The logic:

The fact that the surge worked and we can draw down the troop presence now, is proof that we should have drawn down the troop presence long ago and never done the surge.

The fact that the increased dosage worked and I can stop taking the medicine, is proof that I should have stopped taking medicine long ago and never increased the dosage.

I believe several times in the comments here I had been asked when the U.S. troops would leave and I responded they would leave when the Iraqi government wants us to leave.

I think I'm going to wait to see the details on this one, before I form any serious opinions. I've been hearing about this wrangling off and on for... a few months, I think.

If the Georgians and Russians hadn't done their dance a few weeks ago, I would have been inclined to accept this as evidence that the US and the Iranians had done a deal under the table, and sufficient assurances had been made by both sides to allow a backing down and a redeployment. I would even have offered as evidence from the Iranian side, the recent statements that al-Sadr would be staying in Iran for several years until he became an accepted marjaa. (Incidentally, I laughed when I read the AP story on that. The news was given to the AP reported by an aide of al-Sadr's, on condition of anonymity. I have to wonder if al-Sadr had heard the news before that news release....)

Now, I'm less certain. The Russian reaction has a lot of states scrambling to get their ducks in a row. The US needs to lock things down, so I can certainly see this as incentive for the US to cut deals less perfect than they would have cut three weeks ago. Anyone weak but fundamentally desiring US alliance or protection is in the same boat, and so we've seen a lot of extremely rapid motion between the US and Poland, and to a lesser degree between the US and India.

I would instinctively put Iraq into that boat, but I'm not yet certain the Iraqis see it that way. And then there is Iran. I would have expected them to get loud, perhaps even consider provoking a Tet-style last ditch offensive, somehow. Certainly the Syrians wasted no time offering to host a Russian missile shield. That they haven't means.... I'm not sure. Maybe that they are fundamentally spent and can't do any more, but I'm very skeptical. Maybe that they're not eager to cozy up to a resurgent Russia? That they've been diddle one too many times on their nuclear reactor programs to believe Putin one last time? That the US in haste cut a deal under the table?

That I'm fundamentally off base in my read of the situation?

Unclear.

At any rate, I will be very interested to see the final details. In particular, I'm interested in what is allowed, and what is required. There is a huge difference between being allowed to keep "tens of thousands" of troops in Iraq and being required to do so. I'll be interested in the renegotiation clauses, as well, and in the basing locations and equipment and numbers.

What I suspect/hope for is that the withdrawl will happen between now and 2011, and that somewhere along the lines of 30,000 to 60,000 will remain indefinitely, depending on the circumstances, and I would hope that at least until 2011, some substantial number of troops there is required. I am a strong believer in the South Korea model for Iraq, with troops there in a non-combat but ultimately strengthening and stabilizing role. The prospects of another Iran-Iraq War seem distant, unless it's a proxy war (which I believe no one actually wants.) The dynamic of US troops in force, semi-permanently but not bogged down in combat roles, might alter the rest of the area, too-- some clever State Department guy can figure out how to use this to keep chipping Syria out of Iran's orbit, perhaps.

And certainly there are better things we can be doing with the other roughly 100,000 men and women deployed there. Like, park them in Poland to defend our shiny new to-be-built missile shield installation.

And finally, in my mind, this can be a plus for both candidates. If the deal looks like it's run on the South Korea model, McCain obviously gets to do some crowing about it, since he's pitched that model publicly. On the other hand, Obama can also breathe a sigh of relief in that a legal agreement between the two powers would effectively take the decision out of his hands, once again presenting him with a fait accompli that he really can't do anything about. I'd be much more likely to vote for him, if I knew he had a treaty-level commitment not to do what he's been promising to do for the last two or three years.