Noah Millan of Gideon's Blog juxtaposes a couple of common ideas, and puts them in a context that yields illumination:
bq. "The chief neo-conservative insight in foreign policy is that the internal character of a regime determines its foreign policy.... The implication of this understanding - that some regimes are so constituted that they necessarily wage war, and are therefore a threat (to the extent that they have power) by their mere existence - is that some regimes must be obliterated as a matter of self-defense.... When dealing with radical enemies like these, the only defense is a good offense. I happen to think this neo-conservative insight is correct. But... the chief foreign policy insight of their ideological opposites... [is] that a state's foreign policy affects the character of the regime. And this insight also strikes me as correct.... I believe strongly that our current war is necessary... But that doesn't mean I don't worry about the consequences of a long, drawn-out conflict on our culture and or habits of governance...."
It would be nice if the neo-cons would (preferably soon) develop a corollary to their "insight" -- something along the lines of "the capabilities of a regime's military establishment constitute explicit constraints upon the regime's foreign policy".
Or, as poor Rick Shinseki put it, beware of a 12 division strategy for a 10 division army.
Clark for President!
George,
You have it backwards. The demands of a country's foreign policy set the requirements for military capability.
If a 12-division army is needed for the strategy, and the strategy is vital to the national interest, then 12 divisions it must be and leadership means selling that to the public and legislature. Of course, one may quibble over the premises, as one should given the costs. Is that really necessary? Are there other options? Etc. That's normal.
The USA is presently in the middle of that rethink right now. It's also in the middle of a war. It looks messy because it is - Canadians have nearly broken up their country a couple of times over similar issues, and in the middle of World Wars no less. That's the way it works in a democracy, and the way it goes.
You'll get through it.
George,
You have it backwards. The demands of a country's foreign policy set the requirements for military capability.
I certainly do not have it "backwards" -- not in the near term.
Adjusting force structure to national interest is essential, of course. Nevertheless, restructuring of the force is (short of total war) very much a long term process. A foreign policy that fails to reflect that fact is fundamentally flawed.
Or, it's a policy that chooses to accept certain risks in the pursuit of a war. Which is also normal. What is essential, however, is an honest acknowledgement of those risks.
Shinseki got it wrong, too. We don't need more divisions, we need more strategic lift and special operators, civil affairs, linguiststs, MPs, and the like. We've got more than adequate combat arms forces; what we lack is the ability to get them to various places in a timely manner and to handle the aftermath of quick combat.
Well, it seems to me that George and Joe are both correct: policies must be adjusted to and are necessarily constrained by actual and potential capabilities which in turn must reflect the aims of those policies. Given the Bush tax cuts, I have to question his sense of balancing constraints and capabilities. Three additional thoughts:
- Where are our allies? Either we are overly paranoid, they are overly complacent, or they are a bunch a freeriders, or some mix of the foregoing. I lean heavily toward the they-are-freeriders position.
- The war in Iraq was justified on grounds of enforcement, liberation of an oppressed people, and strategy for dealing long-term with authoritarian and repressive regimes in the Middle East. Was it a good or realistic use of capabilities? (Madeleine Albright says in her recent Foreign Affairs article that the war was legally and morally justified, but a bad investment of resources.) I think it would be an undoubtedly good and realistic use of resources based on the needs of collective security (not just national security) if we had the financial, military and political support of our allies. Thus, either Bush's diplomacy was clumsy or our allies were not going to pull their weight no matter what.
- How do the foreign policies of France, Germany (or Europe as a whole), Japan, etc. reflect the character of those regimes? Put differently, are we encouraging (and subsidizing) European pacifism, denial, anti-Americanism and obstructionism?
In the whole mix of things, I can't help thinking that, aside from our obvious enemies bent on our destruction, the single greatest obstacle to policies tailored to our needs and capabilities and, more than just in passing, those of our allies in Europe, Asia and elsewhere, is the French Republic. France virtually created the Iraqi problem by investing its geopolitical and financial capital in the survival of the regime, and then single-handedly led (and is continuing to lead) the opposition to U.S. policies in Iraq and elsewhere designed to enhance collective security. France is not just free-riding on the U.S.-born costs of Pax Americana, through its active opposition and its unmerited leverage on the U.N. Security Council, it is increasing the costs, which of course affects our capabilities.
Is France the greatest threat to collective security or am I overstating the case against my pet obsession?
Gabriel, you are quite right. All sides of the French political spectrum(save their neo-libertarian side) have unified to support the opposition of pretty much every US action and foreign policy, except when it cleary benefits France. The reasons for this vary, and depend on the political group involved, but range from pan-Franco nationalism to quasi Marxist opposition to "US imperialism." As long as this trend continues, France will continue to be America's chief enemy to fostering world peace(yes, I said France is our enemy. I think that it is justified at this point).
FH speaks clearly. Our friends stayed with us, and long-time fellow-travelers (who were selling weapons and know-how to Saddam and other American enemies) showed themselves to be OTHER-THAN-friends.
In English, not-friends are... um, 'enemies'.
First time reading this blog, just wanted to say hi.