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A recent development has profound implications for the balance of power between America's armed services, and ties into a growing trend.
The trend is the growing use of Army UAV drones and precision artillery/ rockets, in order to perform close air support and battlefield interdiction roles that were once the domain of the US Air Force. Don't fighter planes and bombers still work? Of course they do. But they cost $8,000 - $20,000 per flight hour to operate, plus $80 million - $1+ billion to replace once their airframe runs out of safe flight hours (usually at 8,000 -10,000 hours). Those dynamics, and the need for constant battlefield coverage, have led to an explosion in UAV flight hours.
Problem: Large UAVs like the MQ-1 Predator are a lot less expensive than fighter jets, but they're still a few million dollars apiece. Small UAVs like the RQ-7 Shadow are cheaper and there are more of them, but they have been too small to arm.
Which seems too bad - because if they could, it would change so many things...
It's too bad they couldn't pick something really light, like a 10-pound 81mm mortar shell, and attack a cheap precision guidance kit to it. That would turn common Shadow UAVs into something that could call in GPS-guided Excalibur artillery shells from up to 25 miles away, GPS-guided M30 GMLRS rockets from up to 40 miles away - or just drop a weapon itself to take out a vehicle, machine gun nest, or other target that's found by the drone or called in by the battalion's front-line troops.
Actually, that process is now underway. Trent Telenko explains the impact:
"Each US Army battalion level tactical operations center is now going to own its own 24/7 precision guided weapon armed air force.Welcome to the era of federalized airpower.
Airpower that is incapable by design of being used and directed by a centralized theater air commander.
Airpower that is organic to ground units and provides close air support and reconnaissance with in its capability to the local ground commander without clearance through six to seven layers and two services worth of military command and control to get the job done."
That was done in World War 2, where "grasshopper" planes provided very useful targeting information for their units' artillery et. al. It was dangerous work, but effective. And now it's coming back. Nobody has to write condolence letters to a robot's family.
The key problem to solve is "deconfliction" - milspeak for "please don't have your 6 foot long drone blindly fly into my helicopter or cargo plane, and kill everyone on board."
That issue needs to be addressed anyway, in order to allow UAVs in civilian air space. Which is beginning to happen for some larger drones on a limited basis. Many government departments in the USA, Europe, and other countries want to see civil UAV usage become common, with smaller and more affordable drones in use beside their larger multi-million dollar cousins.
So, it will happen. Once it does, Small and cheap airpower already in use + Adaptation of an existing weapon + Automatic deconfliction = a change in the way the US Army fights.
Nor are these the only trends pushing the military toward more, and more autonomous, robots on their battlefields. As the Brookings Institution's P.W. Singer explains at length in his new book, "Wired for War." The trends we're seeing will only intensify.
The USAF will fight these trends, hard, and try to preserve its monopoly on combat airpower. Just like any central corporate department, they tout the benefits of "efficiency." IT departments certainly did so, when personal computers began to tread on their mainframe computers. All calculated in a way that totally ignores the opportunity cost of not providing key services. Services that others need to get their jobs done, and can provide on their own if allowed to do so.
The USAF tried to take control of all UAVs back in 2005 and 2007, using the same kind of "efficiency" arguments. They failed. I now believe the USAF will lose the larger fight for control of all combat airpower - and that they should lose the fight. Their loss will be America's gain.
Eventually USAF is going to have to be kicked, or kick itself, "upstairs" to a mostly strategic and near-space focus. At least I hope so.
Meanwhile, I'm waiting for the court cases when (say) a Sheriff's department drone fails to be 100% deconflicted, either with aircraft or with terrain that happens to have valuable property or innocent people on it.
Government will of course try to apply not only sovereign immunity but also "we're the only ones who ought to/need to" arguments as policy regarding flight of RPVs (or, quel horreur, UAAVs) over populated areas.
FAA will of course continue to try to micturate all over that.
Fun, huh?
I'm no expert, but I've been reading about frustrations within the army about the Air Force's unwillingness to do close air support for years. The fact that the A-10 has never been replaced after 40 years (and, if I'm not mistaken, the USAF actually tried to retire it in favor of fighter-bombers) has been a sore point within the Army since at least the 1990s.
For all that my acreer has been largely dominated by Air Force designs, I confess I've never had that much sympathy for the organization over all. The individual men and women I've worked with are generally fine (as is the case in most institutions) but the Air Force as an organization.... enh.
This is unambiguously good news. The lower down the chain that procurement and useage authorization can be pushed, the better. Useage for obvious, tactical reasons: The armed forces are not best served by junior officers in the Army needing to go halfway up their chain and halfway up the Air Force chain of command to get assets where they need them. Procurement for a similar and for a subtler reason: Not all units, in all deployments, have the same needs. UAVs are new. UAVs are experimental. This should be the period of maximum creativity and experimentation. The Air Force has not, historically, supported the forms of experimentation I think are appropriate to this situation-- the Air Force as a bureaucratic machine typically wants few designs that are Big Bigger Biggest, whereas what we want for the moment are vast numbers of designs that are smaller and cheaper. Pushing the issues down the procurement chain can only help this.
I can't help but think John Boyd is smiling somewhere, probably singing something unprintably rude. I can only hope that the Air Force is going to get right with this sooner, rather than later.
(Also, Joe, where is the source of the text you quote from Trent Telenko? I may be blind and distracted today, but the link directly above it seems to lead to a related article.)
The key concept here is "kill chain."
Ballistic precision guided munitions (PGM) combined with unmanned air vehicle (UAV) forward observers have a response time that is a low multiple of PGM flight time.
I went looking for and found the latest incarnation of the US Army's Field Artillery Magazine on-line ("Fires" magazine). They have very interesting articles on changing use of the Guided MLRS and other precision guided artillery in Iraq.
The bottom line is that a very rapid, bottom up driven, communication "kill chain" has developed that is much faster than the traditional close air support request for an aircraft sortie coordination chain.
"When seconds count, the USAF is minutes away."
See below:
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2008/Mar_Apr_2008/Mar_Apr_2008_pages_32_34.pdf
and
In so many words, the US Army has made the use of GMLRS a "bottom-up" close support weapon for combat soldiers in "hot contact" with the enemy. One whose use is either "built into the plan" or can be used "outside the plan" in about twice the flight time of the weapon (less than five minutes).
The use of internet relay chat allows the local ground forces to immediately clear overhead air space of manned aircraft for incoming ballistic GMLRS strikes.
Organizationally, the US Army (or Marines) now controls the air space above its troops for all intents and purposes. Incoming artillery always has the right of way no matter what the USAF says in it's theater air tasking order.
Note also that the smaller size of the GMLRS warhead allows its use to be delegated down to NCO level in the field, without the use of USAF JAG officers to sign off on the release of ordnance from jet strike fighters.
The following is from an interview conducted in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on 11 April 2008, about a month after BG McDonald returned to the states as part of III Corps, at Fort Hood, Texas:
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2008/May_Jun_2008/May_Jun_2008_Pages_06_11.pdf
The arrival of the precision guidance kit (PGK) (AKA the GPS-guidance fuse) for 155mm shells in four months (and it's propagation to 105mm guns and 120mm mortars in 18-24 months) and the Precision attack missile (PAM) in 2009 means that additional or faster kill chains will be added to more and smaller American ground units.
The effect of these developments on American ground forces fire power, particularly for light Infantry, cannot be over stated.
Marcus,
You are not distracted or blind, just not Joe's e-mail distribution list. ;-)
Joe,
Noah Shachtman over on the Wired Danger Zone blog touched on this a while back:
New Killer Drones Could be Piloted by Teenagers
By Noah Shachtman October 10, 2008
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/armed-shadows.html#more
Imagine how useful this would be in Gaza right now. I wonder if the IDF has anything like this, or if we're working with them in any way to develop this type of system.
I could imagine a blanket of drones providing coverage of the territory, and being able to zero in on an enemy launch site within seconds of an attack (or even better--before said attack occurs). Live tracking and targeting of the enemy combatants would greatly minimize the collateral damage, as the incoming munitions would be much more surgical, and be able to take them out even after they've moved to another location. Or even being able to abort a response if there would be obvious and unavoidable collateral damage.
IIRC - and Joe can fill in details - the US got its first successful UAVs and related technology from Israel after some domestic projects failed. So, yeah, it's seem likely that they've got the same drone/infantry/fires OODA loop going. Yep, somewhere Boyd is smiling.
Israel also seems to have completely buggered or shut down the Gaza/Hamas electronic communications systems at the same time. Though CNN, et. al. are doing their best to negate this advantage.
Because Israel is so small, and the territories to cover are limited, a fleet of larger Hermes 450 and Heron UAVs (both of which can be armed, and are) can provide the constant weapons coverage, while smaller UAVs like Searcher and Skylark provide the surveillance that cues the larger UAVs.
But NukemHill is right, for a different reason.
Israel does not have GMLRS or Excalibur GPS-guided artillery, which forces more employment of air power as a substitute. It also lengthens the strike chain, because the smaller UAVs' laser rangefinders and geolocation have to cue something else to move over and look, rather than just cueing GPS-guided artillery strikes.
Indeed, if GPS guidance is required, the Israelis have to slide up the cost scale, not down. Fortunately Israeli air bases are within 50 miles of the conflict. You can provide weapons coverage with F-16s on standby in that scenario, and the F-16 have options (JDAM, related GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb) that the UAVs probably do not have yet. But combat air patrols with fighters are costly, and standby alerts create time gaps.
So it would be better, and much cheaper, to have Searcher, Hunter, and related tactical UAVs" with a GPS-capable "zero step kill chain", especially if you want very wide coverage and instant response to rockets.
So riddle me this, Joe: Given the Palis have essentially no AA capability, why does one need an F-16 to haul SDBs in the first place? Why not a C-130 or something even lighter and cheaper, just doing circles overhead? Isn't that what a lot of our AF activities over Iraq and the 'stan amount to, albeit using pricey planes with B- in their name?
Tim remembers correctly.
I can't comment (because I don't actually know, for one thing) about the degree of tech transfer from Israel to the United States in that regard, but the Israelis were certainly early pioneers in the field of UAVs.
Military.com had a really interesting article in January 2008 on UAV flight hours in Iraq, especially in terms of how few UAV flight hours were clocked by the USAF compared to the US Army.
See: Rise of the Machines: UAV Use Soars
About 300,000 of that 500,000 UAV flight Hours per month that the US military racked up in Iraq came from US Army hand thrown Raven UAVs.
The majority of the remaining 200,000 came from Army Shadows and Hunters as well as US Marine equivalent systems including Dragon Eye and Scan Eagle.
IOW, the USAF lost the 2007 "UAV Flight Hour Olympics" in Iraq by almost an order of magnitude.
This bring's the jollowing line I got from an ex-Army NCO:
...into real perspective.
Strategypage reported that 2006 saw literally 10 times as many Army Helicopter precision guided munitions (Hellfire, TOW) used compared to JDAMS or laser guided bombs (LGB) from USAF fighters in Iraq. (See: http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20070702.aspx
Durng 2006 and much of 2007 jet fighters in Iraq were not dropping bombs at all. They are being used as "thinking UAVs."
Fixed wing close air support (CAS) brings just two things to the table that armed UAVs do not. They can straff and they can communicate and coordinate.
The USAF Brass hates to see its jet fighters coordinating, communicating and providing aerial video surveillance to ground forces -- this is both for service prejudice and airframe life reasons.
In addition, they have forbidden strafing runs in Iraq as "too dangerous."
See: http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20071106.aspx
In short, the very things American ground troops want from the USAF CAS forces are the very things the USAF brass doesn't want to or refuses to provide.
So exactly what does the USAF CAS bring to the table that UAV directed PGM artillery doesn't?
The arrival of the Guided MLRS and Excalibur 155mm guided shells has turned the Fixed Wing CAS debate on its head. Artillery with PGMs and UAV support is cheaper and more tactically useful than jets in urban combat. It is a matter of a smaller precision guided bang you can use is better than a bigger one you cannot.
The arrival of the XM1156 "GPS fuzes" for US Army tube artillery and mortar shells has started. Army 155mmm shells are now getting their first XM1156 course corrected fuzes. These are micro-JDAMS for artillery.
The USAF's fundamental disinterest in providing either overhead video or CAS services to its ground force customers allowed a classic case of a new, cheap and untried "disruptive technology" -- UAVs and digital communications tapping into the commercial electronics revolution -- to develop into a successful competitor to the mature and much more expensive jet strike fighter.
IMO, when the A-10 wears out, it will not be replaced and the funds for the close air support mission that will not remain in the USAF.
CAS will become another air warfare mission like aerial anti-submarine warfare. It will be a air warfare mission that another American armed service does for a living.
Joe,
The Israelis have other attack capabilities they can use in conjunction with small UAVs that don't require jet fighters.
They simply have to buy them in sufficient quantities to get the coverage of Gaza they want.
The USA first began using Israel's Pioneer UAVs in the 1980s, from its battleships. Some Pioneer UAVs are still operational.
Israel also pioneered the battlefield use of UAVs, and used them as far back as 1982 to pinpoint syrian SAMs and their frequencies. Then the jets rolled in and wiped the Syrians out on the ground. Syria sent fighters up, and it ended up being about 88-0, Israel.
The Israelis are still ahead of the USA in some areas, like their clever Harpy anti-radar drone which caused such trouble for the US-Israeli relationship. They also have a thriving UAV export industry, which includes major program customers like France (Eagle/Heron 2) and Britain (Watchkeeper/ Hermes 450), among others.
In general, however, the USA has pulled ahead in both technology and tactics. A much larger industrial base and budget, more forces, and more combat will do that.
The larger question is whether the USA will keep its global UAV and general robotics lead in future, as its own engineering base continues to shrink and its competitors' grows. These things have low cost of entry to develop, so catch-up could be very quick.
By coincidence, I read this comment right after this story on what ails Silicon Valley by Michael Malone, who does know the territory. They are hardly unrelated issues.
Trent,
I think the Spike's normal cost is actually rather lower than that, and lower still per missile rather than for the whole missile and launch/guidance system.
In territory that small, the range is enough that it can still be useful.
The thing is, Spike's guidance isn't GPS, to my knowledge. It's imaging infared (IIR), or fiber-optic wire guided.
Rafael makes both Spike and Skylite, however, so I suppose they could add some form of INS capability to the missile if they wished. Add software and chips to the CLU (launch unit) that gives it GPS, then calculate the inertial differential and send the missile to the designated point. Fiber-optic guidance helps refine point of impact.
Yeah, could work.
If so, it would continue an interesting trend from the 2006 Lebanon War: the use of anti-tank missiles as a form of short-range precision artillery by both sides.
Israel's option seems to be a lot more expensive than old Soviet AT-3s - but GPS + drones does give them a nasty over the hill, spot and kill capability that AT-3s dont have. The question is how to do that in a very cheap way. First country to do a simple, light ATGM with wire guidance (for visual engagement) and the equivalent of GPS guidance for under $10,000, and combine that with laser targeting and geolocation on mini-UAVs like the Raven or Puma AE... will have troops nobody wants to face in combat.
Quantity can have a quality all its own, and quantity plus low-level, on the spot decisions is a deadly formula.
Tim (#15)
All true, but it goes deeper. You've got to have the engineers to do the work.
If Sarbanes-Oxley is allowed to shut down the global talent hub aspect of Silicon Valley, and your military engineers all start getting old and retiring without replacement... you're left with a small civilian base to leverage, and a military base that has problems attracting the required talent. That combination says "someone else will take the pole position."
P.W. Singer covers some of that in his book, and I keep hearing related warnings from people in the aerospace and defense industries. It doesn't help that US students start out being very globally competitive around grade 4 in math and science, then continue slipping all the way to graduation, by which point they're way behind.
Bottom line: Too many lawyers, too few engineers is beginning to reach visible problem status for the USA as a global power. As the boomers begin retiring, the extent of the damage will become a lot clearer.
Firms like Pitsco appear to be helping with innovative approaches and learning packages - in states that force the education establishment to actually care about outcomes not paychecks. Even Cliff Claven is helping out (really!). Will it be enough? So far, no.
Meanwhile, Japan continues to do lots of innovative stuff, spurred in part by their aging demographic that needs care. Fewer people + national view of robots as positive = robot caregivers. Already starting.
Thing is, China has that same demographic looming, and soon. Plus lots of engineers. So you've got the ingredients for domestic demand to absorb some of the engineering talent. Which means a dual-use industry with a wider funding base, and a wide engineering base to draw on. Assuming they survive the coming unrest waves intact, which is not a sure bet but a decent one. Robotics investments may even be part of their safety valve during the coming period.
India already has the software expertise which is so fundamental, and a strong drive to 100% locally-built military products even when that's clearly stupid. Robotics is one of the few places where that isn't stupid. The civilian angle isn't as clear due to lack of that demographic push, and an environment that's not very supportive of entrepreneurs. But that doesn't mean that enough robotics engineers won't find a couple in time, in India or abroad in places like the Mideast.
None of which is to argue that the battlefield turnaround discussed here isn't real for the USA. It is, and it will not just continue but accelerate.
Removing the USAF bottleneck will improve the USA's military position and ability to make full use of these technologies. That will help some. Nations fight as they train, and train as they live. The Western Way of War and civil life has an ethic that is uniquely well suited to robots + the low-level decision making that gets full value out of them.
Once acceleration hits a certain point, however, it begins to dictate events, not just guide them. Tim, you've certainly seen that several times over here in the Valley. Will America be ready when that happens? Really ready? Jury's out. Singer doesn't know, and neither do I.
Indeed, and we're not looking too hot there either. You're right about the domestic education scene. There's also trouble in the brain-drain pipeline that gave us a hedge by attracting in the best-and-brightest engineers from around the world.
Used to be we'd be pulling in junior support and project engineers from Taiwan, India or some such place. Stick them in a team with some other domestic and foreign juniors, some older hands, give them a lot of pizza and a short schedule and turn up the heat. Manufactures senior engineers, project managers and the occasional entrepreneur as well as products. And turns the imports into Americans who stay here and contribute, retaining the personal networks both from the homeland and their early jobs.
That process has been in retreat for nearly a decade. Between increasing local costs, the H1B bottleneck, and the rise of the net, a lot of those bottom of the pyramid engineering jobs are now offshore. That doesn't yield the same acculturation or network formation as landing directly in the Valley (or other) scene.
I think it's called "eating the seedcorn". All very rational, but with side-effects that will take a long time to become clear.
Joe,
There is a lot of growth room for fiber-optic guided missiles that the IDF can exploit. Integrating differential GPS into their missile and missile launchers is just the beginning.
The US army ditched FOG-M technology due to a number of institutional and strategic reasons. The biggest being not wanting other nations to pursue/steal the technology after the US developed it.
Curiously enough, once the American military stopped FOG-M development in the mid-1990s, so did everyone else save Israel.
To give you an idea of where the Spike-ER could evolve into, I picked this up from Janes on the "LOGFOG" 50-100km version of the American FOG-M technology development program via Google:
http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jlad/jlad0135.html
Long Fibre Optic Guided (LongFOG) missile system (United States), UNIVERSAL (MULTIPURPOSE: LAND/SEA/AIR) MISSILES
The full document for Long Fibre Optic Guided (LongFOG) missile system (United States) is offered by Jane’s Information Group as part of its Jane's Land-Based Air Defence subscription service, available in both hardcopy and electronic formats.
You may purchase a full subscription to this service through the Jane’s Online Catalogue.
Title
Long Fibre Optic Guided (LongFOG) missile system (United States)
Section
UNIVERSAL (MULTIPURPOSE: LAND/SEA/AIR) MISSILES
Appearing in
Jane's Land-Based Air Defence
Publication date
Feb 09, 2000
Development/Description
In 1995, the now US Army Aviation and Missile Command announced the start of another technology demonstrator programme that is running in parallel with EFOG-M (see separate entry), called LongFOG.This is an extended range, fibre optic guided missile fitted with a modified Allison 150, 205 kg dry thrust low-signature, variable thrust, water injection augmented turbojet engine to extend the effective engagement range up to as much as 100,000 m. The guidance system incorporates a GPS/IMU package for the mid-flight phase and an IIR for the terminal phase.The missile is launched vertically if fired from the HIMARS 6 × 6 system or at a 57.5º elevation angle if fired from the M270 full-tracked MLRS. The missile will fly a high subsonic fly-out to a predetermined target area via waypoints planned by the gunner before launch. The onboard Rockwell Collins IMU and GPS will ensure missile location co-ordinates and attitude. To minimise the radar cross-section signature during fly-out, the missile wings are stowed in the fuselage and the hemispherical nose covered by a shroud. Once in the target area, the missile will discard the nose shroud, deploy its wings in a biplane configuration and utilise flaps to provide braking for a low search speed phase. Using its seeker system the gunner will search for the desired target. Once acquired, the flaps are retracted and the wings transition back into a cruciform position to provide equal skid to turn manoeuvre capability in pitch and yaw. The engine can then be commanded to maximum
Status
Technology demonstrator. One possible result of the programme is the use of the LongFOG or similar airframe as an MLRS launched RPV. If the technology demonstrator proves successful then a follow-on deployable weapons system may be produced if further funding is found.
.
Getting back to the emerging US Army Air Force and it's information age air power. We have to look at what is going on in the way of American National Security politics.
The bottom line is the industrial warfare era of centralized manned air power is over. Manned aircraft are being replaced by unmanned aircraft with the service operating the unmanned aircraft -- and the launch site of the PGM fire support -- being irrelevant.
In the industrial age of air power it required centralized control in order to mass effectively to achieve results. We have entered an information age where cheap precision strike is everywhere. To achieve the best results with it, a new battle field paradigm where control and capability are defused across the whole battle is needed. Where armed UAV's are an organic part of the ground force maneuver and fire support combined arms team down to the platoon and squad level.
Resistance to this emerging paradigm was the real cause of the crisis in American civil military relations that resulted in the twin firings of both Sec of the Air Force Wynne and USAF chief of staff Moseley.
Air Force Secretary Wynne made it mandatory for Gate to not only fire Moseley, but Wynne as well and start attacking the dominant faction in USAF command culture. The appointment of Gen. Norton A. Schwartz as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force was a good first step, but Gates has to fire more USAF generals, or radically alter the promotion policies for the USAF, or both.
Just as the more politically controllable "Flexible Response" Fighter Pilot Generals replaced the "Total War" "Heavy Bomber Generals" of Strategic Air command after Vietnam. The "Fighter Pilot Generals" need to be replaced by the "UAV Geeks," and not for just for reasons civilian control of the military.
The fighter pilot generals are a cross between three things from the 20th Century. They are 21st century versions of the Pre-WW2 "Horse Cavalry generals" of the US Army, "Battleship Admirals" of the US Navy and the leadership of America's 20th century trade unions in the 1970-80's.
In facing the change that UAV's represent in modern war, they share US Army Cavalry branch General Herr's inability to see the paradigm of warfare has changed and are all about protecting their budget turf.
They killed the X-47 UCAV because of the threat it represented to the F-22 and F-35.
The USAF has been attempting to use its Air Tasking Order and air traffic control systems to ground small Army and Marine UAV's of ground troops in combat because of the threat they see to their F-35 in the CAS role.
The USAF tried and have been repeatedly rebuffed in attempts to control all UAV development in the Defense Department, thus "gold plating UAVs to death" so only a limited number -- flown by college educated pilots -- will be built.
These efforts won't work in the long run, but it will delay the fighter pilots general's replacement until after they and their aides retire.
The historical parallel here is from 1940-41. The fighter pilot generals are continuing to stress the superiority of flesh over machines. Just as in 1941, when Horse Cavalry Branch Chief General Herr argued before Congress, in the face of the fall of France in 1940 to the Panzers, that Horse Cavalry had an equal place on the modern battlefield with tanks and that the Congress should continue to fund them.
The F-22 and F-35 are very much like the battleships of WW2. They are the epitome of a weapons system developed over decades, and rendered obsolescent by a cheaper, more lethal, less capital intensive, and easier to mass produce civilian based technology -- the manned airplane. The F-22 and F-35 are incredibly lethal, but too expensive to be risked, just like the battleships of WW2.
As the American industrial trade unions faced rising Japanese automation with calls for tariffs and eventually "negotiated surrenders" where the oldest members of the unions held out for good retirement benefits while younger workers were stuck with lower wages and benefits.
Today the automation of unmanned airplanes has rendered the aerospace engineer college degreed pilot as much an endangered species as the USS Arizona on December the 6th, 1941. Hordes of X-box trained UAV controllers are well trained and not held back by the limits of flesh and blood "meat servos" (AKA pilots) and are available for far less them the USAF pilot. And you see the same ploys by the Generals as the unions to hold them back.
Gates shot down the Fighter Pilot Generals rebellion, this time.
The question is whether they will now follow orders, or drag down their service to keep their identity as fighter pilots.
The one thing that is clear is that the "UAV plus PGM artillery" paradigm the US Army is pioneering is a "disruptive technology" to piloted air power because it is incapable by design to be preempted by higher level air commanders and it can do things that manned air power cannot:
Historically, every additional level of organization required to make a decision doubles the amount of time taken to say "yes." It works out that one level above the point of decision takes twice as long to make a decision, two levels above takes 4 times and three levels above is eight times as long, etc. etc.
Point in fact, attempts to use this kind of air power by central authorities is by definition "sub-optimal" because you cannot reposition Raven or Shadow class UAV's without repositioning the ground units that operate them.
We are coming to a day when close air support and reconnaissance are for the USAF what aerial anti-submarine warfare is -- a mission done in another service.
As most experienced/ knowledgeable people who deal in things military know, warfare is very much a paper/rock/scissors deal. While I hold no brief for the AF in it's treatment of the CAS mission (or lack thereof) I feel compelled to point out what I regard to be several errors in the logic of some of the arguments advanced here.
First, nothing happens without air superiority. Take
away that and every one of these other "smart" systems discussed here goes away/will be shredded
by the enemy's air power. This is what the F-22 is all about. All of the technology discussed here above and the associated tactics & organizational structure that goes with it presume a permissive environment free from disruption via air attack.
Control of the air is the foundation upon upon which
everything else is built. Thus seen, the F-22--far from being obsolete--is absolutely essential to the successful functioning of every other component of the total system. Anyone that doesn't think so should interview German or Japanese surviving veterans of WWII and ask them what it's like to operate in an environment
where the enemy controls the airspace. Hence the absolute necessity of something like the F-22.
The exact shape and nature of the envelope between the F-22 above and precision arty munitions and mini-UAVS below all controlled by the Army
is something else, however. I would offer a few comments as to what that shape might be.
First, some sort of eyeball
cas assets will always be required, if only on a limited/selective basis to preclude a loss of the entire freq spectrum these sys. operate within due to successful enemy ECM tactics. All of these systems being discussed here depend totally on uninterrupted communications in a permissive electronic communications environ- ment.
Second, Many of these systems, especially helicopter based wpns launching platforms are highly susceptible to icing and also have limits on altitude performance. Arty also has both range limitations and topographical ones--especially in places like Afghanistan. And for longer range support for isolated long-range patrols, Army UAV loiter times are often inadequate as are their payloads. And geographical dispersion of troops brings yet another problem to the fore: that of transfer/shifting of limited assets to meet shifting operations.
The original reason that CAS assets were given to the Air Force was that CAS assets were a limited resource and when Army ground commanders had control of those assets they were loath to give up their control to any adjoinging command, even if on that particular day the pace of battle meant that the needs were greater there because of a very real fear based on experience that they would never get them back. Hence he creation of a single-manager system capable of shifting limited resources over a widely dispersed geographical area in response to shifting needs.
The potential problem I see with the concept of taking the USAF out of the picture entirely is that it assumes a small geographical area with no more than Corps-sized units operating--much like the USMC. But this concept is not easily scalable/expanded. Airborne assets can be shifted faster than the ground units/command systems that control them. Only the Air Force, it seems to me, has the potential to do this without jurisdictional squabbling amongst ground commanders--unless, of course, one believes that America will only be involved
in limited engagements against distinctly inferior foes in the future. Wanna bet the future of the nation on that? If not, then it seems that some of the observations here are slightly myopic. From a functional/structural POV
if the AF did not exist, it would have to be invented.
Only the AF has that integrated combination of long-range strike aircraft, transport, refueling and C3 assets along with a doctrine to support it to make possible a seamless support and/or attack system across continents. Thus it seems to me that while acknowledging the technological advances that have made these Army systems possible are to be welcomed on the one hand--along with the admission that the AF has badly handled the CAS issue--it still seems to me that there is a vital role for the USAF if integrated properly so as to provide the necessary flexibility, striking power (in the form of heavier payloads) and longer "legs"/rapidly expanded footprint. That a failure to do so until now
has been almost entirely the fault of the "big kids" in the AF should nevertheless
not see the baby thrown out with the bath-water.
In summation, there is much thinking to be done on the conceptual/planning level in order to both fully integrate what should be complementary approaches
and to insure that valuable assets in the form of both AF command & control systems and weapons platforms should not wither away--as they will be impossible to resurrect on short notice if needed for something like large scale conflicts with potential military technological equals such as a fully modernized PRC, etc.
OK, so you're convinced there is an other than strategic role for the USAF. And you make several good points, especially re the resource-hoarding tendency. That argument notwithstanding, an intercontinental-tactical role (if practical) still doesn't seem to require anything like the current USAF budget.
Military transport, check. Wild Weasel / air-superiority / shock & awe on hostile launch and support facilities, check.
F-35s taking the place of A-10s? I'm highly skeptical.
Hey, Sportsfans, I've never been a fan of the F-35--but blame the Marines and the Navy for pushing that capability--as much as the AF wanting to justify the 22 by using common parts. The AF's "official" bitch with the A-10 has always been it's short-legs and lack of supersonic dash to get to tgt. I've said many times all the A-10s should be given to the Marines and have the AF and Navy buy the Russian Frogfoot under license with US electronics. Its got a servicable 30mm gun, the same titanium tub and both longer legs and supersonic capability the AF claims they want. CAS problem solved.
The 35? Another compromise like the TFX/F-111. I know it's a maint nightmare, but I'd have kept the 111 for USAF deep strike and and developed a non-VSTOL fit to purpose deep strike ac for the Navy & USMC Carrier long-range ops. The VSTOL concept has come and gone for a variety of reasons, but to my mind the common joke about the Marines wanting it simply to get out in the field out of the Air Forces' clutches really is the real one; references to "no more Henderson Fields" notwithstanding.
I'm loving this stuff, seriously.
But I'm also trying and failing to imagine a Frogfoot laden with a decent load of ordnance doing supersonic flight to target and not burning all its fuel getting there. Semi-clean, coming back, maybe. I don't really know the numbers; correct me if there's solid data around to support a useful-range supersonic dash while toting 7 tonnes of draggy stuff that goes boom.
[Also, if you want to fit the Frogfoot into the USAF's structure, you're going to have advocates (requirements?) for compatibility with USAF refueling booms. That refit doesn't seem trivial. Yes, I know some AF refueling assets [will] have probe&drogue capability, but it's still going to be more refit. Then there's the severe NIH effect and non-NATO armament. Picky, picky.]
Anyway, thanks for the observations about the distinction between gaining&keeping air superiority and CAS. They're meritorious.
What's really driving all this are the green eye-shade bean counter guys, not the true threat envelope or tactical needs.
UAV/UAS provides the vision of a potential cost-saving Nirvana which I believe to be a dangerous Chimera whose ultimate total system costs will dwarf the manned systems because there will have to be almost a separate platform for every potential use.
Budgetary reasons to make room for the F-22/35 are why the Navy's A-6, S-3, & F-14 went away despite the mission needs and lots of life left on their airframes. Same for the AF and the F/EF-111, F-4G Wild Weasel birds, and the SR-71. (In the case of the SR-71 the reason was that, while the U-2 came out of the CIA/NRO's budget; the SR-71 came strickly out of the Air Force's hide--that and the lack of career progression for SR-71 pilots--some of the most experienced and competent on active duty.)
Until we get to a budget which allows for "both and" rather than "either or" we are whistling past the graveyard re-arranging the deck chairs.....Carthage must be Destroyed! Reform the twin budget Pac-men of SS & Medicare!
A separate ans re: Frogfoot.
The AF is already refitting tankers with probe & drogue mods due to "jointness" operabality requirements to support the Navy. Yes, the NIH response would be huge; it would probably take El Cid himself to shove it down both Congressional and Pentagon throats. The sweetener would be to build them here under license and put in US electronics, more reliable engines and our armament pkg--or buy only the frames and ship here for outfitting. Just like the A-1O, for what it does, it ain't becoming obsolete any time soon. Another alternative might be the A-10 replacement designed (And offered, but rejected--NIH again) by Burt Rutan a few years ago--you know, that plodding design hack.
Yeah. "The LCBAA can't be made of...composites! Burt, what were you thinking!"
I want to point out a hidden core assumption of the two sides that underlie the UAV development wars.
bq. 1) The USAF seems to think these UAVs are going to become high-dollar, small-number items, that only officers can fly.
bq. 2) The Army and USMC ground pounders are thinking (relatively) near-throwaway -- no less so than the MRAP or M113 chassis. Any NCO or warrant officer could operate them and that borrowing controllers from the gaming industry will make them cheap.
bq. 3) The AF "fear of sub-optimal use" is basically that F-16 or F-15 class assets will be in the wrong place to do any good.
bq. 4) The Army/Marine assumption is that while a lot of units may not have the manned air, there will be enough UAVs that the full coverage -- down to at least company and maybe platoon level -- is made as a part of the normal ground combat combined arms team.
The reason this assumption is critical is related to development and budget. If your internal assumption is that these will be at least as expensive as an F-16 or F-15, you become willing to eat cost overruns that are still below that level.
If your assumption is that they need to be as common as an MRAP or M113 chassis, you drop the gold plate that decreases availability at the sharp end.
The war time realities of Iraq and Afghanistan, where every company grade combat arms officer has a UAV, argues that the ground pounders vision of the future is winning.
The reality is that UAVs are taking over the close air support and aerial reconnaissance roles. Budget will soon follow that fact. If the USAF brass does not head these UAV development trends off and fast, their existence as a separate service is at stake.
That is why the USAF made a play for UAV development control via air traffic control. A system where they can use the air tasking order/air traffic control to limit the total number of air vehicles automatically gets the UAV development curve going back up the Pentagon "gold plating because we can only have a few of them" path the USAF pioneered.
However, the US Navy, for one, will not allow USAF to do that under any circumstances. The Navy does not currently have stealth manned fighters or super long ranged air-to-air missiles for its F/A-18E/F. The F-35 may or may not happen.
The Navy absolutely needs long ranged stealthy UAVs to keep their carriers competitive with both the foreign military threat and -- more importantly -- the budget threat the USAF represents to its carrier fleet.
The Army and USMC will side with the US Navy regards UAV development for their own interests as well.
Yet, as I evaluate it, I keep coming back to the fact that the USMC can best trump the USAF bureaucratic aerial traffic control ace as they have jet fighters and air traffic control capabilities built into their Expeditionary Forces as a matter of course.
This will be the "Key West Agreement" fight for the 21st century with the outcome determining the future existence of the organizational backbones of the military services.
It does not look good for Team Air Force.
You cannot justify a separate military service on less than 200 F-22s fighters and possibly reusable stealth cruise missiles for post B-52/B-1/B-2 heavy bombers.
It's called blitzkrieg and it works both ways. Hopefully Gates whom has cashiered a couple of pro Air Force people trying to get Iraq going in the right direction will hammer this through in the name of efficiency as the days of aerial knights are over w/. He can always use the Marine MEU as his prototype. They have their own helicopters and fighter/bombers.
Civilian usage intrigues me more as lighting up drug corners and border patrol would be a more efficient use of manpower. CCTV simply generates film imagery that has to by examined. As I recall they never got around to all the film created by the photo flyby impacts made of the moon in the 60's as an example of to much info to process in a timely fashion.
OK Guys, back atcha'a
The Marines had their own traffic contol system (TADC--Tac Air Dir Ctr) in existence in Vietnam with a Marine 3-Star in control of I-Corps (Chapman, later Commandant, then Dep Dir CIA) and the AF still won control under the "Single-Manager" system during the seige of Khe Sanh and Operation Niagara.--so I'm not so sure the politics might not play out that way again. Again, as I have emphasized previously, the Marine MAF/MEU model doesn't scale well for combat over vast geographical areas, whereas the USAF is already set up with an in-being, on-going, proven global presence/operation.
Unless you are going to guarantee that in the future
only Corps-sized conflicts will be engaged within a limited geographical area, I don't see how you can easily expand the USMC
concept unless you contemplate doing away with the Army and Air Force entirely and greatly expanding the Marines and the Navy--now THAT would make rationalized sense in that everyone would be in the same uniform and on the same organizational page. Think that's EVER gonna happen politically in this or any other galaxy--or even parallel alternate universe? We can't even get rid of the Dept. of Education, and that was only established in '79 as a Cabinet level position under Carter--and this despite it's elimination as the public goal of one of the most popular Presidents in modern history--Reagan.
And if we are not going to eliminate the UASF and the Army, the same problem of competing theater ground commander
demands for heavy trans- port and tanker support will still exist. Is it to be proposed that these assets be divvied up and Balkanized also? Tell be how rationalized a system that would be?
(Robert M makes a GREAT point, btw, about film imagery and interpretation lag. We still have warehouses full of it from Vietnam that were never touched. Real time, if possible is only way to go. The Army led the way on this with in-cockpit IR read-outs from side-looking Radar/IR in their Mohawks in Vietnam even prior to FLIR becoming operational in-theater)
Further, however, no one has as of yet answered my question about ECM degradation of UAS/V control sys. or what will substitute for USAF CAS assets in those forward areas at the beginning of conflicts prior to movement--very slow movement, btw, if history is any guide-- of substantial Army/USMC UAS/V assets and assoc. gnd control systems in-theater--and before carrier assets--already a limited commodity not instantaneously re- positioned, can be brought to bear.
Another thought: Who will provide "smart" arty and cas support beyond helo assets (remembering wx and altitude limitations for helos) if these control elements/assets--located relatively forward in-theater as they must be--are smashed by enemy air/arty or overrun?
It would seem that USAF systems, both wpns platforms and control systems, are far more survivable--designed as they are to operate over greater distances in the rear or even out-theater, half a globe away.
(Again, I'm not arguing "either or" but "both and" here--just a few thoughts to mangle as anyone sees fit.)
PS to Trent Telenko:
Don't be so sure the Army will side with the Marines/Navy. History does not provide much solace for this pov, whatever the level of Gang Green's frustration with the zoomies. 'Cause if the Navy is going to have to support the Army as well as the Marines it will occur to the Army that maybe, just maybe family will come first for the Navy--and politicians might start thinkin', hey, why are we duplicatin' things, let's ape the Canadians and put everyone in the same uniform and make em' Marines! Be careful what you wish for Black Knights....
Virgil,
What I said was that the USAF would lose its monopoly on all combat air power. Not that the USAF would lose all combat airpower.
Bombers are still useful. F-22s are still useful. Their roles of deep strike and air superiority do not go away. The service itself is likely to become an aerospace service, but it will not disappear and "air superiority"/ "deep strike untethered by communications links" will remain as 2 of its key roles.
There will still be some changes in the wind.
The loitering strike role that bombers now hold over places like Afghanistan will probably fall to refuelable stealth UCAVs like the Navy's X-47 UCAS-D, and land UCAVs like the MQ-9 Reaper/ Predator B and its successors, because of their much lower operating cost and ability to stay on station for 30-40+ hours.
The SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) role played by the F-22s may also erode, as unmanned systems first become part of the F-22's controllable strike package and eventually become its lead wave. Those UCAVs are likely to be USAF airplanes, though both necessity and culture make the Navy more likely to pioneer this approach with its carrier wings.
Joe:
I don't necessairly disagree with much of what you've just said, I'm just worried that the building of airframes for CAS will wither away along with their trained pilots, plus all the other operators that make such a system work, leaving only the air superiority mission. If that happens what will be Plan B if the fears I have expressed about ECM or enemy gnd or air action prove true--or again, what about CAS for the Army prior to their own assets or the Navy/Marine air hoves on the scene in the early stages of a conflict when/if the 82nd parachutes in ahead of the Marines all by it's lonesome?
Or do you think the Navy F-35s will always be in position for early FEBA strikes during initial contact? Because what I think is that, absent the AF to provide long-range "untethered" support, there will be vital missions that both the President and the JCS will shrink from attempting lacking those capabilities, much as we are currently distorting all sorts of planning/tactics absent F-14 fleet defense and ASW S-3 capabilities with really no adequate substitutes in sight. Same holds true for the pathetic attempt by the AF to cross-train pilots in the few remaining broken-down EA-6s that remain.
My main worry is that the bean counters will use UAVs as an excuse to let everything else wither--a trend already started--even tho we're currently spending less on defense as a percentage of GDP than prior to Prarl Harbor. And I haven't even broached the problem of Naval Gunfire (or lack thereof) and long range platforms to let Marines swim to shore ("from the sea") but let the mother ships stay out of range of shore-based ssms. But that's for another day--unless you think that those problems just might possibly/inevitably impinge on the availability of existing air assets currently dedicated elsewhere in planners visions.
Team Army lost any faith in the USAF in 2003 when the Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) got approval from the Central Command to strip Predator and Global Hawk UAV's due to political directives to hunt Scuds. It happened between the time when the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment was preparing its ill fated deep strike on Iraqi ground forces through a time after the 3rd ID and Vth Corp were crossing the Karbala Gap (Roughly March 23 through April 3, 2003).
The reasons given were that these overhead surveillance tools were needed in the Scud hunt to the west. The Army had it's 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment shot to pieces and nearly ate a Republican Guards heavy brigade ambush as a result.
You need to look at what the USMC did to team USAF in 1991 and 2003, particularly the latter.
The USMC's ownership of its EA-6B's lets it dictate to the CFAAC how it will use its air assets in the over all air taking order. You cannot put together a SEAD campaign or deep interdiction strike packages without the EA-6B's jamming. So the Corp's Harriers and FA-18's fly outside the ATO in direct support of the USMC.
The USMC, with it's own air force and record of out maneuvering the bigger services to support line Marines on the ground, came up with a different solution in 2003 to keep the USAF from poaching it's "Manned UAV support" during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.
Background:
The USMC was using P-3 Orions with long range video/thermal cameras as "Manned UAV surrogates" and suffering the same problem with USAF preemption for the Scud hunt.
Until, that is, it started to put USMC Colonels on the P-3's to fight the orders from the USAF CENTCOM theater air commander.
See below:
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20081027.aspx
During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, some of the P-3 AIP (Anti Surface Warfare Improvement Program) reconnaissance aircraft proved useful to marine ground units, but only if the marines put a senior marine officer (usually a colonel) on the P-3s. This insured that the P-3 crew was constantly reminded of what the marines on the ground needed, and the P-3 was not "hijacked" by some other headquarters for a recon mission that was of no use to the marines.
and
...Naturally, such a capable recon aircraft was in great demand, which is why the marines learned that if they could get a colonel on board the P-3, they would basically "own" the P-3 for that flight.
Having a Marine officer on the P-3's that outranked the USAF air controllers, outranked their immediate superiors, and was outside the chain of command that USAF Generals could reach, killed the USAF run CENTCOM air commander's ability to re-task USMC air surveillance assets to "Higher priority" USAF missions.
The USAF partisans would say that the CFAAC was just following "Command guidance" in stripping the US Army of its UAV overhead video surveillance to pursue Scuds.
The USMC would argue, correctly I think, that such "Command guidance" is always subject to interpretation.
The Marines resorted to this bureaucratic tactic in order to over rule CFACC "after take off interpretations" that left them without aerial video coverage on a consistent basis, after they agreed to multiple air tasking orders that included such overhead video coverage.
It is all a matter of trust, and the USMC just voted in combat that they didn't trust the blue suited CFACC.
In 2003, at the Karbala Gap, the US Army Vth Corp wished it had that option.
This is why the US Army institutional response is to build armed UAV airpower that is an integral part of the ground combat combined arms team and IS BY DESIGN INCAPABLE of be used by a USAF theater air commander.
The US Military's ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed tactical operations centers at brigade, battalion and increasingly at company level that are multi-media and direct both UAV's and ground based video/laser tracking and targeting.
They are using 155mm Excalibur and 227mm GMLRS rockets to engage targets urban targets due to their speed of flight, smaller collateral damage and shorter engagement time due to shorter coordination time, compared to USAF close air support. Most of the "Close air support" in 2006 in Iraq was in fact GMLRS fire missions.
The deployment of future generations of the XM1156 GPS fuse to mortars means that those battalion and company TOCs can engage targets out of line of sight with precision guided munitions from organic means without the time taken to call higher level chain of command. This is extremely important because every level of authority required to make a decision doubles the amount of time it takes to make one.
The "Kill chain," to use the modern term of art, with GPS fused mortars is roughly double the ballistic flight time of a GPS mortar shell in combat.
Orders of magnitude mean things. The deployment of this "GPS fuse" -- think of them as "Micro" and "Nano"JDAM kits for artillery and mortar shells respectively -- is the firepower equivalent of going from 1870's machine gun unit deployment deployment to late WWI levels of machine gun deployment. That is, going from machine gun as a "regimental gun" to platoon heavy support weapon, virtually over night.
That speed, rate, and volume of indirect fire PGM engagement will elevate American ground forces fire power, compared to the current Russian or Chinese Army's, to roughly that of the Imperial British Army versus the Zulus or the Dervishes.
This development will not only humbug the whole modern close air support paradigm. It may make humbug the "Missiles in a box" NLOS-LS from the FCS program as well.
I know GPS fuses on Naval 5-inch guns are going to make the USMC ANGLICO teams very happy. Hell, a single USMC MEU could stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by itself with organic artillery and mortars firing nothing but GPS fused cluster bomblet shells.
Consider this passage from wikipedia on the SADARM:
Combat history
The system was used for the first time during combat during the 2003 Invasion of Iraq,1[2] with a total of 121 rounds reported fired by the 3rd Infantry Division with 48 vehicle kills attributed to 108 M895 (sic) SADARM projectiles.
Given that there are two SADARM canisters per M895 shell, we are looking at a 22% hit rate for the 216 SADARM canisters fired in combat.
Now assume GPS fuses for the SADARM carrier shells and a JSTARS/UAV combination to play forward observer increasing that to a 44% hit rate. We have dropped the total number of M895 shells required from 108 to 54.
Now assume that JSTARS/UAV combo is backed up by FCS style unattended ground sensors, thus increasing the SADARM hit percentage to 88%.
We now only need 27 M895 shells with 54 SADARM canisters to kill those 48 Iraqi vehicles.
That is the power of GPS fuses with SADARM.
Now consider that if we know which Iraqi vehicles are wheeled and which are tracked, we can substitute air burst HE shells for some of the SADARM to kill soft vehicles.
This isn't A magic bullet.
It is 10,000 magic bullets fielded in a C3I/ISR system that can target all of them rapidly across the battlefield.
Heavy forces will need to field anti-shell and missile point defenses a'la HAMMERS SLAMMERS to remain relevant on the battlefield.
We are lucky that Iraq's Green Zone shelling got us to deploy Phalanx in the anti-shell "C-RAM" (Counter artillery rocket and mortar) technology. It will give us the technological basis to deploy counter PGM artillery systems sooner than our adversaries.
See these links:
http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0508/news/news2105_c_ram.htm
http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0208/news/news_080208_cram.htm
http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0107/news/170107_cram.htm
Consider how the Russian Army moved through the Roki tunnel into Georgia. They were bumber to bumper, whatever their doctrine on convoy spacing said.
Now consider that each GPS fused shell will have its own separate aim point with a 50 meter CEP. (A 500 shell/W GPS fuse time on target [TOT] will make choke points like the Roki tunnel death traps, if they are in range of enemy artillery.)
The next step after GPS fuse deployment will be automating the process of generating GPS aim points and transmitting them to the fuses on the guns.
If you have a GPS & laser range finder equipped UAV generating GPS coordinates for a high speed avenue of approach, then generating a "GPS FUSE TOT" on that route is a matter of target engagement optimizing software.
The first step in this evolution will be generating the equivalent of final protective fires. Later iterations will allow this kill GPS Fuse zone to be generated on the fly against moving convoys based on the data provided by our sensors. This level of capability is when we start replacing some of the SADARM shells with HE-Frag to kill soft vehicles.
As for point defense ammunition versus artillery shell saturation, the issue of C-RAM capability boils down to when we deploy directed energy weapons that run on vehicle power.
It is coming.
"Hell, a single USMC MEU could stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by itself with organic artillery and mortars firing nothing but GPS fused cluster bomblet shells"
Unless, of course, the Chinese were smart enough to jam or disable our GPS system, rendering a huge amount of our technology inoperable. Our reliance on GPS is an extremely dangerous fact. Just the mental shock of losing our navigation and precision munitions would be devastating to the modern military. You can train for that type of event, but nothing quite prepares you for the loss of everything you spend 95% of your time training with.
GPS could be the modern equivalent of the Maginot Line, its dislocation creating a much larger shockwave because of failure of imagination than just the physical loss itself.
Trent Telenko@34
Having watched (as an AF guy)the UASF-USMC "air-wars" up close and personal in 1968 from DaNang I can attest to the Marines studious attempts to circumvent the "single-manager" system--to the extent they even used to slip over into Laos with their transponders off to bomb arty sites at Co Roc across the border which were threatening Khe Sanh--and I can't say that I don't/didn't sympathize with their pov. And with all AF recce assts based in Saigon@TSN, Army units in I-Corps were, shall we say, less than satisfied even then with AF support on the reconnaissance end. (Currently, I was well aware of the Marine tactics you describe, but not of the withdrawal of the Global Hawks from the Army.)
And the retirement of the EF-111s by the AF looks foolish indeed no matter what the maintenance cost savings--shot themselves in the foot to be sure.....
Look, I'll not defend most of the approach the big kids in the AF have taken, but the sight of each service fighting it's own pvt war is sad to behold. It seems to me the "Centralized decision-making, decentralized execution" mantra of the AF still makes logical sense ( at least in theory--on one analytical level, at least) but runs afoul of both budget constrictions on the one hand--not enough assets to keep everybody happy--and technological advances on the other which allow decision-making to be pushed down closer to the point of attack where maximum flexibility is always required/desired--and where company-grade officers are usually best situated to be making timely decisions.
So today we are faced with a chaotic situation wherein the component parts of the Armed Services are literally at war with each other. (I know, what else is new, '56 "Revolt of the Admirals" and all that) Part of the solution to this sad state of affairs is budgetary as it was in 56). Given adequate resources to each service, the single-manager system in a modified form is still the most logical one. *Someone should have overall control--or what's the point of Commands like Centcom?
Remember, it has always been the Army itself which has historically pushed for a top-down, "General Staff" solution with increased further concentration of decision-making at higher and higher command levels with each subsequent "reform." Remember too, it was just such thinking and Army prodding which led to the JCS/SECDEF system in the first place in 1947, which replaced the far more flexible and loosely coordinated JCS-less command system which successfully directed operations in WWII. (Be careful what you wish for, Black Knights/Team Army...)
So what's the solution? I know the people that are driving much of the unmanned revolution from the supply side--the "desk-bound engineers and x-box futurists" as one Navy pilot has put it--think current trends are pretty much straightforward and inevitable, given the seemingly insatiable demand-side appetites, but I would demure for two reasons:
1) As my referenced Navy guy pointed out over at Neptunus Lex, The more sophisticated unmanned stuff has huge developmental costs almost equal to the manned systems, long lead/test times all based around bandwidth, and "humongous" infrastructure additions, and, 2) The separate, but nonetheless inextricably intertwined parallel "shadow" nuclear C&C structure which is demanded to be highly centralized by the Civilian side of the structure. Developed during the heyday of SAC, it has been settled principle
that one doesn't let corporals, NCOs and 2nd Lts decide when to pull the nuclear trigger--which is why the Davy Crockett bazooka and jeep-mounted LaCrosse nukes were withdrawn from service after cooler heads prevailed.
This highly centralized command architecture deeply influenced (and still does) the shape of the systems for control of conventional warfare across the board--as the same people are utilized to make decisions under either scenario. And it should be remembered that the "Single-Manager" air Tactical Control system was devised when two ex-SAC Generals were simultaneously head of TAC and Vietnam's 7th AF, and with the then Chief of Staff of the AF ("3-fingered Jack Ryan") being a former SAC CG also--small wonder a highly centralized system for control of CAS emerged.
So, because many of the same wpns platforms that are currently used to deliver conventional missions are also tasked to deliver nuclear wpns, the need for a system to provide centralized control never goes away, no matter what technology does to allow company grade officers to drive the utilization of the conventional side. This constant struggle to reconcile the two diametrically opposed needs--and the fact that so many of the tactical conventional assets have to be ready to convert to nuclear delivery virtually over-night--means this problem is not going to ever be resolved, IMO--so everyone will probably remain unsatisfied as far as the eye can see.
The danger here, however, is the tendency to resolve this tension by assuming away the immediacy of the nuclear mission. We have already seen AF problems with nuclear wpns because of relaxed procedures and new personnel being under-trained; and with resultant poor morale due to lack of promotion opportunities in the de-emphasized nuclear areas.
And the commission/panel assigned to review our nuclear mission because of these AF mishaps has just reported that despite being ordered to do so the Navy has refused/failed to field/make operational the nuclear version of it's Tomahawk cruise missile. This refusal seen by me to be the Navy's way of resolving the tension between the different and opposite needs nuclear wpns require/force a command structure fighting a conventional war to respond and adjust to--usually at the expense of the conventional mission.
SO-----in my view, because of the limitations/constraints on UAVs in point one above, and the ever-present nuclear mission discussed in point two driving centralized command authority decision lines, the root causes driving/promoting the institution of some form of single-manager system are unlikely to go away anytime soon, despite numerous end around attempts--even relatively successful ones.
Mark Buehner @36
And don't think the PLA isn't
busily at work on all this--a lot of it done by PhDs pumped out by US universities.
One psychological aspect of this discussion exemplified by impassioned advocates like
Telenko, and noted by many students of military decision-makers, is how scant is the attention US operational commanders/planners pay to enemy tactics/planning--as opposed to obsessing on the readiness of their own forces--despite much lip service to the contrary.
The trick is, we know it would be a turkey shoot for any conventional force to pick a fight with us. They know it too. Its real easy to be enchanted by your own technology and daydream of how badly you would maul the enemy if he played ball with you, but history shows us that doesn't happen very often. If the Chinese (for instance) did decide to go to war, we'd instantly be in trouble simply because they would only do it if they thought they had a good chance of hurting us somehow. Vigilence is critical, but so is flexibility. When it comes to the guys in the trenches, we have an amazingly adaptive and creative fighting force. But when it comes to the field officers and the brass, I despair of the ability to quickly create and problem solve in a true crisis that really took us by surprise. Look how long it took to get the right people with the right doctrine in Iraq.
The Pentagon rewards officers that endorse and utilize the expensive toys they relish, the yes men. The guys that ask difficult questions and pose dangerous scenarios are boat-rockers that traditionally dont move up the ladder (at least until the crisis is full blown). Procurement is still the life blood of the defense department, and it can't be underestimated how greatly it affects doctrine from the top down. When your buying billion dollar hammers, every problem looks like a nail.
Re #36
So far we haven't had to fight an opponent who had the technological capabilities to make it a symmetric fight. Given Chinese, Russian, and Indian aerospace capabilities our satellites are sitting ducks. Rockets full of rocks could take out or degrade our capability.
#36
The DoD has spent a lot of time making their GPS systems jam-proof since the first Gulf War and Saddam Hussein and his cohorts tried in the second Gulf War to jam them but they did not succeed. Obviously, China and Russia (among others) have better technology so they may succeed but our equipment has worked pretty well overall against their technology before so who knows?
No squad has the capability of carrying a UAV with more firepower than a bazooka or RPG. What these UAVs will do is scout ahead along trails or streets (even inside building) and allow the squad to locate potential targets not only for the squad itself, but for air AND artillery assets.
As far as who should be in charge, lets see... The Army thinks it should be in charge. The Navy thinks it should be in charge. The Air Force thinks it should be in charge. And even the Marines think they should be in charge. And CAS is always getting shortchanged. The Air Force could devote every single asset to CAS and the groundpounders will still complain about the stingy Air Force. By the way, we don't have enough artillery assets either.
As far as which platforms can do CAS, if you have air supremacy (not air superiority), then just about any asset which can carry bombs can help out with CAS. We have even used B-52s for CAS in Afghanistan and Iraq. The only reasons to get low are for accuracy and intimidation. We can get very close (at worst) to the same accuracy from 10,000 ft as 100 ft, so why not minimize the chances of getting shot down?
The UAVs will probably take over the role now done by bombers and fighters where they get up and fly around and wait till targets. They first have to learn how to refuel remotely in the air. They probably will eventually take over the strategic and interdiction bombing missions but I'm not so sure about the fighter role right now.
Just remember, UAVs and other remote vehicles are really just in their early childhood. We are still figuring out where they best fit and how best to use them. I am fairly certain if we could look ahead twenty-thirty years, we won't recognize all the uses for them.
RHSwan
Mark,
The jihadis in Iraq used Iranian anti-GPS devices to change the aim point of American GPS artillery and JDAMS by ~100 meters to "generate Martyrs."
Our forces in Iraq adapted and overcame and my source did not reveal exactly how it was done.
Just that it was accomplished.
Getting into a techological battle with the USA has always been a losing proposition for America's enemies.
That's because such a battle is a peer to peer competition and not a game of asymetrical warfare.
In the era of horizontal WI/FI, VOIP, Blackberry electronic communications, the USAF command organization and executing plans are built around a "mainframes and terminals" mind set.
The 24 hour air tasking order cycle by the USAF fighter pilot general's is nothing but a variant of the "mainframe and terminal think" originating from Strategic Air Command's Single Integrated Operational Plan to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.
Luckly, the USAF CoS Schwartz sees some of the weaknesses of the Fighter Pilot generals. He just told them that they and their main frame thinking/Fighter jocks are superior attitudes are redundant. And the Fighter pilot mafia's "analyst" supporters are whining about it for them.
Read these two paragraphs from the DoD Buzz weblog
/ closely.
Unluckally, a fact both Schwartz and these analysts seem to be missing is that cruise missiles are a form of UAV and they are sent in ahead of manned fighters.
Plus, missiles of any type don't need a 24 hour theater air tasking order planning cycle to create a "strike package" to engage mobile "high value targets." This was seen repeatedly during the Kosovo Air War of 1999 with Serb air defenses in the use of manned aircraft.
Manned air power only operated in the air over Kosovo when SEAD planes like the F-16CJ and EA-6B were there to provide cover, in particularly after a F-117 Nighthawk was lost to an "Obsolete" Serb SA-3.
Missiles do not need SEAD forces to operate against enemy air defenses nor do they need to be in the ATO to be useful.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, US Army ATACMS ballistic missiles did the majority of suppression/destruction of enemy air defense missions in the first two days of the air campaign.
They also provided on-call artillery support for special forces teams in the western desert when weather prevented aircraft from hunting Scuds. (FYI, there were only three prototype HIMARS launchers in existence at that time).
See the information below:
http://www.ndiagulfcoast.com/events/archive/32nd_symposium/day1/sorenson_air_arm_100306_nonotes.pdf
Fired over 450 ATACMS in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
The development of UAV surveillance plus rapid flight time engagement cycle GPS guided missiles places much of the USAF interdiction mission, as well as CAS and ISR missions, up for grabs in terms of the DoD budget.
Especially when it comes to heavily defended, mobile, high value targets.
Joe,
I found this interview of USAF General Deptula over at http://worldwidewarpigs.blogspot.com.
IMO, the USAF is negotiating its terms of surrender on UAVs. It just conceded that the US Army can own "sub-theater capable" armed UAVs and use them however the Army sees fit.
Now it is a matter of the US Army buying armed UAV capability that the CFAAC cannot use without Army permission a'la the USMC and that P-3 AIP (Anti Surface Warfare Improvement Program) surveillance plane.
Q. WILL THE PENTAGON NAME AN EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR UAVS, WHICH THE AIR FORCE SOUGHT DURING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION?
A. The deputy defense secretary overturned the idea and elected to stand up a DoD-wide UAS [unmanned aerial systems] task force instead. We are full and dedicated participants.
There are four broad challenges. One, we need an optimal joint concept of operations for all levels of UAS. Two, we must work through airspace control issues. Three, we must address the air defense piece - we've had the luxury of operating in airspace over the last 18 years that we've owned and controlled. But what happens when an adversary flies into that space? Who does the deconfliction? Who identifies friend from foe? It's a big challenge.
Fourth, streamlined and efficient acquisition of our ISR systems. There's been a lot of nonsense written about the Air Force wanting to own all UAVs. We're not interested in that. We're interested in optimizing what's out there. That's where some of the internal Pentagon discussion has been: How do you best use a UAV that has theaterwide capability? You let the joint force commander prioritize use - you don't tie them to just one location and not allow them to move. But that doesn't mean a unit shouldn't have the capabilities provided by UAVs. That unit commander should be provided UAS assets that he or she has control over, but an important question is: Do those need to be UAS with theaterwide capability?
Q. WILL THE USAF TRY AGAIN FOR THE EXECUTIVE-AGENCY PLAN?
A. No, I don't think so. There was so much emotion wrapped up around the issue that it would be counterproductive. And Gen. Norton Schwartz, our service's chief of staff, has said as much.
Q. HAS THERE BEEN PROGRESS ON A POLICY TO EASE THE PROBLEMS WITH FLYING UAVS IN BATTLEFIELD THEATERS?
A. Theater-capable UAS ought to be prioritized by the joint force commander to meet campaign objectives. Local-capable - line-of-sight - UAS ought to be prioritized by the unit commander.
However, if you're going to fly those systems in airspace that other aircraft are going to operate in, they have to be a part of a C2 structure that solves some deconfliction and air defense challenges. We have challenges now where we try to segregate airspace just to operate one or two UAVs. We get in trouble sometimes because we treat theater-capable assets as local-capable assets - that sub-optimizes UAS capability for the joint force commander.
There are a lot of people who misinterpret this as an Army-vs.-Air Force argument. It's not. There are no Air Force targets in Iraq or Afghanistan. The targets belong to the joint force commander. So the issue is between the perspective of the overall joint force commander and a local unit commander. To optimize UAS capability for all, the theater-capable UAVs should be flown in line with what the joint commander needs, while also ensuring there are enough local-capable UAS assets to meet smaller unit commanders' needs. It's very important that we follow our tried-and-true joint organizational approaches that have existed since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. We could be doing it better.
Trent/
I'm glad you mentioned the SIOP because, you know, it still exists. At the risk of being irritatingly repetitive, I again would point out that any command structure that is arrived at has to face the tensions posed by the twin needs to simultaneously use many of the same weapons platforms and personnel to perform the nuclear mission--a mission requiring a centralized control structure-- as well as the conventional one--perhaps virtually over-night. This is something everyone is whistling past the graveyard on, IMO. Your comments please.....Unless, of course, you feel that all sembelence of readiness to perform this mission should be allowed to die on the vine; that nuclear deterrence has no role to play in this era. Because unless you believe this, please explain how this new structure forming before our very eyes is going to be able to address the Command and Control needs such a deterrence posture and resultant retained capability implies.
Or alternatively, do you see tactical delivery platforms--manned or unmanned--for the carrying out of the nuclear mission as being eliminated, and out of the picture such that a separate, parallel command structure would be developed for this mission?
PS to Trent:
I guess what I getting at is do
you advocate a change to something like the old Soviet FA-Frontal Aviation/Strategic Forces division of labor.
Virgil (#33)
I think any battlefield the USA fights on will have the path cleared by F-22s and bombers doing deep strikes/ clearance, per their assigned roles.
E-8 JSTARS, lower-tech platforms like the RC-12 guardrail (special Beechcraft King Airs, look like dogs that wrestled with a porcupine), some UAVs like RQ-4 Global Hawks with SIGINT/ELINT packages that are controlled by satellite uplink... and such F-22s and F-35s as exist (thanks to their unique approach of embedding all kinds of interesting sensors in the aircraft structure) will then make excellent platforms for finding ECM arrays and killing them.
Meanwhile, in the gaps where ECM is not, small armed UAVs will fly, as will other assets. Precision artillery and NETFIRES missiles will respond to their targeting. And it will still suck to be the enemy. Until the ECM is gone or has a much smaller footprint. Whereupon it will really suck.
My larger worry is actually that the low entry cost of UAVs, and Moore's Law, will make it very easy for other countries to also field these kind of UAV/arty surveillance/ strike complexes.
To the extent that the USA retains an edge, it will be a cultural one, born of Americans' impatient "just get it done, and damn the rules if necessary" mentality, and individualist approach. All these UAVs and communications can also enable a very top-down, stifling approach to battle, after all. A number of America's enemies are culturally very likely to take that route instead.
We had better hope so, anyway.
virgil,
What is happening is that there is an emerging bifurcation in airpower.
A lot of airpower missions and budget are shifting from the centralized USAF theater control system to the direct control of ground and naval forces.
There are a lot of reasons for this, starting with the credibility meltdown of USAF senior leadership with DoD civilian leadership,the senior officers of the other services, USAF contractors and, ultimately, Congress.
Consider that the last DOD supplemental bought 15 C-17, 34 C-130J, 13 F/A18E, & Two V-22. If you want to physically fly new airplanes in the USAF, you have to be a cargo pilot. If you want to fly a brand new fighter plane, join the US Navy.
A lot of this was seen recently in the failed USAF tanker bid. Please read summary paragraph #4 in the Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on the Tanker deal closely. (I found it at this link: http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004257.html)
In the bidding process, the USAF originally wanted to use as much of the existing KC-135 infrastructure as possible. That is why Boeing was bidding the KC-767 rather than the larger KC-777, which could not use the same hangers and shorter air fields that the smaller KC-135 could.
The USAF decided mid-competition that fewer, bigger, tanker planes was better for the USAF procurement budget, and went for the KC-30.
In so many words, the USAF changed the tanker requirements in the middle of the bid process, they told Northrop-Grumman, BUT DID NOT TELL BOEING that it did so.
That is the biggest reason why the GAO upheld Boeing's protest, in my opinion.
I strongly suspect the reason why both Tanker replacement bids blew up on the USAF was the Fighter Pilot General's insistence to maximize F-22s buys in the USAF's limited procurement budget. The USAF brass involved with the bidding process were playing cost shifting games to move tanker replacement costs out of the service’s procurement budget and into the operations and facilities/infrastructure budgets.
Any infrastructure cost hits for switching to the larger Northrop-Grumman KC-30 mid-bid over the Boeing KC-767 would come from either the operations or facilities budgets; hence the USAF could buy more F-22s with the KC-30 than the KC-767, even if the latter cost less over all.
The original "Tanker leasing deal" was built around "using a different color of money" than what would be used to buy the F-22. Leasing would be part of the USAF Operation budget. By law, you cannot use “Operations dollars” to buy new equipment. That is what the procurement budget is for. Yet that is what the first “Tanker deal” did, leaving the F-22 “funding wedge” intact without the competition of tanker planes.
There are far more Congressional financial and reporting controls placed on the DoD procurement budget than either the operations or facilities line items. This "color of money" funding game is what attracted Sen. McCain's attention to the first tanker deal and uncovered the procurement fraud that senior USAF officials were involved in with senior Boeing officials.
This time, Boeing found out all of these latest rounds of USAF cost shifting games in their failed bidder out brief, and here we are.
Based on my professional experience in American military procurement, I would say the failure of both Tanker bids lies at the feet of the Fighter Pilot Generals, for their insistence of playing budget games to buy more F-22s.
Now in he aftermath of that fiasco it is damnably hard for the USAF Brass to argue with the Army over armed UAV's with that sort of credibility melt down in the recent past.
Virgil,
The article below the dashed line was in strategypage.com in March 2008 prior to the Wynne/Moseley firings.
The comment of a senior field grade Army type I shared it with was as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wynne & Moseley got the "Or Else."
Now Gen Deptula is stuck negotiating the terms of surrender to the Army on armed UAV's under the Secretary of Defense that fired his last chief of staff.
Joe, Trent:
I was pretty much aware of almost everything contained in the substance of your posts@47&48 and the basic nature of the disputes, but thank's for fleshing out the gaps. But STILL unanswered is the question I have posed @44 & 45 regarding the twin demands put upon a single command structure and it's associated wpns platform mix by the need to accommodate both the conventional (decentralized structure) and nuclear (centralized structure) missions. It seems we are "solving" this problem by wishing it away through atrophy of the assets and structure needed for the successful functioning of the nuclear mission, i.e., be able to be seen by our enemies as having both the capability and the will to carry it out successfully if needed--failure to do so leading to a great lack of credibility--which leads to deterrence failure. Again, your opinions/views please. Or are my worries unfounded?
Virgil,
The entire US Military senior to include the USAF has developed a phobia over things nuclear. This is both a response to civilian political authorities (AKA the removal of tactical nukes from the American tactical air, ground and surface naval forces) and a result of the promotion policies of the services.
Defacto, the nuclear role is being taken over by the US Navy because its submarine force is seriously trained in nuclear policy, procedures and has a major stake in the nuclear weapons budget.
The fighter pilot generals killed SAC, stopped B-2 production, delayed heavy bomber replacement programs to fund the F22 and have removed the centralized control system (specifically the SAC nuclear accountability programs) you keep harping on as a threat to their power inside the USAF.
Nuclear policy and control have become entirely separate from questions of air power.
Nothing anyone does or says is going to put them back together again.
This is a comment I made in March 2004 in my post "The Networked Force" regards military service culture versus the capital expense of the weapons it uses.
It is a very important point to understand when looking at manned aircraft and the emergence of cheap armed UAVs:
"http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/004739.php#c29"/http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/004739.php#c29/
Organizations that are highly invested in expensive and long life pieces of capital equipment tend to be highly conservative if not reactionary about using it. They won't risk it if they don't have too and they are highly resistant to change that might devalue it.
This is critically important in looking at how the various services institutional cultures are changing.
In the 1920s and 1930s aircraft were expensive capital equipment that had to be replaced regularly because of advancing technology and short operational life span. The Army Air Corps was highly innovative and kept pushing the various aircraft paradigms (bomber, fighter attack) that gave us the Eighth Air Force in Europe and the Enola Gay in the Pacific.
The Army ground forces, on the other hand, had expensive and comparatively very long life artillery, vehicles and troops it had to move shot and communicate with. It developed the signals to get the best use of what it had and used Detroit -- the civilian economy -- in WW2 to mass produce what it needed to win.
The Navy was wedded to battleships, but hedged its bets by building an aircraft carrier scouting force as well. Aircraft carriers won the technology debate and WW2. The last of the WW2 Midway class carriers did not retire until after the Berlin Wall fell.
Today a new USAF F/A22 cost $110 million each in current production and only 22 a year are built. An F/A22 will have an operational life of 25 years or more.
The newest US Army Stryker armored vehicles cost $2.5 million and several hundred are built a year and it may have an operational life of 15-20 years.
Which service institution is going to be more innovative and risky in using, modifying with electronics and moving on from its current capital equipment set?
Trent/
I framed my questions as I did because as I have been out of touch for a while I didn't know to what extent the AF had shredded
the nuclear commitment. I knew that 52/b1 no longer sat alert armed; that Looking-Glass no longer flew, etc., but also that the missile part was still there--so I was thinking more "state of flux" rather than the "done deal" situation you seem to describe. Let me tell you why I think the state of play you describe is dangerous.
Most people confuse the concept of "deterrence" with that of "defense." They could not be more wrong. Defense is what comes into play when deterrence fails--at least in the case of nuclear weapons. At the beginning of the Cold War one of the critiques of the policy of "brinksmanship" and "massive retaliation" in the Eisenhower years was the belief that, just as no one wanted to "die for Danzig" prior to WWII, no one would want to trade NYC for Hamburg just to stop The SU from grabbing half of Germany in a conventional excursion. Thusly viewed, our announced posture and associated wpns mix was seen as "not credible" in that, if push came to shove, no President, the mainland of America not being attacked, would risk nuclear immolation of American cities just to save Hamburg. Hence the concept of "Tactical" nuclear war was born in order to finesse this dilemma--and the US began to equip and train accordingly.
The "tactical" nuclear option had several problems, however. Yet paradoxically it's practical problems and conceptual failures were actually it's strengths insofar as successful deterrence was concerned. Let me explain:
On the conceptual side, the Europeans were secretly horrified. To them the stationing of tac nukes in Europe looked like a strategy to "fight" a nuclear war on exclusively on European soil rather than a deterrence strategy. We thought differently. Those espousing our new, more "flexible" posture believed that, as the likely-hood that such weapons might actually be used increased (based on the stated belief that such a tactical nuclear war could be "contained" by limiting it to a strictly European affair, rather than sacrificing American cities) the Soviets, sobered by the more credible possibility that any conventional attack by them might be met with tactical nuclear weapons, would be less likely to consider such adventures.
This concept obviously worked--but not in the way that the US had intended. The Russians were properly horrified by the concept; not because they thought they might "lose" such a war--but by the fact they did not believe it possible (correctly, in my pov) to be contained, First, most actual nukes to be used in this role were "tactical" only in the sense that they were to be used on the tactical battlefield. Most were Hiroshima-sized. This factor alone meant that those on the recieving end would have a hard time believing that their use was not the opening salvo of general nuclear war. American strategy was based on the belief that there was an escalation "ladder" that could be climbed in stages, with pauses to negotiate, etc. The Soviets believed other-wise.
The Soviet was that the destructive striking power of nuclear weapons was so profound that a tremendous advantage accrued to not only their first use but by use of the larger, more destructive ones. Thus, if one believed that one was going to eventually "climb" the escalation ladder to general war anyway, the temptation to leapfrog right to the top and general nuclear war would be overpowering. This would be enhanced from the "pucker factor" influencing reports from the field. How could one distinguish a "tactical" nuclear explosion from one generated by a missile from the US as part of a general nuclear war? They experimented with optical sighting rings to try to measure the size of the fire-balls, for example, but nothing realistically worked. Then too, they asked, what about nuclear weapons delivered on the tactical battlefield on the continent from bases in the UK--a UK that had not been attacked. Were these bases to be considered off-limits from attack?
And if they were, would that not increase the likely-hood that what might be initially to have been considered a "limited" conflict would thereby be greatly expanded--with all the consequences? And of course, CPX dry runs done by both sides, as well as those done by independent think-tanks, all showed a rapid, inevitable race "up the ladder" to general nuclear war. So in not only the view of the Soviets, but others as well, the American belief that a "tactical" nuclear war could be "limited" in any real sense was not only delusional, but dangerous.
Worse, from the pov of those aghast at this policy, was the fact that US forces in Europe were equipped and constantly trained to fight such a war--and you fight like you train, as the saying goes. Yet paradoxically, it was this actual belief--delusional or no--by US commanders that such a war could be successfully fought--and their seeming readiness to initiate it--that successfully deterred the Soviets as they truly believed (again, correctly, IMHO) that any such use of "tactical" wpns could not be contained. Thus a policy designed to "defend" Europe actually, paradoxically, served as a successful "deterrent" to general nuclear war.
In light of the above, my concern is that the trends of our present posture lead us in a "back to the future" posture of "massive retaliation" which might dangerously be viewed by any opponent as an "un-credible" response to minor or limited land-grabs--and thus precipitate the very thing we are seeking to avoid.
Finally, there is another danger in concentrating all our nuclear eggs in our submarine deterrent with the gradual reduction in our land missile forces. The whole psychology behind the siting of nuclear weapons within the continental US is not only due to increased security, but the GUARANTEE that any attempt to neuter our retaliatory forces by a firs-strike would guarantee millions of civilian deaths--and thus trigger an automatic retaliation by a US President
goaded by the revenge factor/political pressure, etc.,--knowledge of said psychological pressures seen to deter any opponent thinking he could pressure an America weakened by such a decapitation strike into premature surrender.
With much of our credible nuclear forces at sea, what if the ability to track and kill our ssbms with conventional weapons is achieved? Now picture this scenario. What would be the response of an American President if, say, one-third or one half of our SSBNS on patrol were destroyed by conventional means in international waters? First, due to communications security, this might be possible as the Us might remain unaware that this was going on for some time. Once presented with this fait accompli and an offer to surrender as any weakened retalitatory strike would be unsuccessful and result in the needless sacrifice and of deaths of
millions of Americans, what would aa President do? The US proper would have not been attacked, no civilians would have yet been killed, and those Navy deaths would have all been "volunteers." Would an American President order the use of nuclear weapons in a losing cause needlessly sacrificing the lives of millions of his fellow citizens when the outcome was fore-ordained? These are not inconsequential questions beyond the realm of possibility.