Oh, I forgot one key quote from *the* source on what constitutes an argument:

"M: Argument is an intellectual process. Contradiction is just the automatic gainsaying of any statement the other person makes."

klaatu wrote:

"No agenda here."

In your comment post, you mean? I don't know - but certainly no argument there. It's just an example of the innuendo and smear as a substitute for reasoned argumentation that I was just talking about. Why not make a case on the merits instead of just playing the "Vulgar Marxism boargame"?

As I alluded to, P, it's hard to specifically refute an argument which has no specifics itself. To take what Isby wrote about as an example, much of what he said is a collection of indisputable bromides.

What Trent pulled out as the money quote was:

"Some of the forces we will need to achieve victory may not be military at all; others may be allied or indigenous forces rather than U.S. forces."

And what I said was: What the hell does that mean?

Now that I read the Isby article again, knowing that Mr. Isby is with "Sparta, Inc.," merchant of high-tech death, I realize that it is, as Trent says, just a "meme," a [vague] idea or style to spread within the Beltway, to create a more favorable atmosphere for the products of Sparta, Inc.

The submeme: "transformation" of the Army: less troopies, more "tooth-to-tail," etc., blah blah.

The supermeme: More $$ for hardware and software, less to pay people.

Well, P, where I come from, like Mr. Isby from Lawyerland, it's perfectly acceptable to question the bias of the witness. I'm sure he'll understand.

And once again, what do you think?

I think the Army is great and is doing a pretty good job while stretched. The leadership and personnel are very impressive, particularly compared to when I started in the 1970s.

Mostly, I think the Army just needs to be bigger to cope with its current missions. A little tweaking here and there, let's try out the Stryker, more Special Forces and Rangers, hell, yeah if you can find 'em without lowering standards, maybe some staff jobs in CONUS can be done be civilians, sure.

Indeed, klaatu, and where lawyers have no substantive rebuttals, trying to pump hot air into purported "bias" is a favored technique.

there of course IS more to war than fighting, as we are seeing now in Iraq. There is defending and rebuilding infrastructure. There is recruiting and training local police forces - which doesnt just involve knowing how to do police work, but knowing how to tell the good locals from the baddies who want to infiltrate your police force, and from the corrupt ones. It means setting up local councils, and knowing how to deal with would be local pols, and knowing how to tell genuine ones from flunkies for the old regime. It means searching for baddies and their weapons, and doing so in ways that RESPECT the locals and their culture. Etc, Etc.

Who's the best to do this? Another conventional army division? More MP's and Special Forces? More allies? Hired contractors? A dedicated peacekeeping corps, as advocated on Oxblog? I dont know, but its a debate we need to have. Do I think we take the word of contractors or think tanks? No. Should we take the word of Army generals(who i wont call "brass hats") Also no. They are not unbiased either, and its perfectly reasonable to state that.

Klaatu wrote:

"As I alluded to, P, it's hard to specifically refute an argument which has no specifics itself."

Which might be why it's hard to respond to any comment you make - not just in this case, but in every case, because you never offer anything like that.

You could construct an argument here even where you think the article lacks specifics - you're very good in your latest comment in reading things into it.

"Mostly, I think the Army just needs to be bigger to cope with its current missions."

Now you're talking (a bit), but note that you're not really disagreeing with Trent - while you knock his posts you should remember that a blog isn't quite a book, that Trent in particular has made arguments about the size of the military before, and rather than just knock what he writes in a specific post it would, IMO, behove you to remember that he has expressed himself on such matters before.

"And once again, what do you think?"

I responded to that insinuation in the previous thread; I can see that you did not bother yourself with going to read what I have written on the subject, as I suggested you do before you make incorrect assumptions and insinuations about where I stand. As I said in that thread, I'm not in the mood to do you any favors: I don't owe you an answer, especially since you won't give anyone else a straight answer on anything (I'm a firm believer in reciprocity; I'd gladly give you specific links to posts I've made on the subject if you weren't - well, what you are).

"it's perfectly acceptable to question the bias of the witness."

And I reiterate: it might be nice if you had something more to offer than just making insinuations about the motives of others and assaulting their characters, referring to them as "merchants of death" (yah know, more and more I'm questioning whether you've ever even been on a military base. Given how many ex-military work for these companies - and my Uncle, after he retired from the military, was one - he worked for two years on contract in the UAE, not that he liked being there but it helped secure his family's financial future - refering to them in that way while on the other hand claiming to only have the best interests of military people in mind seems dubious; that uncle of mine graduated from West Point in '72 and took part in the rebuilding of the military you're alluding to).

"And what I said was: What the hell does that mean?"

I re-checked your previous comments in this thread and: no, you didn't say that.

In any event: Trent's written several posts, lengthy ones - much better on specifics than what you've written here (though alluding briefly to some of the same things) on the need to expand the military, and I have written a number of posts commenting on those, expanding on them - in some cases critically with a different opinion. These have been substantive exchanges, making an argument and yes - holding the position that we can lose (for all that you implied that those who don't share your bile simply aren't smart like Tom Friedman in understanding what the stakes are and that we can lose). I recommend you go look through the archives, both here and on my blog, and take a look - and also see how a substantive argument dealing with the issues rather than slighting people personally looks like.

Anyhow, it seems from the looks of it, and from all the efforts I've made in a variety of ways to encourage you to take a more positive tack to posting, that I'm just beating my head up against a brick wall. So I'll give it up as a lost cause and move on.

Ok, let me try one thing and see if we can get a substantive discussion on one thing. Since you think the above article lacks anything that you can comment on with anything more substantive than a derisive snear, lets talk Stryker.

You say that others want to spend more on equipment and thus less on troops - well, why is the Stryker to be prefered over the M113, which is off-the-shelf, less expensive (given we have a stock of them), C-130 rated, and will be better off-road in rough terrain?

P, This is the sort of thing that I hesitate to render an opinion about, because I don't have an armor or mech. inf. background.

I did see the Stryker on Army News This Week (check your local cable listings). It looked like a Soviet BTR. The voice over commentary said it could do 60 mph, and that it was definately coming to the Army.

That said, I would give the Stryker a try;

(1) It's faster;

(2) Tracks are labor intensive, wheels are easy to change;

(3) M113 armor has not done well in Iraq against IEDs and RPGs.

Also, after I did check your page, I find out you are pissed off at Rumsfeld too:

"On the 'More Soldiers' issue, Trent Telenko has another post worth reading on the subject. The fact is, it's potentially disastrous that we're not working to rectify this right now. Actually, it's probably beyond that point; we should have started expanding the Army's force structure two years ago so it would be at the level we need it to be now.

The really highly annoying thing is I'm tempted to think people didn't do it not because they didn't think this far ahead but because they would have suffered politically for acting on thinking that far ahead. But then that leads to the question of why they aren't pushing this issue through the budget process hard, now. Do they really think we're going to be able to make do, for an indefinite period of time, with the forces we have now?"

So tell me why that's not Rummy's fault.

klaatu wrote: "And once again, what do you think?"

I wonder why you're asking. Every time someone expresses an opinion you don't like, you just disparage them and their standing to have one compared to your supposedly greater knowledge and experience, which is more asserted than displayed.

I don't blame Porphy if he wonders if you're asking because you're sincerely curious or if you're looking for more fodder to direct your snearing insults at.

"This is the sort of thing that I hesitate to render an opinion about"

That doesn't stop you from talking about other things. It didn't it stop you from saying we should try the Stryker in the first place.

Wheels are easier to change than tracks but have you ever tried to get a heavy vehicle out of the mud? Faster isn't faster if it's bogged down, is it? I mean, I don't know - I lack your military background. But from what I've read, wheeled vehicles are fast on roads or firm ground, but not so great elsewhere.

Wheels are also easier targets for RPGs, I would think - even "run flat" wheels, if they get shredded, are going to immobilize the vehicle, right?

Igor, I see you're another fan.

Well, yeah, I think we should try it, because Shinseki and some other guys who know a lot about this kind of thing thought it was a good idea.

There's a whole fleet of vehicles being envisioned, not just an APC.

I haven't driven the Stryker, nor the M113, so I can't compare them on the wheels vs. tracked issue.

But eight big soft wheels with variable inflation is not the same as four wheels.

An idea I've been mulling over for a while is the formation of a dedicated peacekeeping force composed of volunteers from within the existing services. This has a number of advantages over the current system where combat forces are used in policing roles:
1) Specialization means training can be dedicated to dealing with the kind of problems likely to be encountered - there will be fewer civilian casualties due to combat-appropriate responses to noncombat situations (which helps with PR, a critical element of peacekeeping), and there will be fewer US casualties since the peacekeepers will be better trained for the particulars of the peacekeeping role.
2) Combat forces are kept out of peacekeeping, which degrades combat effectiveness. In practice there may be times where combat troops serve in support of the peacekeepers, but the degradation of combat effectiveness due to long stints as peacekeepers can be avoided.
3) Bang for the buck will be better with dedicated peacekeepers - fewer troops needed.
4) A dedicated group of individuals wargaming (peacegaming?) scenarios involving deployment as peacekeepers will be able to do a better job of planning for peacekeeping missions (and designing the peacekeeping force) than individuals with a war-fighting mindset attempting the same task.

In order for a peacekeeping force be created the US would have to face up to the fact that peacekeeping is an inevitable part of US foreign policy in the coming decades, which will be a hard sell in certain quarters. Liberals are likely to go for it, though.

It seems to me that it's important that the force be composed of volunteers. People who join the military to defend against enemies should not be placed in the position of serving as police in situations with a tenuous relationship to the national interest, and it's inevitable that any peacekeeping force will find itself in such situations.

I wrote a comment up, but it disapeared into e-space for some reason. :(

I'll try and re-write what I said about this, at least. I'm gonna pass on the rest for now:

"So tell me why that's not Rummy's fault."

1) Right there that sums up in one sentance the difference between you and I, the difference I've been getting at: you seem to prefer to deal with personalities, I prefer to deal with issues.

2) Apportionment of blame goes beyond your favorite whipping boy; Rumsfeld isn't alone. Neither, though, is the Bush Administration.

3) But, ok, lets apportion blame for this - it goes all around.

a) The Administration - as a whole - failed to press for expanding the military. I can understand why they would have avoided it (if you really read my blog posts, the explaination is mentioned) while still lamenting it and thinking they should have done more.

b) Congress sets the budget.

c) We out here in the country set the agenda for what the government thinks is politically "doable".

Why is it that the budget debates over the last couple years have revolved more around how big the new prescription drug entitlement should be for old people than expanding the military to meet wartime needs? Blame here goes all around not only the administration, the government as a whole, and Congress - both sides of the aisle - but out here to the rest of us. Though bloggers of a certain sort (and comment-writters of a certain sort) press this as an issue, that's not the country as a whole.

I think that we have screwed up priorities, I don't mind saying it, but blame goes beyond one man or even a few men.

I mean, ok, lets look at the alternative - all those guys out there on the campaign trail saying that we don't have enough troops in Afghanistan or Iraq and want us to make a more significant commitment of troops in Liberia. Now look at what they say we're not spending enough money on: as one goes down the list, the military is the last they want to spend more on; they've got the cash spent on an even bigger prescription drug entitlement and other domestic "priorities".

The whole country, not just Rumsfeld, is in a pickle and gets the blame, IMO. I worry a lot about that and indeed I'm quite a pessimist.

Is Rumsfeld exempt? No.

Is Bush exempt? No.

Are Republicans in Congress exempt? No.

But neither are the alternatives exempt - not in the least. Or, to put it this way: funding a military sufficient to our needs may not be Bush's first priority, to my lamentation, but neither is it his last priority.

I think we need a force size equivalent to the '80s force, some 15+ division-equivalents (though not necessarily organized as devisions; more brigade-sized forces and fewer divisions), and likely a 15 CBG navy as well.

I don't curse Rumsfeld out for the fact that we're not doing what we need to to build up such a force - or, more accurately, didn't do what we needed to to start building it up soon after Sept. 11th (because it takes at least two years to form new units in this way, at least of the calibre we want, with the training we want our troops to have, rather than just throwing them in green).

But this was a lapse that goes beyond party and personality. It's a national lapse and a problem of misplaced priorities. In 2002, were the Democrats campaigning on how much more we should be spending on the military, or were they campaigning on how we're not doing enough for our seniors (the richest age group in the country)? On whether we were spending enough on the war, or whether we were spending enough on "priorities" that, while nice, may be luxuries in wartime?

Oh, and before anyone throws "Bush's tax cuts" at me - 1) I'm opposed to Hoovernomics, though the Democrats seem to have adopted it as recession policy but 2) as I also wrote on my blog, and in comments to at least one post over here, I would happily see the entire tax cut scrapped if the money - all of it - went to fund the military I think we need; not scrap the tax cut in the name of the war but then propose to spend it on "other priorities" as the Democratic bait-and-switch went, but really dedicate ourselves to doing what we need to fight and win.

And yah, I got and get very dispirited and depressed that we aren't. However, I recognize that it isn't just one man standing in the way - but even that it may just be that this one man, like the Army as a whole (doing, as you said, rather well considering the commitment strain they are under), doing what is possible given the political constraints that exist - at least perhaps, and unlike you I'm willing, when it comes to personalities, to cut people some slack and try to understand their situation - even when I disagree with certain things and wish they were being done differently.

I also understand that even - rather, especially - in war situations, people being human will make mistakes. I also for a variety of reasons look askance at making up our numbers with Roman-style Foederatii, be they French or German, hired on with slush payments to their governments. Sincere allies, like Britain, are one thing, but Foederatii whose interests diverge from ours - I'd rather we increase the size of our forces, even (or especially) though we're going to be doing the hard stuff (again with the Brits and Aussies, who are compatable not just for political reasons but proficiency reasons) regardless.

I've also written that I think that, given our population is larger now, I believe there is no real reason why we couldn't have an all vollenteer military that is roughly the same size as the all vollenteer military we had in the '80s - and yes, that would mean paying them and doing other things to make and keep military service attractive to the sort of people who are inclined to serve. IMO, the Army especially, under Shinseki but also prior to him and going deeper than any one man, made a number of changes meant to appeal to a wider audience that made service less attractive to the sort of people who are inclined to serve. I mean, the Black Beret issue may seem small, but it's symbolic of something larger: it meant something to earn that and giving it to everyone doesn't mean Monica is going to sign up just because she likes wearing black Berets. But that's a whole 'nother topic, and I can disagree with the policy without thinking that Shinseki was stupid or venal or had some insidious axe to grind or otherwise attack him personally for promoting some things that I think haven't worked out - SNAFU's happen and people can err for reasons having nothing to do with bad motivations and I don't have to think ill of him - or of Rumsfeld, or Bush - when I disagree with them. I can lament a policy or decision I disagree with and not drip with contempt for the people who made the decision.

But I certainly do think less of those who do.

I'm gonna go for one more point:

"Well, yeah, I think we should try it, because Shinseki and some other guys who know a lot about this kind of thing thought it was a good idea."

And the Air Force guys think we need lots and lots of F-22s, are less keen on ground support aircraft like the A-10, and believe that if we're going to buy anymore bombers they should be super-expensive Stealth type bombers or Spaceplanes rather than a cheaper workhorse similar to the B-52. Those with Fighter pilot backgrounds are also not too keen on the idea of pilotless aircraft

Does that mean the case is closed, that they're right on what we need and anyone with a different perspective automatically doesn't know what they're talking about, because the voice of greater experience has spoken?

I'm not so sure we can conclude that, and the Army isn't immune to the same kinds of things (the Service - Branch, really - that comes closest to the ideal of wanting what they need rather than saying they need what they want is the Marines. I say that as a guy from an Army family and I don't think any of my relatives were ever a Marine. The closest was an Uncle who served Sub duty in the Navy in the early '70s; hardly the same deal - same service, different branch. Totally different head. Totally).

Andrew: I agree that a dedicated peacekeeping force should be approached with caution.

First, the idea of a tougher peace corps is good, there will always be a need for relief work.

But, in an insecure environment, I wonder whether ANY group of young military-type personnel could do better than the ones we have now. Unless you're talking about a super highly trained bunch of cops/EMTs/psyops/intel/linguists.

Second, as you say, I don't really want to create a force in search of a permanent mission.

P: Yes, I do focus on personalities and actions. History is made by what people do and say.

I am very angry about what I think is the recklessness of this crew. They have put my son and thousands of others - Americans and Iraqis - at risk. There is no second chance to make a first impression. I would have gone in with much more, just for the overwhelming force and the force structure to provide relief. If some of the generals hadn't stood up, it'd be worse, they would have gone in with less.

And the process of increasing the military that you outlined begins with DoD proposing an increase in "personnel end-strength." It hasn't happened yet.

Also, I am an old NATO boy. I think what was said about "old Europe" was about as bad a diplomatic blunder as you can make. I was in Germany last month and saw a guy on a bicycle with a sign: "old European." He was in his 20s or 30s, so he wasn't commenting on his age.

On the Stryker, you're right about generals wanting things. But this has gone through so much testing and it seems there's a real niche for the Stryker, if for nothing else than urban combat and peacekeeping environments.

[ statement deleted, next steps pending an explanation ]

I'd like to know what was meant by paramilitaries--that just brings to mind militias and warlords from the Taliban to the IRA, to those dress wearing clowns in Liberia.

I'm not seeing a real case for replacement of full time paid soldiers.

And Old Europe can go soak. They can't project their power in any meaningful way, they're simply auxiliaries now.

And nobody knows how to fight "the next war".

I see nothing in the piece that's anywhere near new. It's all been said before, over and over and over ...

Right, Mr. Blair, except for what you say about "old Europe." We need their help.

I often wonder what George Orwell would say about this Iraq thing. I did meet probably the closest living thing to him, Chris Hitchens, not too long ago (May) at a reception, told him that I had been sending his columns to my son. He said that my son would be doing good work in Iraq. And I believe that he is.

The problem with all this talk about "paramilitaries," is that it really seems to be either a system of foreign janissaries or "privatization" of the military.

It ignores the human dimension, the honor, of military service. I smell corporatism in it.

My man William Pfaff of the IHT wrote something in March on the subject. I hate to cut & P but it's so good:

THE HONORABLE ABSURDITY OF THE SOLDIER'S ROLE

http://www.iht.com/articles/90840.html

"Combat or elite military training is a rite of passage, imposing an ordeal that allows those who endure it to believe they have proven their superiority to others. A primordial assertion of masculine identity is involved in this.
.
Therefore, the effort to turn an army into just another technical or civil service career path weakens it in its essential nature. This may seem a claim from another era, but I believe it is true.
.
Saying that, I should put my cards on the table. In a sense I grew up with the U.S. Army. I spent my adolescence during World War II in an army town, putting on my country's uniform at 14, in high school reserve officer training. I did not finally take it off until I was 30, resigning from the volunteer Army Reserve.
.
That long relationship left me bemused by the nature of the soldier's vocation, which ordinarily is to serve anonymously. The act of enlistment removes the choice of the cause for which the soldier is sent to fight. To die as a deliberately elected risk in the service of values consciously chosen is one thing. The soldier is trained to serve national objectives or policies that he may not understand or to which he may be hostile.
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The professional soldier finds honor in what may be called the absurdity of this situation. The 19th-century poet and professional soldier Alfred de Vigny wrote of the soldier as 'scapegoat' for a public 'to whom, and in whose stead, he is daily sacrificed.'
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A form of moral stoicism is thus required of soldiers, ordinarily evoked by refocusing loyalty upon the unit and on comrades. This is notable, for example, in the French Foreign Legion, whose soldiers are trained to give their loyalty not to France but to the legion.
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The state secures itself by means that are not always moral. Yet the security of the state is a moral objective, and indeed its primordial political obligation. The agents of the state, particularly its military services, are caught between.
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This is why Vigny also wrote that the soldier is both executioner and victim. The army is a machine to kill but 'is, too, a machine capable of suffering.' What it does in the service of the state is at potentially fatal cost to its members.
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Because it is a company of those prepared to die, it possesses the moral authority to set terms and a limit on the claims of the state. This, Vigny concludes, is the 'grandeur' of the soldier's 'servitude.' One is uncomfortable with a war instigated and directed by the military virgins who head the Bush administration - who would not understand any of this."

David Dukenport wrote:

"a new low in comments".

Just when I thought I'd seen the worst example of a comment. . .

Eric wrote:

"I'd like to know what was meant by paramilitaries--that just brings to mind militias and warlords from the Taliban to the IRA, to those dress wearing clowns in Liberia."

A fair question but an inaccurate conclusion; paramilitaries are actually fairly common and the U.S. is exceptional in not having many. The author, Isby, is talking about lightly-armed forces used for civil order - France, Germany, and Italy, among other nations, have generally had fairly large paramilitaries. By the way, they are not necessarily private (the paramilitaries of the aforementioned countries are all government forces; the French Foreign Legion is a different sort of animal, btw; not paramilitary, but mercenary military. Same with Gurkas in British and other service).

Paramilitaries often have as much "police" training as "military" training. Typically their heaviest vechicles are wheeled ATVs that look a lot like the Stryker).

I would modify Trent as follows: the future of the American Military isn't paramilitary (that statement seems too categorical to me), but a paramilitary aspect will be developed, combining attributes of this and peacekeeping functions.

klaatu wrote:

"I do focus on personalities and actions. History is made by what people do and say."

I happen to know something about history, too - it being one of my several majors and an area of personal interest. Modern historiography doesn't consist of snearing in contempt at anyone who you don't like (well, except in the case of Marxist and Deconstructionist historians).

"Also, I am an old NATO boy."

I think you may be remembering these NATO countries as they were, rather than as they are after a decade and more of extremely deep defense cuts causing the capabilities of their forces - not the personal bravery and commitment of the members of those forces, but definately the capability of those forces - to lag very far behind.

Though clearly your inclination is to lay the blame for everything at the feet of the U.S., this is a problem the European (Continental, mainly) members of NATO inflicted on themselves, in the face of bi-partisan U.S. encouragement that they do more to keep up, spend more to insure continued joint capabilities, and the like; Actually going back at least as far as Reagan, proceeding through Bush I and through the Clinton Administration, and up to and including G.W. Bush. Their militaries are still '70s era while ours is the first 21st century military. The reason for that is lack of commitment on their part - not lack of commitment of their soldiers, but political commitment to spend what is needed.

Though I lament our lack of sufficient spending, in one year after Sept. 11th we increased our defense spending by more than the entire German defense budget. IMO, that causes frisures in the alliance more than any remark from a government official.

I think what was said about "old Europe" was about as bad a diplomatic blunder as you can make.

If it wasn't an "old Europe" banner, the bike rider you saw would be wearing something else. The gap has existed for more than a few years and goes well into the '90s - as I have pointed out, into the era of a different American administration of a different political Party, one culturally more in tune with the "third way" Social Democrats in Europe.

However, that didn't really alter things; there hasn't actually been as much of a sea-change in relations as your remark implies. If you've been reading European media, you know this but for whatever reason chose to forget it, just as though you will (I assume) Never Forget Rumsfeld's remark - which is also harped on in much of Europe as a retroactive excuse - you're chosing to forget countless remarks from officials in those European countries who's feelings were hurt by the "Old Europe" quip; from calling American politicians NAZIs (the German political establishment got its undies in a bunch when the Italian PM compared a German EU Parliamentarian to Sgt. Shultz - they can dish it out, I guess, but can't take it), to quips throughout the '90s about American imperialism and "hyperpussiance" bullying them about (again, this rhetoric didn't start after Rumsefeld's remark, nor was it new when Bush took office) - where "bullying" them means not us stopping them from doing what they want - be it ratify but not implement Kyoto or cut their defense spending in the face of our worry about what effect it will have on the alliance, to letting them try it their way in former Yugoslavia first (the "hour of Europe" had come and they didn't need us "butting in" in Europe's back yard), through significant policy disagreements: it wasn't Bush who first failed to get French and Russian support in the UN for tough UN action after Saddam thwarted inspectors and broke the Gulf War cease-fire; that was in '98, under Clinton.

I don't blame Clinton for failed diplomacy, as some blame Bush though - I don't hold people to an impossible standard and one cannot convince those who have their own reasons and position on an issue that differs sharply enough with us that it's not a matter of glib persuasion or even backroom deals. The fact that our, and Britain's, reaction to Saddam's violations in '98 was that a stronger line was warranted and military action should be undertaken, while the reaction of the French and Russians was to propose that sanctions be eliminated and the inspection regime weakened, shows that positions differed too sharply to be papered over with fine-sounding, vague diplomatic language.

It was France among other EU countries (such as Belgium and then Germany) whose political class decided that they were in geostrategic competition, rather than cooperation, with the U.S. - and began shaping their policies (including attributes of EU integration) to that end. Their choice - again, they know better what is in their interests than I; though I think it's an unfortunate choice and probably even a mistake, it wasn't a choice we forced them into. Eliding this and laying the responsibility completely at our feet is BAD HISTORY, in all caps and highlighted.

European anti-Americanism, a subject for such noted intellectuals as Jean Francois Reval (a former '60s radical himself) did not spring fully-formed out of Zeus-Rumsfeld's head overnight. To pretend otherwise is to display a lack of awareness of developments, however regretable, in Europe. What makes Americans react as we have - and we are the ones who get accused of "bashing", is that we do not think we have done anything to warrant such behavior on Europe's part - I mean, other than watch their backs during the Cold War and help them out, if for our own reasons, during WW I and WW II when they got themselves into a bloody mess. One might have thought that they'd be a little less antagonized by our success than they apparently are - given what they've said and done not just for the last year but for the last decade or so.

Again, I've gone into this in IMO fair depth in a rather huge number of posts on my blog, analizing it from various angles. The NATO you remember simply no longer exists - and, if you're invoking history, you should not be surprised - alliances of that sort rarely outlast the conflict that drew them together in the first place. That it still exists in any form (and it does) is, historically, the amazing thing - there is still some cooperation and indeed new roles. However, again - it is simply not Rumsfeld or Bush's fault for the lack of continental European countries making commitment to keeping up. If you were in the military back then, you know that there was already a significant divergence of capabilities by the time of the Gulf War in '91 - and not just because we had more troops - we didn't really, IIRC, have a greater number of troops under arms than the European members of NATO - but their capabilities, from level of training to equipment. What we could do that they could not was a shock and surprise even then, and the gap has only grown; again, from their choices, not from ours, including the degree to which the continental European countries - led primarily by France - decide not to participate in joint R&D projects to the degree that the British do - because the continental powers see themselves in competition rather than in cooperation with us.

Rumsfeld with that quip is a handy scapegoat for revisionists who want to retroactively absolve others for what they said and did - but it's not accurate to blame him, or the U.S., for the gap that exists and the divergent - increasingly clashing - interests on both sides of the Atlantic. It simply isn't, for all that it's convenient for some to claim that anything pointing to what France or Europe has done to contribute to this consists of "France bashing" or "Europe bashing" to be dismissed out of hand while they point a finger in one direction only.

klaatu wrote:

"We need their help."

Now you're definately talking like them; from day one they have been saying we can't do this or that without their support - starting, I'll remind people, with Afghanistan - but then witholding it.

Passive-agression on their part which hardly deserves rewarding.

As for Corporatism properly understood, again - that is embodied more in the EU, the "third way", and the Euro-vision of the international community (including selective "civil society groups" participating, which is very Corporatist). I have posts regarding that on my blog (I have posts on a lot of topics there) - search under "corporatism" and they'll come up. But in any case, now I know you're channeling too much Dowd.

Also, re Janissaries: no, I didn't read anywhere in that article any mention of taking young Christian males away from their families at the age of ~7 and raising them as soldiers of Islam. Sorry. (Again, invoke history with some nod to accuracy, please).

I don't think we want a Carabineri or a Guardia Civil for the USA. Those paramilitaries also have a domestic role inconsistent with federalism and the temptation to use anything structured like them domestically would be overwhelming. Otherwise they'd just be sitting around in their barracks if there was no mission.

The post-WWII US Army Constabulary were soldiers, mostly from armor units, who were reflagged, refitted with snazzy uniforms and trained on occupation duties. Not much different from what's happening now, except for the uniforms.

I'm fully aware of European anti-Americanism, been the personal object of it on occasion, but why stoke it?

I'm also aware of the shortcomings of French and German policy, read some Revel and Raymond Aron, but I am American and really feel more responsible for the US side of things.

The French do see themselves in some sort of competition, maybe the Belgians are tagging along.

The Germans, no. Fischer has worked very hard to heal that rift, as have other Germans in public life.

[By the way, Daniel Libeskind just got the commission to design the renovation of the Militarhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr]
http://www.germany-info.org

And then there's the ever-faithful Italians, the Dutch, the Danes, the Spanish.

At the risk of being accused of taking "talking points" from others, I'll recommend William Pfaff's column's on the subject of US diplomatic blunders in Europe:

http://www.iht.com/cgi-bin/generic.cgi?template=articlesearch.tmpl&dt=articleAuthor&location=William Pfaff

No doubt that our technological capabilites far exceed that of the European powers, but what we're doing now is a lot of low tech stuff, police work in a very bad neighborhood, as I saw it described. Lots of guard duty.

After all, the even less technologically capable Polish, Ukrainian, etc armies are welcome.

And a prayer and a tribute for the Danish soldier who died in Basra: for a free and peaceful Iraq, not US hegemony or hyperpuissance.

P:
Hey, you said we were short of troops. So we do need help. Now, not after the budget process that you say should have started two years ago, and would take a year to fund and train more troops even if Rummy was asking for them, which he ain't. See my cross-post re Italians, Danes, Poles, Ukrainians, etc., above.

I used the word "corporatist" badly. Your useage and sense is closer to the correct meaning.

What I meant was: a possible sacrifice of the martial values and ethic that Pfaff writes about to "bottom-line" business values.

Re: janissaries. Just so you're clear, if I use the word "chauvinist," I don't necessarily mean a 19th century French nationalist. If I use the word "boycott," I don't necessarily mean a rent strike by Irish tenant farmers.

That's it, I'm signing off for today.

klaatu wrote:

"I don't think we want a Carabineri or a Guardia Civil for the USA. Those paramilitaries also have a domestic role inconsistent with federalism and the temptation to use anything structured like them domestically would be overwhelming. Otherwise they'd just be sitting around in their barracks if there was no mission."

As far as I am aware, no domestic role is being proposed; on that I would agree with you. Your last sentence in this paragraph is wrong, though - there is a mission, but it's overseas.

"Hey, you said we were short of troops. So we do need help."

So lets just get the Chinese to send some. They have lots of troops, right?

Oh, they aren't offering?

Dittoes with France et al.

Or, ok, let me put it another way that you might get the point on - we need more troops, so why not just hire every guy these private companies are willing to provide? They can pull guard duty, too, right? Or are there pitfalls to going down that road that you think we should avoid, even if there is a downside to not taking that path? I would argue the analogy applies with respect to some of these countries who oppose our policy in the region but whom you think we should introduce, no matter what concessions they demand in exchange for their "help" - expecially considering that, yes, Virginia, it will still be American soldiers doing the fighting, taking the hardest jobs (since we're better equipped for it), and dying - your assertions in the previous thread that we would somehow avoid this to the contrary, well, unproven for sure.

The Italians, Danes, Poles, Ukrainians, British, Australians, and Azeris are welcome because they want to be there and are working in cooperation with us rather than at cross purposes with us. Remember my point regarding the UN Resolution you said needed to be passed to give folks cover, and which was passed? But the French and Germans et al still aren't evidencing any enthusiasm for helping out?

The Turks are sort of changing their tune, but don't you wonder, even a little bit, if they might have an axe to grind in the region that might make their help more of a problem than a solution? (I don't conclude that yet, mind; it's too early to say and I don't have enough information. It depends on where they want to go and what they're hoping to do - help guard the pipeline &tc? Sure. Mess around with the Kurds? Not Cool). Given the policies of the French, among others, in the Middle East - including but not limited to Iraq - and how they very obviously clash with ours, might you entertain the notion that their help might cause more trouble than it solves, were they even be willing to give it?

We need more troops, but I, as a proud American, believe we're capable of handling our own problems. I thought that was part of our honor code, too.

"The Germans, no. Fischer has worked very hard to heal that rift, as have other Germans in public life."

The Germans are at best a mixed bag - as is Fischer himself, btw; he doesn't have exactly a sterling Americaphilic nature; it's just that compared to the cotere around Schroeder, the current head of the Green Party (Fischer) is relatively less antagonistic.

Perhaps Schroeder's government will fall at some point - but it won't be in the next couple of years and until then help and support from Germany isn't in the offing.

"Re: janissaries."

You used the word incorrectly; it's not an analogy for "mercenaries" (with which you seem to insist upon confusing "paramilitaries" as well). For that, a more appropriate example from the same region would be "Varangians" - different era and Empire, but they were mercenaries. Of course, the decidedly negative connotations don't exactly attach to the Varangian Guard, so I suppose it's less useful as a polemical tool.

Now, you were saying about history?

"I used the word "corporatist" badly. Your useage and sense is closer to the correct meaning."

Ok. Understood. That missusage is a pet peeve of mine so I pointed it out.

"but I am American and really feel more responsible for the US side of things."

The point is the origins of the problem isn't America or Americans; pointing fingers of accusation for the growing rift, which is representative of diverging views on what our interests and theirs are, and acting as if it's just a matter of schoolyard comments from Rumsfeld, misses the mark. At some point one has to see the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be, and recognize the limited degree to which 1) we are the cause here and 2) how much we can affect it. It's something they're going to have to sort out one way or another and if you say that snippy remarks don't help, as I pointed out in the other thread but you chose to mischaracterize simply as bashing, neither does letting people get away with the kind of stuff they've pulled with no cost to them - then there are only political rewards for such behavior and no disincentive to it. Sometimes it's actually best to let people know that, hey - their behavior is having a negative effect.

It helped spark more of a debate in Europe on something that was growing rather uncontrollably. We've worn a "Kick Me" sign for the French since de Gaulle, from a policy standpoint shrugging every time and saying "the French will be French" until it reached the point where other countries in Europe thought - hey, the French are having their cake (kicking uncle sucker) and eating it too (being treated like an ally), why not us? After all, there will always be Americans (like klaatu and his like-minded fellows) ready to let us off the hook and blame everything on themselves.

The EU is making a choice on paths to take; IMO, it's not unwise to point out that there is indeed a downside to following the siren-call of anti-Americanism. That we won't just grin stupidly and shrug if they decide to take the path that involves opposing and trying to constrain us in preference to cooperating with us. As far as an American feeling responsible for the U.S. side of things, I think it's important to recognize that our lapse in this regard is probably a more significant contributor to this than any snarky remark highlighting that there was a cost and it wasn't just being paid by America - that there was a downside as far as their relationship with us went, not just a free ride for them. Had we been more candid sooner then perhaps things wouldn't have gotten this far in the first place. But by seeming to be indifferent to whether they were openly supportive or passively-agressive antagonistic, willing to treat them more or less the same either way (as you apparently want our policy to be), well, it only encouraged bad behavior, in my opinion.

As for the human cost - well, there was a human cost to such. . .compromises. . .in the Balkans, too. Have we learned nothing from that? You're acting like recent history has shown that defering to the French among others saves lives, when it hasn't. At the risk of being accused of taking "talking points" from others, I think The New Republic was spot on in its editorial stance regarding the Balkans throughout the '90s, including the early part, and the degree to which working under the constraints our allies imposed (and Clinton defered to, as you think Bush should accomodate them similarly) caused "UN Safe Zones" to become Kill Zones for Serb forces. We see that in the Congo, too, where the appearance of doing something is trumping effectiveness, and Congolese are still dying (though less in camera range now).

Think that won't be a problem in Iraq? The issue isn't so much who gets the oil - that's, btw, a matter for Iraq's people, I would hope - but even to the degree that it is, it's only because of the larger thing at stake: who is in control over the process? Are we going to do it our way, with the support of allies - that is, a way that, IMO, has proven more effective when tried - or the way of the "international community", the side embodied by France, which in the end has historically meant less effectively and with more, not less, death and disorder, endemic crises rather than solutions to crises? That is clearly what is at issue, above and beyond oil contracts.

It's a question that is worthy of serious debate (and, again, I have blog entries on that, too - see my "America's 21st Century Foreign Policy" series). But I would wish that you, and other Americans critical of how the Bush Administration has handled things, would engage it more honestly.

After all, they did manage to get several UN Resolutions passed on our terms over the last year, a feat that ostensibly more subtle and amicable diplomacy didn't manage in the late '90s. I doubt more was really, seriously possible - the French, among others, were opposed to the final pre-war Resolution this spring and no one who criticizes the Bush policy has shown how they would have changed their mind (beyond absolute fantasy).

Klaatu, P... looks like a real debate to me, with Klaatu backing his stuff up with more in-depth viewpoints and explaining what he sees is missing.

Understand you're a bit peeved, P., but cut the guy a bit of slack (and Klaatu, the links in Winds of War today to Arabic translation materials was good... may add that to out "support the troops" stuff). Trent wasn't exactly specific in his post, and it IS legit to point out that lack of specificity without offering a solution. Of course, I'd also say it's fair in a blog to note a general trend without doing a lot of filling in the blanks (though if you do, it may not be wise to suggest that the Army brass be pushed aside absent specifics to justify that).

I'd say we can safely take a break from debating styles as a topic, leave questions of qualifications and "there you go again" viewpoint zingers aside, and stick with the issues here: Does the USA need more boots on the ground? If so, where should they get them? How would paramilitaries work with existing agencies, groups, etc. like the Peace Corps? What are the implications for the U.N. and its role? What paramilitary models do we NOT like, and why? Which ones make sense, and could they be handled in ways that get around Klaatu's very solid point about military service being a special type that mustn't be cheapened? Some of that debate is happening already, obviously, and it's a good thing.

Just getting the list of key questions straight advances the debate significantly, and it's obvious that a blog's comments section isn't going to solve or even outline all of the above. If we stick to the achievable and use URLs rather than long comments to make and back up key points, the discussion can be fruitful and engaging for all.

But we might have to wait for Trent (or P's) next post for that, because this comments section may already be well past the length where many will stop reading.

Gripping thread gentlemen. Yet, the analysis and prognostications belie the hideous fallacy of what is happening. This entire argument is based upon the differing tactics and strategies necessary to advance the colonization and religious reformation of the middle east with military force, and perpetual unending war. The threat levels, theaters, force presence and requirements, and objectives may differ, but this thread envisions solutions or resolutions exclusive to war, and presumes Americans can afford or would knowingly support such an epic undertaking.

When did hunting, capturing, or killing jihadist islamic mass murderers, and those that aid and abet them morph into colonizing and reforming the middle east?

Is this the agenda America supports?

I may be sentimental, and I laugh in anticipation of the slime I am about to recieve, but is not America the defender of freedom and justice for all?

When did America accept colonization and religious reformation as national policy?

Our enemies are, or were few. Defeating this enemy requires speedy redress in Mecca, Medina, and Riyadh, and the vigorous police and criminal manhunts America and the rest of the world are currently prosecuting. Cut off the fountains of funds flowing out of the house of Saud, and are enemies are protean sexually repressed religious fanatics throwing stones.

This is not to minimize the potential threats which are real are quite literally apocalyptic if funded adequately, - but our enemies are jihadist islamic mass murder gangs, not the entire middle east, and defeating them will require more than military force.

The technology meme is driving humanity in two exceedingly unhealthy potentially castostrophic and converging vectors. Weapons, - all kinds of horrific, gore producing, collateral damage causing weapons, - and particularly the unholy world altering WMD technologies are advancing radically and proliferating rapidly.

Secondly the human restraints and former moral, legal, and political constraints prohibiting the use of these devasting weapons are eroding, morphing, and reversing - and American under this fraudulent leadership is the prime abuser.

If we do not seek peace, war will surely destoy us all.

This is not America. This leadership is perpetuating a world seething with more enemies and fewer friends, a world of division, divisiveness, hate, and fear and our children will burden and hazard the terrible costs in money and blood of the ill, deceptive, and perfidious agenda the Bush fundamentalist republican oligarchy is ramming down our throats.

Our military is unchallengeable - allah be praised - but the Pax Americana war agenda is beyond our capabilites ecnomically and politically, contrary to the best interests of the people, and essentially un-American.

Actually, Tony, most people I talk to who speak of paramilitaries as key adjuncts are thinking more of places like Liberia and Congo than Iraq or Iran. Afghanistan would be more of a "bubble" case.

Step back for a second from the issues you have with Bush, and talk for a minute about how you'd deal with Kaplan's "New World Disorder" thesis as described in works like "The Coming Anarchy." The pattern of involved states like France & Cuba is very, very clear - and involves heavy use of mercenary military (Foreign Legion) or Paramilitaries integrated with a militarized version of the Peace Corps (Cuban approach, we covered that). The U.N. has also demonstrated clearly, in Rwanda, Afghanistan & Kosovo, that it is worse than useless - indeed more often it's an active facilitator of genocide. So what's the alternative?

Or is your approach to situations like Liberia, Rwanda, Congo et. al. to remain uninvolved? Defensible in Jeffersonian terms, but if so then yes, it does implicitly leave you on the outside of this debate looking in.

I have always been clear what I meant by "The future of the American military is PARAMILITARY."

Anyone claiming differently is a troll not worthy of a response on my part.

From two previous posts here on Winds:

U.S. Military -- Back to the Future!

http://windsofchange.net/archives/003631.html

T.R. Fehrenbach wrote the following in his Korean War classic "THIS KIND OF WAR":

"You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life, but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."
It is this enduring truth that is now being used by partisans of the US Army Brass and Democrats to beat up Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration in the aftermath of the recent Iraqi War.

The argument is that the Bush Administration ignored the well-informed Brass, particularly Army Chief of Staff Gen. Shinseki's advise, on the need for thousands more troops in Iraq - that the Army is "executing a 12 division strategy with a 10-division Army" - especially in light of Iran and Syria sending in foreign fighters to the Sunni areas of Iraq to support the Ba'athist remnants.

Conservatives like Stanley Kurtz have been harping on the shortage of American combat troops here and here long before this.

I disagree with this analysis....

In terms of war fighting strength to conquer Iraq, Rumsfeld was right and Shinseki was wrong.

We did not need 250,000 combat troops to conquer Iraq. We did it on the ground with a third that number. This is a very important point. In the narrow field of professional evaluation of relative ground combat power, where Shinseki should have beaten Rumsfeld all hollow, the civilian Defense Secretary called it right.

It is the number and type of troops needed in the aftermath of our victory where Rumsfeld and Shinseki are both wrong.

The issue of American combat power and military "transformation" are irrelevant to the needs of "nation building." An article critical of Rumsfeld accidentally captures the essence of the issue:

Young Men in the Mud "In many ways, the contrast between war fighting and nation-building resembles the difference between productivity in the manufacturing and service industries. Businessmen have long known that you can rather easily substitute capital and technology for labor in manufacturing. Until very recently, however, it's been far more difficult to do so for the service industries. A similar principle applies to military affairs. In war fighting, everything ultimately comes down to sending a projectile downrange. How you send the bullet (or bomb) makes a difference--you can use an infantryman with a rifle, or a B-52 launching a cruise missile. But the effect at the far end is the same--the delivery of kinetic or explosive energy. Over the last 50 years, American strategy has made increasing use of effective technology, substituting machines for men, both to reduce casualties and to outrange our enemies. But this trading of capital for increased efficiency breaks down in the intensely human missions of peace enforcement and nation-building. American wealth can underwrite certain aspects of those missions: schools, roads, water purification plants, electric power. But it can't substitute machines or money in the human dimension--the need to place American soldiers (or police officers) on patrol to make the peace a reality."

and

America is in the chaos elimination business because tyranny anywhere is a threat to Americans everywhere, even at home. That is the searing lesson of 9/11. There is no such thing as defense in this war - only the complete elimination of our enemies. This means killing terrorists and reforming at gun point the societies that breed them. This is why Democrats are dead and damned on issues of national security - the kind of naked military and cultural imperialism necessary to win is against the party's secular religious creed.

NGO's, on the other hand, are parasites. They thrive on the open wounds of chaos and disorder in the international system.

Rumsfeld is as blind here as the military's brass hats. He is far too concerned about transforming the fighting force and nowhere near enough concerned about anything else critical to national security. I am tempted here to say that war should no more be left up to a Secretary of Defense than to the Generals.

These are the truths we face.

1. We are burning out the National Guard and Army Reserve support troops from repeated deployments. Retention and recruiting for both are crashing.

2. Contracting out nation building to multinational NGO's or corporations like Brown & Root or Dynacorp won't work without a secure environment, something which only American troops can provide.

3. Military allies can't provide long-term security in occupied areas either because their interests and ours are too likely to diverge, though their forces can help immensely during and immediately after a given conquest.

4. If we must deploy large numbers of American occupation troops anyway, which can't be our existing, expensive and limited ground combat specialists who are needed for further operations, we must create a new force structure as cheaply as possible -- AKA draftees -- to provide the staying power we need for long-term nation building.

The American Ground Troop Shortage

http://windsofchange.net/archives/003719.html

The US Army don't need more combat "super troopers" in Iraq. It needs support force "garri-troopers," the sort the Army has done away with in the active force, moved to the reserves, abolished or contracted out. And the Army needs a lot of them. Borrowing again from a Washington Monthly article I have quoted before:

"Over the last 50 years, American strategy has made increasing use of effective technology, substituting machines for men, both to reduce casualties and to outrange our enemies. But this trading of capital for increased efficiency breaks down in the intensely human missions of peace enforcement and nation-building. American wealth can underwrite certain aspects of those missions: schools, roads, water purification plants, electric power. But it can't substitute machines or money in the human dimension--the need to place American soldiers (or police officers) on patrol to make the peace a reality."

To administer Iraq effectively, given the foreign fighters being fed in by Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, the USA needs a garrison of at least 250,000. It has ~160,000 in Iraq now (counting the British Army) with two divisions worth of various Europeans and other allies (including Mongolians!!! Mongolians in Baghdad?!? Talk about bad historical memories!) headed for Iraq right now.

So if the USA has a force of 250,000 in Iraq just for garrision. Just how large a force structure are you going to need for an on-going mission there? The ratio of two units preparing for or coming back from a peacekeeping assignment means an on-going commitment to Iraq will require 750,000 troops in the force structure and they are not combat troops. Add 750,000 to 480,000 and that gets an Army of 1,230,000.

Force structure wise, I was told by e-mail that we should be aiming for 2-3 COSCOMs (Corps Support Commands) and a TAACOM (Theater Army Area Command). A COSCOM is a roughly division sized force of support units and a TAACOM has several COSCOMs under it with additional support units of its own. This is the ending text of a series of e-mails:

"That's right. The mix of logistics, medical, administrative and MP units that would support combat-arms forces of corps size (or theater army level) could also serve, sans combatants, as a ready-made, tailorable relief force (with the field combat units still occupying able to more fully utilize their own COSCOMs and TAACOM without hardships to our own combat troops)."

To get that number of trained soldiers in 18 months to two years is going to take a draft. Whether the politicians or the public likes it or not, America is half way to a draft already with the US Army offering two year enlistments for new recruits. The refusal to admit this by the professional American military and the politicians is going to give us a burnt out "hollow military" ground force inside of two years, due to tubing re-enlistment rates by reserve troops and regular non-coms unless something drastic is done.

and

Too sum this post up, WE ARE AT WAR! In this war there is no substitute for American troops to fulfil the mission of killing terrorists and terrorist supporting states, rooting out weapon of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure and human capital, and reforming Arab culture at gun point. The only way we are going to get enough American support troops in Iraq fast enough is via a draft.

I agree with the tactical realities you advance Trent, but challenge the strategy....

[Robin is correct. Tony's challenge is noted but off topic, remainder of comment deleted under the Comments Policy's Relevance Rule - that isn't what Trent's post is about. A copy of what he wrote has been forwarded to Tony, so that he still has the text he spent time writing.]

Once again, Tony, your comment has nothing to do with the discussion.

Trent et al, let me suggest one distinction that may make the argument clearer; it is the difference between defeating an enemy army and conquering a foreign country.

We're damn good at one, and less good at the other. Rumsfeld was absolutely right about what it would take to defeat the Iraqui Army. But he wasn't about what it would take to conquer Iraq.

I'll suggest that the root of this is twofold; one is that our military is designed to defeat enemy forces, and that politically (and probably institutionally within the military) we're just not comfortable with the whole topic of 'conquest'.

We will need a variety of forces to get good at conquest, from the 'pointy end' folks we have now, to counter-guerilla irregular forces, to cadres of police, administrators, public works engineers, teachers, and others.

It'll be a combination of everything from SOG to the Peace Corps.

So if you were to broaden your definition of 'paramilitary', I'd agree with you.

A.L.

I was of the opinion that what Trent was refering to would look more like an amalgamation of light military police units and SeaBees.

Jeez, when Trent expands his comments, I agree with just about everything he says, but:

1. When Shinseki testified before Congress in February, he was asked how many troops would be needed. His answer: "several hundred thousand."

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-02-25-iraq-us_x.htm

The Army Secretary, Thomas White, agreed with Shinseki.

Wolfowitz disagreed, said that the number would be far fewer. I'll cite to the same Wash. Monthly article by Phil Carter that Trent does on that:

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0306.carter.html

I think Wolfie said that he couldn't imagine it taking more troops to occupy a country than to conquer it. Those "brass hats," whadda they know?

Shinseki and White lost the argument and were shown the door by Rummy. "Don't let it hit you on the way out!" was the jist of the farewell they were given.

Doesn't the occupation start the second after the conquest? Shouldn't the forces required for the occupation be front-loaded, to deal with the immediate aftermath of war, and then taper off as Iraqis take over?

Of course these are all what-might-have-beens, or could-shoulda-woulda. As I said, you never get a second chance to make a first impression.

If we had the Shinseki-style presence on, say, April 9, maybe we could have caught Saddam, maybe we could have stopped the looting sooner, maybe we could have got the power back on, etc. Maybe we shut down the bad guys real fast, help out the good guys right away, and persuade those on the fence to stay at home and live their lives.

The recklessness of the whole thing, though.

We can't even get TV right. I really thought we would have a massive psyops publishing and broadcasting apparatus ready to go when this started. Instead, the occupiers were effectively silent for weeks while Iranian TV and then al-Jazeera dominated. We still have only a half-assed effort on that.

2. Feeling as you do about the need for more troops; I don't know why you cite to a guy like David Isby. He appears to be a guy who, to quote Mr. Carter again, is of the same mind as "businessmen who have long known that you can rather easily substitute capital and technology for labor in manufacturing," and wants to apply those concepts to the military. And sell the capital and technology.

Really. Isby an employee of "Sparta, Inc," a high-tech defense contractor?

Listed on "Find a Republican Lawyer?"

It would be too ridiculous for parody if it weren't true. But so architypal of the rah-rah war party.

3. Your force structure is what should be there now. Yes, A TAACOM, two more COSCOMs, another division or two.

Ain't gonna be no draft, no way, no how. I'm not saying it might not be needed, but it's politically unfeasable. It would cut into Bush's suburban vote in swing states like Ohio, MN, PA, Fla.

So they will just muddle along, half-assed, while the kids like my son have to put themselves out as targets everyday, the Iraqis get more pissed at the lack of power or the latest accident involving hapless but innocent civilians being killed by nervous GIs.

And then what? What's going to happen when the Shiite party wins the election? Or will elections be "indefinately postponed?"

If Bush & crew won't do it right, then lets just get out, declare victory, keep a a couple of bases in the western desert of Iraq, and leave the rest of the country.

"1. We are burning out the National Guard and Army Reserve support troops from repeated deployments. Retention and recruiting for both are crashing. "

What are we supposed to do with reserve units? Leave them home while we draft civilians? That's nuts. It defeats the whole purpose of having reserve units.

Unless you really like the way it was in the Vietnam era, when getting into the reserves was a good way of avoiding combat.

"4. If we must deploy large numbers of American occupation troops anyway, which can't be our existing, expensive and limited ground combat specialists who are needed for further operations, we must create a new force structure as cheaply as possible -- AKA draftees -- to provide the staying power we need for long-term nation building."

Draftees aren't any cheaper than volunteer troops. It just looks that way because instead of raising the money to pay them enough to get them to volunteer and explicitly spending it, you instead force the draftees to work for less than they would be willing to work for uncoerced, which is an economic sacrifice just as surely as a tax is, except that it doesn't show up as a government expenditure of money. Thus it deceptively looks cheap, but is not in fact any cheaper. The other difference is that the sacrifice is borne not by the taxpayers in general, but only by the draftees.

Overall, I don't see any advantages to a draft, but I do see a lot of downsides.

"To get that number of trained soldiers in 18 months to two years is going to take a draft. Whether the politicians or the public likes it or not, America is half way to a draft already with the US Army offering two year enlistments for new recruits. The refusal to admit this by the professional American military and the politicians is going to give us a burnt out "hollow military" ground force inside of two years, due to tubing re-enlistment rates by reserve troops and regular non-coms unless something drastic is done."

First of all, how do you figure that draftees can be trained faster than volunteers? It doesn't make sense. Unless you're figuring that you can snap your fingers and get a herd of draftees ready for training... but it ain't going to happen. You could raise a herd of volunteers just as fast, and train them at least as fast. After all, we've already got plenty of recruiting stations, but we don't have any draft boards or other related infrastructure (and don't forget border guards at the Canadian border!)

And how is a 2 year enlistment "halfway to a draft"?

And "tubing re-enlistment rates" is not a sign that we need to force people in. It's a sign that we need to recruit more people to spread the load, sell the mission better, improve the mission, and/or improve the terms and conditions. Instituting a draft while everyone is stampeding for the exits is just asking for a replay of the Vietnam draft.

>Trent et al, let me suggest one distinction that
>may make the argument clearer; it is the
>difference between defeating an enemy army and
conquering a foreign country.
>
>We're damn good at one, and less good at the
>other.

The American South, Germany and Japan argue differently.

There is a time tested US Army doctrine for the long term administration of conquered territory.

It just isn't being followed by Rumsfeld and the rest of the Bush Administration for reasons related the politics of "I don't wanna" as well as to the on-going breakdown of American civil-military relations.

>And how is a 2 year enlistment "halfway to a draft"?

The answer to the next two questions makes it self-evident:

1) Exactly how much useful time is left in a volunteer soldier's term of enlistment after basic and advanced training?

2) How does that time compare to a three year draftee?

>What are we supposed to do with reserve units?
>Leave them home while we draft civilians? That's
>nuts. It defeats the whole purpose of having
>reserve units.

Reservists are meant to surge to complete a mission and then either return home or get augmented with draftees for a long term war.

The DoD has been calling up reservists in some high need support fields for 179 days. Returning them home for two weeks and then calling them up again for 179 days.

This is happening because Congress passed a law limiting reservists to a 180 day call ups without a Presidential declaration of emergency or Congressional approval.

Reserve retention rates are reflecting this basic injustice.

We are either at war for the long term and need draftees or we are not at war.

Choose.

C'mon Trent, are you going to argue that today's Army is the Army of 1945 (forget the Army of 1866)??

We've spent a bunch of blood, gold, and sweat becoming the best there is at destroying opposition forces.

As noted, we haven't spent much on becoming the best there is at picking up the pieces afterwards. There are logical reasons for this; there are also consequences.

I think we both agree that we need to become the best there is at picking up the pieces afterwards, and that it's going to a lot of boots on the ground - as well as sneakers, oxfords, high-heeled pumps, and sandals.

I'll also suggest that we are going to need some help, unless we want to become a military state (devote an even-more immense amount of our national effort to the military)...that's not help on any terms, as some folks from the UN have suggested, but help nontheless.

A.L.

Joe wrote:

"looks like a real debate to me, with Klaatu backing his stuff up with more in-depth viewpoints and explaining what he sees is missing."

And it didn't take *any* coaxing at all, did it? Nope - didn't take a dozen or so (probably two dozen) posts to try and get him to engage on an issue. Nope, not at all. Porphy was wrong - Klaatu was substantive the whole time.

Ok, fine.

"Understand you're a bit peeved, P., but cut the guy a bit of slack."

No problem - you say I'm wrong and that he's been substantive in all his comments since day one, then I haven't a leg to stand on; if for no other reason than it's your blog.

"Trent wasn't exactly specific in his post, and it IS legit to point out that lack of specificity without offering a solution."

If you say that's what Klaatu was doing, and only that, then again - who am I to disagree?

"Just getting the list of key questions straight advances the debate significantly, and it's obvious that a blog's comments section isn't going to solve or even outline all of the above."

I might ask if it is, just perhaps, equally a falacy to point to one blog post that someone - anyone, be it you, me, Armed Liberal, or Trent - and complain that it doesn't outline everything in great detail, ignoring whatever else the author of said post may have said on similar subjects. I guess I did, but I'm gaveled out of order.

"Just getting the list of key questions straight advances the debate significantly."

Weren't you able to ask the questions in a way that

1) was far less confrontational and dismissive than any of klaatu's posts prior to late yesterday afternoon?

2) and by doing so in a less confrontational way also managed to get more to the point of the matter, really advancing debate?

I can't say. I know what I think, but I'm willing to accept your judgement. With that, I'll accept the verdict that I am the one responsible for any "zingers and questions of qualifications" - noty anyone else who might have started off by questioning other people's military records - and I'll be gracious and bow out.~~~~~

A.L.

The Army of 2003 is if anything more capable in that regard than the Army's of 1866 and 1945.

I was sent the following in response to my "The American Ground Troop Shortage" post on one of the military affairs lists I am on:

"...It's the fact that the US Army has manuals and plans for occupation of a conquered nation - and Iraq meets the definition completely. Your 'shoganate' remark is a little heavy handed but broadly accurate in regard to the plan for Civil Management as coordinated by a Civil Affairs Brigade. I suspect the problem is that Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Cheney truly believe the US Military doesn't know its ass from a hole in the ground. That there may or may not be truth in that opinion is only partially relevant. The Clinton administration was dismissive of the military as a whole. The current administration appears to be dismissive of the military leadership."

My correspondent is right. There is a war brewing between the military brass and the civilians in the Bush Administration. It is interfering with the war on terrorism, but it is a boil on the American body politics that must be lanced.

Only after that show down is really dealt with will the military be reorganized to deal with its growing paramilitary mission.