Analyst firm Forecast International's "Europe Market Overview" offers a less-than-optimistic view of Europe's status as a defense market, and provide very relevant background to US Secretary of Defense Gates' Oct 25/07 speech and Winds' associated article "What's Europe Worth? NATO in Afghanistan." Forecast International:
"Currently only four dual EU-NATO members have military budgets that allocate the NATO minimum requisite of 2 percent of annual GDP for defense: France, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Romania.... Greece - typically one of the bigger defense spenders in Europe - is reining in its budget, bringing it down to 1 percent of GDP or less through 2015. Forecast International projects that, by 2011, total defense spending across the European continent will amount to just under $300 billion.
The EU, which has no formal army of its own, declared its first two "battlegroups" operational at the start of the new year. These 1,500-strong multinational rapid response groupings are largely envisioned to lead peacekeeping or humanitarian operations and are considered by some a first step toward the creation of a deployable 60,000-strong EU Corps under the Helsinki Headline Goals of 1999. But the NATO Alliance, too, has its own NATO Response Force (NRF) of 25,000 troops which was formed with the intent that it would be deployable within days to conduct a variety of operations in intemperate zones. However, NATO officials already have been forced to scale back their [40,000 troop] ambitions in the face of the hard realities presented by its members’ smaller armies and tighter budgets, and believe the same issues will ultimately plague the EU battlegroup effort.
As it now stands, the European dual EU-NATO members have a rough total of $234.34 billion allocated toward defense among them for 2007, with the combined spending of France and the U.K. representing almost 55 percent of that total. And this is only the financial aspect – the manpower and equipment facets of each nation’s armed forces are also severely strained.... defense spending across the entire European continent will reach only $266 billion in 2007, or about 58 percent of the U.S. baseline defense budget of $462 billion for the current fiscal year.... many of these nations' domestic defense industrial bases feel the crunch from lack of state orders needed to sustain themselves.
"What you have today is a Europe that seeks to project greater international involvement and security responsibility, whether through defensive measures in Afghanistan or humanitarian or peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, Kosovo and areas of Africa," [Forecast International analyst Dan Darling, who is not Winds' Dan Darling] continues. "Yet these governments are asking more from their downsized militaries while providing less by way of defense appropriations.... So long as Europe's public at large lacks the perception of a distinct security threat, raising defense spending will not be an immediate concern in European capitals, thus forcing governments to confront hard choices."..."








For decades, the US effectively subsidized NATO's security. We spent at least 25% of our annual defense budget to protect Europe. That meant the European countries didn't need to spend so much to protect themselves. They were like adult children living in their parents' basement and thinking they're all grown up because they pay $100 a month in rent.
The choice for Europe is simple. If they don't see a security threat, then they can continue not to pay much for their defense. If they do see a security threat, it is their responsibility to address it. Neither of those choices automatically obligates the US to continue spending tens of billions each year on their defense.
Time to grow up, kiddies. Mamma and Daddy America are tired of carrying your lazy asses.
Although I'm perfectly happy providing all the anti-piracy defense the oceans need.
Just making sure there's no reason for China to make a real navy, thanks.
So long as Europe's public at large lacks the perception of a distinct security threat, raising defense spending will not be an immediate concern in European capitals, thus forcing governments to confront hard choices.
ho ho ho ho Europe's public lacks perception of almost everything but their state subsidies, that is the problem: the defence budget competes against them.
Larr J(#1)
Neither of those choices automatically obligates the US to continue spending tens of billions each year on their defense.
It is not so easy. America is in fact defending Europe thru Iraq and Israel. The world is so interlinked right now with economic, political and security bounds that you cannot isolate a part of it.
Al(#2)
Although I'm perfectly happy providing all the anti-piracy defense the oceans need.
The allied navies inter operate rather well. The US Navy constitutes some kind of mother corporation and the rest of allies contribute in their local areas as subsidiaries. Check that Naval warfare has always been linked with commerce, and that in the present globalized world, we all would be affected, especially China, if something disturbs it.
"First, be armed."
The Prince, by Machiavelli
I don't know whether the lack of European military investment is an indicator of nihilism, a civilizational death wish, the societal rot from "la dolce vita", or some incredibly effective mind control ray developed in China, Russia, Iran, or Saudi Arabia.
In any case, almost all of the major trends in world development point toward increased competition between nations and civilizations in the 21st century. The Europeans appear to have forgotten that the ultimate form of competition is war.
All of the soft power in the world won't save a nation or a civilzation from an opponent with substantial hard power and the will to use it decisively.
Perhaps the Europeans believe that in the crunch they would rapidly re-build formidable military strength either individually or as a continent. They certainly have built very powerful military establishments in the past as individual nations. However, they appear to have forgotten (or are forgetting) how much time and money is required to build a strong defense industrial base and a strong defense training base. These capabilities take decades to fully develop, but they can be degraded or destroyed by neglect in a few years. As the Europeans appear to be doing.
Unfortunately, when a nation or civilization needs to react to a serious threat, it rarely has decades to re-build its military power.
Perhaps they believe, like Sir Galahad, that their strength will be as the strength of ten because their hearts are pure ...
There are no historical data points to support this theory, but it's a charming Arthurian legend. It will be interesting, in the Chinese sense of the word, to see how the European experiment in non-power politics plays out.
Unfortunately, when a nation or civilization needs to react to a serious threat, it rarely has decades to re-build its military power.
_Perhaps they believe, like Sir Galahad, that their strength will be as the strength of ten because their hearts are pure ... _
It worked for chad, facing invasion from libya. They improvised weapons platforms from open-bed trucks, "technicals", and beat off the invaders with mostly sheer courage.
Of course, there's the chance it wouldn't have worked against anybody but libya.
"First be armed" is excellent advice in general, but there are exceptions.
Mercenaries can constitute such an exception, as can international or national forces that may act independently of or even to the detriment of the people.
It was excellent for the Romans to be well armed when the Roman Army was essentially Roman manhood armored, armed and formed up for war. But the late Roman army was a curse that kept the people disarmed and was as likely to fight for barbarians as for Romans - or more likely, since the barbarians hung together through tribal loyalty while the Romans were hamstrung on that score by detribalization, a radical alteration of religion that removed the props of ancient solidarities, devastating demographic changes and antique quasi-multicultural notions. The Roman people, or what was left of them, would have been better off to build an army like the ancient one that was them and answered to them rather than to have already formed above them armed forces that were neither loyal nor removable.
I don't think substantial armed forces of the type that would be built if armed forces budgets simply went up would be useful to Europe today.
Old Europe in the early 21st century mostly means a decadent older generation that has betrayed its insufficiently numerous children in order to spend its wealth on itself, and two younger generations, one of sheep descended from the enervated native populations, one one of wolves, descended from Europe's ancient enemies and brought in by the aging old Europeans to make up the numbers in the flock - as though all warm bodies were functionally interchangeable - and to toil under heavy taxes in order to keep the elderly comfortable in early retirement - as though that was likely to happen.
This situation is much, much more dangerous to Europe than any external foe. China will not invade Europe, but Islam is already flooding the place with settlers and their descendants.
Armed forces committed to professionalism in a sense not dissimilar to careerism, to multi-culturalism, to internationalism and to appeasement of the wolves of Islam at the expense of ... well, the sheep ... are worse then useless in this situation.
So nobody has any adequate to build up such armed forces, neither the elderly who would rather spend every euro on their own dotage, nor the young sheep, who would have more to fear from enlarged non-loyal armed forces than to hope for from them, and who are already taxed enough to pay for the self-indulgence of their elders and the multiplication of their domestic enemies. The young "old Europeans" that are smart enough to realize that the prospects for any descendants they themselves might have are not good, and who care, and who are valuable enough to find homes in other countries such as Australia will secure their safety best by fleeing. (And we should accept them.)
OK, that's strictly the cartoon version, without nuance or regard for the different situations in different countries. But it's got a lot more reality to it than talking about the desirability of European arms while ignoring the key issues.
And the great Niccolo himself was inclined to point to the essential but "politically incorrect" features of a struggle rather than get hung up on every detail.
To talk about the need for more European arms now with no regard to the struggle quietly going on over who will own Europe is as unreal as it would have been to talk about how good it was to have strong arms north of the Mediterranean without regard whether these arms were Roman, barbarian or in Carthaginian Spain and forming up under Hannibal and ready to march East.
To put it another way: social programs are a better use of however many euros you may wish to allocate to securing peace and security than armed forces are, as long as the domestic danger is greater than the foreign danger, as long as the nature of the armed forces that would be built is such as to render them inefficient or worse against domestic enemies of the old European nations, and as long as any hope remains that social programs (in combination with changes in policy to suit Islam at the expense of people whose hostility is not to be feared) will reduce the immediate threat.
I'm a bit sympathetic to Europeans in this sense: the superpower nuclear arsenal made any military spending they had useless. Given that the superpowers had in Suez a veto on any European military action. And the nuclear ballistic missile seemed to cancel anything else.
Of course the Cold War is gone for some 15 years. So there's that.
Meanwhile many poor nations in North Africa would like stuff. Spain, France, Italy must make tempting targets, so too the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, and so on. Absent US defense Morocco for example could easily conquer Spain and Portugal. Land and Slaves and plunder.
That is not a happy outcome.
Jim Rockford #8:
"...Morocco for example could easily conquer Spain and Portugal."
Spain has an army being reorganized into two land commands including 3 mechanized brigades, 1 cavalry (i.e. light armour) brigade, 2 light infantry brigades, the Spanish Legion brigade, a parachute brigade, and a mountain warfare brigade.
Plus several garrison infantry brigades, support unit, etc.
Armour strength comes to around 750 tanks.
An air force including c.180 fighters including F/A-18's and Typhoons.
A navy including an aircraft carrier, 11 frigates, 4 submarines, 4 amphibious ops ships etc.
On paper Morocco, while completely outclassed in air and naval forces, has a roughly comparable army: including 3 mechanized brigades, one light security brigade, two paratroop brigades, 8 mechanized infantry regiments, plus 39 infantry battalions, etc.
In practice I would be willing to bet that the Spanish Army would be fully capable of chewing them up and spitting out the pips.
Though unlikely to get the chance; given the Spanish air/naval edge, any Moroccan invasion would in short order become a seabed navigational hazard.
As for the Portuguese, I haven't even bothered including them as the excitement would be all over before they could get there.
Two weeks ago, in the eviction and cleaning of a shanty town near Madrid full of Romanians and Moroccans, the last ones faced the riot police with Intifada tactics: women and children on the streets and men on the roof tops launching stones and bottles. When journalist appeared, women and children began rolling on the floor crying and yielling, others showed the riot ammunition the police had used against them.
Sixteen police officer were injured, one of them seriously, by a bottle impact that broke his jaw in three pieces.
Spain should have bought Merkavas instead of Leopards.
BTW there cannot be a war between Morocco and Spain because Morocco allegedly contributed to build an alibi on how the Socialists returned to the government.
_In practice I would be willing to bet that the Spanish Army would be fully capable of chewing them up and spitting out the pips.
Though unlikely to get the chance; given the Spanish air/naval edge, any Moroccan invasion would in short order become a seabed navigational hazard._
Here's what morocco could do. They should arrange a home game. Get the spanish army to invade morocco instead of the other way around. Then when it looks like their army is about to get decimated, the soldiers melt away among the civilians.
If they can sucker the spanish army into doing one of thse 10-year occupations, where the civilians keep attacking them and they kill civilians, by the time the spanish pull out in disarray morocco will be completely trashed, but the spanish army will be in sad shape too. Moroccans can rejoice that they won because the spanish are leaving.
Jim (#8). Morocco is not in the greatest shape militarily. Old air force, old equipment, not about to get hugely better. Gotta wonder what base of facts you use to make that inference, if any.
If you'd talked about a straight up match, on 3rd party territory, involving Algeria instead - now that would be an interesting fight.
Jane's International Defense Review, Nov 9/07:
Airlift will begin to get better with NATO's pool of 4 C-17s, and the introduction of the A400M around 2010-2011. NATO's AGS project, sort of like a 2nd generation E-8 JSTARS on an A321 airframe, will also help close a key capabilities gap.
Ultimately, however, the biggest weakness is at home, as we saw with the Dutch army in Afghanistan.