The latest NIE regarding Afghanistan is reportedly not good - to put things midly. As we've discussed here before, Al-Qaeda lost in Afghanistan but won in Pakistan, where the classic "friendly dictator" strategy and the "democracy will solve" approaches have both come a-cropper. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban control a large section of western Pakistan, complete with training camps that are larger and more extensive than Afghanistan pre-9/11. Pakistan itself is in the middle of an insurgency that's far more serious than Iraq's, and key elements of the state continue to work with Al-Qaeda and with that insurgency. Others are willing to be bought. The inherent coup possibilities should be obvious.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan remains a long way away from being a functioning country, as any sane person would expect. And NATO allies continue to come up short in men, equipment, and promised aid. There are some notable exceptions (Australians, British, Canadians, Dutch, French, and Polish) - some of whom (Canadians, Dutch) are getting extremely tired of shouldering the combat load while larger countries like Italy, Germany, Spain, et. al. do so little. To Pakistan's nukes and a resurgent al-Qaeda, add "the future of NATO" to the things at stake in Afghanistan-Pakistan.
Obama has said that Afghanistan and al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area would become a greater focus of his Presidency. Maybe that's just the standard lie told so often by people who do not wish to fight their co-belligerents anywhere, and always push "somewhere else" in order to conceal that fact ("jam tomorrow and jam yesterday, but never jam today"). Or, maybe he's serious.
If he is serious, he'll need a viable strategy.
I'm not sure there is one, absent progress in Pakistan - and I've yet to see a viable plan that would give us progress in Pakistan. There are just too many people in Talibanistan, Pakistan, whose birth rates and local environment will ensure a steady stream of brainwashed jihadis coming across a very permeable border in perpetuity. If you're a villager on the Afghan side, what are the odds that your village can hold out against that for the next 30 years? What are the odds that the foreign troops (even if they're in small enough numbers and behave well enough to be tolerated) will remain that long? And how militarized would Afghanistan have to be, in order to shut down that inflow and make the areas near the border anything but de facto al-Qaeda safe havens that expand outward?
If Pakistan's government had been able to control its side of the border, we'd be looking at a very different situation in Afghanistan. Right now, it isn't able to, and may not even want to.
This take explains my view that Afghanistan is a stupid place to do much of anything - except maintain low-key efforts that manage an unsolvable problem.
Regardless, a viable strategy is necessary. It's necessary if you're taking the "manage it" approach. It's necessary if Afghanistan becomes a significant hook for your efforts and prestige. And hey, maybe the pig will fly, and things will happen that improve the Pakistani side. Unlikely, I'll grant, but you need to do something on the Afghan side while playing for time and looking for resolution.
The British blog Defense of the Realm has a very interesting set of prescriptions on that note, in their 12-part series, "Winning the War."
Their analysis makes the point that Afghanistan cannot be solved by military means - then backs it up with an analysis of Afghanistan's situation, and the key fulcrums for allied efforts.
Now, Richard North isn't some idiotarian who believes that building schools without a strong military effort will do anything except give al-Qaeda demolition practice. But he does make a strong case that military objectives in Afghanistan need to be subordinate to some simple and easily understandable civilian goals that would serve as the central thrust of policy.
Contrast with what we have now: a semi-random aid hodgepodge that has operated as a "hearts and minds" adjunct to military operations.
That's not going to get it done.