The latest NIE regarding Afghanistan is reportedly not good - to put things midly. As we've discussed here before, Al-Qaeda lost in Afghanistan but won in Pakistan, where the classic "friendly dictator" strategy and the "democracy will solve" approaches have both come a-cropper. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban control a large section of western Pakistan, complete with training camps that are larger and more extensive than Afghanistan pre-9/11. Pakistan itself is in the middle of an insurgency that's far more serious than Iraq's, and key elements of the state continue to work with Al-Qaeda and with that insurgency. Others are willing to be bought. The inherent coup possibilities should be obvious.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan remains a long way away from being a functioning country, as any sane person would expect. And NATO allies continue to come up short in men, equipment, and promised aid. There are some notable exceptions (Australians, British, Canadians, Dutch, French, and Polish) - some of whom (Canadians, Dutch) are getting extremely tired of shouldering the combat load while larger countries like Italy, Germany, Spain, et. al. do so little. To Pakistan's nukes and a resurgent al-Qaeda, add "the future of NATO" to the things at stake in Afghanistan-Pakistan.
Obama has said that Afghanistan and al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area would become a greater focus of his Presidency. Maybe that's just the standard lie told so often by people who do not wish to fight their co-belligerents anywhere, and always push "somewhere else" in order to conceal that fact ("jam tomorrow and jam yesterday, but never jam today"). Or, maybe he's serious.
If he is serious, he'll need a viable strategy.
I'm not sure there is one, absent progress in Pakistan - and I've yet to see a viable plan that would give us progress in Pakistan. There are just too many people in Talibanistan, Pakistan, whose birth rates and local environment will ensure a steady stream of brainwashed jihadis coming across a very permeable border in perpetuity. If you're a villager on the Afghan side, what are the odds that your village can hold out against that for the next 30 years? What are the odds that the foreign troops (even if they're in small enough numbers and behave well enough to be tolerated) will remain that long? And how militarized would Afghanistan have to be, in order to shut down that inflow and make the areas near the border anything but de facto al-Qaeda safe havens that expand outward?
If Pakistan's government had been able to control its side of the border, we'd be looking at a very different situation in Afghanistan. Right now, it isn't able to, and may not even want to.
This take explains my view that Afghanistan is a stupid place to do much of anything - except maintain low-key efforts that manage an unsolvable problem.
Regardless, a viable strategy is necessary. It's necessary if you're taking the "manage it" approach. It's necessary if Afghanistan becomes a significant hook for your efforts and prestige. And hey, maybe the pig will fly, and things will happen that improve the Pakistani side. Unlikely, I'll grant, but you need to do something on the Afghan side while playing for time and looking for resolution.
The British blog Defense of the Realm has a very interesting set of prescriptions on that note, in their 12-part series, "Winning the War."
Their analysis makes the point that Afghanistan cannot be solved by military means - then backs it up with an analysis of Afghanistan's situation, and the key fulcrums for allied efforts.
Now, Richard North isn't some idiotarian who believes that building schools without a strong military effort will do anything except give al-Qaeda demolition practice. But he does make a strong case that military objectives in Afghanistan need to be subordinate to some simple and easily understandable civilian goals that would serve as the central thrust of policy.
Contrast with what we have now: a semi-random aid hodgepodge that has operated as a "hearts and minds" adjunct to military operations.
That's not going to get it done.
Good points all. COIN hasnt really changed, and the surge strategies really arent any different (although they must be adapted).
Here is what i think could buy Afghanistan some breathing room:
1.We need to embed troops into towns and villages in the countryside. You absolutley cannot establish a presence without, well, being present. Had the French paratroopers been living in the area they were ambushd, they woulnd't have walked into a disaster.
1b.This obviously necessitates placing troops in greater danger. This is also a requirement of COIN. Insurgents don't need to attack armored columns or military bases (thought they will on occasion). We want them to attack our troops, so that we can kill them. Anti-insurgency requires a certain amount of making yourself intentionally vulnerable in order to induce the enemy to come out and fight you.
2.We need to develop and provide services in the town and villages we are present in. This should be obvious, and ultimately this is the long term investment, the 'point' of the fighting.
3.We need to continue to form tribal alliances and nourish them. We need to raise local levies staffed with allied trainers and take them into the field. Otherwise we will never have the manpower to execute step 4.
4.We need to physically close the border with Pakistan. This is going to take A LOT of troops, A LOT of equipment, and (unfortunately) A LOT of landmines. This aspect will be wildly unpopular around the world, but it will save lives. Every terrorist deterred or killed trying to enter the country is potentially dozens if not hundreds of lives saved. Some innocents will be killed by our landmines. But less in the big picture. The landmines deactivate themselves after a set amount of time, so this is not an intergenerational nightmare like the Soviets version. Combined with barbed wire, bulldozers, and dynamite, this is how you close a border. Mind you this is a massive undertaking, on an engineering scale with anything in history. But if Alexander could build a peninsula to Tyre, and Harod could build Masada, and the Chinese the Great Wall all without concrete, we can do this. But it would be an incrediable undertaking, no doubt.
Mark, points re: COIN strategy are apropos, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams are a step toward that. Though the Talibanistan, Pakistan problem creates an "embedded for 30+ years" problem.
It would certainly help short term, anyway.
In terms of combat engineering, the analogue you're looking for in modern times is Algeria, where the French did wall off the country. Problem is, that's very tough to do in mountainous terrain.
Can border patrol be done much more expensively by a combination of long-endurance UAVs and manned propeller planes, a la Project ODIN? Yes, not nearly as well.
Land mines might help. Would this administration rather lose than use them? Yup. would al-Qaeda line children up at gunpoint, and have them clear minefields by alking into them? Again, yes. Would the media swallow it hook, line, and sinker? Heck, they'd make it all up based on unverified rumor.
Like I said, solutions seem thin. But a greater focus on agriculture and exportability as the fulcrum, coupled with local embedding, would certainly help.
Joe and Mark B.,
Have you read Vanni Cappelli's article "The Alienated Frontier" from the Fall 2005 Orbis? I think this provides useful background.
Before considering tactical options, we need to ask what it is that America needs to accomplish in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Al-Qaida could return to Afghanistan if the Taliban return to power there. But al-Qaida can already plan and carry out worldwide terrorist operations from Pakistan, so preventing access to Afghanistan doesn't solve that problem. If Afghanistan improves and Pakistan deteriorates, the net effect would be worse. We need an approach that solves both problems. However, I would agree that any improvement in Afghanistan will make Pakistan an easier problem to deal with. There seem to me to be three possible strategies:
Indigenization
On the Afghan side of the border, current plans are to quadruple the Afghan army and police and hope that an Afghan central government can run the country in 4-8 years. On the Pakistani side, over the same interval, our plans are to help the central government restore effective jurisdiction over the areas bordering Afghanistan and evicting al-Qaida from its bases there.
Change Sides
If Pakistan is uncooperative and/or the Afghans can't take over, we could scale back our presence in Afghanistan dramatically and support insurgents who seek to reunite the Pashtun areas of Pakistan to the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. This strategy might bring the Taliban back to power, but they have alienated much of their former base and our support for Pashtun reunification could end the alienation from us that has motivated the tribes to harbor al-Qaida. The drawback of this strategy is that the Punjabi-run Pakistani state might then collapse, bringing extremists to power or into possession of Pakistan's nuclear warheads.
Deterrence
If the first strategy is ineffective and the second is deemed too risky or unlikely to work, the last option is to withdraw from Afghanistan on an accelerated basis regardless of the conditions we leave behind. We would need to make clear that any future terror attacks on the West by groups based in Afghanistan or Pakistan would bring retaliation to a degree that would motivate the government of each country to deny sanctuary to al-Qaida. The question is whether such retaliation would be possible or credible.
It shouldn't be necessary to fortify the border if there are sufficient Afghan troops near endangered villages to repel large-scale assaults by jihadis from over the border. The danger of an endless flow of jihadis from Pakistan really depends on the ratios of forces on each side of the border.
Economic development is critical once security has been restored to violent areas. But political change and security have to come first, and the problems associated with partition will probably remain.
But before worrying about economics or security, we need to answer the question of what our overall goals should be and what level of commitment and time we are willing to make on behalf of them.
Have to agree with everything you said Joe. Landmines are a politically incorrect way to die, and unfortunately having acid poured over your face by the Taliban isnt.
That being said, i gotta think if high explosives can cut a pass through a mountain, it can bring a mountain down on top of a pass. Now i realize we are talking about a LOT of explosives here, but one could probably task a few sets of special forces units with engineers to do nothing but wander through goat trails and find good choke points to topple. Time consuming drudgery, no doubt, but every little bit helps.
My other 'reinventing the wheel' pet idea has always been DeKalb Illinois own barbed wire. If we turned on some of our industrial capacity to pump out as much wire as the combatants did in WW1, we could probably make a wall of it a mile deep all the way down the border.
Not a game changer, but just running enormous webs of concertina wire by the mile all over the place would be a major headache for infiltrators, and make UAVs jobs easier. It also creates a nice footprint indicating where people are cutting through the wire. I wonder if you could string it by helicopter? Well regardless, the mindset should be do anything we can to make crossing that border a nightmare. Bonus points for anything that plays to American strength, like the ability to turn out barbed wire by the acre without breaking a sweat.
I like aspects of the Change Sides option David. Specifically we would be well served to redouble and triple our efforts to find allies on either side of the border willing to take up the fight in Pakistan against unfriendly tribes. Yes, i realize that is part of the reason we got into this whole mess. But juicing up your preferred warlord and setting him loose on your enemy warlord is a time honored tradition. Is there a Massoud out there, waiting for a partner that can supply MREs, explosives, and possibly the odd airstrike? If we had a functional intelligence agency, maybe we would know that.
I like aspects of the Change Sides option David. Specifically we would be well served to redouble and triple our efforts to find allies on either side of the border willing to take up the fight in Pakistan against unfriendly tribes. Yes, i realize that is part of the reason we got into this whole mess. But juicing up your preferred warlord and setting him loose on your enemy warlord is a time honored tradition. Is there a Massoud out there, waiting for a partner that can supply MREs, explosives, and possibly the odd airstrike? If we had a functional intelligence agency, maybe we would know that.
I confess that I haven't read the entirety of the link, but it initially describes what I think is the first strategic problem: Afghanistan is not, and never has been, a centralized state. (The comparisons with Iraq are not apt because Iraq has functioned as a nation-state) Our focus on Kabul and Kharzai are probably wrong.
I'll read the rest of it later, but I think our strategic goals in Afghanistan are pretty minimal (probably closer to a "manage it" approach). Our strategic goals in Pakistan are more substantial and difficult. I don't know that Mark B's number 4 helps the situation in Pakistan, so I'm not sure it's worth it.
But before worrying about economics or security, we need to answer the question of what our overall goals should be and what level of commitment and time we are willing to make on behalf of them.
Yes. I personally think the question is properly framed as "What Do We Do About Pashtunistan?," but that's probably too provocative for some.
My sense is that there is not public support for nation-building in Afghanistan or decades-long embeds.
I just don't have any idea what to do. Afghanistan is probably a much tougher nut to crack than Iraq, and the problem with concentrating efforts on the former is that it plays into some sort of axis alliance between Iran, Russia, and China. I just am not clear how we could play these powers off against one another if we're fully invested in Afghanistan/Pakistan. I'd suggest we leverage gains made in Iraq, especially among the Quietists, to put pressure on Iran to conform... or undertake serious efforts to undermine the al Faqih in Iran (the ruling sect of Shi'ism). But there's a time limit and I just don't know what the actual circumstances are, or how far such a program may have already been implemented.
There is just no short term resolution for Afghanistan. It's not us. It's them. They simply don't have any traditions of self governance under the rule of law that would enable them to prevail against tribal interests. Very complex problem, and it needs a problematique that isn't based on garbage. I simply don't know enough to propose a strategy. My intuition tells me that we start with Iran using the Iraq regime as a lever. But I'm just sorta guessing.
The other uncertainty involves what the heck the Obama administration could do. They'll try to implement a "guns and butter" approach to policy, because they'll feel compelled to placate everyone and match their campaign rhetoric. But a simultaneous "guns and butter" approach to policy has, simply put, never worked. I think an Obama administration is poised to make a really tragic error... and there's not much anyone can do to stop it. We'd be better served focusing on a recovery from such a catastrophe rather than trying to avoid it at this point. Hate to be the pessimist.
I should also say that I don't think a pure "butter" strategy is any sort of realistic option. If Obama tries that we may be in for more than just a setback. That would be the opening the enemy is hoping and praying for.
Are you referring to the President Elect of America or the President of Pakistan with this statement:Maybe that's just the standard lie told so often by people who do not wish to fight their co-belligerents anywhere, and always push "somewhere else" in order to conceal that fact ("jam tomorrow and jam yesterday, but never jam today"). Or, maybe he's serious.
First, I think we have to ask who are the Afghans? I do not think it was ever a real country, but rather a real truce between warring tribes.
Who are the tribes or ethnic groups that we can use. The Pashtun don't seem to have much use for us. This whole idea of putting together a Humpty Dumpty that probably never was whole, 10,000 miles away at great cost, with the idea of putting together some westward loving democracy seems to me not to be the most efficient, effective or economic way to ensure our security.
Not only is the terrain a nightmare, the shifting political political sands are probably beyond our ability to ken. For example the man who signed the first death warrants issued by the Taliban was Mohammad Karzai. We also have an ongoing problem in that our land supply route goes though Pakistan. Not the ideal situation.
I think we should blatantly pit the different religious and ethnic groups against one another, backing those that support us with weapons and air support and letting those that harbour Al Queda and the Taliban fend for themselves.
Al Queda and the Taliban will be driven out when it is economically profitable for their enemies to make war on them. We should make that a reality as soon as possible.
This may sound cruel, but we should throw the country into Civil War for another 20 years, that should keep them occupied. Just make sure that no one gains the upper hand.
Robert M (#11): Both, in equal measure.
RE: warring tribes approach. That is the traditional response, and I've discussed the Pashtunistan option with people in the know - who raise many of the same issues raised in these comments (good job, all!).
What I'm hearing that the Kalifah/ Emir approach being pursued by al-Qaeda has worked very well in stamping out many of the opportunities for a Massoud approach, and would likely result in a unified and hostile Pashtunistan if we promoted separatism. That campaign has also more or less expunged the USA's human intelligence assets in theater - the the Iraqi tribal revolts among tribes who once worked with al-Qaeda means that Iraqis in al-Qaeda must ow be viewed with suspicion by Zawahiri et. al (and in some cases, that suspicion will be justified - Iraq has created a fantastic intelligence/ mole opening).
Al-Qaeda's combination of local jihadis (excellent local intelligence), foreign muscle (tip the balance of power, no compunctions at doing whatever), and absolute ruthlessness (leverage 1 & 2 fully), works. Especially because it's implemented within a framework that's similar to the Pahtuns' own rigid traditions, and can claim socio-religious kinship to them (reduced foreign antibody reaction).
There's a potential lesson here re: what sorts of doctrines and approaches do work in tribal areas. It isn't the only possible solution, but it's pretty clearly one of the viable solutions.
With all that said, Pashtun unity is not absolute, and waters calmed by the relocation of some foreign jihadi emirates in Talibanistan could become turbulent again. Even a hostile and independent Pashtunistan would be enormously clarifying - so long as it didn't bring the ISI/al-Qaeda to power in Pakistan via coup or quasi-coup.
TOC@12 outlines my own preferred "Perfidious Albion" approach of absolute cynicism. Unfortunately this nation is drenched in a Wilsonian Dudley Do-Right culture which sees the "spreading of democracy" as the main focus of our foreign policy rather than the furthering of America's interests. True enough, spreading "democracy" may well be a worthy long-term goal--but as has been famously said, in the long-term we are all off the planet. Unfortunately, in seeking to achieve this long-term Wilsonian nirvana successive American governments have ended up tilting at here-and-now wind-mills.
Any American President owes allegiance only to the American people--and while the betterment of the lives of all people world-wide may be said to ultimately redound positively to the American people en grosso mondo as it were--no American government should ever sacrifice the well-being of it's citizens for a hypothetical better world. And this hard-headed realism includes making decisions that make every single non-American on the planet worse off in their lives if such decisions better the lot of Americans--that's what a government (_any_ government) is elected to do.
The strategy that TOC outlines above would do just that (for a part of the world at least.) Unfortunately for both America and the rest of the world, Wilsonian America will not tolerate such a course of action--which means that basically we're screwed, sports-fans--another quagmire with no redeeming value. At least the one in Vietnam can be said to have staved off the osmosis-like Communist take-over of Thailand--this quagmire stave's off nothing that can possibly be seen to be worse than the quagmire itself. Obama should take to reading the likes of Lord Curzon and his biographers if he hopes to have even a scintilla of a feel for the "vibe" of the region, else much effort and blood will ultimately be seen to have been wasted.
PS: Remember, Wilson justified our presence in Mexico by saying: "We are going down in Mexico to teach the Mexicans how to elect good men!"
And we all know how well that all worked out!
#15 from virgil xenophon at 8:51 pm on Nov 29, 2008
PS: Remember, Wilson justified our presence in Mexico by saying: "We are going down in Mexico to teach the Mexicans how to elect good men!"
And we all know how well that all worked out!
the Wilsonian delusion was something I have mentioned when talking about the Neo-cons. The whole idea of using our military power as a moral force in the middle east and the related delusions of empire were idiotic on there face. How Bush fell for this and the America is going to bring democracy to the Middle east, not only showed incredible hubris but an even more monstrous ignorance.
Bush's Middle East Policy was, at times, explained as the same to the letter of Wilson's above quoted reasoning in involving us in Mexico.
Divide and conquer works just fine for me as it did for Perfieious Albion in its dealings with continental powers for centuries.
Goodbye Neo-Cons please don't let the door hit you in the ass on your way out.