.

We never sent enough troops, and 20 or 30 thousand will have no measurable impact. Our forces are more or less restricted to garrison forts and armed convoys, it is 'Indian Country' over there. It would have taken 400,000 troops to secure Iraq if the Iraqis cooperated. Absent that we would need nearer 2.5 million troops to subdue the country and that wouldn't last beyond their departure.

We have no hope of imposing our solution on Iraq. That does not mean I would eschew the use of force, I would not. But I would be thoughtful.

> The only evidence we have is that a nation cannot occupy a foreign people that are nationalistically self aware. The models of "success" are few, and filled with, bloodshed, internment camps, and ultimate withdrawal anyway.

Japan and Germany prove the essential truthiness of that statement.

Tom --

Iraq is not a nation. It is a set of TRIBES. The people in Iraq are not "nationalistically" aware. They are oriented towards tribe. Not a people, a rabble.

The Sunni spend most of their time killing Shias (and Americans) to set themselves up as "Saddam 2.0" The Shia want to have payback on the Sunnis and drive them out of Iraq the way Milosevic drove out Muslims, Croats, and Slovenes from Serbian territory.

The very IDEA of a nation is ridiculous. If Iraq WERE a nation it would resemble Japan or Germany circa 1946. Defeated, knowing it, and calculating it's best interest lying with a distant US rather than a close and hungry Soviet Union or Iran in the current instance.

WHY should the US want "stability?" Why not INCREASE the chaos which is the US's friend? Yeah it sucks if people die and media makes a big fuss about it, but the more chaos ensues in Iraq the less any party is able to control the region and mount a challenge to the US with ballistic misille nukes (the "equalizer") of militaries.

Look at Somalia. THAT is a success. So too Afghanistan. Drive out the regime, break a lot of stuff, kill the regime and as many of it's followers and supporters as possible. The only thing wrong with Pakistan was that it's regime was not punished and that was due to their nukes. Which in and of itself argues for Saddam's removal (before he got nukes) and also Iran.

Why should we "fix" any nation we invade? Simply break it and make it a hell-hole filled with chaos.

This creates obvious incentives not mount hostile paramilitary actions against the US particularly the WMD (nuke, dirty-bomb aka polonium 210 stuff, chemical, bio like the anthrax attacks). A single Polonuim 210 dirty bomb in a stadium could kill in Litivenko like agony nearly 100,000 people. So the US should create obvious and easy incentives (don't play footsie with Al Qaeda or you'll end up like Somalia).

Surging won't do anything because nation building is not in our interest (debatable if it's possible or not). What is in our interest is keeping our enemies (which is Muslims and Muslim regimes) as weak as possible and killing each other instead of ourselves.

The one great strength of Muslim peoples (their savage tribalism that leads them to orgies of killing) is also their great weakness. Syria, Iran, and Saudi are all our enemies so we should encourage them to over-reach in Iraq (a "trap" they can't resist) and them smash them hard and encourage chaos in their own regions.

Tom, read some history. People who were nationalistically self-aware have been occupied successfully since the dawn of time, sometimes even permanently. Hint: where does the word "fatigue" come from, and why is it an English word.

I would add that your formulation, even if true, would apply equally strongly to the other groups competing for dominance and influence in Iraq. al-Qaeda, Iran, and the Saudis are all equally foreign, but all have undeniable influence. As do the Americans. A less ideological observer might ask about relative influence and competing visions for Iraq.

Of course, a reality-based discussion like that is completely precluded by your ideological formulation, which says no positive influence is possible. You pragmatist, you.

Implosion is certainly a possibility in multi-ethnic states, and ethnic strife can be hidden by dictatorship's heavy hand and then re-emerge much later. Vid. Yugoslavia, where Tito sat on them for 50 years and it was all blown to hell as soon as he left. Or, a multi-ethnic state can stagger forward out of the mess. Vid. South Africa. Or, it can partition with bloodshed and then be much more peaceful thereafter. Vid. India. It's a classic chaotic system, and there is no real way to know in advance, but given implosion's consequences it is worth trying for the happier outcome of a multi-ethnic state on moral grounds alone. It is also, however, necessary to keep asking oneself periodically if that course is still viable.

At present, there is strong general support for a united Iraq (even the Kurds want autonomy and pretty much got it, but see the value in having a larger entity behind them to fend off Turkey). The problem is pretty much as John Farran said - what kind of Iraq? There agreement breaks down, possibly fatally.

Iraq has no air force and just 1 armored division. The US will need to be there simply to guarantee its territorial integrity, and this requirement becomes even stronger for the various entities if Iraq partitions. Those troops also have supply lines that must be protected. 30,000 is probably the very minimum requirement, maybe 40,000.

Beyond that, the questions for Iraq strategy revolve around how many more troops if any, for what additional missions if any, using what concept of operations, all to what end.

#10 Iraq is a western construct, have I not been saying that? It certainly was in mind.

You're prescription for chaos as the solution is part of the major part of the problem. We have been interferring in the mideast since the 30's, and the Europeans still longer. And this is where we are now. Seems like there should be a reconsideration of policy. To conclude that anyone "hayes" us because they are less than human is a horroshow. They fight us to get us out of their homeland, as we would do here.

It is ultmately not ours to decide what form governance takes in the mideast, that will be decided by the inhabitants. Equally, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the rest are also not nations in the western sense, they also (excluding Jordan) contain various religious sympathy's, and in Syria, some Kurds.

#11 Joe:

It is obvious I have read more history than you, and also obvious I used more varied sources. I take your feeble personal attack as evidence of an inability or unwillingness to examine your first principles.

Put another way: pot, kettle, black.

You have not in any way refuted my point, and give evidence that you don't understand it, since you fit apparently everything into the false left/right dichotomy.

Now I am still waiting for anyone to show a post renaissance example of successful rule by a western nation over a foreign nation remote from the center and large in population. The Brits couldn't even hold onto other English speaking nations. They had to incarcerate the Boers in the first modern concentration camps. India broke into pieces and still festers. It is entirely unclear whether India will remain unified absent a threat t from china and Pakistan (the Baluchi/Punjai etc part of India.)

Yugoslavia is an excellent example of how only Monarchial/authoritarian systems can manage competing ethnicities. Democratization is accompanied by ethnic cleansing, there, India, Africa, etc. South Africa is an interesting case, and we shall see. But if they do find a democratic multi ethnic system, that endures, I would note that they did it themselves: outsiders couldn't.

So, Joe, put your biases at risk or not as you choose. Reality does not wait upon you, the president or anyone, just bear that in mind. I used to be a national chauvinist like you, and a card carrying young republican in fact. But then I traveled, and read more than National Review, and standard history texts. Shocking stuff that.

#9 can't tell if that is serious or ironic.

Anyway comparing puny Iraq to Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan is very humorous indeed. Some of the obvious differences include the match up in strength, and who started the war, which leads to how we ruled and how they complied. Germany and Japan knew they were defeated and had hope for the future self rule of their own country. We started the war with Iraq, and told them it was a war against Saddam not the Iraqi people, and the Iraqi people did not fight for Saddam. Therefore they weren't defeated; therefore we earned no right to rule. We tricked them.

If you were to insist upon choosing an Axis co-belligerent, pick Italy. The similarities are poor quality regular army, and ruthless partisans, the difference being we let the Italians regain self rule rapidly and they were glad to be rid of the hated foreign occupier the Germans.

Tom, the presence of different ethnic and religious groups is present in Afghanistan. Is it your contention that Afghanistan cannot exist absent a totalitarian dictator or that Western efforts in Afghanistan are doomed?

Joe, amazingly I agreed whole-heartedly with your article. I'm a little iffy on shooting millitants on sight, but I understand the point, and it's worth being seriously considered, or at least heavily debated.

Although I also understand the point that we have no idea what stability is going to look like now. Although the general public seem to have intereast in some kindof peace, the far sides of the argument seem to have no intereast in doing so (it kindof reminds me of an exageratted pollitical state in america... far sides battling while most of the public is uninterested). However, the power is completely in the hands of the fringe, and the middle is leaving mixed neighborhoods as quickly as possible. The goverment, as I understand it, is powerless... either by choice or by an inability to dictate force to their opponents.

Will our troops decimating these fringe groups restore peace to baghdad, or will it incite more groups to the forefront? I think it is probably our best chance at this point. I'm on the fence about leaving, but we face the very real possibility that not quelling this violence will force various sunni/shia nations to openly support sides which could lead to a WWIII in the middle east (Merry Christmas Rockford).

The question is still "what next?", and I think we've got to consider that there may be more at stake than merely our 'war on terror'.

How do we tell when our window to restore peace is closed? I've been asking that question for awhile, and I'm still not sure how to define that moment.

Mr. Perry writes

Now I am still waiting for anyone to show a post renaissance example of successful rule by a western nation over a foreign nation remote from the center and large in population.

Yet when Mr. Freeman responds with exactly that, Perry shifts to the "but that's different" mode. So, Iraq is like every other occupation, except the ones that were successful. We should have suspected, because Perry had already started adding qualifiers like "post-renaissance" and "western". A more classic example of moving the goal posts would be hard to make up.

#15 PD

I would contend that Western efforts to design a Western style Democratic system are doomed: we cannot design their government, law or social structure; we can only prolong the agony of their own reordering of their society.

We had the power, have the power to smash any organized state, but we cannot build a new one for anyone. The power to kill is not the power to give life.

A country like Afghanistan requires either a Monarchial or Authoritarian (not specifically Totalitarian) government. Those type governments are not bound by an equalitarian view of law and custom. Equalitarianism is anathema when differences in culture are clear. And too the ethnicities overlap. Should the idea of Democracy take hold, and it may have, there will be a break up and ethnic cleansing to define new borders.

I think I addressed your question: is it so?

Tom:
Successful post-renaissance rule by Western nations over remote and populous territories?

Well, it all depends on how you define success, surely. After all, most states have ended, one way or another.
Though all the European empires did, a span of roughly 1550 to 1815 for the Spanish American empire is hardly trivial.
As for the British colonial (i.e. settlement) territories, it is debatable how far, after the American experience, Britain wanted to "hold onto" them (Ireland was another matter; and Indian partition perhaps the greatest British failure).

True, once national consciousness in the modern sense emerges, long-term domination becomes increasingly difficult. And Western nations have become increasingly disinclined to enforce rule without overriding cause.
But that domination and direction, whether malign or benign, though perhaps not prolonged direct rule, is possible in modern times is I repeat, shown by the post-war imposition of systems by the US and the USSR on various countries. Though longer term success probably depends on whether you are working with or against the grain of those societies.

Whether Iraqi society and history allows, makes problematic, or precludes a unitary, relatively law-bound, democratic state is still at issue.

The questions re. Iraq at this point are:
- how far the (Arab) Iraqi's (or at least a viable portion of the same) are willing to live in a compromise polity;
- how far this potential (if any) has by this point been damaged by civil/sectarian strife;
- whether the will and resources are available to the US for an effort to achieve a unitary Iraq or a managed "federal" solution;
- what US strategic interests (and humanitarian considerations) require as a minimal end-state.

As I said, I'm increasingly inclined to think that all that may be achievable now is a "least worst" outcome for both Iraqis and Western strategic interests. (My priority, by the way, is the latter.)

(BTW, if we're going to play "who's the leftist?", as British Labour Party supporter, I'm probably over the left wing horizon and receding fast.)

#18 Tom,

"I would contend that Western efforts to design a Western style Democratic system are doomed: we cannot design their government, law or social structure; we can only prolong the agony of their own reordering of their society."

The Iraqi people approved a constitution that we designed. The Sunni Arabs largely opposed it but they participated in the elections that followed and have been part of the government since then. The problem for the Iraqis is that nobody seems to want to make a central government as effective as it needs to be but nobody wants to be the first to jump ship.

The problem for us is that we have been clinging to the idea of a strong central state, and that idea is probably doomed at least for the time being. Any military efforts we continue to undertake in Iraq must be in service to a near-term political outcome, not an open-ended political process, and an outcome that separates the three main groups appears to be the one we would have the least difficulty facilitating if US troop levels cannot go much beyond those presently there.

The example you are searching for is Egypt, which the British occupied in 1882 and tried to reform under Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer). The effort to remake Egypt in a more British image failed and eventually Britain withdrew. But Egypt (and also Iraq until 1958) retained parliamentary institutions to which there were elections. It is is not inconceivable that at some future time such institutions could become the basis of governments in the region.

Prior to the invasion, Iraq's civil code was based upon the Napoleonic Code arrived at by way of Egypt. Napoleon would generally be an exemple of a military might creating countries, legal frameworks and values that have withstood the test of time.

Military conquests can be ephermal. Many of the parliamentary systems imposed by the English and the French in the Middle East were undone by fascist and communist revolutions supported from abroad (and from "the West" in particular). It seems to me that the biggest threat to an Iraqi republic similarly comes from outside the country.

PD Shaw,

You make a useful point in noting that the modern Middle East has never been isolated from surrounding regions. In fact, a century ago it could be argued that the region was open to liberal Westernizing influences (eg. the 1905 Iranian revolution). The influence of European fascism and communism on the Middle East in the interwar period, and for a long time afterwards, reflected similar trends in Europe and Latin America.

I think it would be quite reasonable to argue that political Islamism today may be just another temporary trend. The difference is that the movement originates among disaffected and expatriate Muslims and is not really a direct import from the non-Islamic West. But whether it has any greater staying power is very much an open question.

American influence may also prove ephemeral, although if the Middle East eventually evolves in a less illiberal direction Americans will see that as a kind of vindication. The question is what will happen in the meantime.

We could occupy every block of Baghdad until 2050 and the day after we left the same fighting would break out.

The Saudis and some others have said that they will not permit Sunnis in Iraq to be "cleansed" by the Shias and will intervene if that seems imminent.

So what to do? I agree with Joe that the increase of 22,000 troops (so said to be as I write, Jan. 10) seems unlikely to affect the situation except over the very short term. I would spend a lot of time excoriating Bush and Rummy for screwing the whole thing up, but there's no profit in that. So:

1. Destroy Sadr's militia as much as possible, including killing Sadr.

2. Tell the Sunni sheiks that if they don't clean out al Qaeda, with or without our assistance, we will no longer try to hold the Shia in check.

3. Completely seal the borders of Iraq with Iran and Iraq, allowing no traffic to cross for any reason whatsoever, and kill anyone who tries.

But I have no reason to think these measures would be any more effective than the administration's apparent intentions.

#17 indeed an apt name. I think you’re argument about shifting goals posts is a phony bait and switch tactic. The fragmentary posting you refer to is serious? Can you seriously think all comparisons cannot be examined? But there is an issue with definition of terms. We all do not seem to agree completely on meanings; therefore going beyond to a broader discussion is difficult, like nailing Jell-O to a wall. Make your point instead of attacking the messenger. I patiently explained what is similar and what is not can you address that instead of me. How is occupying Japan or Germany after WW2 remotely like what is happening in Iraq. Unless your standard is American troops are there?

#19 John

Thank you for your thoughtful reply. I agree that definitions are needed; I suspect that is a large problem amongst a diverse group.

The world did change with the renaissance; Europe moving from ignorant backwater to foremost technological region of the world, with further develops of weapons and military doctrine that the world eventually had to follow.

The Spanish and British in the areas the settled versus the areas where they ruled over foreign peoples is complex. The eradication of the pre-Colombian populations of the Americas is unprecedented. Do you agree? I note how hard it was for either power to retain control once the settler populations and economies had reached self sufficiency. Kind of like Britannia in the Roman Empire, once it was no longer a drain on the Imperial treasury, and when it should have begun to show a surplus, it went into repeated revolt, finally it was abandoned.

I think European rule over non Western nations is more illustrative. I think we will find it largely transitory, though that depends on a timescale you value, I suppose. The life time of Winston Churchill saw the 2nd British Empire reach apogee and dissolution. In my mind, that is a blink of the eye historically. Ireland, now that is a tough one.

The USSR is I think a good example of my point. Looking a Russia 1919, could one predict that their flag would fly over ten European capitols, 26 years later? With the crack up of the Soviet bloc we get to see what changes stuck and what did not. The subject peoples freed themselves, in a sense that validates the idea that nationalistic self aware populations cannot be subdued. The 44 years of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe is half the span of Churchill’s lifetime.

Interesting too, is where old hatreds and feuds sprung up, and where they did not. They sprung up in places that were occupied but not modified, Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, Bessarabia/Moldova. But they did not spring up in areas which were cleared and resettled, like East Prussia, Silesia, and the Sudetenland. And that, is my point.

Occupation by force is a waste of time. Unless one is willing to move populations, and settle new lands permanently, ones stay is temporary.

Iraq is a recognized country, but probably not viable. That it takes Saddam's methods to hold it together seems an argument against. At this late stage even partition is out of the question as far as imposed by the West. We could recognize an independent Kurdistan. We should really be thinking of an Arab consolidation. Israel has no negotiating partner, and no party they can call to account for Arab actions: there are 22 Arab countries. This division provides military advantage and political morass.

My own concern is firstly my country, and our allies. I think it is unnecessary and counter productive and hypocritical for us to attempt to manage any part of the world, not our own. The whole left/right thing doesn’t work for me. I see at a minimum four broad distinctions in political outlook, two just doesn’t cover it.

Anyway, I enjoy our discussion, feel free to write me here, by email or however. I will check back.

Donald Sensing:

If you believe (as I do) that, "We could occupy every block of Baghdad until 2050 and the day after we left the same fighting would break out." why would you consider "excoriating Bush and Rummy for screwing the whole thing up"?

Unless you mean for having invaded in the first place?

The problem isn't (and never one) was of troop numbers or tactics, the basic premise (that there exists an Iraqi polity) was flawed. Is that what you would excoriate Bush and Rumsfeld for?

Did you share the belief in Iraqi polity? I did.

#20 David

I agree they approved a constitution, but I wonder if it is a meaningful exercise. Their input seems limited and circumscribed. It remains to be seen whether it will last 24 hours after our departure, and we will assuredly depart: when is the question. I think the Kurds would be long gone legally as they are already practically, except for diplomatic considerations, on their part. There, we are wanted. I would expand on your point and say that the problem is the idea of Iraq: it is a Frankenstein country.

I am not familiar with what you describe in Egypt, Thanks for pointing it out. I will look it up. I appreciate your remarks, please continue.

#21 PD
I think we disagree here. The threat to "Iraq" is internal, and not fixable by outsiders. Though we have certainly meddled in the internal affairs of other nations, to our own long term loss. The Mossadegh government of Iran was certainly preferable to the Shah or the current masters. Napoleon and the revolution are interesting subjects. I note that they old regimes tried to coalesce into old forms in the aftermath, but could not. And accepted a new type authoritarian model, which ended only with WW1.

#22 David

Do you think it is possible that the insurgent fundametalist militant Islam of some middle easterners is simply the desperation of those without hope?

#23 Donald

"We could occupy every block of Baghdad until 2050 and the day after we left the same fighting would break out"

That is so true. I think the logical extension of that is let us conserve our blood and treasure now, instead squandering them futilely, chasing daydreams

#26, SG:

More precisely, I should have explained that based on today's status quo that "we could occuply . . ." I do not think that was always the case.

As you know, Army Chief of Staff Shinseki warned the Congress in 2002 that more than 300,000 troops would be needed inside Iraq to both defeat its military and maintain order afterward. Rumsfeld was so incensed that he sent Paul Wolfowitz to the Hill the next day to call Shinseki a liar. Yet according to news reports today, this evening Bush will admit he never sent enough troops.

I thought in 2003 that toppling Saddam was the right thing to so, even if by invasion. I still think it was the right thing to do. But when conquering a nation for a just cause - and our cause absolutely was just - the first obligation of the conqueror is to conquer the nation. That we never did, refused to do, in fact. We simply defeated the inept Iraqi military.

An overwhelming American military footprint in Iraq from the git-go could have prevented the wax of al Qaeda there and the formation of the sectarian militias. We had a "golden year" to enable Iraq to begin its post-Saddam era aright. Now it's too late.

#26 SG

I thought the idea was unworkable, and counter to our interests when it began to be a subject of discussion years ago. I am not one of those who ever thought Bush made a rational case for action. Bush's grotesque incompetence masks the failure of the idea, as a failure of implementation.

#31 Donald

You said: "We simply defeated the inept Iraqi military." and I absolutely agree with that. In fact we told the Iraqi people, not to fight, and that we were not fighting them. Then we acted as though we conquered them. That is a considerable shift of the goal posts. Once Saddam's government was destroyed we should have left. Then there would have been flowers thrown at our troops. It would have been cheap; a salutary example. There was no need to stay.

#31 Donald Sensing,

I agree with you that we never conquered Iraq. I don't agree that an overwhelming footpring would have made it right, or even better (from a US perspective). I think that an overwhelming footprint would have turned out like the Soviets in Afghanistan, and would have quickly burned any good will we had at the beginning.

IMO, the only reason we haven't faced a more general insurgency (i.e., a Shia-based insurgency) is that, by virute of our limited footprint, we obviously weren't trying to occupy the country. Since we don't have the manpower or the political will to forcibly put down a popular anti-US insurgency, it's a good thing that one never developed.

But that's all in the past. At this point I'd like someone to explain why it's now in the US interests to stop the sectarian violence. It seems like this is largely a good thing (from a US perspective), and we ought to look to export the sectarian conflict into neighboring countries.

We are never going to stop Shia and Sunni from fighting each other if that's what they want (and clearly, that's what enough of them want). All we are doing now is turning their failure to coexist into a US failure. Why would we want to do that?

"At this point I'd like someone to explain why it's now in the US interests to stop the sectarian violence."

Anarchy breeds radicalsim and substantially increases the likelihood that it will be in US interests to return to Iraq from a position far less desirable in the near to mid future. I think if you go back and read the 9/11 Commission report the (arguably) top foreign policy reccomendation was to prevent the creation of bases for terrorists. Chaos would allow Iran and al-Qaeda to carve out informal spheres of influence in Iraq which would be ideal for that purpose.

You could have sectarian violence at a level that didn't produce anarchy or destablize the Iraqi state.

#35

And what makes Iraq any more attractive as a "terrorist base" than a hundred (or a thousand) other pockets of lawlessness around the globe?

Mr. Perry;

I must say it's quite amusing to see you go about "not attacking the messenger" in a post that consists of nothing but that.

The only evidence we have is that a nation cannot occupy a foreign people that are nationalistically self aware.

But let's look at that last response —

"the match up in strength" : that would seem to favor reforming Iraq, since it was less able to resist.

"who started the war" : the same — in both cases the invasion of the conquered nation was a direct result of the other nation invading allies of the USA.

"Germany and Japan had future had hope of future self rule" : again the same as in Iraq.

"told them [Iraqis] it was a war against Saddam, not the Iraqi people" : so you think the better model would have been a war against "rag-heads" like the one against the "Krauts" and "Japs"? I would think this would again weigh in favor of Iraq, not against it.

Location, location, location . . .

#37

If you would like to debate the debate, I guess we can do that. You and others have slid the discussion around, and take no responsibility for it. I find people very resistant to plain facts that do not support their prejudices, so they play games, cut and paste, massage meanings, and equivocate, in a spirit that seems treacherous. Thus we wind up with our current political climate, where draft-dodgers like Saxby Chambliss are "courageous" for a big mouth, and Medal of Honor recipient Max Cleland is "cowardly" because he thinks invading Iraq is a bad idea.

This is my original post, I have not moved away from it:
"Bush and Co. are off in Cloud Cuckoo Land, but that just makes it worse. The ISG principles were lawyers and bureaucrats: none of them could claim to speak with authority on History, Psychology, Economics or Military Science. There (((I corrected “their” with “there”))) is no evidence whatsoever that we can, or could ever positively influence the outcome in Iraq. There is no evidence that we could ever have succeeded as described by the Bush administration. There is no successful model for what they want to do. The only evidence we have is that a nation cannot occupy a foreign people that are nationalistically self aware. The models of "success" are few, and filled with, bloodshed, internment camps, and ultimate withdrawal anyway. Not every question has an answer; there is no possibility of a western oriented, democratic unified Iraq. Pretending otherwise is a sure road to greater failure. And failure comes without regard to acknowledgment by interested parties. “Stability” is a meaningless concept when it isn't downright asinine. There are very few options left to us, but none of the successful prospects include staying in Iraq and accomplishing a damn thing."

Now, you have to see that as a reply to the article that preceded it, and the same theme. You and others have tried to move the conversation away from that why? Why must someone always trot out Nazi Germany? Everything and everyone not like us is not therefore Hitler and the Nazi's.

So, reiterating the point.

If all I am allowed to do is to repeat myself verbatim that is not going to be a conversation. If in answering posts, elaborating points for those who misunderstand or have genuine questions constitutes something tawdry, then, I question your intentions.

I am not bound by your view of my view. You may criticize any of my points, but you may not tell me why I made them. Reference yourself: there is a difference between "I disagree because," and "You're intent is deceitful." Nostradamus you are not.

I find nothing wrong in my original post, and I stand by it, word for word. I defy you to refute my original points, with reference to the article to which they are attached. I will take silence as a shameful withdrawal; I will take continued assassination attempts, as comedy.

You can find pissing contests and shouting matches almost anywhere; this is your big chance to converse with someone with whom you disagree. And possibly persuade, but you will have to be willing to examine and risk your first principles.

PD Shaw, did I answer your question? I think that I did.

Just curious... but are there other people who in reading my original post think I was unclear when referring to Western countries remaking other countries, foreign to them? Germany after all is Western, and is not therefore foreign to the West. Was it clear that I was speaking of modern times, and not ancient times? I see nationalism/racism and the nation/state to be modern (Post Renaissance) and different from particularism and provincialism. I kind of take it for granted. I guess I wonder now, whether that is generally accepted or not? Does that cause anyone to read my comments differently? I'd be interested in your comments.

Yes, Tom Perry you answered my question (I assume we're talking about the Afghanistan question from #15 to #18) Frankly, I just asked it to see if you would take similar positions on Iraq as Afghanistan. You did. Let me just suggest that there are a lot of people who seem to feel that the Iraq war is so wrong that they are incapable of realizing the logical conclusions of their argument.

My point of disagreement with you is probably in that I think you over emphasize the type of democracy being installed. Bush has had a tendency to use the word "freedom" which is probably pretty banal to most ears, but I think its appropriate. You can look at freedom watch and see a nice continuum in which states are graded from free to unfree. I'm not sure there is any Arab state that is not completely on the unfree end of the scale. Moving along that scale is important. I do not expect Iraq to become Switzerland. I also suspect people using the term "Jeffersonian democracy" are trying to set a standard which promises failure.

While I do think war has been an important source of social and political transformation from the time of the Romans, Napoleon, and the British Empire, the more important transformative force has been in capitalism and technology. These will modernize the tribal societies, but they can not penetrate closed autocratic states.

Tom Perry (#41): Isn't you're point narrower. Russia imposed communism on Mongolia, right? Are you suggesting that its impossible to impose a liberal government as opposed to an authoritarian government?

Tom Perry #41:
"Germany after all is Western, and is not therefore foreign to the West"

A rather circular argument, surely.

Does the West include Russia; Serbia; Turkey?

What precisely are its limits and definitions, or are we talking about matters of degree?

If the US was able to if not remake, at least re-direct Japan, does that make Japan "Western" at the end of WW2?

If so what, if anything, does "Western" actually mean?
Japan remains Japanese culturally, despite the profound impact of American influence; just as India remains India has been masssively influenced by British rule.
"... ones stay is temporary." True. But ones effect can be permanent and profound.

My apologies if you consider I am distorting your argument, but I can see no reason why it should not be re-stated as: post-1945, no capitalist liberal democracy can (or should?) enforce reform on any other country, especially a "Third World" one and most especially one inhabited by Muslims".

While that may be true in practice and in specific circumstances, given the self-imposed political constraints of the "West", and more pertinently to the current situation, in the present conditions specific to Iraq, I see no reason why it should be elevated to an absolute.

For what it's worth, I'd agree with Donald Sensing: if you are going to conquer, it's best to CONQUER and then RULE, not diddle about.

Tom Perry #33: "we told the Iraqi people ... we were not fighting them. Then we acted as though we conquered them" I'd reply that the problem is that's precisely what we did NOT do and SHOULD have done. In retrospect if unwilling to RULE, it might have been best to win, install an interim govt. and quit.

But then, if said govt. had fallen to Iranian domination, collapsed into anarchy (and parts become al Qaeda host) or been partitioned by neighbours, we could now be looking at prospective Iraq War III anyway. The country can't be ignored, unfortunately, due to strategic factors re. position, political cotention, terrorism, and above all security of oil flows, even if hopes for it as a catalyst of regional cultural change have evaporated.

Back to "least worst outcome", again.

#42/43 PD Shaw

OK. I follow.

When speaking of Freedom, I think you are talking about the ability to speak ones mind, and rule ones own life? But not necessarily have a say in government? And that Freedom can vary with say, culture? Yes, I think we can theoretically help with that, by smashing despotic governments, but it is the people themselves who must follow that to its logical conclusions.

While, I agree in theory, I am not sure I see how to practice it. I can’t think of any examples. Do you have a suggestion? My thought on advancing Freedom and Democracy are that it something we can aid, after the fact. Example Slovenia: They alone managed to emerge from Yugoslavia and produce Freedom and Democracy, I would be prepared to extend the protection of NATO to them to keep their Freedom and Democracy safe from outsiders, but I will not support engagement in their internal affairs.

I certainly agree with your concluding paragraph in 42.

Yes, one can impose an authoritarian government; one cannot impose a liberal democratic government. Liberal democracy requires order, tolerance, and personal liberty as attitudes and beliefs reflected in the operation and law of a given country; one cannot impose them. Authoritarianism simply requires obedience, and that can certainly be imposed by a greater force.

#44 John

Please tell me why arguing about the West is circular? If we substitute America for West is it still circular?

No to the mentioned countries. The West is European; European settled and modeled countries inclusive of the Catholic/Protestant nations and exclusive of the Orthodox and non C/P nations. Japan is anomalous, so too are Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea: they act in the public sphere in the Western manner but are derived from quite differing cultures. Japan has acted Western since Admiral Perry “opened” it to the world, which was actually the source of our conflict. Our victory eliminated their militarism, they decided to continue Westernization. These countries are good examples of how we may spread Western Capitalist ways. I’d think the Eastern/Orthodox countries will follow in a generation or two.

I agree that one nation can have a profound effect on another. Without the British, India would not be united (sort of) and westernized (sort of.)

I’d say that the redefinition you suggest is not quite what I mean, but it is the area of legitimate discussion, maybe slightly distorted. But let’s see. We would probably have to agree on what self aware populations are, and when we feel we can put a date to it. Your point about the absolute is well taken. I’ll use metaphor/analogy to express my point differently. Trying to impose our way is like trying to make another person stop smoking. You can police them, you may be able to keep cigarettes away from them, but you cannot make them not want a smoke. Attitudes absolutely cannot be changed from without. One can hope for, but not compel their acceptance. On the other hand if one comes to you and asks for help to quit smoking there are some things one can do. Still change is driven by the other.

I agree one can conquer and rule. One cannot rule without conquest, and one must not be squeamish about the methods involved in conquest. We did not conquer Iraq. We have still not done so. We toppled a regime, while telling the people a story of liberation that completely undermines the idea of our rule.

There is no love lost between Persians and Arabs, the borders in the Mideast are insensible and should be revised to obtain peace and stability. The Iranian threat and Shia link is way overblown. To the extent it exists, it exists in an enemy of my enemy is my friend way. We can’t fix them, and our efforts have made everything worse for us, and for the states in the region. Our policies have failed for more than 30 years; it is high time for an objective, bottom up review. Our counter productive hostility toward Iran not only fails in its goal, but strengthens the regime versus its own people. There may be some who fear or dream of a new Achemenid/Sassanian Persian Empire, but they would have a worse time than us in garrisoning Arab populations. Besides the regime members are really into domestic power, and personal wealth. War puts all that at risk. President Ahmadinnerjacket, can be treated like the crazy uncle, because he is not the power de jure, or de facto in Iran. And we will go mad trying to prevent every conceivable contingency. Sometimes you just have to let it go.
We cannot micromanage the world.

I think you guys are making much ado about nothing.

The coalition is not there to "impose their will". We got rid of Saddam, we're giving the Iraqis a good shot at self-rule. We are neither imposing our will nor do we own the result. That's for the Iraqis.

As for the larger argument about the use/continuance of force in Iraq in general: I ask you all to come up with worst-case scenarios. In each of them, it's better with the U.S. Army forwardedly positioned in Iraq than not. The exceptions may be scenarios involving the Norks, but even then, we're fine.

That's not arguing about the surge one way or another. In fact, it's really not that relevant. It would be nice to have Baghdad as an open city -- perhaps nice enough to let the rest of the country go to pot. Especially if we're going to stay a while and enjoy the scenery.

What concerns me is that some folks are predisposed to think that we've "lost". From two years ago, it worried me that no matter how Iraq turned out (short of a new Switzerland) we would have "lost". There's just something really sick about that mentality, and I think it hurts the nation.

We've eliminated Saddam, we've positioned fighting units next to Iran and Syria, and we've got great experience in counter-insurgencies. That's great. The rest of the stuff we screwed up on. Concentrate on what you want, but don't spin me -- it's a mixed bag, not "chasing daydreams"

Tom Perry #46:
My criticism of "circularity" was based on my (likely mistaken) perception that your argument can be formulated as: any nation that can be occupied and modified by a "Western" Power is therefore Western, Westernizing or "Westernizable" (sorrry about that last).

I'd respond: you can't know until you try. I'd agree that, all other things being equal, it would be better not stick our noses into a wasps nest. But I still content that it was necessary to eliminate the Saddamist Iraq from the Middle east equation, and given that it was worth trying to instigate a political phase-change in the region. The odds of this succeeding now appear poor; but perhaps not yet zero.

I'd agree, one cannot and should not micromanage the world. However, the strategic significance of the Gulf Region and the linked dangers of Iranian ambition, regimes of stasis, and regional nuclear proliferation may make a "hands on" approach unavoidable, wishes notwithstanding.
I'd like to think Arab-Iranian differences would obviate all problems; but I wouldn't want to bet too much on it.

Daniel Markham #47:
I don't thing the present situation is a total loss; Iraq is no longer a potential regional menace. And Saddam has paid the price for breaching the Iraq cease-fire terms.
My concern is, as things are turning out, Iraq as a "forward position" may be of little value, even a liability.
We can disengage from the centres of population and enjoy the desert scenery.
But if it comes to supporting (or threating) a full scale war front, sea supply would be nice, and running that via Basra looks a bit iffy right now. (This wouldn't be a problem if Turkey allowed a full-scale land supply route, but if they did, they'd surely have a price.)

PD Shaw/Markham: At this point, I would settle for a lot less than a jeffersonian democracy. The fact that this was even considered at one point is fairly naive, but worth a shot. At this point I would settle for simple banditry, neighborhood skirmishes, some lawlessness, and the ability of iraqi's to engage in their daily lives.

Instead what we appear to have is severe infighting, law that is upheld only by militia groups (who each have their own sense of wrong and right), markets and shops that are terrified of opening because the might be bombed or seen as pro-western, and the same thought-insurgency groups that were present under Saddam are now terrified to show their faces in Iraq.

All of these things stunt the will of the people. It's an intentional plan by fundamentalists. And people are responding by locking their doors or fleeing the country. A populace that is scared to speak their mind will not stabilize into any kindof of democracy. It will fall into mob rule. The farther this goes along, the harder it will be to dig Iraq out.

Now, Joe basically pointed out that he doesn't think 20,000 will turn this thing around. I agree. And unless you see us changing strategy in the near future we're in trouble.

I feel that Iran & Syria are unlikely ventures at this point. And given the current state of Iraq and Afghanistan, would probably be unwise.

PD Shaw/Markham: At this point, I would settle for a lot less than a jeffersonian democracy. The fact that this was even considered at one point is fairly naive, but worth a shot. At this point I would settle for simple banditry, neighborhood skirmishes, some lawlessness, and the ability of iraqi's to engage in their daily lives.

Instead what we appear to have is severe infighting, law that is upheld only by militia groups (who each have their own sense of wrong and right), markets and shops that are terrified of opening because the might be bombed or seen as pro-western, and the same thought-insurgency groups that were present under Saddam are now terrified to show their faces in Iraq.

All of these things stunt the will of the people. It's an intentional plan by fundamentalists. And people are responding by locking their doors or fleeing the country. A populace that is scared to speak their mind will not stabilize into any kindof of democracy. It will fall into mob rule. The farther this goes along, the harder it will be to dig Iraq out.

Now, Joe basically pointed out that he doesn't think 20,000 will turn this thing around. I agree. And unless you see us changing strategy in the near future we're in trouble.

I feel that Iran & Syria are unlikely ventures at this point. And given the current state of Iraq and Afghanistan, would probably be unwise.

I would settle for a lot less than a jeffersonian democracy. The fact that this was even considered at one point is fairly naive, but worth a shot.

I do not know that the administration every advocated or even used the phrase "jeffersonian democracy." I can recall critics using the phrase, and unless someone can point to its use by the administration I remain convinced that its use was an effort to set expectations high.

"I can recall critics using the phrase, and unless someone can point to its use by the administration I remain convinced that its use was an effort to set expectations high."

That's been the case all along. Critics of the war predicted entire armies lost and then took careful notes when folks on the other side said something like it would be a cakewalk. Instead of everybody saying it's a war, it's going to be long and suck, we get rhetorical posturing on both sides. The administration was clear that the GWOT is multi-generational. (insert partisan rant about GW here if you like)

GWOT is preciated on the fact that many nations are not really nations at all. So boys and girls, get used to Iraq, because somebody has to do the policing around the world if you want to keep the nuts in check. Complete overt force like nuclear weapons is not going to do it, and running away back to mommy is not going to do it either. So can you take all the arm-waving and name-calling and pound sand. We're in for a bunch of peacekeeping missions for the next long while. Knowing the U.S., we're probably in for a bunch of chicken-shit "It's all our fault" self-flaggelation interspersed with "Let's go kill all of 'em" over-use of force. Eventually, however, we'll figure it out. I have faith.

I actually predicted to a friend (take me on faith here) that we would defeat the Iraqi army farily easily at first, until they changed into a guerrilla force and started hitting us in the cities. And then our technology would become moot, and we would have a much more difficult time. I did not predict a multiple-insurgency type battle (though anyone with actual knowledge of Iraq probably should have). I was definately more concerned with what we would do after we arrived in Iraq... would we put together a puppet goverment (at the time my most coherent concern), would we see the country through, would we be ready to pull a nation back together?

Yes, the GWOT is going to be long, and I expect a 50-100 year on-off skirmishes, but Iraq is coasting us a ton of resources that we should be using to attack terrorists on OUR terms, not micromanage a country that's bleeding into a culture war while our troops serve as bait.

Still, if we leave WWIII is coming. Hopefully it won't happen anyway.

"not micromanage a country that's bleeding into a culture war while our troops serve as bait."

Will Iraq become a terrorist haven if we leave? I vote yes.

If that's true, then we must stay -- to some degree. We would be complete idiots to abandon them if we know we'll have to fight our way back in ten years. That doesn't mean we need to micromanage anything. Maybe if more Iraqis serve as "bait" and less Americans, that will keep the folks happy. Although, sadly enough, that is already the case.

Perhaps, just perhaps, everything is happening the way it is supposed to happen. We screwed up with troop levels, we're correcting. We thought it would be short-lived (I guess we did. I never did, but it seems all the anti-war folks thought they were told it was going to be over in a weekend or so) but it's decades long. We thought WMD was in Iraq, but instead it was a failed state, held together by brutal force, sitting on top of billions in natural resources and full of bandits and cut-throats.

We can either choose to self-analyze ourselves to death -- Woe are we! -- or we can adjust, adapt, and overcome. The thing I hated the most about the Carter presidency, and I'm remembering it clearly now, is this constant morose feeling. It was like a blanket of depressing sadness that just settled over the country. I haven't felt that from people in a long time, but I'm beginning to feel it again listening to the Dems and some posters. Maybe things are going well. Iraq is a mess, but perhaps this is a learning experience the country is going to need later. If we think we can get away with light and lean, and we can't, isn't it better to know it now rather than ten years from now? If we're going to be attacked by people from countries that are like Iraq or Iran, don't you think we're going to need this COIN toughening up we're getting now? Why must everything always be argued to some irrational extreme? As awful as any death is, we've lost less in Iraq than we have in single days of fighting in our past. By comparison, Iraq is a picnic. Yet, to some, "GW's War" is, as one R said this week "The greatest foreign policy disaster in this country's history"

Give me a break.

I'm afraid that all these fancy, sophisticated analyses are off-target because the starting point is that we are dealing with rational actors.

And that seems to be something that is in very short supply in that part of the world.

Alain: that depends on your definition of rational. That also depends on what your goals are. I've said it before: the leaders in charge of Iraq are all playing a dangerous game, hoping that their side will win out and gain more power than they othwerise deserve. I think all sides are playing the powergrab game.

No, I don't really see that as rational either, but as long these groups think they have more to gain from being irrational, Iraq will be a very dangerous place.

Realistically and long-term, the real options seem to be:

a) Foreign occupation indefinitely; or

b) A proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia tearing to shreds anything that might accidentally be left of Iraq and presenting the rest of the world with $200 a barrel oil.

The chances of the Sunnis and Shi'as trusting each other enough to establish a successful power-sharing government are nil, and partition of the country would result in innumerable minority enclaves that would either continue the bloodshed or require "ethnic cleansing" on a massive scale. But this would be the outcome of a civil war in any case, with of course both sections becoming prime breeding grounds for terrorists.

As many observed before the invasion, most of the probable outcomes of Saddam's removal are no-win for the US, let alone the Iraqis. I'm afraid I can't even see the glass as half-empty; at this point, it looks completely dry to me.

This has been a most enlightening exchange. It has been suggested to me by someone who's opinion I value, that I tend toward overreach, am use language inexactly. I thought about it for several days, and tend to agree. Though I think some of that comes from assumptions we all make about what is generally known or accepted.

In any case I think we would all benefit by common usage of words and terms. Politicians have become past masters at manipulating language, and as Orwell suggested we cannot let them have control over the language, and with that, thought.

If we could agree on terms, words, and meanings then we could all spend more time discussing an idea, less time arguing past each other.

I am not sure how we could do this. Any suggestions?
I would specifically like to hear from: Daniel Markham,
John Farren, PD Shaw, David Billington, alchemist, and anyone interested.

tperry1776@gmail.com

It depends on what you mean by "terms."

Seriously, it's hard for me to keep up with old threads, so I'll just make a few personal observations and suggest that some of the best analysis of these issues is in Fareed Zakaria's "Future of Freedom: The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," which is an updated and extended version of his 1997 Foreign Affairs article The Rise of Illiberal Democracy

"Democracy" means elections, but a number of dictatorships have held elections. We could talk about "free and fair elections," but that brings up more arguments, colored by international observers that have ratified elections as "free and fair" as a way of helping jumpstart the process.

Zakaria talks about "Constitutionalism," which is a system in which the rule of law is more important than any leader. Venezuela has a democratic government, with arguably free and fair elections because the leader changes the rules so that he will prevail.

Zakaria also talks about "liberalism" as a grouping of values which emphasize the individual over the state, either in economics or social matters, or both. There is not one single recipe for liberalism, but FreedomWatch does a good job of trying to quantify the different strains.

What I think we are trying to accomplish in Iraq is some form of Constitutionalism in which leaders will stand for elections and win or lose. The test is whether the elections are for one time only or are the beginning of a series of conversations between the demos and the leadership of different factions. Also, we are trying to encourage Iraq to move from the "unfree" side of FreedomWatch's list to the "partly free" or better. This will be easy in some things and not so easy on others.