This is from a recent speech given by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the Conference of European Armies on Oct 25/2007:
"Said differently, our progress in Afghanistan is real but it is fragile. At this time, many allies are unwilling to share the risks, commit the resources, and follow through on collective commitments to this mission and to each other. As a result, we risk allowing what has been achieved in Afghanistan to slip away."...."While there will be nuances particular to each country’s rules of engagement, the "strings" attached to one nation’s forces [JK: several nations have these, including caveats that more or less forbid them to enter combat] unfairly burden others, and have done real harm in Afghanistan. As you know - better than most people - brothers in arms achieve victory only when all march in step toward the sound of the guns."....
..."For example, a widely recognized benchmark is for Allies to spend 2 percent or more of GDP on defense. Yet currently, only 6 out of 26 NATO members have met that goal." [JK: and some of those are the nation's smallest members]....
"As it stands today, non-U.S. NATO nations have more than 2 million men and women in uniform, yet we struggle to maintain 23,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan. This is partly a function of how NATO militaries are organized, and partly a matter of resources - but it is mostly a matter of will and commitment. The same is true for equipment and other resources. Consider that earlier this year the U.S. extended its Aviation Bridging Force in Afghanistan in Kandahar because the mightiest and wealthiest military alliance in the history of the world was unable to produce 16 helicopters needed by the ISAF commander. Sixteen.
Meeting commitments means assuming some level of risk and asserting the political will necessary to deploy armed forces beyond one’s borders - fully manned and equipped, and without restrictions that undermine the mission. In Afghanistan, a handful of allies are paying the price and bearing the burdens of allies to create the secure environment necessary for economic development, building civic institutions, and establishing the rule of law. The failure to meet commitments puts the Afghan mission - and with it, the credibility of NATO - at real risk. If an alliance of the world’s greatest democracies cannot summon the will to get the job done in a mission that we agree is morally just and vital to our security, then our citizens may begin to question both the worth of the mission and the utility of the 60-year-old transatlantic security project itself."
Which leads to the natural question: just what is NATO, or Europe, really worth these days?
The short answer: it's worth something, but not much. If this is the best level of help Europe can offer in a crystal-clear case like Afghanistan, then the truth is that they are not dependable, or even very useful, allies.
Which does not make them totally useless - but does need to inform our calculations.
NATO troops deployed in less volatile areas of Afghanistan (mostly in the north) relieve the USA of the need to deploy an equivalent number of troops to low-priority areas. That's something.
The NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), meanwhile, have provided a future model that moves us closer to a successful Cuban-style strategy that combines armed soldiers and international aid in a single, deployable package. That's worth something, and very necessary in a world where NGOs aren't willing to have a presence in the kinds of places they're most needed - and/or become the "Toyota Taliban" where they are present. NGOs do bring some value, and they should be used when possible, but a backup needs to be available as a 'Plan B' or even a 'Plan A' in some cases.
The PRT-type model then needs to be expanded in the US military, and also encouraged abroad by constantly and publicly grinding Europe's (fake) professed ideals against the need to do more along these lines. When they do pony up, the USA should praise them and then learn from them, as well as from American experiences.
NATO training forces can be useful, though in truth similar results can be had from paying firms like DynCorp and cultivating a set of arrangements with INTERPOL. Still, if some of this can be had by pressuring Europeans rather than spending tax dollars, great.
In southern Afghanistan, the British, Australians, Canadians, and Dutch have fought well, and that whole area has become a sort of "commando's olympics" for forces from across NATO and beyond. That combat has improved all of the armies taking part in terms of training and equipment, which is a plus, and highlighted the weakness of certain popular equipment types. The Special Forces in particular have an impact unrelated to their size, and need to be meshed in with PRTs at a doctrinal level in NATO.
On the geopolitical front, these countries' presence in Afghanistan also gives them a direct stake in Pakistan's ongoing descent into its status as Taliban Afghanistan II in its western regions, and eventual failed state status. Since people (and hence, the earnings they send back) are Pakistan's #1 economic export, a direct irritant in their relationship with other countries besides the USA has potential value because other complainers have a handy lever. Still, that value is only realized if it results in concrete pressure on Pakistan; until it pays off, it's just a type of bet.
On the minus side of the ledger, besides the low level of actual equipment, money, and troop commitments, we have the recent Dutch experience. Their forces fought well, and hammered the Taliban militarily over several hard-fought days. Only to see a weak ministry at home revert to 'Srebrenica mode' and instantly reverse every gain.
It's a familiar scenario, and the reasonable bet is to expect similar weakness from most NATO countries in similar situations. The suicide complex runs deep there, and civilizational confidence is vanishingly low. That's reality.
Given this ledger of plusses and minuses, the reasonable expectation for Europe & NATO is that they can be depended on only to send very limited numbers of peacekeeping forces in relatively quiet areas. Challenging them to do more, engaging their navies to participate in ocean policing and counter-piracy, and making US commitments dependent on their performance not their alliance, is worth some forbearance, and even some sacrifices. But only in proportion to the (fairly low) actual upside they represent.
Looking for other sources of help, on the other hand, is pretty obviously an imperative. While working to stiffen whatever spine NATO has left and make them as useful as possible for as long as possible, the limits must be acknowledged and real help sought. It's pretty clear that real force multipliers will be found beyond Europe - either via Asian and Middle Eastern partnerships based on hard-edged goals and driven by true realism (as opposed to the wishful pap currently peddled in its name), or via organized recruitment of auxiliary forces like a Foreign Legion who can assume many "European duties" more reliably, while broadening the local cultural and linguistic expertise available to commanders.