Winds of Change.NET: Liberty. Discovery. Humanity. Victory.

Formal Affiliations
  • Anti-Idiotarian Manifesto
  • Euston Democratic Progressive Manifesto
  • Real Democracy for Iran!
  • Support Denamrk
  • Million Voices for Darfur
  • milblogs
Syndication
 Subscribe in a reader

The Limits of Duty to Country

| 21 Comments
In the comments to a post inspired by Armed Liberal's defiance of stoning (as to which, by the way, at least one of the women mentioned has had a brief stay granted), commenter Sam asked to hear my thoughts on his argument about the rightful power of the state:
And: we've all submitted to a level of "ownership" by the state. This country does a better job of minimizing that than most, but society exists to restrict the freedom to do "bad" things in the hope that "good" freedoms will be expanded. When we disagree about what good and bad are is where we bump up against that ownership issue. We have to do as we're told or end up dead/imprisoned. That's ownership, isn't it?
Is it proper to think of Americans as "owned" by the state? Is that the right relationship, more broadly, for a person to have with the state?

Part I: Classics

Plato appears to have thought so, for he has Socrates relate the point as explanation for why he will not attempt to flee his own execution. Here is the excerpt from the Crito:
Soc. "Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the State? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?" None, I should reply. "Or against those of us who regulate the system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of this, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?" Right, I should reply. "Well, then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands?- you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? And will you, O professor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country." What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not? Cr. I think that they do.
Plato's position might be said to be further amplified by the following exchange on being a free man versus being a slave, from the Alcibidaes:
SOCRATES:

Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?

ALCIBIADES:

Yes; I see that they will all perish.

SOCRATES:

And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, ensue?

ALCIBIADES:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.

ALCIBIADES:

That is true.

SOCRATES:

And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.)

ALCIBIADES:

That is evident.

SOCRATES:

And that which is better is also nobler?

ALCIBIADES:

True.

SOCRATES:

And what is nobler is more becoming?

ALCIBIADES:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?

ALCIBIADES:

True.

SOCRATES:

Then vice is only suited to a slave?

ALCIBIADES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And virtue to a freeman?

ALCIBIADES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided?

ALCIBIADES:

Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES:

And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?

ALCIBIADES:

I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.

SOCRATES:

And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?

ALCIBIADES:

Yes, I do.

SOCRATES:

How?

ALCIBIADES:

By your help, Socrates.

SOCRATES:

That is not well said, Alcibiades.

ALCIBIADES:

What ought I to have said?

SOCRATES:

By the help of God.
This is the classical view, then: that the state does indeed own a man, as even a "free man" is like a slave morally; and the state's ownership is to be directed at improving the greater virtue of the community. To truly become free requires the help of God. In the meanwhile, the state's ownership of men is right and proper.

Sam, in asserting the same position, is on very solid philosophical ground. He will find this traditional conception asserted time and again through history. Once Europe becomes Christian, he will find defenders in the Church as well as in the halls of the state.

Part II: Enlightenment Thinking

He will find it difficult, however, to justify the United States of America.

Because of its history, the United States requires a different explanation of the authority of the state. It arose in rebellion to civic authority, by serious thinkers who believed that what they were doing was not only neither a crime nor a sin, but an expression of their rights under the natural law written by their Creator. Catholic theory has a different view of what natural law has to say on the subject; search on "canker-worm" in the previous link to find it.

It is possible that Jefferson and Washington were wrong -- both criminals and, if you like, sinners. In overturning civic authority, they therefore created a great crime -- but we might still be justified in newfound obedience to the state they created. For better or worse, it is now the civic authority, and we should show it the obedience that they wrongly denied to the authorities of their day.

However, it is also possible they were right. If so, there is a right to rebel -- a natural law that holds that men are created equal, even if 'one man is [not] as good as another,' as the Catholic article holds. The American nation is founded on the idea that rebellion is a human right: "...to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them[.]"

If that is so, though, how to get around the problems raised by Socrates, and Sam?

Part III: The Problem of Rebellion

Does it not do violence to the law and the communal good, as Socrates held, to believe that anyone is justified in putting aside the common law? The Alcibidaes quote suggests that "tyranny" might be an answer to the problem -- when the state is behaving tyrannically, it is proper to overthrow it. Not by accident nor by coincidence, "Tyranny" was a term frequent in the writings of the Founding Fathers.

Yet what is tyranny, finally? If the state is going to execute you, is that not the ultimate tyranny from your point of view? If it drafts you into its wars, when you do not agree, is that not tyranny? If not, why is it tyranny to impose a tax on tea or require the purchase of stamps?

We are treating with natural rights here: we need to be able to say that in the one case, to rebel is a wrong justly punishable by the state even unto death; but in the other case, to rebel is the exercise of a natural right that the state has no proper authority to resist. Yet there is no clear line: America holds that the Boston Tea Party was an exercise of natural rights, but that the secession of the Southern states -- by acts of assembly not different in form from those that created the United States -- were unjustified rebellion.

Part IV: Wagering Lives, Fortunes and Sacred Honor

Some of this can be excused by pointing out that the facts on the ground were decided by the wager of battle, not by philosophers. It should be no surprise that the wages of battle are chaotic. They always are.

If we look at likely future scenarios, too, there is a certainty that claims will be tested by the wager of battle. This may not be so full-throated as all out war: the Civil Rights movement entailed real fighting and military force, with marches in defiance of legal orders; regular deployments of the National Guard; attacks on police by rioters in Boston and elsewhere; and even lynchings by insurgent mobs.

That is to restate that rebellion is a natural right -- but it is also to add that it is a right with costs. You do not exercise the right to rebellion like you do the right to religious liberty.

The right to rebel has to be said to be a natural right, but one that must be justified in the midst of the field.

That is to say: We are free men, not slaves. If we obey, we choose to obey. If we do not, we are as right as we can make ourselves. We wager our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor -- and, if we are truly justified, we do so in bonds with other men who freely choose to stand with us and stake their own.

Oddly enough, this proves to be the resolution to the problem raised by the Catholics:
All [ultra-democratic doctrines] originate in a manifestly false supposition, that one man is as good as another.
Not so this one. It holds that this fundamental human right has to be justified according to the wager of battle. That implies a matching of tactics and strategies, the making of alliances and the forging of powerful arguments. Not just any man will be the equal of that task. Here is an ultra-democratic doctrine: it holds that any man may overthrow the state, and be right to do it. But it does not believe that any man is good enough to do it. All of which reminds me of the climactic lines in the movie Shane. There, too, there were competitors for who was the proper authority -- the bold cowboys who had fared hard against the Cheyenne in settling the land, or the new farmers who wished to move in and build fences across the range. There, too, the existing authority had brought in force of arms, in the form of a gunfighter named Wilson, to enforce the existing order. In deciding to stake his life, fortune and honor on the challenge to that order, Shane faces the 'state's' righteous demand:
Shane: So you're Jack Wilson.
Jack Wilson: What's that mean to you, Shane?
Shane: I've heard about you.
Jack Wilson: What have you heard, Shane?
Shane: I've heard that you're a low-down Yankee liar.
Jack Wilson: Prove it.
John Hancock did. He proved that we are free men, not slaves. That shall I defend, with my life and fortune, and sacred honor.

21 Comments

From Spooner:

"It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that that each man makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties to the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much protection, the same as he does with any other insurance company; and that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to pay tax, as he is to pay a tax, and be protected.

But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: Your money, or your life." And many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat.

The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol [*13] to his head, proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful.

The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a "protector," and that he takes men's money against their will, merely to enable him to "protect" those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful "sovereign," on account of the "protection" he affords you. He does not keep "protecting" you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villanies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave.

The proceedings of those robbers and murderers, who call themselves "the government," are directly the opposite of these of the single highwayman."

It's a great post that begins with Socrates and ends with John Hancock, although it's a shame he had to kill that cowboy feller.

I believe T.J. Madison has a point in regards to taxation: the bunch that signed the DOI were the "old guard" by the time of the Constitution, and the new bunch wanted federalism to have taxation authority (Probably the mess of the country's finances had something to do with that -- how little has changed!) Taxation proved to be crack to democracies: as long as people could get elected to take money from one group to pay off another (for good or bad causes), there was momentum towards total taxation. We're already over 50% -- that is, over half of what you make goes to somebody else against your will.

On another thread somebody laughed at the idea of cutting taxes, as if it were some kind of silly political stunt. People are regularly asking to be taxed more. I think they are going to get what they are asking for.

Ah, but there was no direct taxation of individuals by the federal government until 1913. In fact, the original Constitution actually forbade it, which is why an amendment had to be passed to do it.

The power to tax is the power to destroy.

"sic semper tyrannus" shouted the man at Ford's Theatre.

Grim, you seem to be working from a conclusion, seeking the reasons afterwards.

I fail to see how there is any natural right to rebel, barring death or threat of death. It cannot be said that is is rational or moral to take one's life or place oneself in a position where one's life would be forfeit, or subject oneself to the threat of destruction. Accordingly, there is a natural law argument that a government which is conducting itself in a way that poses a significant risk of death may justify rebellion, but the risk must be significant enough to outweigh the risk of death as a result of rebellion.

Instead, the Revolutionary War signifies the British Crown's failure to maintain sovereignty over distant colonies. Maintaining sovereignty required either the consent of the governed or the sword. It largely relied upon consent; when consent became qualified, the Crown declined to fully use the sword. Sovereignty qualified is sovereignty lost. Its no less true when the rebels are Taliban or minutemen.

I believe the contribution of the Enlightenment to this subject is in reciprocity and reason. The political theorists of this time saw the relationship of government and governed as one having mutual benefits. Good citizens make a good state and a good state makes good citizens. Once that relationship becomes central, then reason may be employed to argue that the state may have powers best not employed.

John Hancock was a smuggler.

Thus the IVth Amendment.

We have lost respect for the smuggler and the IVth.

"Grim, you seem to be working from a conclusion, seeking the reasons afterwards."

Indeed, that's right. America is the conclusion with which I begin, and it is her reasons I seek after. The United States is based on a system of thought that is alien to the classical tradition of the West.

That being the case, it's necessary to sort out what must be true instead. If Jefferson was right to assert what he did -- the conclusion with which I gladly begin -- then what are the underlying ethics? What does it say about the relationship between man and state?

Anyone is free to conclude -- as Sam -- that Socrates was right and Jefferson was wrong. What interests me is the question of what it means if Jefferson is right. I think he was, and so the answers to that question are important to me.

An excellent post, but I think towards the end it seems to justify rebellion based solely on its likelihood of success. While a rebellion which cannot succeed can never justify its violence (it may be able though to justify its disobedience to some degree), a rebellion which can succeed through violence is still not justified by the fact that it wins the wager alone. Rather, it must all be that the evil which persists is greater than the evil which would be caused by the revolt. In other words, the rebellion must have a just cause.

The Confederacy's rebellion is not justified precisely because the cause for which it was undertaken - namely, at its root, slavery - did not justify the destruction of the community of which it was a part. While there were many causes to the civil war, there is little reason to believe that without slavery the South would have ever considered itself forced 'to the point'. The Confederacy believed in 'freely entered, freely parted', but the better analogy would have been to a divorse, 'freely entered, but leavable only at great cost'.

Revolt and rebellion against the society is, as Socrates says, a terrible thing. But it is not the most terrible of things. Revolt is never to be lightly undertaken, but at some point the evils of a tyrant become greater than the evils of revolt. Again, stretching the analogy, we would never (or I should say 'ought never') council a person to leave a marriage simply because their in some sort of malaise, but on the other hand there is some level of abuse past which we would never (or 'ought never') council someone to remain that relationship 'for the good of the family' or some other communal justification.

If you look at Socrates thinking, colored as it was by the fractous Greek tribal society, with its many betrayals both small and great, Socrates makes the claim that there is no degree of tyranny - no ammount of abuse the 'parent' can heap on a 'child' - which justifies the child defending himself or separating himself from the relationship. While we cannot easily measure what ammount of tyranny justifies revolt, nor can we make any hard and fast rules because the degree of evils brought about by a rebellion vary from situation to situation, nonetheless I think that it is safe to say that we can recognize unsufferable abuse when we see it and we can generally recognize justifiable revolt when it happens.

Frankly, I consider the ultra-libertarians who believe that community has no right to impose regulation, rules, and even taxation on a person to be quite as silly as those that believe that the person is wholly owned by and subject to the whim of the state. Both are unreasonable extremes. There is great good in (and great need of) both society and the individual. One cannot wholly trump the other.

To be short, the problem with Socrates argument is that virtue is not always the grace of the state (or the superior), and vice not always the condition of the slave (or the inferior). When society finds itself thus upside down, the 'slave' is justified in overturning it for the good of himself and of the society.

However, and this is the big catch, before the act is justifiable, the 'slaves' assessment must be correct.

I gather you don't have a complaint with the concept that the 'probability of success' is a valid test to the righteousness of a rebellion. Indeed, that's a fundamental part of Just War theory (and, like much of what we are discussing today, solidified in Catholic moral thinking).

What you're arguing is that probability of success is a necessary condition for justifying a rebellion, but not a sufficient one.

I don't think I disagree with that, and I don't think I meant to imply otherwise. A successful rebellion on, say, totalitarian fascist principles would surely not create a morally acceptable new state.

As to the specific example of the Confederacy, I am here thinking of A Nation of Our Own by X. This is an account of the early days of the Confederate States, including especially their own Constitutional convention in Alabama. It focuses on the similarity between the modes used by Washington and Jefferson (both slave owners, of course) and Confederate leaders, who saw themselves as proud inheritors of the traditions of both men. And surely, indeed, they were that -- not only the same forms but the same principles that justified the Revolutionary War were brought forth to justify this second rebellion.

The complaint you field is that slavery would have been the basis of the Confederacy in a way that it wasn't the basis for the early Republic. That may be true. However, it should also be noted that the Revolution really did justify itself on the same principles, and really did make the same exception from those principles for the institution of slavery. What we are talking about is a difference of degree, not kind.

Is that difference of degree sufficient to make the early Revolution moral and justified, and the Confederate one unjustified and illegal? I'm honestly not sure how to draw that line. If the Confederate States had succeeded as a project -- which it almost did at several points in the war -- would it have been a worse tyranny than the slaveholding parts of the early Republic, or the parts that profited by the slave trade? That would seem to be the necessary question to answer, and I don't know how to answer it. It probably cannot be answered with certainty.

By the same token, it's easy to think of several rebellions against US Federal authority that were justified even though they failed (but might have succeeded) -- say, Chief Joseph's. I think we can safely say that, although he failed, Joseph was not acting immorally.

Oops. :) I was writing from memory, and meant to look up the precise title and author of the cited work before hitting "post." The proper citation is: A Government of Our Own by Willaim C. Davis.

Grim,
I'm going to ignore the "classical" part because my exposure to that was well over forty years ago in required for graduation philosophy and humanities courses.
Enlightenment thinking?
As there were three "enlightenments", British, American and French, I'll have to choose French for the one you're referencing. The anti-Catholic (with some justification) thought that led to 18th Century Europe's version of Cambodia's killing fields.
The American Revolution/Rebellion was a consequence of the English Crown and Parliament
refusing to give the North American colonials the same rights as those confered on Englishman in England. If these rights had been extended prior to 1776 there would have been no Declaration and no Revolution.
Speaking of 1776, you use the term "rebellion is a human right", when it's obvious the right was that of a society, not an individual human.
Jefferson, remember, believed that the new Nation was one which should be ruled by a paternal intellectual meritocracy overseeing a basically agrarian society. He also accepted and believed in the French Enlightenment's belief that the only morality was that of Reason.
This belief, parroted by the likes of Darwin, Freud, Marx and Hitler has led to untold human suffering.
Regarding the War of Seccession, I can see no "just war" theory therein supporting the Confederacy's aggresion. Maybe there are a number of Constitutional law experts who can logically and rationally disagree with Lincoln's belief that "A house divided against itself cannot stand". After all, the slave issue was not part of the 'official' war justification prior to 1864.
You know, bottom line, I'm probably just too obtuse to understand where this post was going and what actions it wanted to justify.
Mike

This was not intended to justify anything, Mike. It's an exercise in pure philosophy. Sam asked what I thought was an interesting question about whether the proper relation of man to state was that of slave to owner. It's a question that has been explored since Socrates, but one whose classical answer isn't compatible with the kind of society we've built. So, it seemed worth looking at what an answer from the American perspective would look like. I thought some of the Winds readers might enjoy contributing.

As for the likening of Jeffersonian thinking to Hitler... well, I'd have to say it was an interesting reading of the facts. I enjoy an interesting idea myself, from time to time.

#9 from Grim: "I gather you don't have a complaint with the concept that the 'probability of success' is a valid test to the righteousness of a rebellion. Indeed, that's a fundamental part of Just War theory (and, like much of what we are discussing today, solidified in Catholic moral thinking)."

Right.

#9 from Grim: "What you're arguing is that probability of success is a necessary condition for justifying a rebellion, but not a sufficient one.

I don't think I disagree with that, and I don't think I meant to imply otherwise."

I do disagree with that. I would approve, for example, the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.

As a nit, Donald (#3) said there was no taxation of individuals until 1913. I believe that might be more correctly stated "taxation of personal income" as old George did put down the Whisky Rebellion -- folks were paying taxes, just not on income. I'm not a tax history expert, so I hope I got that right.

As to the question of rebellion, first as a southerner I am required to say that The War of Northen Agression was unjustified, whatever the facts. (wink)

The sad new thing I note in the world is that the rich countries, good or bad, have enough technology nowadays that things are not going to change, as we saw in China in the Tiananmen Square episode. Maybe I'll be proven wrong.

Jefferson's reasons for rebellion were basically that the king broke the deal. That, in that case, power returned to the natural leglislature of the people, which were going to be represented by Congress. This idea that there is a deal, a social contract, that can be voided seems to me to be noteworthy -- and the bar was set by Jefferson to be very high.

As far as the American Civil War, everybody thought that states could secede, else the New England states wouldn't have threatened it in the early 1800s. Lincoln, who seems a bit overrated to me, used force to change the nature of "the deal". In a lot of ways we're still coming to terms with that today. When you wonder why the federal government is controlling the way your toliet operates, why your kids are required to take certain tests in school, or why you have those little tags on your mattresses -- it's because the contract has changed. It continues to change. One wonders how it is possible for any population to complain, as we did, that the contract is no longer valid? (assuming that elections are unable to change key structural shortcomings -- a big assumption, I know) Will we wake up in 500 years in a world where the natural leglislature is so foreign to us that we have culturally lost our ability to really self-govern? It's an important question. Jefferson, echoing an earlier philosopher, used to say that moral questions can be solved just as well by asking a politician or a ploughman. A large part of our current society doesn't believe that anymore -- and as Martha Stewart might say, that's not so good.

You think, then, that the Warsaw Ghetto uprising had no chance at all of success?

Surely success has to be defined in context. I think there was at least a chance that an uprising in Warsaw could have cost the government enough to force some concession out of it -- even if that concession was simply leaving it alone to starve on its own, or being able to assert less-than-real-control over it. Given the context, even that would have been a success.

In the context of the Holocaust, surely rebellion is justified even if the cost is going to be more-or-less the same: even if we know (which in a real war, we never really do) that the Nazis are going to crush every place of resistance. Yet it raises the cost, which may slow the Holocaust's progress (which could lower its cost, given the wider war), or at least make future such acts less likely (by setting a useful example for future governments that might wish to eliminate their Jews).

An extreme context, I think, yields extreme examples -- but there is a success to be had even here. Against the purest tyranny, resistance may be said to succeed even if all it does is reduce the ability of the existing tyranny to act.

In borderline cases, where you have a government that some like pretty well but others find tyrannical, surely you have to demonstrate that you are capable of a better kind of success. Otherwise, you can't justify the pain of war.

Fine: put "success" in context so that if a revolt is justified, it can always be deemed to be a "success". That does to the "success test" for whether a revolt is justified exactly what I want done.

Grim: "In the context of the Holocaust, surely rebellion is justified even if the cost is going to be more-or-less the same -"

Yes.

Grim: "An extreme context, I think, yields extreme examples -- but there is a success to be had even here. Against the purest tyranny, resistance may be said to succeed even if all it does is reduce the ability of the existing tyranny to act."

Yes. Or even I would suggest if the strength of the tyrannical power is not impaired in any meaningful way, if it's simply a decision to die fighting rather than to take it quietly.

1)I just want to point out that the difference between socrates et al and our founding fathers was that socrates was building an entirely theoretical society, and the founding fathers we're building a real goverment. those differences are important.

I remember that socrates ideas were intereasting, but they often assumed the best intentions of men, and the idea that the best 'of men' could be braught into a single society. Of couse, that's impossible. Even the idea that you can only involve the 'best' brings rise to the worst: jealousy, jigonism, facism and elitism.

My understanding of how our goverment works is that it's built on a system of checks and balances. No system can hold too much power (and will fight to hold onto their realm of power) so that power will be spread evenly and controllable in local elections. what we see now is the parties working between groups to extend their power into all three branches... in addition removing local, independent political thought. This all extends from the formation of pollitical parties which the founding fathers hated (HATED) because they "would be more interested in contending with each other than in working for the common good."

I guess that's egg on on their face!

2)I am not at all a tax historian, but I'm curious. How did we raise funds for armies before taxes? How could build the worlds largest/highest-tech army now without taxes? Taxes seem important to me because it's possible for a community to collect funds to purchase something (say schooling/water purification/energy grid) that an individual may not be able to do.

But then again, it's all i've ever known.

If Jefferson was right to assert what he did -- the conclusion with which I gladly begin -- then what are the underlying ethics?

I agree with Mike Daley that the underlying ethics are the French enlightenment and specifically Rousseau's Social Contract, which held the view that the people had the right to rescind the contract with the state if the state acts against the "general will." He was proclaiming that the general will of these colonies was that they were unhappy. Therefore, from a Jeffersonian perspective any unhappy person is justified to revolt against their government so long as they can claim popular support.

I believe Shay's rebellion provides information about what the Founders thought of succesive revolutions. In particluar, I believe Samuel Adams rejected the notion that leniency should be given the rebels, as opposed to death. Leniency he reasoned was the province of monarchs, not republican forms of government founded on the popular will.

OTOH, in response to Shay's rebellion, Jefferson famously wrote:

I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, & as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical. Unsuccessful rebellions indeed generally establish the encroachments on the rights of the people which have produced them. An observation of this truth should render honest republican governors so mild in their punishment of rebellions, as not to discourage them too much. It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government.

I believe Jefferson's views are unsound and the source of great suffering. Still, the emphasized part is often ignored. Shay's rebellion helped create the Constitution which eroded state's rights and created a standing army.

#17: "I just want to point out that the difference between socrates et al and our founding fathers was that socrates was building an entirely theoretical society, and the founding fathers we're building a real goverment. those differences are important."

I think that's right. That's why I referred to the wager of battle as an explanation for why the system wasn't perfectly harmonious as a philosophy. It's a real-world system, and that means it has to deal with externalities. What you end up with is a practical system, rather than a pure one.

18:

As I said, anyone can prefer Socrates to Jefferson -- surely that's the sort of point on which good men can honorably disagree.

I think Jefferson is correct, myself. A certain amount of rebellion is very healthy in a republican form of government. The occasional tax revolt keeps things on an even keel. Early American unions fought literal battles with the US Army, because the army was deployed by Gilded Age politicians in the interest of rich political contributors. I mentioned Chief Joseph earlier.

I don't think these people should have been hanged from the yardarm. These minor rebellions, some successful and some not but all with the prospect of success, have been good for us.

What's interesting to me is why Socrates would do and believe what he did. Its alien to me that one would kill oneself at the command of an unjust state.

By the time of the Enlightenment, Hobbes assumed the opposite to be true, that self-preservation is the most fundamental of natural laws:

A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.

Accordingly, one cannot consent to one's execution, although I believe Hobbes might recognize that consent might be obtained by fear of a more painful death. And I similarly believe Hobbes only recognized a right to revolt where this natural law was implicated. If the State jeopardizes your life, then you can be expected to revolt even if the chance of success is small.

From Hobbes standpoint then, Socrates is acting irrationally, driven either by unnamed fears, foolish passions or madness.

#20 -- Socrates would argue that Hobbes was reducing the argument to the street -- of course the unwashed barbarian would act so, but that is hardly the rule. That is simply the rule for unwashed barbarians. Sounds smart, but trite and hollow, like so much so-called knowledge of the elite.

I admire Socrates in that his life made sense with his philosophy. Of all the great blessings I could wish on a person, this one is the highest. I hope I never hear that in actual truth he tossed the broth and ran like a scared dog.

Leave a comment

Here are some quick tips for adding simple Textile formatting to your comments, though you can also use proper HTML tags:

*This* puts text in bold.

_This_ puts text in italics.

bq. This "bq." at the beginning of a paragraph, flush with the left hand side and with a space after it, is the code to indent one paragraph of text as a block quote.

To add a live URL, "Text to display":http://windsofchange.net/ (no spaces between) will show up as Text to display. Always use this for links - otherwise you will screw up the columns on our main blog page.




Recent Comments
  • TM Lutas: Jobs' formula was simple enough. Passionately care about your users, read more
  • sabinesgreenp.myopenid.com: Just seeing the green community in action makes me confident read more
  • Glen Wishard: Jobs was on the losing end of competition many times, read more
  • Chris M: Thanks for the great post, Joe ... linked it on read more
  • Joe Katzman: Collect them all! Though the French would be upset about read more
  • Glen Wishard: Now all the Saudis need is a division's worth of read more
  • mark buehner: Its one thing to accept the Iranians as an ally read more
  • J Aguilar: Saudis were around here (Spain) a year ago trying the read more
  • Fred: Good point, brutality didn't work terribly well for the Russians read more
  • mark buehner: Certainly plausible but there are plenty of examples of that read more
  • Fred: They have no need to project power but have the read more
  • mark buehner: Good stuff here. The only caveat is that a nuclear read more
  • Ian C.: OK... Here's the problem. Perceived relevance. When it was 'Weapons read more
  • Marcus Vitruvius: Chris, If there were some way to do all these read more
  • Chris M: Marcus Vitruvius, I'm surprised by your comments. You're quite right, read more
The Winds Crew
Town Founder: Left-Hand Man: Other Winds Marshals
  • 'AMac', aka. Marshal Festus (AMac@...)
  • Robin "Straight Shooter" Burk
  • 'Cicero', aka. The Quiet Man (cicero@...)
  • David Blue (david.blue@...)
  • 'Lewy14', aka. Marshal Leroy (lewy14@...)
  • 'Nortius Maximus', aka. Big Tuna (nortius.maximus@...)
Other Regulars Semi-Active: Posting Affiliates Emeritus:
Winds Blogroll
Author Archives
Categories
Powered by Movable Type 4.23-en